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This thesis seeks to show the consistency and quality of Aristotle’s ontology in its 
treatment of worldly being(s) by examining how Aristotle treats a range of worldly 
phenomena.   
 
It does so by following Aristotle and considering (a) the structuring of worldly being in 
general by establishing that we exist as objects in a world of objects and that it is as 
determinate beings that we exhibit states and characteristics, (b) the structuring of our 
“physical” human engagement with the world through our exhibition of desire, choice, 
pleasure, and natural human biological development, (c) the structuring of our “mental” 
human engagement with the world through our human faculties for imagination, 
memory, and reason, (d) the structuring of organic being in accordance with the 
underlying concepts of limit (determinateness), priority (temporality), symmetry 
(duality), the “mean” (centredness), and proportion (dynamic wholeness), (e) the 
structuring of organic being as soul and matter, and (f) the meaning of “God” as the 
keystone of this system.   
 
It ultimately seeks to defend the value of Aristotle’s ontological or architectonic 
approach to the world and does so, implicitly and to some extent explicitly, vis-à-vis 
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The objective of this work is to present Aristotle’s philosophical worldview and 
show the reader that it is valid, valuable, and even indispensable for a full and true 
understanding of the world.  Despite the intuitive clarity of Aristotle’s “common sense” 
realism, however, we find that it is even difficult to get into a position in which we can 
properly engage with Aristotle since his pre-modern viewpoint is based upon the 
“metaphysics” and “ontology” which Leslie Jaye Kavanaugh explains as that: 
 
“Metaphysics… always implies an architectonic – an ontological structure that positions 
beings and Being within a complex composition1”  
 
and which Immanuel Kant explains as that: “By the term Architectonic I mean the art of 
‘constructing a system.  Without systematic unity, our knowledge cannot become 
science; it will be an aggregate, and not a system2”.  Moving back to Aristotle we find 
that he insists upon the need for a philosophical architectonic on the basis that:  
 
“There is a science which investigates being as being and the attributes which belong to 
this in virtue of its own nature (ἔστιν ἐπιστήμη τις ἣ θεωρεῖ τὸ ὂν ᾗ ὂν καὶ τὰ τούτῳ 
ὑπάρχοντα καθ᾽ αὑτό).  Now this is not the same as any of the other so-called special 
sciences; for none of these others treat universally of being as being.  They cut off a part 
of being and investigate the attribute of this part; this is what the mathematical sciences 
for instance do (Met. Γ 1003a21-26)”   
 
and that: “It is evident…that it belongs to one science [i.e. philosophy] to be able to 
give an account of these concepts [i.e. opposites, plurality, unity, negation, privation 
etc.] as well as of substance (οὐσία)…and that it is the function of the philosopher to be 
able to investigate all things (Met. Γ 1004a32-1004b1)”.  In short, then, we see that 
Aristotle insists that we need philosophy in order to represent the ontology of the world 
                                                 
1 Kavanaugh, Leslie Jaye The Architectonic of Philosophy: Plato, Aristotle, Leibniz 
(Amsterdam, 2007) p 2.   
 
2 Kant, Immanuel Critique of Pure Reason (London, [orig. 1781]1934) p 471 
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around us and this position assumes that the world is, indeed, a system which can be 
represented systematically3. 
 As regards why we have to defend and discuss such a basic precept of 
“traditional” philosophy as that the world can and should be understood philosophically 
– this being held by such various thinkers as Aristotle and Kant – I suggest that we need 
to do so because there are sceptical philosophers who do not (strangely enough) believe 
in philosophy and they are people who have a popularity which requires us to defend 
the very existence of philosophy from their prejudices if we wish to take (Aristotle’s) 
philosophy seriously.  As regards the basic principles of this “antiphilosophy” we find 
that David Hume asserts such things as that:  
 
“…upon the whole, there appears not, throughout all nature, any one instance of 
connexion which is conceivable by us.  All events seem entirely loose and separate.  
One event follows another; but we never can observe any tie between them.  They seem 
conjoined but never connected…the necessary conclusion seems to be that we have no 
idea of connexion or power at all, and that these words are absolutely without any 
meaning, when employed either in philosophical reasonings or common life4”  
 
and that: “Our idea…of necessity and causation arises entirely from the uniformity 
observable in the operations of nature, where similar objects are constantly conjoined 
together, and the mind is determined by custom to infer the one from the appearance of 
the other.  These two circumstances form the whole of that necessity, which we ascribe 
to matter.  Beyond the constant conjunction of similar objects, and the consequent 
inference from one to the other, we have no notion of any necessity or connexion5”.  I 
add that an updated version of Hume’s antiphilosophy is the antiphilosophy of Richard 
                                                 
3 I note that Leslie Jaye Kavanaugh observes regarding Kant’s architectonic that: “...the method 
of the architectonic of pure reason constitutes the construction of a schema wherein the parts are 
arranged as to first principles.  This schema, originating from an idea, is an architectonic unity 
rather than a technical unity (The Architectonic of Philosophy: Plato, Aristotle, Leibniz 
(Amsterdam, 2007) p 5)” and I suggest that the critical distinction between Kant and Aristotle 
here is that Kant’s philosophy centres upon our thought seeking to discern the supposed a priori 
and formal laws of nature whereas Aristotle’s philosophy is concerned with being (which 
encompasses our thought) and seeks to carve nature at its joints.  
 
4 Hume, David An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding (1757) §58  
 
5 Hume, David Ibid. §64 
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Rorty who argues regarding “…the idea that we have ontological intuitions which make 
the notion of “mind” more than just a blur6” that: 
 
“We no more know “the nature of mind” by introspecting mental events than we know 
“the nature of matter” by perceiving tables.  To know the nature of something is not a 
matter of having it before the mind, of intuiting it, but of being able to utter a large 
number of true propositions about it7” 
 
and that: “…we do not start with visual images.  We do not “start” with anything.  We 
are just trained to make reports – some perceptual, some introspective – as part of our 
general training in uttering true sentences, our learning of the language8” and with Rorty 
concluding that: “Functionalism comes down to saying that anything you want to say 
about persons will have an analogue in something you can say about computers, and 
that if you know as much about a person as a team consisting of the ideal design 
engineer and the ideal programmer know about a computer, then you know all there is 
to know about the person9”.   
 Now, I suggest that if the idea that we can possibly see “man” as a “bundle” of 
events or as a “computer” (or even as a “machine”) seems to be ludicrously bad then 
this is probably because it actually is ludicrously bad but I add that this also a highly 
respectable ludicrous badness which has proved itself to be highly convenient in the 
sense that it justifies technocracy by elevating “science”10 and by subjectivising and 
relativizing man and making him “plastic”11.  In other words, although I will show the 
                                                 
6 Rorty, Richard “Mind as Ineffable” in Richard Q. Elvee (ed.) Mind in Nature; Nobel 
Conference XVII (San Francisco, 1982) p 65-66 
 
7 Rorty, Richard Ibid. p 69 
  
8 Rorty, Richard Ibid. p 71 
 
9 Rorty, Richard Ibid. p 74 (cf. “What we’ve got is not a mind but a program, that is, a way of 
being wired up.  When one puts it in those terms, it comes to seem misleading to speak of the 
mind as a control organ which does what the too-complex hardware can’t do.  Because it is 
simply the complexity of the hardware.  This is my brief little defence of computers (Ibid. p 
114)”). 
 
10 Rorty argues that “…we can content ourselves with saying that the nature of a mental state is 
to be the sort of state of the human organism which psychologists study (Ibid. p 76)” 
 
11 Rorty’s “pragmatism” both subjectivises man, as follows: “The question “What is the place of 
man in nature?” is a good one if it is constructed to mean something like: “What self-image 
should we humans have of ourselves?”  For then it is shorthand for Kant’s classic questions 
“What do we know?  What should we do?  What may we hope?” (Ibid. p 62)” and relativises 
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ludicrousness of this antiphilosophy both by explicitly arguing against it and also by 
subjecting it to implicit comparison with Aristotle’s real philosophy, I add that we 
should also recognise that our situation is that our technocratic position is to some 
degree above criticism in the sense that it simply is the “solution” that “the system” (and 
its elites) clearly desire to have in place.  This is, then, our general situation but let us 
also consider another direction of antiphilosophy and briefly examine it.  I suggest that 
Alain Badiou explains well that Ludwig Wittgenstein’s antiphilosophy is an emotional 
stance rather than a philosophical position by explaining his assertion that:  
 
“Most of the propositions and questions to be found in philosophical works are not false 
but nonsensical (TLP 4.003)” 
 
as follows: “It is typical of antiphilosophy that its purpose is never to discuss any 
philosophical theses…since to do so it would have to share its norms (for instance, 
those of the true and false).  What the antiphilosopher wants to do is to situate the 
philosophical desire in its entirety in the register of the erroneous and the harmful.  The 
metaphor of sickness is never absent from this plan, and it certainly comes through 
when Wittgenstein speaks of the “nonsensical”12” which highlights the basic problem of 
engagement we have considered above, i.e. that it is difficult even to make (modern) 
antiphilosophy engage with our (Aristotelian) philosophy.    
I add that Wittgenstein seems to follow Hume in his assertion that: “There is no 
compulsion making one thing happen because another has happened (TLP 6.37)” and 
Rorty in his assertion of subjectivism that: “Outside logic everything is accidental (TLP 
6.3)” and that philosophy should be restricted to: “the clarification of propositions (TLP 
4.112)” and yet we also find that Wittgenstein’s objective is not “pragmatism” but 
“mysticism” and hence that he asserts that: “There are, indeed, things that cannot be put 
into words.  They make themselves manifest.  They are what is mystical (TLP 6.522)” 
and that: 
 
“The sense of the world must lie outside the world. 
                                                 
the world, as follows: “The nominalist…construes “finding the nature of X” as just finding the 
most useful way to talk about the things which have traditionally been called “X” – a way which 
need not employ any term coreferential with “X” (Ibid. p 79).” 
  
12 Badiou, Alain Wittgenstein’s Antiphilosophy (London, 2011) p 77 
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In the world everything is as it is, and everything happens as it does happen: in it no 
value exists – and if it did exist, it would have no value. 
If there is any value that does have value, it must lie outside the whole sphere of what 
happens and is the case.  For all that happens and is the case is accidental. 
What makes it non-accidental cannot lie within the world, since if it did it would itself 
be accidental. 
It must lie outside the world (TLP 6.41)” 
 
which does, I suggest, provide us with such insights into our modern “antiphilosophy” 
as (a) that we encounter an immense egotism in respect to all of these thinkers (b) that 
they all refuse to engage with philosophical tradition and with the world itself (c) that 
their conclusions may appear to be elegant or useful but that they are inevitably partial 
and shallow and (d) that the combination of ego with shallowness and lack of system 
inevitably leads to the intellectual confusion, deceit, and wishful thinking that we 
undoubtably encounter in a large part of modern philosophy13. 
As regards “real” philosophy and the peculiar quality of Aristotle’s philosophy 
within this tradition let us consider Georg W.F. Hegel’s wonderfully perceptive 
assessment of Aristotle’s system that: 
 
“He [i.e. Aristotle] gets the sensuous phenomenon before him in its entire completeness, 
and omits nothing, be it ever so common.  All sides of knowing enter his mind, all 
interest him; all are handled by him with depth and exhaustiveness…[and] 
Aristotle…abandons a determination only when he has traced it to another sphere 
wherein it retains no longer its former shape…[and] sometimes Aristotle does not aim 
                                                 
 
13 I suggest that shallow or ungrounded philosophy often leads to confusion and politicisation 
and that it is hence that we find that the (supposed) implications of such philosophies often run 
contrary to the philosopher’s apparent basic intention.  We see an example of the muddled 
opportunism of mainstream modern thinking, i.e. that its disconnection from reality allows it to 
be interpreted in many different ways, by observing that whereas Alain Badiou comments that: 
“…Anglo-American grammarian philosophy – that twentieth-century form of scholasticism…is 
contrary to everything that Wittgenstein the mystic, the aesthete, the Stalinist of spirituality, 
could have desired (Wittgenstein’s Antiphilosophy (London, 2011) p 70-1)” we find that Karl 
Popper contrarily argues that this very approach to philosophy: “…really all goes back to 
Wittgenstein, who said that the meaning of a sentence is the method of its verification, and who 
says in his Tractatus that science can say all that can be said, and that after that there can be no 
unanswerable questions left (“World 3 and Emergent Evolution” in Knowledge and the Body-
Mind Problem: In defence of interaction (London, [orig. 1969] 1994) p 76)” (and I suggest that 
we encounter a similar confusion regarding the philosophy and intent of René Descartes and the 
use made of his philosophy). 
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to reduce all to unity, or at least to a unity of antithetic elements; but, on the contrary, to 
hold fast each one in its determinateness, and thus to preserve it14” 
 
and also Martin Heidegger’s equally perceptive assessment of Aristotle’s philosophical 
intent, as follows:  
 
“…did we not assert, during the first enumeration of the four meanings of being in the 
Aristotelian sense, that the unity of these four meanings remains obscure in Aristotle?  
We did.  However, this does not rule out but, for a philosopher of Aristotle’s stature, 
precisely entails that this unity be troubling in view of its multiplicity.  We need only 
observe how Aristotle explains the πολλαχῶς [i.e. the manifold].  Thus he says on one 
occasion (Met. K 1060b32f): τὸ δ᾽ ὂν πολλαχῶς καὶ οὐ καθ᾽ ἕνα λέγεται τρόπον.  
“Beings are manifold and so not articulated according to one way.”  But he also sees 
immediately and clearly the result that this view, when taken out of context, could 
generate, namely the dispersion of ὂν into many τρόποι, a dissolution of the ἕν.  In 
contrast, Aristotle states: παντὸς τοῦ ὄντος πρὸς ἕν τι καὶ κοινὸν ἡ ἀναγωγὴ γίγνεται 
(1061a10f).  “For each being, for all beings in whatever sense, there is a leading up and 
back to a certain one and common”; and at 1060b35: κατά τι κοινόν: “to some sort of 
common.”  We are always encountering this cautious and (as to what the encompassing 
one may be) open-ended τι (of some sort).  Aristotle speaks of the final and highest 
unity of being in this fashion; see 1003a27 in Met. Γ 1003a27 (and many other 
passages): τὸ ὂν ᾖ ὂν, τὸ εἴναι as φύσις τις – a sort of governing from out of and in 
itself15”  
 
and as regards how Aristotle stands within the tradition (according to these thinkers) we 
see (A) that Hegel concludes (a) that the great benefit of Aristotle’s approach is that his 
“…Final Cause is true and concrete, as opposed to the abstract Platonic Idea16” and (b) 
that its great deficit is that although: “Aristotle always moves in the speculative…he 
seems always to be philosophising only on the individual, the special, and not to arrive 
at what is absolute, universal or God…the one Absolute, the Idea of God, appears in 
                                                 
14 Hegel, G.W.F. “The Philosophy of Aristotle” The Journal of Speculative Philosophy ([orig. 
1825-6] 1871) p 73-75 
 
15 Heidegger, Martin  Aristotle’s Metaphysics Θ 1-3: On the Essence and Actuality of Force 
(Indiana, [orig. 1931] 1995) p 23 
 
16 Hegel, G.W.F. “The Philosophy of Aristotle” The Journal of Speculative Philosophy ([orig. 
1825-6] 1871) p 76 
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Aristotle’s Philosophy, but as a particular somewhat, side by side with the others17” and 
(B) that Heidegger concludes that: “…in spite of his tendency to radicality he did not 
press on into the ultimate originality of the Being of the world18.”   
Now, I suggest that we should question whether we need Hegel’s Idea or 
Heidegger’s Dasein to complete Aristotle’s system or if Aristotle’s system simply 
stands up on its own on the basis of the revealed principle that:  
 
“…nature is only one particular genus of being (ἓν γάρ τι γένος τοῦ ὄντος ἡ φύσις) 
(Met. Γ 1005a34)” 
 
i.e. on the basis that we simply find that the world is both sensible and super-sensible 
and that we can to some degree “see” the super-sensible through the sensible19.  We see, 
however, that this philosophical tradition is a real conversation with other people and is 
a mature engagement with other thinkers and with the world itself whereas the 
alternative is, I suggest, pseudo-philosophy and antiphilosophy which is ultimately 
founded upon solipsism and narcissism.  This is the distinction I find between our 
philosophy (or at least a large part of it) and Aristotle’s and I suggest that the reader 
should at least be willing to test the prejudices and conceits of modern thinking by 










                                                 
17 Hegel, G.W.F. Ibid. p 77-8 
 
18 Heidegger, Martin Plato’s Sophist (Indiana, [orig. 1924-5] 1992) p 59 
 
19 For an interesting article on the necessary interdependency of ontological commitment, 
method, and metaphysical construction see Suman Gupta’s “Ontological Commitment, Methods 
and Philosophical Positions” in Indian Philosophical Quarterly (1975).  On the sensible and 
supersensible see also Giovanni Reale’s The Concept of First Philosophy and the Unity of the 




1 Aristotle on Objective Reality 
 
I will break down and show in this work the thoroughness, consistency, and 
correctness of Aristotle’s architectonic of being and of human being and, to this end, let 
us begin immediately below by revealing the basic philosophical framework and 
approach of Aristotle’s picturing of the world.  The basic components of Aristotle’s 
“architectonic” of the world are as follows (1) the “categories” of being and of being-in-
the world:  “substance”, “quantity”, “quality”, “relation”, “place”, “time”, “being-in-a-
position”, “having”, “doing”, “being affected”  (2) the “elements” of earth, water, air, 
and fire which can (and should) be recast as solid, liquid, gas, and plasma (or, 
alternatively, energy) and (3) the “first principles” or “originative sources” described as 
follows:  
 
“We must reckon as an “originative source” (ἀρχήν) and as “primary” (πρώτην) the 
matter which underlies, though it is inseparable from (τὴν ὕλην τὴν ἀχώριστον μέν, 
ὑποκειμένην), the contrary qualities (τοῖς ἐναντίοις): for “the hot” (τὸ θερμόν) is not 
matter for “the cold” (ὕλη τῷ ψυχρῷ) nor “the cold” for “the hot”, but the substratum is 
matter for them both (ἀλλὰ τὸ ὑποκείμενον ἀμφοῖν).  We therefore have to recognise 
three “originative sources”: firstly that which is potentially perceptible body (τὸ δυνάμει 
σῶμα αἰσθητόν), secondly the contrarieties (αἱ ἐναντιώσεις) (I mean, e.g., heat and 
cold), and thirdly Fire, Water, and the like [i.e. the elements] (GC II 329a30-35)” 
 
from which we see that these “principles” operate (a) as “matter” or thingliness (b) as 
“contraries” and (c) as “elements”20 or “enformed matter” and then as “substance” 
                                                 
20 I note that Aristotle comments on the term “element” generally that:  
 
“The term “element” is also applied metaphorically to any small unity which is useful 
for various purposes; and so that which is small or simple or indivisible is called an 
“element (στοιχεῖον)”.  Hence it comes that the most universal things are elements (τὰ 
μάλιστα καθόλου στοιχεῖα εἶναι); because each of them, being a simple unity, is present 
in many things – either in all or in as many as possible.  Some too think that unity and 
the point are first principles.  Therefore since what are called genera are universal and 
indivisible (because they have no formula), some people call the genera elements (ἐπεὶ 
οὖν τὰ καλούμενα γένη καθόλου καὶ ἀδιαίρετα (οὐ γὰρ ἔστι λόγος αὐτῶν), στοιχεῖα τὰ 
γένη λέγουσί τινες), and these rather than the differentia, because the genus is more 
universal (Met. Δ 1014b3-13)” 
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regarding which: “…what is the most characteristic of substance appears to be this: that, 
although it remains, notwithstanding, numerically one and the same (ἕν ἀριθμῷ ὄν), it is 
capable of being the recipient of contrary qualifications (τῶν ἐναντίων εἶναι δεκτικόν) 
(Cat. 4a10-11)” (and see also Metaphysics Δ for detail of Aristotle’s basic philosophical 
terminology).   
I suggest that this basic picture of “principles” working through the “contraries” 
open to “substances” allows us to interrogate and make sense out of a range of areas of 
reality with examples being (A) what Howard Curzer calls Aristotle’s “doctrine of 
disjoint spheres” in respect to human “virtues” which posits that the field of human 
virtue covers a range of “dispositions” which possess scales of “contraries” as follows:  
 
“…every disposition (πᾶσαν διάθεσιν) is both produced and destroyed by the same 
things applied in a certain manner, for example health by food and exercises and 
climate; these points are clear from induction…[although] it must be grasped that in 
every continuum (ἐν ἅπαντι συνεχεῖ) that is divisible there is excess and deficiency and 
a mean, and these either in relation to one another or in relation to us (καὶ ταῦτα ἢ πρὸς 
ἄλληλα ἢ πρὸς ἡμᾶς) 21, for instance in gymnastics or medicine or architecture or 
navigation…from the start our nature does not diverge from the mean in the same way 
as regards everything, but in energy we are deficient and in self-indulgence excessive 
(E.E. II 1220a26 – E.E. II 1222a39)” 
 
regarding which Aristotle gives us the paradigm example of the courageous man who is 
a mean between: “…the man who is not afraid of things of which he ought to be afraid, 
nor when nor as he ought, [and who] is rash, [and] he that is afraid of things of which he 
ought not to be afraid, and when and as he ought not to be, [and who] is cowardly (E.E. 
                                                 
which shows us that Aristotle’s “element” is not a “simple” or a “datum” in a modern sense 
(e.g. the simplistic simples of Hume and Descartes) but is rather a distinct example of formal 
being-in-the-world (and see also Post. An. II 96b15-26).  I also note that Russell Winslow 
explains well the elemental or foundational nature of Aristotle’s “categories” as that: “…in 
Aristotle, for a logical statement to bear continuity and unity – its measure of certainty – it must 
reflect the continuity that secures the being about which the statement is made.  Thus, insofar as 
categories are the beings that are, for Aristotle, these ur-logical structures cannot be simply 
human words and concepts divorced from the world.  Moreover, we might even say that the 
world gives itself to us as categories (Aristotle and Rational Discovery (London, 2007) p 6-7).” 
  
21 Cf. “…it follows that as…actions are contrary to each other and to the mean, so also the states 
of character that cause them are contrary to each other and to virtue (ἀνάγκη, ὡς ταῦτ᾽ ἀλλήλοις 




II 1221a18-19)” and we find that Aristotle provides an extensive table of emotions / 
virtues at E.E. II 1221a using this principle which begins with the following terms: 
Irascibility, Spiritlessness, Gentleness (the mean); Rashness, Cowardice, Courage (the 
mean) etc.22 
 We also find that Aristotle adds the further structuring in respect to virtue that 
there are both “intellectual” and “moral” virtues, as follows:  
 
“…the [soul] has two parts (δύο μέρη τῆς ψυχῆς), and the virtues are divided between 
them (καὶ αἱ ἀρεταὶ κατὰ ταῦτα διῄρηνται), one set being those of the rational part (τοῦ 
λόγον ἔχοντος), intellectual virtues, whose work is true (ὧν ἔργον ἀλήθεια), whether 
about the nature of a thing or about its mode of production, while the other set belongs 
to the part that is irrational but possesses appetition (αἱ δὲ τοῦ ἀλόγου, ἔχοντος δ᾽ 
ὄρεξιν) (E.E. II 1221b28-32)” 
 
and as regards the problems incumbent in a contrary unstructured view of human 
character Aristotle argues that: 
 
“…not to know that it is from the exercise of activities on particular objects that states 
of character are produced is the mark of a thoroughly senseless person (τὸ μὲν οὖν 
ἀγνοεῖν ὅτι ἐκ τοῦ ἐνεργεῖν περὶ ἕκαστα αἱ ἕξεις γίνονται, κομιδῇ ἀναισθήτου) (N.E. III 
1114a9-10)”  
 
on the basis, as discussed above, that we must evidently see that human being is 
structured, grounded, and channelled in the senses (a) that our behaviour can be broken 
down into discrete areas or “habits” which correspond to their objects of desire, (b) that 
our behavioural objects have “virtues” as equilibrial “mean” states, e.g. courage is not 
opposed to cowardice but is a mean between rashness and cowardice, i.e. on Aristotle’s 
account we have a real engagement with the world rather than just having “have / have-
                                                 
22 I note that Howard Curzer outlines Aristotle’s position well in his Aristotle and the Virtues 
(Oxford, 2012), as follows: “(i) …no action or passion exhibits more than one virtue (or vice) 
because each virtue governs completely different objects…the spheres of the virtues do not 
intersect (p 23) (ii) the doctrine of the mean recommends triangulating in on the right choice (p 
51) (iii) When Aristotle stipulates that one virtue, temperance, governs food, drink, and sex, he 
is saying that these three pleasures are so intertwined or parallel that a single trait is right for all 
three (p 20) (iv) Aristotle narrows the spheres of the virtues partially to ensure that different 
virtues have different objects (p 224) and (v) [There are] virtues…each governing a different 
sphere or aspect (peri ho) of human life.  Each virtue consists of an intellectual component 
consisting of some sort of knowledge and intellectual abilities, plus a moral component 
consisting of dispositions concerned with passions, desires, pleasures etc. (p 294-5)”. 
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not” “on / off” contraries like switches, and hence (c) that we must recognise that we 
are “beings” which are discrete substantive objects or actors in the world whilst also 
being of the world and formed by the world.   
A further example of qualities acting through and on objects is (B) the field of 
human desire in which we see (i) that:  
 
“…every desire is for the sake of something: for the object of desire is the starting point 
for the practical intellect (καὶ ἡ ὄρεξις <δ'> ἕνεκά του πᾶσα· οὗ γὰρ ἡ ὄρεξις, αὕτη ἀρχὴ 
τοῦ πρακτικοῦ νοῦ) (De An. III 433a15-16)”  
 
and (ii) that:  
 
“…things different in kind are, we think, completed by different things (τὰς ἐνεργείας 
τὰς διαφερούσας τῷ εἴδει ὑπὸ διαφερόντων εἴδει τελειοῦσθαι) (N.E. X 1175a25-26)”  
 
and with a specific example being that: “…it is not every pleasure one should seek from 
tragedy, but the appropriate kind [of pleasure] (οὐ γὰρ πᾶσαν δεῖ ζητεῖν ἡδονὴν ἀπὸ 
τραγῳδίας ἀλλὰ τὴν οἰκείαν) (Poet. 1453b10-11)” and with the paradigmatic picture 
which emerges here being that (a) forces or principles (b) (inter-)act with (c) substances 
and objects.  I comment that the negative significance of this picture of desire is that it 
precludes the very idea of and possibility of a “hedonistic calculus” on the basis that the 
real world is a complex of various objects of desire and of various desiring objects 
which are only theoretically interchangeable23 and with the ultimate consequence of this 
situation being that we must engage with a worldly situation in which: “…“Each animal 
is thought to have a proper pleasure, as it has a proper function (δοκεῖ δ᾽ εἶναι ἑκάστῳ 
ζῴῳ καὶ ἡδονὴ οἰκεία)”; viz. that which corresponds to its activity (ἡ γὰρ κατὰ τὴν 
ἐνέργειαν).  If we survey them species by species, too, this will be evident; horse, dog, 
and man have different pleasures (N.E. X 1176a3-6)”.  I add that Aristotle expands on 
this point by arguing that not only does each species have its own peculiar world and 
objects of desire but each individual man possesses such a world and such objects to 
some degree and Aristotle also adds that this peculiar awareness and specificity of man 
                                                 
23 Aristotle argues that the objects of the world cannot be reduced to a scale of values on the 
basis that: “…those persons are wrong in their criticism who imagine that all terms are used 
analogously, so that that which is neither a shoe nor a hand will be intermediate between “shoe” 
and “hand”…as though there must be an intermediate in all cases (Met. I 1056a31-35)”.  
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is not a gift from the gods, as it were, but actually arises from out of the peculiarly 
conflicted nature of human being itself24.   
I ultimately suggest that the significance of this structured picture of reality is 
that the subtlety and concreteness of Aristotle’s account does by its very nature 
implicitly reject and rebut reductionist accounts of the world (i.e. such as the hedonistic 
or felicific calculus) and I add that other areas of reality which also fit Aristotle’s 
picture are (C) that we engage with many different “objects” from the world (or aspects 
of the world) through our various senses (and Aristotle famously adds that we also have 
a “common sense” which can survey and take in the whole object) and on this subject 
area Aristotle argues that a “sense” is peculiarly delimited by its “object” as follows:  
 
“…there are some things that cannot be employed for something other than their natural 
objects, for instance sight – it is not possible to see a thing that is not visible, or to hear 
a thing that is not audible (E.E. II 1227a23-25)”25 
 
(D) that our mind engages with the various “objects” in the world through various 
“sciences” and hence Aristotle continues (from the above) by arguing that “science” 
possesses an additional range of possibility and interpretation over “sense” as follows:  
 
“… but a science does enable us to do a thing that is not the object of the science.  For 
health and disease are not the objects of the same science in the same way: health is its 
object in accordance with nature, and disease in contravention of nature (E.E. II 
1227a26-28)” 
 
(i.e. the medical method can be used both to cure and to poison) and (E) that we as 
people are “objects” which possess an innate capacity for “friendship” and “love” with 
other relatable “objects” and with this relationship taking the forms of uni-directional 
empathy, mutual sympathy between beings, and coming together in a shared identity.   
                                                 
24 Cf. “…in the case of man each individual seems dear to himself, although in the case of other 
animals it is not so, for example a horse to itself…so it is not dear to itself.  But neither are 
children, but only when they have come to possess purposive choice; for when that point is 
reached the mind is at variance with the appetite (ἤδη γὰρ τότε διαφωνεῖ ὁ νοῦς πρὸς τὴν 
ἐπιθυμίαν) (E.E. VII 1240b31-34)”.  
 
25 See also Hendrik Lorenz’s “The Assimilation of Sense to Sense-Object in Aristotle” in 
Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy XXXIII (Oxford, 2007) 
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To expand on Aristotle’s “love” and its objects in more detail I observe further 
that we can even say that a “self” in a sense only exists through its ability to relate to, 
emulate, and engage with others and also that Aristotle describes the directionality of 
“love” from one person to another as follows:  
 
“Loving depends, more than being loved, on the actual feeling, whereas being loved 
corresponds with the nature of the object (ἔστι δὲ καὶ κατὰ τὴν φιλίαν τὸ φιλεῖν μᾶλλον 
ἢ τὸ φιλεῖσθαι, τὸ δὲ φιλεῖσθαι κατὰ τὸ φιλητόν) (E.E. VII 1239a34-36)”  
 
and that he argues that this directional love leads to a situation between the parties in 
which: “Some persons grow up by nature affectionate and others ambitious; one who 
enjoys loving more than being loved is affectionate, whereas the other enjoys being 
admired and loved more.  So the man who enjoys being admired and loved is a lover of 
superiority, whereas the other, the affectionate man, loves the pleasure of loving (E.E. 
VII 1239a27-31)” whereas true friendship is a mutual love such that: “A friend is one 
who loves and is loved in return, and those who think their relationship is of this 
character consider themselves friends (φίλος δέ ἐστιν ὁ φιλῶν καὶ ἀντιφιλούμενος: 
οἴονται δὲ φίλοι εἶναι οἱ οὕτως ἔχειν οἰόμενοι πρὸς ἀλλήλους) (Rhet. II 1381a1-2)”26.  
We see, then, that Aristotle ultimately considers how the world is structured so that 
there is meaningful interaction between a wide range of objects over space, over time, 
and through various dimensions, i.e. through desire, love, sense etc. 
Another important example of an architectonic structuring that we find in 
Aristotle’s work is (4) the high-level division of organic being into the genera of (i) 
plant, (ii) animal and (iii) man, as follows: 
 
“All animals have, in addition [to plants], some measure of knowledge of a sort 
(γνώσεώς τινος πάντα μετέχουσι) (some have more, some less, some very little indeed 
(τὰ μὲν πλείονος τὰ δ’ ἐλάττονος, τὰ δὲ πάμπαν μικρᾶς)), because they have sense-
perception (Αἴσθησιν γὰρ ἔχουσιν), and sense-perception is, of course, a sort of 
knowledge (ἡ δ’ αἴσθησις γνῶσίς τις).  The value we attach to this knowledge varies 
greatly according as we judge it by the standard of human intelligence (πρὸς φρόνησιν) 
or the class of lifeless objects (πρὸς τὸ τῶν ἀψύχων γένος).  Compared with the 
                                                 
26 I add as regards the connection between “friendship” and “love” that Aristotle argues that: 
“…love (ἔρως) seems to resemble friendship (φιλία), for the lover is eager to share the life of 
the loved one, although not in the most proper way but in a sensuous manner (κατ᾽ αἴσθησιν) 
(E.E. VII 1245a25-27)”. 
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intelligence possessed by man, it seems as nothing to possess the two senses of touch 
and taste only; but compared with entire absence of sensibility it seems a very fine thing 
indeed.  We should much prefer to have even this sort of knowledge to a state of death 
and non-existence (τεθνεὸς καὶ μὴ ὄν).  Now it is by sense-perception that animals 
differ from the creatures which are merely alive [i.e. plants] (Διαφέρει δ’ αἰσθήσει τὰ 
ζῷα τῶν ζώντων μόνον); since, however, if it be an animal (ἐὰν ᾖ ζῷον), its attributes 
must of necessity include that of being alive (ἀνάγκη ζῆν), when the time comes for it to 
accomplish the function proper to that which is alive (δεήσῃ ἀποτελεῖν τὸ τοῦ ζῶντος 
ἔργον), then it copulates and unites and becomes as it were a plant (τότε συνδυάζεται 
καὶ μίγνυται καὶ γίγνεται ὡσπερανεὶ φυτόν), just as we have said (GA I 731a32-731b8)” 
 
from which we see that Aristotle believes that we can classify organic being on the 
basis (i) that all living things share the “function proper to that which is alive” which is 
the reproduction of the kind (which also requires a prior “self” or substantive being and 
also a capacity for self-supporting nutrition) (ii) that it is the power of sensation that 
differentiates animal from plant (see also Juv. 467b19-26) (iii) that the power of human 
intelligence (and of human desire and pleasure; see N.E. X 1176a8-10) is of a different 
order or quality to the power as it is expressed in sensate animals (and as the power of 
movement and hence sensation gives animals a radically different quality of life than 
that of plants).  Aristotle does, then, regard (i) plant, (ii) animal, and (iii) man as being 
generic organic elements of nature to which I add that (iv) the “eternal” heavenly 
objects and (v) the “simple” elements are the other generic but inorganic elements of 
nature.   
 From a further alternative perspective I add that Aristotle also gives a different 
but complementary picture of organic being through his conceptualisation of a “scale of 
life” in nature which runs from the inanimate through plants and animals to man (see 
N.E. I 1098a1ff; Resp. 477a15ff) and within which insects are an intermediate form (see 
Long. 467a20-21; Juv. 468b2-3) and also testacea (see GA I 731b8) and from which we 
see that it is meaningfully possible to say at a very high level both that there is an 
observable “scala naturae” from chemical element through plant and animal to man (as 
above) and also that: 
 
“…life is defined in the case of animals by the power of perception (τὸ δὲ ζῆν ὁρίζονται 
τοῖς ζῴοις δυνάμει αἰσθήσεως), in that of man by the power of perception or thought 
(ἀνθρώποις δ᾽ αἰσθήσεως ἢ νοήσεως); and a power is defined by reference to the 
corresponding activity (ἡ δὲ δύναμις εἰς τὴν ἐνέργειαν ἀνάγεται) which is the essential 
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thing (τὸ δὲ κύριον ἐν τῇ ἐνεργείᾳ); therefore life seems to be essentially (κυρίως) the 
act of perceiving or thinking (N.E. IX 1170a16-19)”  
 
and with Aristotle’s assessment of animal “evolution” being that:  
 
“…all animals…have an innate faculty of discrimination, which we call sense-
perception (ἔχει γὰρ δύναμιν σύμφυτον κριτικήν, ἣν καλοῦσιν αἴσθησιν).  All animals 
have it, but in some the perception persists, while in others it does not.  Where it does 
not, there is either no cognition at all outside the act of perception, or no cognition of 
those objects of which the perception does not persist.  Where perception does persist, 
after the act of perception is over the percipients can still retain the perception in the 
soul (ἐν οἷς δ' ἔνεστιν αἰσθομένοις ἔχειν ἔτι ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ).  If this happens repeatedly, a 
distinction immediately arises between these animals which derive a coherent 
impression from the persistence and those which do not (πολλῶν δὲ τοιούτων 
γινομένων ἤδη διαφορά τις γίνεται, ὥστε τοῖς μὲν γίνεσθαι λόγον ἐκ τῆς τῶν τοιούτων 
μονῆς, τοῖς δὲ μή) (Post. An. II 99b35 – 100a4)”   
 
and with Aristotle suggesting that this human “thought” is the highest realisation of 
animal “sensation” and hence that thought is the “…aim of all things, or of all things 
that possess sensation or reason; or would be, if they could acquire the latter (εἰ λάβοι 
νοῦν) (Rhet. I 1362a23-24)”.  I add that Russell Winslow explains the end product (so 
far) of this natural evolution as follows: “How do humans move? Anthropoi move in 
their most exquisitely human way not by metabolising, not by walking, nor be seeing 
and hearing, but human beings reveal their natural motion in and through their orthoi 
logoi – which is to say, through the cultivation of their ethical and intellectual virtues27” 
or, in other words, that if we see man as a real product of evolution rather than as a 
chance product of nature we should also see (with Aristotle) that man possesses the 
nutrition and reproduction of the plant, the movement of the animal, and also the mind 
of man which positively transforms all that has gone before.  
I add in respect to Aristotle’s principle of “evolution” (a) that the development 
of the animal’s capacity for thought leads in “man” to a development of and enabling of 
his sense of and capacity for “love” and “care” along the lines that: “…those [animals] 
that have more understanding and possess some memory continue the association, and 
have a more social relationship (πολιτικώτερον) with their offspring (HA VII 589a1-3)” 
                                                 
27 Winslow, Russell Aristotle and Rational Discovery (London, 2007) p 10 
 
 20 
and (b) that Aristotle’s principle of “evolution” is ultimately a cascading of principles 
of meaning (and of consequent action and affection) through history and being, as 
follows: 
 
“…it is also a law of nature – activity is a more desirable thing, and there is the same 
relation between effect and activity as between the parties here: the person benefitted is 
as it were the product of the benefactor (ἡ γὰρ ἐνέργεια αἱρετώτερον, τὸν αὐτὸν δὲ 
λόγον ἔχει τὸ ἔργον καὶ ἡ ἐνέργεια, ὁ δ᾽ εὖ παθὼν ὥσπερ ἔργον τοῦ εὖ ποιήσαντος).  
This is why even animals have the philoprogenitive instinct, which urges them to 
produce offspring and also to protect the offspring produced.  And in fact fathers love 
their children more than they are loved by them…and these in turn love their children 
more than their parents, because activity is the greatest good.  And mothers love their 
children more than fathers, because they think that the children are more their work; for 
people estimate work by its difficulty, and in the production of a child the mother 
suffers more pain (E.E. I 1241a40–1241b9)” 
 
from which I suggest that the development of (or evolution of) “mind” is also the 
development of “care” in the world and also that nutrition, sensation, and thought (and 
plant, animal, and man) are themselves an evolution of being which further 
substantiates Aristotle’s evolutionary conceptualisation of a scala naturae28.  
I add the further complication in respect to how Aristotle understands the basic 
structuring and evolution of the main components of the world (especially organic and 
inorganic) that Aristotle argues regarding the inorganic structuring of nature that the 
“simple” elements “imitate” the “divine” and that “organic” being is distinct from both 
of these only in the sense that it is perishable and “composite” and with “rational” 
beings having the further distinction that they are able to determine their own motion to 
some extent, as follows: 
 
                                                 
28 Cf. “It looks as though Nature herself desires to provide that there shall be a feeling of 
attention and care (αἴσθησιν ἐπιμελητικὴν παρασκευάζειν) for the young offspring.  In the 
inferior animals this feeling which she implants (ἐμποιεῖ) lasts only until the moment of birth; in 
others, until the offspring reaches its perfect development; and in those that have more 
intelligence (φρονιμώτερα), until its upbringing is completed.  Those which are endowed with 
most intelligence show intimacy and attachment (συνήθεια καὶ φιλία) towards their offspring 
even after they have reached their perfect development (human beings and some of the 
quadrupeds are examples of this); birds show it until they have produced their chicks and 
brought them up; and on this account hen birds which have laid eggs but omit to sit on them, 
deteriorate in their condition, as though they were deprived of one of their natural endowments 
(GA III 753a8-16)”. 
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“…the heavenly bodies [do not] tire in their activity; for motion does not imply for 
them, as it does for perishable things, the potentiality for the opposite, which makes the 
continuity of the motion distressing; this results when the substance is matter and 
potentiality; not actuality (ἡ γὰρ οὐσία ὕλη καὶ δύναμις οὖσα, οὐκ ἐνέργεια, αἰτία 
τούτου).  Imperishable things are resembled in this respect by things which are always 
undergoing transformation, such as earth and fire (μιμεῖται δὲ τὰ ἄφθαρτα καὶ τὰ ἐν 
μεταβολῇ ὄντα, οἷον γῆ καὶ πῦρ); for the latter too are always active, since they have 
their motion independently and in themselves (καὶ γὰρ ταῦτα ἀεὶ ἐνεργεῖ: καθ᾽ αὑτὰ γὰρ 
καὶ ἐν αὑτοῖς ἔχει τὴν κίνησιν).  Other potentialities, according to the distinctions 
already made, all admit of the opposite result; for that which is capable of causing 
motion in a certain way can also cause it not in that way; that is if it acts rationally (τὸ 
γὰρ δυνάμενον ὡδὶ κινεῖν δύναται καὶ μὴ ὡδί, ὅσα γε κατὰ λόγον) (Met. Θ 1050b25-
33)” 
 
and I add in respect to the parallelism between the “organic” and “inorganic” (i) that 
Aristotle sees in nature a “cyclical” principle which underlies both organic and 
inorganic being in the sense that: “Fire comes-to-be through the agency of Fire [i.e. fire 
spreads] and Man through that of Man [i.e man reproduces] (GC I 320b20-21)” (ii) that 
Aristotle argues the “organic” cycle of being is “complex” in the sense that: “…the seed 
comes from other individuals which are prior and complete, and the first thing is not 
seed but the complete being, e.g. we must say that before there is a seed there is a man, 
not the man produced from the seed, but from another from whom the seed came (Met. 
Λ 1073a1-3)” and (iii) that Aristotle argues that “inorganic” being is “simple” in the 
sense that: 
 
“The cause of this continuous process, as has been frequently remarked, is cyclical 
motion (τούτου δ' αἴτιον, ὤσπερ εἴρηται πολλάκις· ἡ κύκλῳ φορά), the only motion 
which is continuous (μόνη γὰρ συνεχές).  Hence also the other things which change into 
one another, for instance, the simple bodies, by being acted upon or having power to 
act, imitate cyclical movement (διὸ καὶ τἆλλα ὅσα μεταβάλλει εἰς ἄλληλα κατὰ τὰ πάθη 
καὶ τὰς δυνάμεις, οἷον τὰ ἁπλᾶ σώματα, μιμεῖται τὴν κύκλῳ φοράν).  For when Air 
comes-to-be from Water, and Fire from Air, and Water again from Fire, we say that 
coming-to-be has completed the cycle, because it has come back to its starting-point.  
Hence motion in a straight line is also continuous because it imitates cyclical motion 
(ὥστε καὶ ἡ εὐθεῖα φορὰ μιμουμένη τὴν κύκλῳ συνεχής ἐστιν) (GC II 337a 1-8)” 
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and with Aristotle explaining elsewhere that what is “…continuous…[is] more strictly 
and in a prior sense one whose motion is more simple and indivisible (οὗ ἀδιαιρετωτέρα 
ἡ κίνησις καὶ μᾶλλον ἁπλῆ) (Met. I 1052a21-22)” and with his conclusion on 
“inorganic” matter being that it is “always active” in the sense that: “…contains in itself 
the cause of its continuity.  A thing is of this kind if its motion is one and indivisible in 
respect of time and place (ἀλλὰ ἔχει ἐν αὑτῷ τὸ αἴτιον αὐτῷ τοῦ συνεχὲς εἶναι. τοιοῦτον 
δὲ τῷ μίαν τὴν κίνησιν εἶναι καὶ ἀδιαίρετον τόπῳ καὶ χρόνῳ) (Met. I 1052a25-26)”. 
As regards this seeming distinction between “inorganic” and “organic” being, 
however, I add that Aristotle argues that we find in “the other animals the factor of force 
is as simple as it is in the case of inanimate objects” which shows us that Aristotle’s 
critical distinction is not between “inorganic” and “organic” but between “human” and 
“non human”, as follows: 
 
“In inanimate things the moving principle is simple, but in living things it is multiple, 
for appetition and rational principle are not always in harmony.  Hence whereas in the 
case of the other animals the factor of force is simple as it is in the case of inanimate 
objects, for animals do not possess rational principle and appetition in opposition to it, 
but live by their appetition, in man both forms of force are present – that is, at a certain 
age, the age to which we attribute action in the proper sense; for we do not speak of a 
child as acting, any more than a wild animal, but only a person who has attained to 
acting by rational calculation (ἐν μὲν τοῖς ἀψύχοις ἁπλῆ ἡ ἀρχή, ἐν δὲ τοῖς ἐμψύχοις 
πλεονάζει: οὐ γὰρ ἀεὶ ἡ ὄρεξις καὶ ὁ λόγος συμφωνεῖ. ὥστ᾽ ἐπὶ μὲν τῶν ἄλλων ζῴων 
ἁπλοῦν τὸ βίαιον, ὥσπερ ἐπὶ τῶν ἀψύχων（οὐ γὰρ ἔχει λόγον καὶ ὄρεξιν ἐναντίαν, 
ἀλλὰ τῇ ὀρέξει ζῇ)) (E.E. II 1224a23-30)” 
 
and with Aristotle explaining above that his critical distinction is that our peculiar 
human consciousness is a result of an imbalance of self and that we are required by our 
human nature to correct or manually focus ourselves through our own capacity to 
formulate an overarching “object” or “aim” in our lives.  I note, however, that apart 
from the peculiar stress of human beings – who are conflicted in the world by their 
desire and mind pulling them in different directions – that Aristotle believes that all 
organic beings suffer the stress of: “…perishable things, [which have] the potentiality 
for the opposite, which makes the continuity of the motion distressing; this results when 
the substance is matter and potentiality; not actuality (Met. Θ 1050b26-28)” which 
shows us, I suggest, how consistently and coherently integrated Aristotle’s 
philosophical picture of man is with his wider philosophical picture of the world.  I 
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suggest that it is evident that Aristotle’s account of the world as an “education of forms” 
is nuanced and realistic, that it should not be confused with crude anthropocentrism, and 
also that Aristotle’s position is evidently superior to a purely materialistic viewpoint 
which, as Aristotle repeatedly observes, adequately explains nothing.   
As regards the supposed “errors” of Aristotle’s basic account of the world (as set 
out above) I make note of Aristotle’s famously erroneous claim that there are simple 
“spontaneously generated” organisms in nature whose matter take on form 
“spontaneously”, as follows:  
 
“Those natural objects which are produced, like artificial objects, spontaneously (ἀπὸ 
ταὐτομάτου), are those whose matter can also imitate for itself that motion which the 
seed initiates (ὅσων ἡ ὕλη δύναται καὶ ὑφ᾽ αὑτῆς κινεῖσθαι ταύτην τὴν κίνησιν ἣν τὸ 
σπέρμα κινεῖ).  Those whose matter cannot do this cannot be generated otherwise than 
by their proper parents (Met. Z 1034b5-8)”  
 
and I comment, first, as regards the (im)plausibility of “spontaneous generation” that we 
find that Monte Ransome Johnson observes that: “…contemporary theories about the 
origins of life on earth (and on other planets in the speculative field of astrobiology) 
suggest that life originates through a process called “abiogenesis” or “biopoesis” 
whereby organic molecules arise from recombination of inanimate matter.  The notion 
of “self-assembly” in these theories is arguably equivalent to the traditional term 
“spontaneous.”  A recent textbook on the subject opens with these words: “The main 
assumption held by most scientists about the origin of life on Earth is that life originated 
through a spontaneous and gradual increase of molecular capacity29” and, second, as 
regards the relationship between “organic” and “inorganic”, between “chemistry” and 
“biology”, and as regards the true nature of organic being as a channelling of “form” we 
find that Karl Popper observes that:  
                                                 
29 Johnson, Monte Ransome “The Medical Background of Aristotle’s Theory of Nature and 
Spontaneity” in Proceedings of the Boston Area Colloquium in Ancient Philosophy (2011) p 
139-140.  I note that Johnson comments on the subtlety of Aristotle’s account of spontaneous 
generation which as “a process of concoction (Ibid. p 136)” expects to find gradation and 
differences which accord with the nature of the phenomena under observation (which are 
intermediate between animal and mineral).  I add that Johnson concludes that: “On the one 
hand, Aristotle rejected spontaneity (and equivocal generation or abiogenesis) as the origin of 
all life on Earth, where we are likely to accept it as our best going theory; and Aristotle accepted 
spontaneity as a cause in the case of certain species of animals where we reject it (and detect 




“If you take a bacterium, then it never dies normally because it doesn’t produce 
offspring and then die, but it produces offspring by splitting itself.  So, if you take a 
present-day bacterium, none of its ancestors has died.  In other words, it’s still the same 
“thing” as the original bacterium from which it comes.  So we could say the very 
opposite of what you say: it is not a new organism but a very old organism in a slightly 
changed form30” 
 
from which I suggest that the nature of elemental “life” is far more open that is often 
claimed.   As regards the “divine” I suggest that it is interesting that Aristotle seems 
willing to reject anthropocentrism by contemplating the idea that from one perspective 
chemical being and simple organic being is “divine” since it is pure (and Aristotle 
reasonably suggests that chemical being “imitates” astral being31) and also with his 
thought that more sophisticated organic life is in one sense increasingly conflicted and 
therefore increasingly defective whilst also being ultimately able to reconnect with the 
“good” and “God” through the remediation of human reflection32. 
Let us conclude on this point by considering Aristotle’s methodology here by 
observing that Aristotle looks at his subject matter in several different ways – e.g. as 
plant / animal / man and also as nutritive / sensitive / intellective – and that he believes 
that we can (and should) seek to carve nature at the joints in various directions and at 
various levels for various purposes.  I also add in respect to Aristotle’s overall method – 
and also in respect to how he sees our seeing of the world – that the underlying problem 
with which Aristotle is dealing is how to cut through the mass of worldly particulars to 
see the universals / principles which operate beneath, as follows:  
 
“The problem at once presents itself, in what sense we are to speak of parts of the soul, 
or how many we should distinguish.  For in a sense there is an infinity (ἄπειρα) of parts 
(De An. III 432a23-24)”  
                                                 
30 Popper, Karl “World 3 and Emergent Evolution” in Knowledge and the Body-Mind Problem 
(London, [orig. 1969] 1994) p 55 
 
31 Cf. “Imperishable things [i.e. the heavenly bodies] are imitated by those that are involved in 
change, e.g. earth and fire.  For these are also ever active, for they have their movement of 
themselves and in themselves (Met. Θ 1050b28-30)”   
 
32 For interesting essays on the nature of “animality” and “humanity” see Thomas Nagel’s 
“What Is It Like to Be a Bat?” in Philosophical Review (1974) and Donald Davidson’s 
“Rational Animals” in Dialectica (1982) and see also Aldous Huxley’s lecture “On Human 




(cf. “Any entity has innumerable features, not all of which cohere into a unity; likewise, 
an individual performs many actions which yield no unitary action (οὕτως δὲ καὶ 
πράξεις ἑνὸς πολλαί εἰσιν, ἐξ ὧν μία οὐδεμία γίνεται πρᾶξις) (Poet. 1451a17-18)”) and 
we ultimately find that Aristotle’s answer is to carve nature at the joints by (i) first 
surveying a range of alternative positions before (ii) then coming to and stating his own 
position that the operating principle of human being is its “soul” which has (1) nutritive, 
(2) sensitive, and (3) imaginative elements which are moved in various degrees by (A) 
reason and / or (B) appetite.  In other words, I suggest (a) that we see that Aristotle 
argues that there is an “infinity” of parts and of facts in the world but that we can 
nevertheless discern generic distinctions in nature (b) that Aristotle knows and argues 
that how we divide and group this data of the world will decide the depth and truth, 
falsehood, or semi-truth / falsehood of how we see the world (and various cuts of being 
are valid for varied approaches and purposes) and (c) that in his assessment of the 
example we have considered above – i.e. the soul – Aristotle takes an approach which, 
as Thomas Kjeller Johansen correctly explains, seeks to “…posit as few psychological 
capacities as possible, those that are the sufficient to explain the basic varieties of life 
behaviour33”.  
 Having noted above, then, some of Aristotle’s basic architectonic structures, 
both in principle and as applied, let us also consider (5) that Aristotle routinely and 
explicitly uses the actual term “architectonic” when he is trying to explain and show the 
existence of (natural) guiding-principles by using the analogue of the “master-
craftsman” or “architectōn” or, loosely though significantly, the “architect” (and, in a 
sense, this “architect” is an Aristotelian reply to Plato’s Demiurge), as follows.  First, 
regarding the “master-craftsman” Aristotle argues (A) that logos is embodied in the 
master craftsman in the sense that: “…rational principle is a master-craftsman (ὁ δὲ 
λόγος ἀρχιτέκτων) (Pol. I 1260a16)” (and see also Met. A 981a-b) and, in more detail, 
that:  
 
“…there are two arts which rule over matter and have the knowledge of it (δύο δὲ αἱ 
ἄρχουσαι τῆς ὕλης καὶ γνωρίζουσαι τέχναι) – the art which is concerned with use of it 
and the master-art of bringing forth (ἥ τε χρωμένη καὶ τῆς ποιητικῆς ἡ ἀρχιτεκτονική).  
Thus the art concerned with its use is also in a sense a master-art, but as a master-art it 
                                                 
33 Johansen, Thomas Kjeller The Powers of Aristotle’s Soul (Oxford, 2012) p 79 
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differs from the other insofar as it knows the form (διὸ καὶ ἡ χρωμένη ἀρχιτεκτονική 
πως, διαφέρει δὲ ᾗ ἡ μὲν τοῦ εἴδους γνωριστική), while the art that brings forth knows 
the matter (ἡ δὲ ὡς ποιητική, τῆς ὕλης); for the steersman knows what kind of form the 
rudder should have and orders [its production], but the other knows from what [kind of] 
wood [it should be produced] and how it should move (Phys. II 194b1-7)” 
 
which suggests that we see the world as “matter” through utilitarian eyes but as “forms” 
(and through “logos”) when we see the world as a “master-craftsman” does.  Second, 
Aristotle argues regarding the “master craftsman” (B) that it is only by understanding 
the “principle” or “form” that we can achieve “completion” and hence: 
 
“…if happiness should be posited as being actions well performed, then the best life for 
every polis as well as for every individual would be the practical life (τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν 
εὐπραγίαν θετέον, καὶ κοινῇ πάσης πόλεως ἂν εἴη καὶ καθ᾽ ἕκαστον ἄριστος βίος ὁ 
πρακτικός).  But the practical is not necessarily in relation to others, as some suppose; 
and practical thoughts, too, are not only those occurring on account of what comes to be 
from acting, but much more those which are complete in themselves and are 
speculations and thoughts for their own sake; for a good deed is an end, and so it is a 
certain action.  Outward actions in the highest sense, too, we say to be mainly those 
which master artists perform by thoughts (μάλιστα δὲ καὶ πράττειν λέγομεν κυρίως καὶ 
τῶν ἐξωτερικῶν πράξεων τοὺς ταῖς διανοίαις ἀρχιτέκτονας) (Pol. VII 1325b14-23)” 
 
which shows us (a) that the highest expression of human being is the concrete and full 
expression of thought (cf. “the practical is not necessarily in relation to others, as some 
suppose; and practical thoughts…are complete in themselves and are speculations and 
thoughts for their own sake”) and (b) that we again see that this highest realisation of 
being is realised in the thought of the “master-craftsman” who here represents the final 
developed human representative of an “education of forms” which parallels the 
evolution of organic being that we have previously seen operative in nature generally as 
the development of “mind” and of “care” in the world.   
Third, Aristotle argues regarding the “master craftsman” (C) that we see through 
the example of craft products that we encounter in the world the complexity of a 
hierarchy of “goods”, of “forms”, and of “ends” and hence:  
 
“Every art and every inquiry, and similarly every action and pursuit, is thought to aim at 
some good; and for this reason the good has rightly been declared to be that at which all 
things aim.  But a certain difference is found among ends; some are activities, others are 
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products apart from the activities that produce them.  Where there are ends apart from 
the actions, it is the nature of the products to be better than the activities.  Now, as there 
are many actions, arts, and sciences, their ends also are many; the end of the medical art 
is health, that of shipbuilding a vessel, that of strategy victory, that of economics 
wealth.  But where such arts fall under a single capacity – as bridle-making and the 
other arts concerned with the equipment of horses fall under the art of riding…in all of 
these the ends of the master arts are to be preferred to all the subordinate ends (ἐν 
ἁπάσαις δὲ τὰ τῶν ἀρχιτεκτονικῶν τέλη πάντων ἐστὶν αἱρετώτερα τῶν ὑπ᾽ αὐτά) (N.E. I 
1094a1-15)”  
 
which shows us that we find a structured hierarchy of principles in things and in nature 
regarding which the “higher” principles stand over and above the “lower” principles in 
the sense that the need for and craft of “bridle-making” subserves the need for and craft 
of “horseriding” and (I add) in the sense that the organs of a man subserve the man 
himself.  I comment here that Paul Feyeraband correctly assesses the significance of 
Aristotle’s position as that: “Considering the conflict between abstract principles and 
common sense (artisan-practice), he opted for the latter and modified philosophy 
accordingly34.   
We have seen, then, that Aristotle implicitly argues above that the mind is in 
some sense capable of being a precise expression of (and perhaps a channelling of) the 
world and of its forms – i.e. through the paradigm of the “master-craftsman” – but I add 
that we also see that Aristotle states this principle explicitly as (6) that the 
epistemological structuring in our thought aligns with and corresponds to the 
ontological structuring of nature in the sense that:  
  
                                                 
34 Feyerabend, Paul “Intellectuals and the Facts of Life” in Conquest of Abundance: A Tale of 
Abstraction versus the Richness of Being (Chicago, 1999) p 266.  I note that Aristotle uses the 
“teacher” as well as the “master craftsman” as an analogue through which he can explain the 
structuring of meaning in nature (and our ability to follow this meaning), as follows: “And that 
the end stands in a causal relation to the means subordinate to it is shown by teaching.  For, 
having defined the end they show, regarding other things, that each of them is a good, because 
that for the sake of which is explanatory.  For example, since “being healthy” is such-and-such a 
thing, then necessarily this other thing will be what is useful for it.  And what is healthy will be 
the efficient cause of health, though only the cause of its being, but not of health being a good 
(E.E. 1218b16-22)”.  For further consideration of the architectonic “master craftsman” see 
Claudia Baracchi’s Aristotle’s Ethics as First Philosophy (Cambridge, 2008), David Charles’ 
“Wittgenstein’s Builders and Aristotle’s Craftsmen” in R.W. Sharples (ed.) Perspectives on 
Greek Philosophy (Aldershot, 2003), and Monte Ransome Johnson’s “Aristotle’s architectonic 




“There are many senses in which a thing is said to “be”, but all that “is” is related to one 
central point, one definite kind of thing, and is not said to “be” by a mere ambiguity (τὸ 
δὲ ὂν λέγεται μὲν πολλαχῶς, ἀλλὰ πρὸς ἓν καὶ μίαν τινὰ φύσιν καὶ οὐχ 
ὁμωνύμως)…some things are said to be because they are substances (ὅτι οὐσίαι), others 
because they are affections of substance (ὅτι πάθη οὐσίας), others because they are a 
process towards substance (ὅτι ὁδὸς εἰς οὐσίαν), or destructions or privations or 
qualities of substance, or productive or generative of substance (ἢ φθοραὶ ἢ στερήσεις ἢ 
ποιότητες ἢ ποιητικὰ ἢ γεννητικὰ οὐσίας), or of things which are relative to substance 
(ἢ τῶν πρὸς τὴν οὐσίαν), or negations of one of these things or of substance itself (ἢ 
τούτων τινὸς ἀποφάσεις ἢ οὐσίας).  It is for this reason that we say even of non-being 
that it is non-being.  As, then, there is one science which deals with all healthy things, 
the same applies in the other cases also…for each one class of things, as there is one 
perception, so there is one science, as for instance grammar, being one science, 
investigates all articulate sounds (Met. Γ 1003a33–1003b21)” 
 
from which we see that Aristotle argues that how we “say” things are and how we 
“perceive” them has at least some correspondence to how things actually “are” (see Cat. 
2a19-21)35.   
I add in respect to this structuring of thought that Aristotle explicitly states this 
principle of correspondence of thought and being as follows:  
 
“…being immediately falls into genera; for which reason the sciences too will 
correspond to these genera (ὑπάρχει γὰρ εὐθὺς γένη ἔχον τὸ ὂν καὶ τὸ ἕν: διὸ καὶ αἱ 
ἐπιστῆμαι ἀκολουθήσουσι τούτοις) (Met. Γ 1004a4-6)”  
 
and that Aristotle enlarges upon his idea that our thought channels being through 
sciences and coalesces into sciences in accordance with the various objects of the world 
as follows: 
 
“…since there are many senses in which a thing is said to be one, these terms also will 
have many senses (ὥστ᾽ ἐπειδὴ πολλαχῶς τὸ ἓν λέγεται, καὶ ταῦτα πολλαχῶς μὲν 
λεχθήσεται), but yet it belongs to one science to know them all (ὅμως δὲ μιᾶς ἅπαντά 
ἐστι γνωρίζειν); for a term belongs to different sciences not if it has different senses, but 
                                                 
35 For an interesting consideration of how we “say” things are see Rémi Brague’s “Aristotle’s 




if it has not one meaning, and its definitions cannot be referred to one central meaning 
(Met. Γ 1004a22-25)”  
 
and he explains “focal reference” in his Ethics, as follows: “…with the term “surgical”, 
- we speak of a surgical mind and a surgical hand and a surgical instrument and a 
surgical operation, but we apply the term properly to that which is primarily so called.  
The primary is that of which the definition is implicit in the definition of all, for 
example a surgical instrument is an instrument that a surgeon would use, whereas the 
definition of the instrument is not implicit in that of surgeon (E.E. VII 1236a19-23)” 
and he does so in the context of the argument that we cannot simplify the concept of 
“friendship” but must recognise both that our terms and also things in the world 
themselves are complex, multifaceted, and meaningful and that they exist: “…not 
having a common name by accident and standing in a merely chance relationship to one 
another (E.E. VII 1236b25-26)”.  I suggest that Aristotle’s point of emphasis here is that 
by simplifying and reducing the world to “names” and our thought to nominalism we 
restrict and misrepresent our engagement of the world since we thereby: “…confine the 
use of the term friend to primary friendship [and to do this] is to do violence to observed 
facts, and compels one to talk paradoxes (E.E. VII 1236b22-23)”36. 
 I suggest, then, that Aristotle is continually revealing to us the positive 
structuring of nature and that he is doing so with our tendency towards and need to 
simplify constantly in mind for both pedagogical and philosophical reasons.  In other 
words, I suggest that Aristotle seeks to teach us not only about the nature of nature itself 
but also about the nature and quality (and limitations and distortions) of our thought and 
mind (and of our logos and logic).  I add that we find that Aristotle’s basic principle that 
we are engaging with the world by engaging with objects in the world leads 
consequentially to the need to consider the degree to which we can engage in 
demonstrative science about the various “beings” of the world on which subject 
Aristotle concludes that “…not to know of what things one should demand 
demonstration, and of what one should not, argues of want of education (Met. Γ 1006a6-
8)” and that:  
 
“…it is the mark of an educated man to look for precision in each class of things just so 
far as the nature of the subject (ὕλη) admits; it is evidently equally foolish to accept 
                                                 
36 On the subject of “focal reference” see Enrico Berti’s “Multiplicity and Unity of Being in 
Aristotle” in Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society (2001) 
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probable reasoning from a mathematician and to demand from a rhetorician scientific 
proofs (N.E. I 1094b23-27)” 
 
(note: “as the subject admits”).  I add that it is also clear that Aristotle also recognises 
that this sectorial specificity spills over into the person himself in the sense that any 
given person will have a mindset which normally corresponds to the “type” of person 
they are, i.e. in the sense that a mathematician, say, will see the world and treat it (and 
select the questions that it presents to us) in a very different way to, say, a philosopher 
or a carpenter.  I comment that we have seen throughout our consideration so far that 
Aristotle’s world – which includes ourselves – is a world of distinct and meaningful 
beings or objects. 
 I add further in respect to the structuring in our thought that it is carried through 
into a structuring in our disciplinary approach to the world into “special” sciences and 
also philosophy which necessarily sits over them on the basis that:  
 
“There is a science which investigates being as being and the attributes which belong to 
this in virtue of its own nature (ἔστιν ἐπιστήμη τις ἣ θεωρεῖ τὸ ὂν ᾗ ὂν καὶ τὰ τούτῳ 
ὑπάρχοντα καθ᾽ αὑτό).  Now this is not the same as any of the other so-called special 
sciences; for none of these others treat universally of being as being.  They cut off a part 
of being and investigate the attribute of this part; this is what the mathematical sciences 
for instance do (Met. Γ 1003a21-26)”   
 
and with Aristotle insisting (i) that philosophy has a prior and holistic importance in the 
sense that:  
 
“It is evident…that it belongs to one science [i.e. philosophy] to be able to give an 
account of these concepts [i.e. opposites, plurality, unity, negation, privation etc.] as 
well as of substance (οὐσία)…and that it is the function of the philosopher to be able to 
investigate all things (Met. Γ 1004a32-1004b1)”  
 
from which we see that Aristotle’s philosopher is the guardian of the fundamental 
“elements” and “categories” which we considered in footnote 20 (ii) that science is 
necessarily limited to its own subject matter in the sense that: “…it does not belong to 
the geometer to inquire what is contrariety or completeness or unity or being or the 
same or the other, but only to presuppose these concepts and reason from this starting-
point (Met. Γ 1005a11-13)” with the underlying problem here being with scientists (a) 
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applying philosophical concepts in a partial and utilitarian manner because they: “…use 
them [i.e. philosophical concepts] just so far as to satisfy their purposes; that is, so far as 
the genus to which their demonstrations refer extends (Met. Γ 1005a25-27)” (b) 
misunderstanding the key philosophical concept of “substance” by:  
 
“…forgetting that substance, of which they have no correct idea, is prior to these other 
things.  For number qua number has peculiar attributes, such as oddness and evenness, 
commensurability and equality, excess and defect (Met. Γ 1004b9-12)”  
 
and ultimately (c) falling into (A) the ontological error of empiricism by supposing 
that: “…all attributes are accidental (πάντα κατὰ συμβεβηκός) (Met. Γ 1007a30-31)” 
because they cannot themselves philosophically make sense of the architectonic 
structure of the world and into (B) the epistemological error of relativism by supposing 
that: “…everything [is] relative – relative to opinion and perception (πρός τι ποιεῖν 
ἅπαντα καὶ πρὸς δόξαν καὶ αἴσθησιν), so that nothing either has come to be or will be 
without some one’s first thinking so.  But if things have come to be or will be, evidently 
not all things are relative to opinion (Met. Γ 1011b5-7)”.   
Ultimately, then, we see (a) that Aristotle insists on the priority of philosophy 
before science on the basis that our thinking (both scientific and otherwise) is likely to 
go astray it if is not based upon a clear understanding of the ontological basis of the 
world and of the epistemological basis of our own thought and (b) that Aristotle insists 
that if we do not accept or understand that we see the world at a distance then we are 
likely to see both the world and ourselves as being a collection of “accidents” and / or 
that we are likely to see the world as being relative to our own opinions when both of 
these positions are palpably not the case37.  In other words, we see that Aristotle 
                                                 
37 I note that not only do Aristotle’s observations upon the world implicitly rebut the idea that 
(blind) “chance” is responsible for the world we encounter but that Aristotle explicitly (and 
repeatedly) rejects this position, as follows: 
 
“…with everything its corruption and perversion are not in any chance direction, but 
leads to the contrary and intermediate states (E.E. II 1227a36-37)” 
 
and also, following Paul Feyerabend, I note that modern thinking has begun to understand the 
truth of Aristotle’s position, as follows: “Today, after the arrival of the theory of relativity, 
quantum mechanics, the thermodynamics of open systems (Prigogine) and the most recent 
developments of the science of mechanics itself (Moser) it has become evident that Aristotelian 
physics with its emphasis on well-structured processes with a beginning, middle, and an end, 
and its denial of an absolute void provides a much more adequate natural philosophy than the 
mechanical point of view of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries which has retained its 
influence up to the present day.  And those who still rant and rave against him turn out to be 
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suggests that without philosophy grounding our thoughts we run the risk of seeing the 
world in physicalist terms or in mentalist / solipsistic / anthropocentric terms and I add 
(c) that Giovanni Reale correctly (in my view) breaks the (Aristotelian) discipline of 
philosophy down into (i) ousiology (the study of substance(s)) (ii) ontology (the study 
of being) (iii) aetiology (the study of principles) and (iv) theology (the study of divinity) 
and with this leading to (v) a distinction between “sensible” and “supersensible” and 
hence between physics and metaphysics38. 
 We also see (7) that Aristotle extends his architectonic structuring of the world 
down to the level of the “special sciences” each of which possesses the particular 
architectonic required by its subject matter.  On this matter let us not consider how 
Aristotle applies his philosophy to the “sciences” of physics or of zoology but how he 
treats the more problematic “special science” of politics and how he applies his general 
philosophical principles to this very specific dimension of reality.  Aristotle’s 
fundamental principle of politics as stated in his Politics is that: 
 
“…in every composite thing, where a plurality of parts, whether continuous or discrete, 
is combined to make a single common whole, there is always found a ruling and a 
subject factor (ἐν ἅπασιν ἐμφαίνεται τὸ ἄρχον καὶ τὸ ἀρχόμενον), and this characteristic 
of living things is present in them as an outcome of the whole in nature, since even in 
things that do not partake in life there is a ruling principle, as in the case of a musical 
scale (Pol. I 1254a28-33)” 
 
which shows us that Aristotle seeks to apply an overarching principle (which we have 
already seen applied in other contexts) that the nature and texture of the world is 
actualised by the “powers” (and “principles”) that are within it and which are specific to 
their subject matter and structured and hierarchical but also generalisable by analogy.  I 
comment that we see in outline here that Aristotle seeks to review and to highlight the 
commonalities of organic beings (“living things”) and inorganic beings (“musical 
scale”) and also their differences and that Aristotle suggests that we can expect the same 
principles to be operative in respect to human politics as we find in respect to other 
                                                 
“crude animals who bark at things they do not comprehend” (Albertus Magnus) (Problems of 
Empiricism: Philosophical Papers Volume 2 (Cambridge, 1981) p 15)” 
 
38 See Giovanni Reale’s The Concept of First Philosophy and the Unity of the Metaphysics of 
Aristotle (New York, 1980) 
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subject matters which seem to be (and are often treated as being) absolutely 
incomparable.   
Now, I add that we find that the consistency and scope of Aristotle’s vision 
which finds a common “ruling principle” in many distinct areas of worldy being does 
not preclude the fact that Aristotle’s consistency is achieved without reducing the 
subject39 and hence that Aristotle is able both to embed human politics in a wider reality 
and also to formulate the grounded but deep and subtle assessment of human political 
structures that Ed Kaitz describes below:  
 
“Aristotle’s observations are both sobering and chilling.  He watched and recorded with 
scientific detachment the rise and fall of dozens of creatively organised city-states in 
ancient Greece.  His keen empirical eye evaluated close to 160 different types of 
constitutions.  In other words, Aristotle did his scholarly work each day in a living, 
breathing political Petri dish of inestimable value to both ancient and modern political 
philosophers…Democracies, says Aristotle, tend to be pulled in one direction: toward a 
vilification of everything involving merit, hierarchy, inequality, proportion, and worth.  
For Aristotle, this type of democratic “energy” actually begins at birth: “People are 
prone to think that the fact of their all being equally free-born means that they are all 
absolutely equal”.  The duty of a mature legislator and statesman, says Aristotle, is to 
spend much of his time pulling his country in the opposite direction from where the 
righteous wind tends to blow in a democracy.  That means blocking legislation that 
undermines the ability of talented, qualified, and hardworking individuals to receive the 
benefit of their exertions in due proportion…By defending the rich, the statesman 
establishes much-needed ballast against the tendency in democracy to introduce “radical 
legislation”40” 
 
and with Robert Paul Wolff agreeing that political structures do possess such “ruling 
principles” or “virtues”, as follows: 
 
“…we might say, for example, that the virtue of a monarchy is loyalty, for the state is 
gathered into the person of the king, and the society is bound together by each subject’s 
                                                 
39 Aryeh Kosman explains this principle well, as follows: “In none of these teachings does the 
individual subject disappear; whether in friendship, polity, or contemplation, the self is 
enhanced by incorporation, not diminished (“Aristotle on the Desirability of Friends” in Virtues 
of Thought: Essays on Plato and Aristotle (Cambridge Mass., [orig. 2004] 2014) p 182)”  
 
40 Kaitz, Ed “Aristotle’s Warning” in American Thinker (2010) online 
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personal duty to him.  The virtue of a military dictatorship is honour; that of a 
bureaucratic dictatorship is efficiency.  The virtue of traditional liberal democracy is 
equality, while the virtue of a socialist democracy is fraternity.  The ideal nationalist 
democracy exhibits the virtue of patriotism, which is distinguished from loyalty by 
having the state itself as its object rather than the king41” 
 
and I note that Wolff argues that Aristotle is (alongside Emile Durkheim) a paradigm of 
the conservative tradition regarding which: “The fundamental insight of the 
conservative philosophy is that man is by nature a social being42” and with Wolff’s 
complementary critique of liberalism (reductionism / universalism / idealism / 
individualism without the individual etc.) being that: “…liberalism has made the 
mistake of supposing that man is no more than a combination of the bestial and the 
angelic, the passionate and the rational.  From such an assumption it follows naturally 
that man, like the beasts and angels, is essentially a lonely creature.  But, Aristotle tells 
us, man has a mode of existence peculiar to his species, based on the specifically human 
faculty for communication.  That mode of existence is society, which is a human 
community bound together by rational discourse and shared values43”.   
I conclude at this point, then, that Aristotle’s philosophical vision is a defence of 
nature and of the principles of nature as exhibited in beings generally and particularly in 
man since he is himself a principle as an individual.  I add, however, that Aristotle’s 
“individual” is very different than ours in the sense that he is not a brute individual who 
is an end and world in himself but he is, rather, contextualised by Aristotle as a 
conflicted and ruptured being whose individuality is corrected by the tapping into the 
depths of nature to develop the spheres and sciences of politics, philosophy, ethics etc44.  
                                                 
41 Wolff, Robert Paul “Beyond Tolerance” in A Critique of Pure Tolerance (Boston, 1965) p 3-4 
 
42 Wolff, Robert Paul Ibid. p 29 
 
43 Wolff, Robert Paul Ibid. p 30.  See also Kurt von Fritz’s “Aristotle’s Anthropological Ethics 
and its Relevance to Modern Problems” in Journal of the History of Ideas (1981). 
  
44 I note as an aside that I find a strong degree of commonality between the thought of Aristotle 
and that of Edmund Burke who argues (i) that: “A certain quantum of power must always exist 
in the community, in some hands, and under some appellation (Reflections on the Revolution in 
France (1790) §167)” (ii) that: “The only concern of the state is, that the capital taken in rent 
from the land, should be returned again to the industry from whence it came; and that it’s 
expenditure should be with the least possible detriment to the morals of those who expend it, 
and to those of the people to whom it is returned (Reflections on the Revolution in France 
(1790) § 189)” (iii) that: “Circumstances (which with some gentlemen pass for nothing) give in 
reality to every political principle its distinguishing colour, and discriminating effect (Ibid. §8)” 
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As regards the existence of “principles” in nature and of political “principles” I suggest 
that this fact is obvious and I offer my own assessment of the situation as being (A) that 
a modern Western person navigates the world politically along a scale from the 
principle of “self” as expressed by pure libertarianism or anarchism (a man should 
simply pursue his own interests), through establishment conservatism (a man should 
employ and maintain the state as an umbrella under which he is enabled to pursue his 
own interests), through to traditionalist conservatism (a man should take advantage of, 
express, be a part of, and conserve the principles of his society), through to national 
socialism (a community or state sets down the principles which the individual must 
follow), and international socialism (all people must follow the same collective 
ideology45) (B) that societal structures can be tribal, national, or imperial and with the 
very distinct principles of each being blood and myth, place and history, and interest 
and ideology (and I note the interesting overlap between myth, history, and ideology 
and the distinctness of blood, place, and interest) (C) that “principles” can be ideas and 
ideologies (and religions) which transcend and transform cultures and with our current 
modern situation being that the external myths of religion have been replaced by the 
internal myths of ideology (i.e. the case is now that we rather than Jesus have been 
tasked with “saving” the world, whale, mankind etc.) and (D) that individual countries 
and societies have their own “principles” just as do individual people with this 
effectively being “history” as opposed to “sociology” or “anthropology”.   
I ultimately suggest, then, regarding the architectonic structuring of being 
(following Aristotle) (1) that it is not merely possible to claim that the world is founded 
upon “principles” or “archai” but almost impossible to avoid reaching this conclusion 
(2) that accepting these “principles” requires us to accept that there is a structuring and 
meaningfulness in nature and in history and that, by thinking philosophically, we can 
see such things as A.N. Whitehead, as follows: 
                                                 
and (iv) that: “The rights of men are in a sort of middle, incapable of definition, but not 
impossible to be discerned (Ibid. §73)”. 
 
45 From the societal angle I suggest that there are clearly three basic modern “principles” of 
government – conservative (traditionalist), liberal (individualist), and socialist (collectivist) – 
and additional dimensionalities of power as internal / external, democratic / authoritarian, and 
local / imperial and I note that the “global” expression of liberalism is an unhindered free 
market, the “global” expression of socialism is global government, and the “global” expression 
of conservatism is the insistence that individual societies and nations should have the right of 





“A vegetable is a democracy; an animal is dominated by one, or more centres of 
experience…What is merely latent potentiality in lifeless matter, has awakened into 
some realisation in the vegetable.  But in each instance of vegetation, the total bodily 
organism strictly limits the individuality of expression in the parts.  The animal grade 
includes at least one central actuality, supported by the intricacy of bodily functioning.  
Purposes transcending (however faintly) the mere aim at survival are exhibited.  For 
animal life the concept of importance, in some of its many differentiations, has real 
relevance.  The human grade of animal life immensely extends this concept, and 
thereby introduces novelty of functioning as essential for varieties of importance46”   
 
from which we see that and that the “principles” and “powers” which animate us are the 
“principles” and “powers” of nature which are analogously found in various 
manifestations of nature.  As regards the relationship of our “principles” with “nature” I 
add (3) that by shifting the location of principles from nature to us we thereby move the 
“principles” and “powers” into ourselves and transmogrify and mythologise our picture 
of ourselves and of the world around us (and see my Aristotle on the Meaning of Man 
for detailed consideration of this point).  I add regarding Aristotle’s politics that we find 
that the core of his political position is (A) that if we accept that we are “social animals” 
which cannot properly exist apart from society our consideration of human existence 
must be able to accept and accommodate the existence of society in its picturing of the 
world and (B) that societies exist locally as individuals in an analogous sense as people 
exist locally as individuals and that it is reasonable to conclude that power channels 
through societies by means of their structures / culture / history in a parallel way as 
human life / culture / history / wealth etc. channels itself through human individuals and 
shapes them.   
 Ultimately, then, I hope that the reader can now see the accuracy of G.W.F. 
Hegel’s assessment of Aristotle, that: 
 
“He [i.e. Aristotle] gets the sensuous phenomenon before him in its entire completeness, 
and omits nothing, be it ever so common.  All sides of knowing enter his mind, all 
interest him; all are handled by him with depth and exhaustiveness…[and] 
Aristotle…abandons a determination only when he has traced it to another sphere 
wherein it retains no longer its former shape…[and] sometimes Aristotle does not aim 
                                                 
46 Whitehead, A.N. “Expression” in Modes of Thought (New York, 1938) p 24-28 
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to reduce all to unity, or at least to a unity of antithetic elements; but, on the contrary, to 
hold fast each one in its determinateness, and thus to preserve it47” 
 
and that he is also of a mind to question Wittgenstein’s assertion that:  
 
“Most of the propositions and questions to be found in philosophical works are not false 
but nonsensical (TLP 4.003)”  
 
by assessing whether all, or indeed any, of Aristotle’s above philosophical statements 
are, indeed, “nonsensical”.  The reader should already suspect that I find a deep and 
mature meaningfulness in all of Aristotle’s thought and also a destructively egotistical 
and “nonsensical” principle of shallowness inherent in Wittgenstein’s thought (despite 
its elegance and other merits).  I summarise the above assessment as being the 
structuring of the world into hierarchies of “principles” as (1) the “categories” of being, 
(2) the “elements” of being, (3) the faculties which operate through “contraries”, (4) the 
scala naturae and the cutting of nature “at the joints”, (5) the analogy of the “master 
craftsman” who can understand and master the world, (6) the epistemological mental 
structuring which runs parallel to the ontological structuring of being, and (7) the 















                                                 
47 Hegel, G.W.F. “The Philosophy of Aristotle” The Journal of Speculative Philosophy ([orig. 




2 Aristotle on Passion and Action 
  
Having outlined Aristotle’s framework “architectonic” above, let us now 
consider the building blocks of that structure moving from “passions” to “states” and 
then to “actions”.  We find that Aristotle defines “pathos” (best though not comfortably 
translated as “affection” following the latin word “affectio” meaning the relation or 
disposition towards something produced in a person; a change in the state of the body or 
mind of a person; feeling, emotion; love, affection or good will towards somebody; will, 
volition, inclination) by reference to “pleasure and pain” and hence: “…by [affections] 
(πάθη) I mean…the feelings that are accompanied by pleasure (ἡδονὴ) and pain (λύπη) 
(N.E. II 1105b23)” and also by reference to its being “passive” in the sense that:  
 
“…passive qualities ([ποιότητος] παθητικὰ ποιότητες) and affections (πάθη)… [are] 
“Just as honey itself contains sweetness and, therefore is said to be sweet”…we call 
honey sweet, as we said; but we do not imply that the honey itself is in some way 
affected.  And so with all similar cases.  Again, if we take heat and cold, though we call 
all such things passive, we do not imply that the things which admit or possess them are 
passive.  We mean that the qualities (ποιοτήτων πάθους) mentioned can, one and all, 
cause a sensation (ποιητικὴν παθητικαὶ ποιότητες).  The sense (πάθος), for example, of 
taste is affected by sweetness and sourness, by coldness and warmth that of touch (ἀφή) 
(Cat. 9a28–9b8)” 
 
and with this relationship defining existence on the basis (a) that: “…he who assigns 
“able to affect, or be affected by, something” (τὸ δυνατὸν παθεῖν ἢ ποιῆσαι) as a 
property of “being” (ἴδιον τοῦ ὄντος), by assigning the property potentially, has 
assigned it in relation to what exists (πρὸς ὂν) (Top. V 139a5-7)”, (b) that: 
 
“…every disposition and every affection naturally comes into being in that of which it 
is a disposition or affection, for example, knowledge in the soul, since it is a disposition 
of soul (πᾶσα γὰρ διάθεσις καὶ πᾶν πάθος ἐν ἐκείνῳ πέφυκε γίνεσθαι οὖ ἐστὶ διάθεσις ἢ 
πάθος, καθάπερ καί ἡ ἐπιστήμη ἐν ψυχῇ διάθεσις οὗσα ψυχῆς) (Top. VI 145a35-37)” 
 
and (c) that: “A property (Ἴδιον) is something which does not show the essence of a 
thing (τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι) but belongs to it alone and is predicted convertibly of it (ὑπάρχει 
καί ἀντικατηγορεῖται τοῦ πράγματος).  For example, it is a property of man (ἴδιον 
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ἀνθρώπου) to be capable of learning grammar; for if a certain being is a man, he is 
capable of learning grammar, and if he is capable of learning grammar, he is a man 
(Top. I 102a18-22)” which shows the full complexity of Aristotle’s world as a world of 
“beings” and of their possible48 and actual “properties”49 and “dispositions”. 
I add that Aristotle’s “feeling” or “pathos” covers both emotional / mental 
feeling and also sensual / physical feeling and also that his account of reality seeks to 
cover both the formal essences of “being” and also the affections and dispositions of the 
souls and bodies of organic, and particularly human, beings.  To the basic building 
block of “pathos” I add Aristotle’s further concepts of “dunameis” or “faculties” or 
“powers” or “potentialities” which Aristotle defines as follows:  
 
“…faculties (δυνάμεις) [are] the things in virtue of which we are said to be capable of 
feeling these (καθ᾽ ἃς παθητικοὶ τούτων), e.g. of becoming angry or being pained or 
feeling pity (N.E. II 1105b23-25)”   
 
“habits” or “states” or “hexeis” which Aristotle explains as follows: 
 
“Dispositions (διαθέσεις)…are qualities easy to move or to change, such as heat, cold, 
disease, health, and so on.  A man is disposed in some manner according to all such 
conditions but rapidly undergoes change.  Being warm, he may soon become cold; 
being well, he may soon become sick.  So it is with all other dispositions, unless one 
should chance to become second nature through long lapse of time, proving either 
inveterate or else, at the least, very hard to displace, when we might, I think, call it a 
habit (ἕξις) (Cat. 8b36–9a4)”50   
                                                 
48 Cf. “It is self-evident that nothing prevents the accident from being temporarily or relatively a 
property; for example, the position of sitting, though it is an accident, will at the time be a 
property…nothing prevents the accident from becoming both a relative and a temporary 
property, but it will never be a property absolutely (Top. I 102b21-23)” 
 
49 Cf. “Our first presupposition must be that in nature nothing acts on, or is acted on by, any 
other thing at random, nor may anything come from anything else, unless we mean that it does 
so in virtue of a concomitant attribute (ληπτέον δὴ πρῶτον ὅτι πάντων τῶν ὄντων οὐθὲν οὔτε 
ποιεῖν πέφυκεν οὔτε πάσχειν τὸ τυχὸν ὑπὸ τοῦ τυχόντος, οὐδὲ γίγνεται ὁτιοῦν ἐξ ὁτουοῦν, ἂν 
μή τις λαμβάνῃ κατὰ συμβεβηκός).  For how would “white” come from “musical”, unless 
“musical” happened to be an attribute of the not-white or of the black?  No “white” comes from 
“not-white” – and not from any “not-white”, but from black or some intermediate colour.  
Similarly, “musical” comes to be from “not-musical”, but not from any thing other than 
musical, but from “unmusical” or any intermediate state there may be (Phys. I 188a31-34)” 
 
50 Cf. “…we feel anger and fear without choice (ἀπροαιρέτως), but the virtues (αἱ ἀρεταὶ) are 
modes of choice or involve choice (προαιρέσεις τινὲς ἢ οὐκ ἄνευ προαιρέσεως)…For this 
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and “actuality” or “actualisation” or “energeia” which Aristotle explains as follows: 
 
“…knowledge, like knowing, is spoken in two ways – as potential and as actual (ὧν τὸ 
μὲν δυνάμει τὸ δὲ ἐνεργείᾳ).  The potentiality, being, as matter, universal and indefinite, 
deals with the universal and indefinite (ἡ μὲν οὖν δύναμις ὡς ὕλη τοῦ καθόλου οὖσα 
καὶ ἀόριστος τοῦ καθόλου καὶ ἀορίστου ἐστίν); but the actuality, being definite, deals 
with a definite object, - being a “this”, it deals with a “this” (ἡ δ᾽ ἐνέργεια ὡρισμένη καὶ 
ὡρισμένου, τόδε τι οὖσα τοῦδέ τινος) (Met. M 1087a15-19)” 
 
and I elaborate regarding this structuring of being (i) that “pathē” comprise the 
structuring of organic and “composite” substances in the sense that they allow 
organisms to receive the “active” qualities of the things that they encounter in the world 
(e.g. the sweetness of sugar)51 and (ii) that passive “dunameis” must be actualised 
through active “energeiai” or “activities” or “actualities” and also through “praxeis” or 
“actions” and through “hexeis” or “habits” and “kineseis” or “changes” (and this can be 
change of place (i.e. movement), change of quality, of relationship etc.) and with 
“actuality” being a valid term for this expression of being since it represents the 
channelling of the “activity” of being which is the “now” of existence (rather than just 
being the mere general potentiality for this realisation).   
I explain this last point further as (iii) that the full picture of Aristotelian being is 
not just of “potentialities” and “activities” statically or mechanically inhering in a 
“substance” or “ousia” but that these “energeiai” (from “en” or “in” and “ergon” or 
“function” / “work”) or “activities” are dynamically actualised within and as an 
expression of the structured being of any given “ousia” or “substance” or “being” 52 (and 
with the paradigm example of an “ousia” or “substance” being a living organism (see 
                                                 
reason also they are not faculties (δυνάμεις)…all that remains is that they should be states of 
character (ἕξεις) (N.E. II 1106a2-12)”.  
 
51 I note that Carl Jung agrees with Aristotle – against the standard modern position – that 
“emotions” are “passive”, as follows: “Emotion, incidentally, is not an activity of the individual 
but something that happens to him (“The Shadow” in Aion: Researches into the Phenomenology 
of the Self (London, 1959) p 8-9)”. 
 
52 Cf. “…it is as that which is building is to that which is capable of building, and the waking to 
the sleeping, and that which is seeing to that which has its eyes shut but has sight, and that 
which has been shaped out of the matter to the matter (Met. Θ 1048b2-3)” 
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Met. Θ 1050a21-23)53).  I add that a variant form of “actuality” is “entelecheia” (from 
“en” or “in” and “telos” or “end”) which expresses this dynamism further as being the 
“end” of being as a “goal directed principle” both in the “static” abstraction of the 
“eidos” or “form” or mode of being54 and also as the “dynamic” life cycle of the 
concrete “being” or individual “ousia” centred around the principle of “life” which is 
such that: “…what has been born must have growth (αὔξησις), a highest point of 
development (ἀκμὴ), and decay (φθίσις) (De An. III 434a24-25)”55 (and for the 
distinction between energeia and entelecheia see Met. Θ 1047a30-1047b2). 
As regards the meaning and value of the above analysis I suggest that it is 
important for us to see that Aristotle is using the example of man and of his ethical 
structuring in order to explain the structuring of nature itself and I add regarding the 
particular significance of ethical “states” or “hexeis” (a) that these “states” are an 
example of the actualisation of a potentiality (b) that they are an important example of 
“states of being” (e.g. of having judgement, temperance) occurring on the back of prior 
building blocks of being – the “affections” or “emotions” – and that they therefore give 
us a privileged insight into a structuring and process that we find generally in nature, 
and hence (c) that these “states” observably come-to-be in the sense that they develop in 
us through the education of our natural faculties and then represent our comportment to 
the world rather than being a physical or mechanical or even a purely sensual or 
informational exchange or interaction with the outside world and (d) that these human 
states give us a clear case study for our consideration of worldly being since they show 
us that we are subject to development, education, coming-to-be, natural structuring, and 
evolution which can be assumed to have a wider scientific and philosophical 
                                                 
53 Cf. “…life is an activity (ἡ δὲ ζωὴ ἐνέργειά τις ἐστί), and each man is active about those 
things and with those faculties that he loves most (καὶ ἕκαστος περὶ ταῦτα καὶ τούτοις ἐνεργεῖ ἃ 
καὶ μάλιστ᾽ ἀγαπᾷ); e.g. the musician is active with his hearing in reference to tunes, the student 
with his mind in reference to theoretical questions, and so on in each case; now pleasure 
completes the activities, and therefore life, which they desire (ἡ δ᾽ ἡδονὴ τελειοῖ τὰς ἐνεργείας, 
καὶ τὸ ζῆν δή, οὗ ὀρέγονται).  It is with good reason, then, that they aim at pleasure too, since 
for every one it completes life, which is desirable (N.E. X 1175a12-17)”. 
 
54 Cf. “By form I mean the essence of each thing and its primary substance (εἶδος δὲ λέγω τὸ τί 
ἦν εἶναι ἑκάστου καὶ τὴν πρώτην οὐσίαν) (Met. Z 1032b1-2)” 
 
55 Cf. “…we state the function of man (ἀνθρώπου ἔργον) to be a certain kind of life (ζωήν τινα), 
and this to be activity or actions of the soul (ψυχῆς ἐνέργειαν καὶ πράξεις) implying a rational 
principle (μετὰ λόγου), and the function of a good man to be the good and noble performance of 
these, and if any action is well performed in accordance with the appropriate excellence (κατὰ 
τὴν οἰκείαν ἀρετὴν) (N.E. I 1098a12-15)” 
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significance in respect to the nature and processes of nature itself but with this 
significance being very difficult (and perhaps impossible) for us to fully unpack.   
More particularly, we see that the kernel of Aristotle’s argument is that “virtues” 
are significant as being formed “habits” rather than surface “emotions” or fixed 
“faculties”, as follows: 
 
“…knowledge (ἐπιστήμη) is considered as lasting and hard to displace from the mind, 
though a man may, in fact, have acquired it in only a moderate measure…And the same 
will hold good of the virtues (ἀρετή) – for instance, of temperance (σωφροσύνη), 
judgement (δικαιοσύνη) (Cat. 8b30-34)” 
 
and with Aristotle’s interest in “habits” and in “ethics” being that they give us 
observable and manipulable instances of creative power which appear in nature on the 
basis that:  
 
“…activity plainly comes into being and is not present at the start like a piece of 
property (ἡ δ᾽ ἐνέργεια δῆλον ὅτι γίνεται καὶ οὐχ ὑπάρχει ὥσπερ κτῆμά τι) (N.E. IX 
1169b29-30)” 
 
and with his paradigm example being explained as that: “…moral character (τὸ ἦθος) is, 
as even its name implies that it has its growth from habit (ἀπὸ ἔθους), [achieved] by our 
often moving in a certain way [and it is] a habit not innate in us is [which is] finally 
trained to be operative in that way (ἐθίζεται δὲ τὸ ὑπ᾽ ἀγωγῆς μὴ ἐμφύτου τῷ πολλάκις 
κινεῖσθαι πώς, οὕτως ἤδη τὸ ἐνεργητικόν) (which we do not observe in inanimate 
objects, for not even if you throw a stone upward ten thousand times will it ever rise 
upward unless under the operation of force) (E.E. II 1220b1-5)”.  I add that Aristotle is 
also interested in “ends”, “aims”, “goods”, and “superfluities” which he explains as 
follows: 
 
“…a good life is a superfluity (τὸ δὲ εὖ ζῆν ἐστὶν ἐκ περιουσίας), while life itself is a 
necessity (αὐτὸ δὲ τὸ ζῆν ἀναγκαῖον)…For example, to be a philosopher is better than 
to make money, but it is not preferable for him who lacks the necessities of life (Top. III 
118a8-13)”  
 
and also as that: “…a “state” indicates the [sign] of virtue, whereas “good” indicates not 
the [sign] but a quality (ἡ μὲν ἕξις τί ἐστι σημαίνει ἡ ἀρετή, τὸ ἀγαθὸν οὐ τί ἐστιν ἀλλὰ 
 43 
ποιόν) (Top. VI 144a17-19)” from which we see that Aristotle’s ultimate aim is (a) to 
understand the nature of the “superfluity” of the “good” and of “virtue” (or 
“excellence”) (b) to understand how “good” emerges (as well as and alongside brute 
“actuality”) as a state or disposition – naturally and / or by acquisition – in the context 
of the subject of human being and (c) to understand the circumstances within the world 
through which this “good” can be realised and actualised (and hence we see again that 
Aristotle uses the study of ourselves as an method through which we can understand 
nature). 
 Now, having considered the basic structuring of Aristotle’s thought about 
passion and action above and having seen the depth, clarity and subtlety of Aristotle’s 
insight, let us now consider that we must place this insight side by side with the 
limitedness and reductionism of philosophers such as René Descartes who asserts such 
things as that: “…a man who walks across a room shows much better what motion is 
than a man who says “It is the actuality of a potential being in so far as it is potential”, 
and so on56” and such as Richard Rorty who asserts such things as that:  
 
“It may seem weird to say that there might turn out to be no living bodies, or that there 
might turn out to be no minds.  It was of course weird to say it turned out that the earth 
was not at rest.  It seems to be that what we need to explain is not the truth of a 
proposition, but the inclination of human beings to assert the proposition57” 
 
and with our problem here being that this antiphilosophy needs to be explained and 
explicitly countered since it is all-pervading, i.e. we must present the choice to the 
reader that we can either trace the “joints” of nature with Aristotle or simply pursue our 
own thoughts and desires without this reflectixity and humility on the basis that 
“nature” does not exist and is merely whatever we make of it.    
I suggest that Aristotle combats such positions – which he would have described 
as “sophism” – as follows.  First, (1) in overall terms we see that Aristotle refuses to 
remove “man” (i.e. the “human observer”) from our philosophical account of the world 
or from the reality that we encounter on a day-to-day basis and Aristotle does this on the 
basis that we must take into account the fact that we do and are able to positively 
                                                 
56 Descartes, René “Letter To Mersenne 16th October 1639”, CSM III §597 p 139 
 
57 Rorty, Richard “Mind as Ineffable” in Richard Q. Elvee (ed.) Mind in Nature; Nobel 
Conference XVII (San Francisco, 1982) p 90 
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replicate the world (to some extent) through our representations of the world, as 
follows:  
 
“…“knowledge” is said to be of the “knowable,” but is a “state” or “disposition” not of 
the “knowable” but of the “soul” (ἡ γὰρ ἐπιστήμη ἐπιστητοῦ λέγεται, ἕξις δὲ καὶ 
διάθεσις οὐκ ἐπιστητοῦ ἀλλὰ ψυχῆς) (Top. IV 124b34-35)”    
 
and this knowledge is both natural to us and also transformative of us in the sense that:  
 
“…if knowledge is predicated of someone, then grammatical knowledge or musical 
knowledge or one of the other kinds of knowledge will be predicated of him, and if a 
man possesses knowledge or if the description which he has is derived from his 
knowledge, then he will also possess grammatical knowledge or musical knowledge, or 
one of the other kinds of knowledge, or will derive his description from one of them, 
being called, for example, a “grammarian” or a “musician” (Top. II 111a37-111b4)” 
 
which shows us and gives us concrete proof that there is a creative meaningfulness and 
pregnancy of possibility in nature – which Aristotle explains as that: “…nature always 
implies a subject in which it inheres (ἐν ὑποκειμένῳ ἐστὶν ἡ φύσις ἀεί) (Phys. II 
192b34)” – which is peculiarly expressed in and through “man”.  I add that we see here 
Aristotle’s approach towards or strategy for philosophically explaining the world 
(which was outlined in detail in my Aristotle on the Meaning of Man) which is that the: 
“…natural way of doing this [i.e. of engaging with the world] is to start from the things 
which are more knowable and obvious to us [e.g. the existence of man] and proceed 
toward those which are clearer and more knowable by nature [e.g. the nature of 
“substance” or “ousia”] (Phys. I 184a12-13)”.  In other words, Aristotle insists 
throughout that we should never forget that our knowledge is necessarily knowledge of 
the world from a human perspective.  
Second, (2) we see that Aristotle refuses to reduce the world to mathematics on 
the basis that: 
 
“…the affections of the soul are inseparable from the physical matter of living beings 
(τὰ πάθη τῆς ψυχῆς οὕτως ἀχώριστα τῆς φυσικῆς ὕλης τῶν ζῴων) in the way in which 
anger and fear (θυμὸς καὶ φόβος) are inseparable and not in the way in which line and 
plane (γραμμὴ καὶ ἐπίπεδον) are (De An. I 403b17-19)”  
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which shows us (a) that Aristotle regards “pathos” as “emotion” as being inextricably 
linked to physical nature and hence he argues (famously) that being angry or afraid has 
both psychological and physiological aspects and (b) that Aristotle’s view of reality is a 
holistic one in which he regards both human emotions and geometric and quantitative 
characteristics as being characteristics of the human body (though I note that he is 
explicitly arguing in the above quoted passage that man cannot properly be seen or 
represented mathematically; and see also Met. M 1078a23-30).  In respect to his 
insistence upon “bodies” I add that Aristotle describes the relationship between pathē 
and bodies as being that “…to be…bodily conditions (σωματικά)…is thought to be 
characteristic of feeling (πάθους) rather than of a state of character (ἕξεως) (N.E. IV 
1128b14-15)” and also that: 
 
“In most cases it seems that none of the affections, whether active or passive, can exist 
apart from [the] body (φαίνεται δὲ τῶν μὲν πλείστων οὐθὲν ἄνευ [τοῦ] σώματος 
πάσχειν οὐδὲ ποιεῖν).  This applies to anger (ὀργίζεσθαι), courage (θαρρεῖν), desire 
(ἐπιθυμεῖν) and sensation generally (ὅλως αἰσθάνεσθαι), though possibly thinking is an 
exception (μάλιστα δ' ἔοικεν ἰδίῳ τὸ νοεῖν).  But if this too is a kind of imagination, or 
at least is dependent upon imagination (εἰ δ' ἐστὶ καὶ τοῦτο φαντασία τις ἢ μὴ ἄνευ 
φαντασίας), even this cannot exist apart from [the] body (οὐκ ἐνδέχοιτ' ἂν οὐδὲ τοῦτ' 
ἄνευ σώματος εἶναι) (De An. I 403a6-10)” 
 
which shows us that Aristotle (i) regards pathē as being bodily and hexeis as being 
psychic and (ii) suggests that the only (possibly partial) exception to this picture of an 
interfusion of body and soul is our power for thinking or “nous” though even here 
Aristotle is equivocal and he argues elsewhere that “nous” is itself a “state” that we 
must attain (see Post. An. II 99b18)58.  We see, then, that Aristotle avoids the 
simplification of Cartesian splitting of the world into “mind” and “body” and also the 
subsumption of mind into world or world into mind (or into “God”) and we see, rather, 
                                                 
58 I note that Aristotle’s fuller position on “nous” is that there is both (a) a “passive” nous which 
“is such because it becomes all things (ἔστιν ὁ μὲν τοιοῦτος νοῦς τῷ πάντα γίνεσθαι)” and 
which hence involves our desiring and sensory world and (b) an “active” nous which “makes all 
things (ὁ δὲ τῷ πάντα ποιεῖν)” and which “is a kind of positive state like light (ὡς ἕξις τις, οἷον 
τὸ φῶς) (De An. III 430a14-16)” and which involves our peculiar ability to think and to 
contemplate the world.  I comment that it certainly seems that “passive” nous is more 
unambiguously bodily than “active” nous and that Aristotle’s ultimate position seems to be that 
there is an “active” state in nature which produces a “passive” state in us (and see Russell 
Winslow’s “On the Life of Thinking in Aristotle’s De Anima” in Epoché (2009)). 
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that Aristotle seeks to understand and appreciate (i) the relationship between the human 
body and human being (ii) the relationship between body and mind (iii) the relationship 
between mind and world and (iv) the precise nature of the human mind and, also, of the 
meaning of the meaning which it takes from in the world59. 
Third, (3) we find that Aristotle’s philosophy seeks to explain the world 
conceptually through philosophy rather than descriptively through science and with 
Aristotle’s conceptual approach being stated, as follows:  
 
“...when the agent is there (<καὶ> γὰρ τοῦ μὲν ποιοῦντος ὅταν ὑπάρχῃ), the patient 
becomes something (γίνεταί τι τὸ πάσχον): but when “states” are there (ἕξεων 
παρουσῶν), the patient no longer becomes but already is (οὐκέτι γίνεται, ἀλλ' ἔστιν 
ἤδη) – and “forms” (i.e. “ends”) are a kind of “state” (τὰ δ' εἴδη καὶ τὰ τέλη ἕξεις τινές).  
As to the “matter”, it (qua matter) is passive (ἡ δ' ὕλη ᾗ ὕλη παθητικόν) (GC I 324b16-
19)”   
 
which reiterates (i) that matter is “passive” and acted upon (ii) that Aristotle’s hexeis are 
the “active” transformations or phases of a “passive” pre-existing something (iii) that 
“forms (eidē)” and “ends (telē)” are “…kinds of “state” (ἕξεις τινές)” and (iv) that 
Aristotle’s pathos / hexis distinction is connected to the distinction between “being” and 
“becoming”60.    
I add that Aristotle argues regarding “truth” which he describes as an “affection 
of thought”, as follows: 
 
                                                 
59 I note that, as Fred D. Miller Jr observes, Aristotle avoids the error of: “The Pythagoreans and 
Plato [who] failed to take into account the indispensable role of the body (“Aristotle’s 
Philosophy of Soul” in Review of Metaphysics (1999) p 334)”.  I also note that Carl Jung agrees 
that we can expect body and mind to be significantly related, as follows: “...so intimate is the 
intermingling of bodily and psychic traits that not only can we draw far-reaching inferences as 
to the constitution of the psyche from the constitution of the body, but we can also infer from 
psychic peculiarities the corresponding bodily characteristics (“A Psychological Theory of 
Types” in Modern Man in Search of a Soul (London, [orig. 1933] 1961) p 85)” (cf. “Experience 
shows that it [i.e. the ego] rests on two seemingly different bases: the somatic and the psychic 
(“The Ego” in Aion: Researches into the Phenomenology of the Self (London, 1959) p 3).” 
 
60 Cf. “…that which has become habitual becomes as it were natural (καὶ γὰρ τὸ εἰθισμένον 
ὥσπερ πεφυκὸς ἤδη γίγνεται); in fact, habit is something like nature (ὅμοιον γάρ τι τὸ ἔθος τῇ 
φύσει) for the distance between “often” and “always” is not great, and nature belongs to the idea 
of “always”, “habit” to that of “often” (ἐγγὺς γὰρ καὶ τὸ πολλάκις τῷ ἀεί, ἔστιν δ᾽ ἡ μὲν φύσις 
τοῦ ἀεί, τὸ δὲ ἔθος τοῦ πολλάκις) (Rhet. I 1370a5-8)” 
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“As to that which “is” in the sense of being true or of being by accident (τὸ δ᾽ ὡς 
ἀληθὲς ὂν καὶ κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς), the former depends on a combination in thought and 
is an affection of thought (τὸ μέν ἐστιν ἐν συμπλοκῇ διανοίας καὶ πάθος ἐν ταύτῃ) 
(which is the reason why it is the principles, not of that which “is” in this sense, but of 
that which is outside and can exist apart, that are sought (διὸ περὶ μὲν τὸ οὕτως ὂν οὐ 
ζητοῦνται αἱ ἀρχαί, περὶ δὲ τὸ ἔξω ὂν καὶ χωριστόν));  and the latter is not necessary 
but indeterminate (τὸ δ᾽ οὐκ ἀναγκαῖον ἀλλ᾽ ἀόριστον) (Met. K 1065a21-25)”  
 
which shows us (i) that “truth” is a “pathos” internal to us and is an abstraction which 
relates to but does not directly represent the substance itself and (ii) that “accident” is 
external and actual but superficial to the substance itself (and I note that both of these 
cases represent meanings which are peripheral to a substance).  Hence we see (iii) that 
“substance” is something that we analyse and break down in our own thought for our 
understanding and convenience and with the subtlety and maturity of Aristotle’s 
position being very different from Richard Rorty’s evasive idea that truth is equivalent 
to “our general training in uttering true sentences, our learning of the language61”.  I 
contrarily suggest that Aristotle is concerned with positively assessing our engagement 
with the world in a full rounded sense by seeing (a) regarding “truth” that we establish 
“truth” in our observation of being in the world whilst also needing to appreciate the 
difference between the “meaning” of our truth and the “meaning” of being itself  (and 
we see the importance here of “internal” and “external”) and (b) regarding “being” that 
we establish and define the meaningfulness of “essence” and the triviality of “accident”.   
We therefore see, in outline, that Aristotle’s objections to our modern perspective are 
(1) that we must take into account the fact that we engage with the world as human 
beings, (2) that we cannot reduce the world to mathematics, and (3) that we can only 
understand the world completely through philosophy and not through science. 
Moving on, then, let us consider what Aristotle’s position on “passion” and 
“action” informs us about Aristotle’s methodology and its provenance.  I suggest that it 
is important to note that the original and common (in Aristotle’s time) meaning of the 
word “pathos” seems to have been its use in the theatre to explain human emotion: 
“Misfortunes and painful experiences when on a large scale are called affections (ἔτι τὰ 
μεγέθη τῶν συμφορῶν καὶ λυπηρῶν πάθη λέγεται) (Met. Δ 1022b21)” (and Aristotle 
                                                 
61 Rorty, Richard “Mind as Ineffable” in Richard Q. Elvee (ed.) Mind in Nature; Nobel 
Conference XVII (San Francisco, 1982) p 71 
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effectively uses “pathos” to mean “emotion” in his Rhetoric, Poetics etc.) but that 
Aristotle seems to have deliberately redeployed the term to expand its meaning and 
make it serve as a unifying philosophical term62 signifying:  
 
“…a quality in respect of which a thing can be altered (πάθος λέγεται ἕνα μὲν τρόπον 
ποιότης καθ᾽ ἣν ἀλλοιοῦσθαι ἐνδέχεται), e.g. white and black, sweet and bitter (Met. Δ 
1022b15-16)”   
 
which he can employ in his biological writings to describe the non-essential 
characteristics of organic being, as follows: “Περὶ δέ τῶν παθημάτων …I mean such 
conditions of the parts as the following (Λέγω δέ τὰ τοιαῦτα παθήματα τῶν μορίων): 
blue and dark colour of the eyes, high and deep pitch of the voice, and differences of 
colour and of hair or feathers (GA V 778a16-21)” (David Depew reasonably sees this 
use of “pathos” as being a biological “trait-vocabulary”) and also employ in order to 
explain the elements of language, as follows: 
 
“Words spoken are symbols or signs of affections or impressions of the soul (Ἔστι μὲν 
οὖν τὰ ἐν τῇ φωνῇ τῶν ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ παθημάτων σύμβολα); written words are the signs of 
words spoken (καὶ τὰ γραφόμενα τῶν ἐν τῇ φωνῇ).  As writing, so also is speech not the 
same for all races of men.  But the mental affections themselves, of which these words 
are primarily signs, are the same for the whole of mankind (ὧν μέντοι ταῦτα σημεῖα 
πρώτων, ταὐτὰ πᾶσι παθήματα τῆς ψυχῆς), as are also the objects of which those 
affections are representations or likenesses, images, copies (De Int. 16a4-8)”  
 
all of which shows us that Aristotle not merely possesses a terminology to represent 
physical facts, particulars, features, and beings but that he possesses (and formulates) a 
terminology which also represents our partially corresponding thoughts, opinions, and 
impressions of these natural beings and aspects of being63.   
                                                 
62 I note that Aristotle explicity argues that: “If no name already exists, then I think it our duty to 
coin one (Cat. 7b11-12)” 
 
63 I note that Aristotle’s basic assumption in respect to “signs” is that: “…if a peculiar affection 
applies to any individual class, e.g. courage to lions, there must be some corresponding sign of 
it (εἰ γάρ ἐστιν ἰδίᾳ τινὶ γένει ὑπάρχον ἀτόμῳ πάθος, οἷον τοῖς λέουσιν ἀνδρεία, ἀνάγκη καὶ 
σημεῖον εἶναί τι); for it has been assumed that body and soul are affected together…a sign is 
peculiar in the sense that the affection is peculiar to the class as a whole (τὸ γὰρ σημεῖον οὕτως 
ἴδιόν ἐστιν, ὅτι ὅλου γένους ἴδιόν ἐστι τὸ πάθος), and not to it alone, as we are accustomed to 
use the term.  Thus the same affection will be found in another class also, and man or some 
other animal will be brave.  Therefore he will have the sign; for ex hypothesi there is one sign of 
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In other words, I suggest that we generally see that Aristotle’s intention is (i) to 
record all of the instantiations of human being (using a series of standardised terms) and 
then to see how they translate into an overall picture of human activity and being (ii) to 
relate these instantiations of human being to the structures of human being and also (iii) 
to relate these instantiations of human being to the relationship between a human being 
and the world around him.  As always, we find that Aristotle’s thought is fully 
integrated and hence we see that Aristotle’s positions as stated above are fully in line 
with his basic philosophical approach to the world which is that:  
 
“…some things are said to be because they are substances (ὅτι οὐσίαι), others because 
they are affections of substance (ὅτι πάθη οὐσίας), others because they are a process 
towards substance (ὅτι ὁδὸς εἰς οὐσίαν), or destructions or privations or qualities of 
substance, or productive or generative of substance (φθοραὶ ἢ στερήσεις ἢ ποιότητες ἢ 
ποιητικὰ ἢ γεννητικὰ οὐσίας), or of things which are relative to substance (ἢ τῶν πρὸς 
τὴν οὐσίαν), or negations of one of these things or of substance itself (ἢ τούτων τινὸς 
ἀποφάσεις ἢ οὐσίας).  It is for this reason that we say even of non-being that it is non-
being.  As, then, there is one science which deals with all healthy things, the same 
applies in the other cases also…for each one class of things, as there is one perception, 
so there is one science, as for instance grammar, being one science, investigates all 
articulate sounds (Met. Γ 1003b6-21)”  
 
and that: “…the demonstration must start from certain premises and be about a certain 
subject and prove certain attributes (εἰ δὲ ἀποδεικτικὴ περὶ αὐτῶν ἐστί, δεήσει τι γένος 
εἶναι ὑποκείμενον καὶ τὰ μὲν πάθη τὰ δ᾽ ἀξιώματ᾽ αὐτῶν) (Met. α 997a5-7)”.  I suggest, 
then, that we see (a) that Aristotle’s philosophical vision of the world is an ousiology, 
i.e. is of substances or “ousiai” and of the attributes or “pathē” and “states” or “hexeis” 
which are or come-to-be in them (b) that this substantive basis of existence – i.e. of 
substantive beings or “wholes” – leads Aristotle to insist that our treatment of reality 
must always relate back and correspond to the particular substance or subject being 
treated and that this means that there cannot be a reductive “unity of science” but only 
an expansive consideration of the various structures and principles and their powers for 
                                                 
one affection (ἓν γὰρ ἑνὸς ἦν).  If, then, this is so, and we can collate signs of this kind in the 
case of animals which have only one particular affection, and if each affection has a sign, since 
it necessarily has only one sign, we shall be able to judge their character by their appearance 
(Pr. An. II 70b14-26)” and I comment that, as always, Aristotle is insisting here upon 
“substance” in the sense that he argues that a sign must be a sign of something. 
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analogy that we observe in nature64 and (c) that Aristotle’s observations regarding 
“man” in his Ethics as being an “ousia” having “pathē” and “hexeis” is simply a natural 
part of a much wider philosophical (and scientific) vision of reality. 
As regards modern observations regarding the obviousness of (and obvious 
value of) Aristotle’s perspective I add that Aristotle’s active / passive distinction is both 
a practical observation and an explicit ontological statement that our experience is an 
existential fact in the world in the sense that:  
 
“…where objects differ in kind the part of the soul answering to each of the two is 
different in kind (πρὸς γὰρ τὰ τῷ γένει ἕτερα καὶ τῶν τῆς ψυχῆς μορίων ἕτερον τῷ γένει 
τὸ πρὸς ἑκάτερον πεφυκός), since it is in virtue of a certain likeness and kinship with 
their objects that they have the knowledge they have (εἴπερ καθ᾽ ὁμοιότητά τινα καὶ 
οἰκειότητα ἡ γνῶσις ὑπάρχει αὐτοῖς) (N.E. VI 1139a9-11)”  
 
which is a “duality” which is well explained by Aryeh Kosman, as follows: 
 
“The perceptual capacities, and the faculties of reason and thought as well, are 
potentialities of the sensitive and intelligent subject to be affected in certain ways, to be 
acted upon by the sensible and intelligible forms of objects in the world.  When we 
think of them in this way, there is nothing particularly mysterious about those powers: 
they are simply the abilities to be open to certain affectations and closed to certain 
others – the reciprocal capacities, we might say, of being discriminatingly receptive and 
resistant65”.  
 
                                                 
64 I suggest that it is a gross philosophical error to suppose that we ordinarily deal with “data” or 
“sensa” in our engagement with the world since we do rather deal with things or wholes (books, 
computers, cups of tea, people etc.) and hence find that in reality: “…it is the whole that is 
better known by perception (τὸ γὰρ ὅλον κατὰ τὴν αἴσθησιν γνωριμώτερον) (Phys. I 184a25)”.  
I add that Aristotle argues both that types of being have their own sciences and hence: “Most of 
the principles… which are connected with a particular science are peculiar to it.  Hence to 
convey to us the principles connected with each particular science is the task of experience.  I 
mean, e.g. that it is for astronomical experience to convey to us the principles of astronomy (for 
it was not until the phenomena had been thoroughly apprehended that the demonstrations of 
astronomy were discovered) (Pr. An. I 46a18-22)” and also that most general terms are 
analogous in the sense that: “All things are not said to be actual in the same way but rather by 
analogy: as that is in that or to that, so this is in this or to this; for some are as motion to 
potentiality and others, as substance to some matter (λέγεται δὲ ἐνεργείᾳ οὐ πάντα ὁμοίως ἀλλ᾽ 
ἢ τῷ ἀνάλογον, ὡς τοῦτο ἐν τούτῳ ἢ πρὸς τοῦτο, τόδ᾽ ἐν τῷδε ἢ πρὸς τόδε) (Met. Θ 1048b6-9)”  
 
65 Kosman, Aryeh “Being Properly Affected: Virtues and Feelings in Aristotle’s Ethics” in 
Amélie O. Rorty (ed.) Essays on Aristotle’s Ethics (Berkeley, 1980) p 107  
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and also by Claudia Baracchi using a unnatural though philosophically suggestive use 
of language to explain this point, as follows: 
 
“…we may understand excellence [i.e. or “arētē” or “virtue”] as a possession, property, 
or propriety of the soul, as a hexis – that which a soul “has” and, when in action, 
shows…[and] the process [of learning] unfolds from a “having” to a “having”, through 
the enactment of a “having”…what is at stake is a certain transmission, or even 
translation, of a given “having”.  A certain activity is transferred from the outside to the 
inside, as it were.  Someone learning takes something in and makes it one’s own.  
Whether a way of acting is acquired from a teacher or from prevalent custom, the 
principle of action (that which directs and subtends it) is brought inside from the 
outside, substantially assimilated66” 
 
but with William Charlton outlining a further subtlety that:  
 
“At the deepest level in nature there can be no distinction between a power and what 
possesses it: the basic constituents of nature have no “internal constitution”…which can 
account for how an object is affected and affects other things67”  
 
or, in other words, that whilst we must describe the world (with Kosman and Baracchi) 
as a “duality” of external and internal, action and passion, body and soul, etc. and avoid 
simplifying the world by evading these relationships, we must also appreciate (with 
Charlton) that such distinctions are our mental distinctions (and our abstractions) and 
that the real world is an integrated world or situation in which beings are wholes which 
simply have their own intrinsic natural powers and engage in activities in the world 
which encompasses them.  
 I add that Eric Sanday observes that the “active” and “passive” distinction is in a 
sense an artificial or analogous distinction in the sense that: 
 
“…Aristotle calls this shared actuality “twofold” (ditton), similar in a sense to the 
twofold nature of the way up and the way down.  To submit ourselves to the way, we 
must submit to a single path going from the Piraeus to Athens and from Athens to the 
                                                 
66 Baracchi, Claudia  Aristotle’s Ethics as First Philosophy (Cambridge, 2008) p 117 & 109 
 
67 Charlton, William “Aristotelian Powers” in Phronesis (1987) p 288  
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Piraeus.  The path is one, but its being is two.  Similarly, when we submit to a 
perceptible, we submit to a certain self-awareness.  The grasp the animal has of the 
object, however partial it is, is a grasp the animal has of itself68” 
 
whilst we also see that it only through such an engagement with the world that a man 
can reflect upon himself as a man and thereby possess conscious self-awareness etc.  As 
regards why Descartes is wrong to dismiss the idea of “powers” on the basis that: “…a 
man who walks across a room shows much better what motion is than a man who says 
“It is the actuality of a potential being in so far as it is potential”, and so on69” I add that 
Michel Foucault explains the importance of seeing the world as “powers” as follows: 
 
“…there is power when there is a relationship between two free subjects and there is an 
imbalance in this relationship such that one can act on the other and the other is, or lets 
himself be, “acted upon”…[and this relationship is] Never equal, because as soon as 
there is power there is inequality.  But you could have reversible systems.  Take what 
happens in an erotic relationship, for example. I am not taking about a love relationship; 
I am talking only about an erotic relationship.  You know perfectly well that it is a game 
of power, and one in which physical strength is not necessarily the most important 
element…Only, what happens is that in societies, in most societies, maybe in [all 
societies], organisations are created to fix and maintain power relationships to the 
advantage of some, in a social, economic, political, institutional, et cetera, dissymmetry, 
which completely freezes the situation.  And this is what is generally called power in 
the strict sense70”  
 
and suggest that Foucault (as also Aristotle) is speaking of a deeper and nuanced 
worldly reality whereas Descartes is merely referring to the surface mechanisms of 
worldly being.  I add in respect to this distinction between “actuality” and “potentiality” 
A.N. Whitehead’s observation that: ““Actuality” is…decision amid “potentiality”.  It 
represents stubborn fact which cannot be evaded.  The real internal constitution of an 
actual entity progressively constitutes a decision conditioning the creativity which 
                                                 
68 Sanday, Eric “Phantasia in De Anima” in Claudia Baracchi (ed.) The Bloomsbury Companion 
to Aristotle (London, 2013) p 110 
 
69 Descartes, René “Letter To Mersenne 16th October 1639”, CSM III §597 p 139 
 
70 Foucault, Michel “Interview with Michel Foucault 3rd November 1980” in About the 
Beginning of the Hermeneutics of the Self (Chicago, [orig. 1980] 2016) p 129-130 
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transcends that actuality71” which suggests that the concept of “actuality” (and 
“potentiality”) must be seen as being the best conceptual representation that we can 



















                                                 
71 Whitehead, A.N. Process and Reality (Cambridge, 1929) p 68-69 
 
72 For a general discussion of the “pathē” see Amélie Oksenberg Rorty’s “Aristotle on the 
Metaphysical Status of Pathe” in The Review of Metaphysics (1984) and D.S. Hutchinson’s The 
Virtues of Aristotle (Routledge, 1986), for pathē as a structuring of reality see Alan Code’s 
“Aristotle’s Investigation of a Basic Logical Principle: Which Science Investigates the Principle 
of Non-Contradiction?” in Canadian Journal of Philosophy (1986), and for discussion of pathē 
as emotions Jamie Dow’s “Aristotle’s Theory of the Emotions: Emotions as Pleasures and 
Pains” in Michael Pakaluk & Giles Pearson (eds.) Moral Psychology and Human Action in 
Aristotle (Oxford, 2011).  For a consideration of Aristotle’s philosophy as an “ousiology” see 
Giovanni Reale’s The Concept of First Philosophy and the Unity of the Metaphysics of Aristotle 
(New York, [orig. 1967] 1980) and for an explanation of “entelecheia” see Stephen Menn’s 
“The Origins of Aristotle’s Concept of Energeia: Energeia and Dunamis” in Ancient 
Philosophy (1994)), Alfred E. Miller and Maria G. Miller’s “Aristotle’s Metaphysics as the 
Ontology of Being-Alive and its Relevance Today” in Proceedings of the Boston Area 
Colloquium in Ancient Philosophy (2004), and Wilfrid Sellars’ account of an Aristotelian 
(necessarily material and individuated) carrot in his “Aristotle and Emergent Evolution” (online, 
unpublished undated typescript).  For an interesting modern consideration of “states” see Robert 
Rosen’s “The Concept of State” in Life Itself: A Comprehensive Inquiry Into the Nature, Origin, 




3 Aristotle on Desire 
 
 Having considered the basic structuring of human being as “powers”, 
“emotions” “dispositions”, “states”, “activities” etc. let us move on to consider the 
irrational and innate orectic or desiring “side” of human being.  We find, first, that this 
“side” is itself structured as follows: “…appetite (ὄρεξις) is the genus of which desire 
(ἐπιθυμία), passion [or spirit] (θυμὸς), and wish (βούλησις) are the species (De An. II 
414b3-4)” and that it fits into a wider architectonic structure of human being, the two 
main heads of which are “mind” and “appetite”, as follows:  
 
“…the things which move the animal (τα κινοῦντα τὸ ζῷον) are intellect (διάνοιαν), 
imagination (φαντασίαν), purpose (προαίρεσιν), wish (βούλησιν) and [desire] 
(ἐπιθυμίαν).  Now all these can be referred to mind (νοῦν) and [appetite] (ὄρεξιν).  For 
imagination and sensation cover the same ground as the mind (Καὶ γὰρ ἡ φαντασία καὶ 
ἡ αἴσθησις τὴν αὐτὴν τῷ νῷ χώραν ἔχουσιν) (for they all exercise judgement (κριτικά)) 
though they differ in certain aspects as has been defined elsewhere (MA 700b17-22)”  
 
and with further detail of Aristotle’s position being (i) that “appetite” drives 
“movement” and implies “imagination” and “sensation” and / or “thought”, as follows:  
 
“…inasmuch as an animal is capable of appetite it is capable of self-movement (ᾗ 
ὀρεκτικὸν τὸ ζῷον, ταύτῃ αὑτοῦ κινητικόν); it is not capable of movement without 
possessing imagination (ὀρεκτικὸν δὲ οὐκ ἄνευ φαντασίας); and all imagination is 
either (1) calculative or (2) sensitive (φαντασία δὲ πᾶσα ἢ λογιστικὴ ἢ αἰσθητική).  In 
the latter all animals, and not only man, partake (ταύτης μὲν οὖν καὶ τὰ ἄλλα ζῷα 
μετέχει) (De An. III 433b28-31)”  
 
(see also MA 701a4-6) (ii) that “sensation” drives “imagination” and “appetite”, as 
follows: “If sensation, necessarily also imagination and [appetite] (εἰ δ' αἴσθησιν, καὶ 
φαντασίαν καὶ ὄρεξιν); for, where there is sensation, there is also pleasure and pain, 
and, where these, necessarily also [desire] (ὅπου μὲν γὰρ αἴσθησις, καὶ λύπη τε καὶ 
ἡδονή, ὅπου δὲ ταῦτα, ἐξ ἀνάγκης καὶ ἐπιθυμία) (De An. II 413b23-25)” and (iii) that 
when “thought” drives “movement” this necessarily requires “appetite” (i.e. Aristotle 
specifically excludes “contemplation” here), as follows: “…mind is never found 
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producing movement without appetite, for wish is a form of appetite (ὁ νοῦς οὐ 
φαίνεται κινῶν ἄνευ ὀρέξεως, ἡ γὰρ βούλησις ὄρεξις) (De An. III 433a22-23)”73.  
Having outlined above the basic architectonic of Aristotle’s account of human 
desire I add that Aristotle differentiates human desire from animal desire on the basis 
that man has a sense of time, as follows:  
 
“…appetites may conflict, and this happens wherever reason and desire are opposed, 
and this occurs in creatures which have a sense of time (γίνεται δ' ἐν τοῖς χρόνου 
αἴσθησιν ἔχουσιν) (for the mind advises us to resist with a view to the future, while 
desire only looks to the present (ἡ δ' ἐπιθυμία διὰ τὸ ἤδη); for what is momentarily 
pleasant seems to be absolutely pleasant and absolutely good, because desire cannot 
look to the future) (De An. III 433b5-8)” 
 
and with our relationship with time – our “view to the future” – enabling us to achieve 
our “good” as well as being a source of internal conflict, as follows: 
 
“…human thought… does not possess the good at this moment or that (οὐ γὰρ ἔχει τὸ 
εὖ ἐν τῳδὶ ἢ ἐν τῳδί), but its best, being something different from it, is attained only in a 
whole period of time (ἀλλ᾽ ἐν ὅλῳ τινὶ τὸ ἄριστον, ὂν ἄλλο τι) (Met. Λ 1075a7-10)” 
 
and I suggest that a part of this “view to the future” is our ability to take ownership and 
to shape and direct our own individual human “self” – i.e. it is a commitment to seeing 
ourselves as a being which is a living entity existing over time – which can be described 
as a personal entelechy which, as A.D. Smith explains, allows us to:  
 
“…have an appreciation of our lives as a whole and respond evaluatively to given 
situations by reference to that wider context74” 
  
and I add that it is interesting that we fail in this self-realisation through “weakness of 
will” or akrasia both if we think and act too quickly (and so are led by our passions) or 
                                                 
 73 Cf. “…the word living is used in many senses (πλεοναχῶς δὲ τοῦ ζῆν λεγομένου), and we say 
that a thing lives if any one of the following is present in it – mind, sensation, movement or rest 
in space, besides the movement implied in nutrition and decay or growth (κἂν ἕν τι τούτων 
ἐνυπάρχῃ μόνον, ζῆν αὐτό φαμεν, οἷον νοῦς, αἴσθησις, κίνησις καὶ στάσις ἡ κατὰ τόπον, ἔτι 
κίνησις ἡ κατὰ τροφὴν καὶ φθίσις τε καὶ αὔξησις) (De An. II 413a 22-25)”  
 
74 Smith, A.D. “Character and Intellect in Aristotle’s Ethics” in Phronesis (1996) p 68 
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if we do not think and act quickly enough (and so are led by events).  We find that 
Aristotle explains this situation as follows: “Of incontinence (ἀκρασία) one kind is 
impetuosity, another weakness.  For some men after deliberating fail, owing to their 
emotion (διὰ τὸ πάθος), to stand by the conclusions of their deliberation, others because 
they have not deliberated are led by their emotion (ἄγονται ὑπὸ τοῦ πάθους) (N.E. VII 
1150b19-22)”75 and that the end result of this lack of “aim” or “focus” is both (a) 
limitedness in the sense that: “…people who have no fixed aim are not given to 
deliberation (E.E. II1226b30-31)” and (b) incoherence or lack of “integrity” in the sense 
that: “…assuredly an evil man is not a single individual but many, and a different 
person in the same day, and unstable (E.E. VII 1240b16-17)”. 
 We see, then, from the above assessment that Aristotle expects “desire” to 
develop and mature over “time” through the guidance of “reason” (and “mind”) and I 
add that Aristotle develops this point by observing that “desire” is “present in us from 
birth” (and is presumably “the impulse within the thing itself (τὴν ἐν αὐτῷ ὁρμὴν) (E.E. 
II 1224b8)”) whereas “reason” will come to be “if our growth is allowed”, as follows: 
 
“…we possess by nature both parts76; since rational principle is a natural property, 
because it will be present in us if our growth is allowed and not stunted, and also desire 
is natural, because it accompanies and is present in us from birth; and these are pretty 
nearly the two things by which we define the natural (σχεδὸν δὲ τούτοις δυσὶ τὸ φύσει 
διορίζομεν) – it is what accompanies everybody as soon as he is born, or else what 
comes to us if development is allowed to go on regularly, for example grey hair, old age 
etc. (E.E. II 1224b29-35)” 
 
and Aristotle adds that: 
 
“…since the intellectual excellences involve reason, these forms of goodness belong to 
the rational part, which as having reason is in command of the [soul]; whereas the moral 
                                                 
75 Cf. “…from the start our nature does not diverge from the mean in the same way as regards 
everything, but in energy we are deficient and in self-indulgence excessive (E.E. II 1222a37-
39)” 
 
76 Aristotle argues that: “…the [soul] has two parts, and the virtues are divided between them, 
one set being those of the rational part, intellectual virtues, whose work is true (ὧν ἔργον 
ἀλήθεια), whether about the nature of a thing or about its mode of production, while the other 
set belongs to the part that is irrational but possesses appetition (ἔχοντος δ᾽ ὄρεξιν) (E.E. II 
1221b28-32)”  and also that: “…[excellence] has two forms, moral virtue and intellectual 
excellence (ἀρετῆς δ᾽ εἴδη δύο, ἡ μὲν ἠθικὴ ἡ δὲ διανοητική) (E.E. II 1220a4)” 
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virtues belong to the part that is irrational but by nature capable of following the 
rational – for in stating a man’s moral qualities we do not say that he is wise or clever 
but that he is gentle or rash (E.E. II 1220a8-12)” 
 
from which we see (a) that Aristotle has a particular interest in our reasoning faculty 
because it comes into being (and engenders a particularly human sense of individuality) 
rather than being innate and (b) that Aristotle’s primary interest is in how a man 
develops into or matures into a gentleman and with this maturation being achieved 
through the shaping of character and of desires as the concentrated and focussed “care” 
of a mature human being (which is achieved in the teeth of our human situation77).   
In respect to this arc of natural human development I note that it is significant 
that Aristotle argues that “care” is found in the “middle” of a man’s life, i.e. in his 
“akmē”, since this is the consequence of the fact that the young have too much energy to 
“care” on the basis that: “The young, as to character, are ready to desire and to carry out 
what they desire.  Of the bodily desires they chiefly obey those of sensual pleasure and 
these they are unable to control Rhet. II 1389a3-6)” and that regarding the elderly we 
find that they “…are chilled whereas the young are hot…They live in memory rather 
than in hope (Rhet. II 1389b29-1390a6)” and with it being only in the man in his prime 
that we find (or should find) that: “Their rule of conduct is neither the noble nor the 
useful alone, but both at once.  They are neither parsimonious nor prodigal, but preserve 
the due mean.  It is the same in regard to passion and desire.…all cases of excess or 
defect in the other two [i.e. youth and old age] are replaced by due moderation and 
fitness.  The body is most fully developed from thirty to thirty-five years of age, the 
mind at about forty-nine (Rhet. II 1390a33-1390b10).”  I suggest that it is a significant 
distinction that animals reach their “end”, and the full use or expression of their natural 
energy, in their expression of the reproductive powers of their mature years whereas 
Aristotle’s “man” reaches his “end” in the harnessing of his “reason” and “desire” as 
self-control and as “care” which also primarily occurs during his prime years. 
I add further regarding how Aristotle is interested in how our reason shapes our 
desires and in how our desires shape our characters that we find that Aristotle argues 
that our “life” is itself a “mode of knowing” in the sense that:  
                                                 
77 Cf. “…in the case of man each individual seems dear to himself, although in the case of other 
animals it is not so, for example a horse to itself…so it is not dear to itself.  But neither are 
children, but only when they have come to possess purposive choice; for when that point is 
reached the mind is at variance with the appetite (ἤδη γὰρ τότε διαφωνεῖ ὁ νοῦς πρὸς τὴν 




 “…perception and knowledge themselves are the thing most desirable for each 
individually (ἔστι δὲ τὸ αὑτοῦ αἰσθάνεσθαι καὶ τὸ αὑτὸν γνωρίζειν αἱρετώτατον 
ἑκάστῳ) (and it is owing to this that the appetition for life is implanted by nature in all, 
for living must be deemed a mode of knowing (καὶ διὰ τοῦτο τοῦ ζῆν πᾶσιν ἔμφυτος ἡ 
ὄρεξις: τὸ γὰρ ζῆν δεῖ τιθέναι γνῶσιν τινά)) (E.E. VII 1244b27-29)”  
 
but with the important caveat that our “aims” and “starting points” are not themselves 
rational even if we only achieve them as rationally mediated and directed desires or 
“goods”, as follows:  
 
“…does [virtue] (ἀρετὴ) decide the aim or the means to it?  Well, our position is that it 
decides the aim, because this is not a matter of logical inference or rational principle, 
but in fact this must be assumed as a starting-point (ἀρχὴ).  For a doctor does not 
consider whether his patient ought to be healthy or not, but whether he ought to take 
walking exercise or not (E.E. II 1227b24-27)” 
 
which shows us that our world is not logical in the sense that our logic is only a mediate 
glimpse of the principles of nature which are themselves unknowable and with a further 
statement of this position being that: “…all essences are by nature first principles of a 
certain kind (εἰσὶ δὴ πᾶσαι μὲν αἱ οὐσίαι κατὰ φύσιν τινὲς ἀρχαί), owing to which each 
is able to generate many things of the same sort as itself (διὸ καὶ ἑκάστη πολλὰ δύναται 
τοιαῦτα γεννᾶν), for example a man engenders men, and in general an animal animals, 
and a plant plants.  And in addition to this, obviously man alone among animals initiates 
certain conduct – for we should not ascribe conduct to any of the others (πρὸς δὲ 
τούτοις ὅ γ᾽ ἄνθρωπος καὶ πράξεών τινών ἐστιν ἀρχὴ μόνον τῶν ζῴων: τῶν γὰρ ἄλλων 
οὐθὲν εἴποιμεν ἂν πράττειν) (E.E. II 1222b16-20).”  We therefore find that we cannot, 
for Aristotle, understand our world as “logic” but only through logic and we do so by 
regarding the natural impulses of worldly beings and by following their desires and 
hence reasons through to their “ends”.  In human terms we find that we engage with and 
contemplate the objects of the world as only human beings can and with our peculiar 
human desire being registered in the very first words of Aristotle’s Metaphysics which 
are that: “All men by nature desire to know (Met. A 980a22)”. 
 In essence, then, we see that the situation in respect to human desire is that it is a 
natural impulse which must be guided by human reason in the sense that: “…the 
reasoning faculty is a principle controlling not reasoning but appetite and passions 
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(ἄρχει δ᾽ ὁ λογισμὸς οὐ λογισμοῦ ἀλλ᾽ ὀρέξεως καὶ παθημάτων) (E.E. II 1220a1-2)” 
and with this human reason standing in for the automatic guidance of nature but without 
simply being nature itself.  Having considered, then, the complex and conflicted nature 
of human being, let us also consider the pure phenomenon of desire by considering the 
nature of purely animal desire or instinct which is (1) (famously) that animals are like 
“winding machines” (τα αὐτόματα) driven by instinct (MA 701b2) and that: “…dogs do 
not delight in the scent of hares, but in the eating of them, but the scent told them that 
the hares were there (N.E. III 1118a18-19)” (2) that: “Temperance and self-
indulgence…are concerned with the kinds of pleasures that the other animals share 
in...these are touch and taste (N.E. III 1118b24-26)” and (3) that “desire” is the 
“impulse” for animal “movement” in the sense that:  
 
“My appetite says, I must drink; this is drink, says sensation or imagination or thought, 
and one immediately drinks (εὐθὺς πίνει).  It is in this manner that animals are impelled 
to move and act, the final cause of their movement being desire (τῆς μὲν ἐσχάτης αἰτίας 
τοῦ κινεῖσθαι ὀρέξεως οὔσης) (MA 701a34-5)”  
 
which Cynthia Freeland explains as that:  
 
“A berry does not “cause” a bird to eat it by simply being there in the bird’s 
environment, or even by being seen by the bird.  It can only enter into a causal story 
about the bird’s behaviour if the bird sees this round red shiny thing as food.  For this, 
imagination is required78” 
 
and I add that animals’ peculiar power to sense is a consequence of their ability and 
perhaps “desire” to move and to be able to find sustenance on the basis that: “Plants get 
their food from the earth by their roots; and since it is already treated and prepared no 
residue is produced by plants – they use the earth and the heat in it instead of a stomach, 
whereas practically all animals, and unmistakably those that move about from place to 
place, have a stomach, or bag, – as it were an earth inside them – and in order to get the 
food out of this, so that finally after the successive stages of concoction it may reach its 
completion, they must have some instrument corresponding to the roots of a plant (PA II 
650a21-27)”.  I note that we again encounter the emphasis that the power to move and 
                                                 
78 Freeland, Cynthia “Aristotle on Perception, Appetition, and Self Motion” in Self-Motion: 
From Aristotle to Newton eds. Mary Louise Gill & James G. Lennox (Princeton, 1994) p 49 
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to sense is an evolutionary extention or expansion of the power to live, feed, and 
reproduce that we find in plants and I add that, for Aristotle, the power of sensation of 
the lower animals ultimately culminates in the additional human power to think and also 
to actively create79.  We therefore see that Aristotle’s “man” and his “reason” are 
embedded in nature whilst being evolutionarily elevated phenomena of it.  
I note that Aristotle’s reflections upon “impulse” seem to fit well with Karl 
Popper’s conjecture regarding the evolutionary principle of “active Darwinism” which 
is that:  
  
“…a new kind of animal behaviour – what Darwin and even Sir Alister Hardy here 
describe as a new “habit” – may be much better described as a new invention; a new 
discovery…[and with] an example [being], the evolutionary emergence of limbs from 
fins.  What is more likely: that the “habit” of trying to walk on the land – or, let us say 
it, the wish – came first, and the evolution of limbs came afterwards (of course, in many 
slow stages, and with feedback), or that it all started with an anatomical change of the 
fins?  Of course, we do not know, and we shall never know: the question cannot be 
answered by science.  Yet I regard it far more likely that a small change of “habit” 
produced a new kind of environment which in turn produced a new selection pressure 
which led to an anatomic change that was used at once because it suited the preferences 
or wishes of the animal, rather than that a small anatomic change occurred and persisted 
unused until some of the animals found out how it could be used, changing their 
preferences and “habits” accordingly80”  
 
and I note that Popper correctly notes that: “my hypothesis is not a scientific conjecture: 
since it cannot be tested, it should be described as a metaphysical conjecture81” but does 
not draw the (Aristotelian) conclusions (which I would recommend) regarding the 
limitation of science and the (Aristotelian) need for metaphysics to represent such 
matters as “life”.   
                                                 
79 Cf. “…all things that go through the process of becoming acquire locomotion last.  It is this 
that accounts for the fact that some living things, e.g. plants and many kinds of animals, owing 
to their lack of the requisite organ, are entirely without motion, whereas others acquire it in the 
course of their being perfected …the degree in which things possess locomotion corresponds to 
the degree in which they have realised their natural development (Phys. VIII 261a 13-18)” 
 
80 Popper, Karl “The Place of Mind in Nature” in Mind in Nature: Nobel Conferenece XVII (San 
Franscisco, 1982) p 43 
 
81 Popper, Karl Ibid. p 43 (and see also the article by Ragnar Granit “Reflections on the 
Evolution of the Mind and Its Environment” in the same volume) 
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In respect to Aristotle’s metaphysical account Russell Winslow comments on 
the nature of and role of “impulse” in Aristotle’s account of organic being as a form of 
imitatio Dei, as follows: 
 
“…threptikē psychē [i.e. the “nutritive soul”] strives and yearns for what always is.  The 
activity of consuming food enables the preservation of our individual embodied form 
through time.  Through the consumption of other life (vegetative or otherwise), we are 
able to sustain ourselves in a very limited sense, reaching out towards what always is 
and is divine by attempting to sustain and ensure the persistence of the work that 
belongs to our individual form.  With regard to genesis, entities ensure the persistence 
of their form through time as well.  Forms are not created in Aristotle’s conception of 
generation but are rather preserved through subsequent generations; they are passed on 
in kind to the next generation and as such participate in what always is, or what is 
divine, in a certain respect…the primary characteristic that animates the nutritive soul 
is a yearning for divinity, or, rather, the yearning of life to secure and preserve its being 
through the maintenance and reproduction of its form (eidos)82”  
 
and I follow A.N. Whitehead in observing that we are here considering the 
fundamentals of being, as follows:  
 
“Even in sight, we enjoy our vision because there is no eyestrain.  Also we enjoy our 
general state of life because we have no stomachache.  I am insisting that the enjoyment 
of health, good or bad, is a positive feeling only casually associated with particular 
sensa.  For example, you can enjoy the ease with which your eyes are functioning even 
when you are looking at a bad picture or a vulgar building83”  
 
and Whitehead adds that by considering these fundamentals we are engaging in a form 
of philosophy on the basis that: “The organic permanences survive by their own 
momentum: our hearts beat, our lungs absorb air, our blood circulates, our stomachs 
digest.  It requires advanced thought to fix attention on such fundamental operations84”.    
                                                 
82 Winslow, Russell “On the Life of Thinking in Aristotle’s De Anima” in Epoché (2009) p 302-
3 
 
83 Whitehead, A.N. “Nature Alive” in Modes of Thought (New York, 1938) p 159 
 
84 Whitehead, A.N. “Expression” in Modes of Thought (New York, 1938) p 29  
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 I add that contrary to the “advanced thought” of A.N. Whitehead’s philosophical 
approach we find B.F. Skinner’s descriptive “scientific” approach to these fundamentals 
which is as follows:  
 
“Like other activities of the organism, such as digestion, respiration, or reproduction, 
some behaviour with respect to the environment is acquired through natural selection 
because of its consequences in preserving the species85”  
 
and I add that Whitehead comments upon the “high-grade intellecuality” of the 
empirical approach, as follows: “…exclusive reliance on sense-perception promotes a 
false metaphysics.  This error is the result of high-grade intellectuality86”.  As regards 
these approaches I suggest that we see a real conflict of approach between a conceptual 
and philosophical worldview and a descriptive and scientific worldview and that this 
conflict is between two forms of philosophical thinking, one of which seeks to hold on 
to the fundamentals of the world and the other of which dismisses them and with 
Whitehead also explaining this dismissal well, as follows: “The first principle of 
epistemology should be that the changeable, shifting aspects of our relations to nature 
are the primary topics for conscious observation.  This is only common sense; for 
something can be done about them87”. 
This is, however, our main dispute and I comment, finally, that we have seen 
above that Aristotle’s account of “desire” is intimately intertwined with his accounts of 
“reason” (and “choice”), “activity” (and “pleasure”), and also “human development” 
and maturation (and also with “imagination”, “sensation”, “memory”, “thought” etc) 
and we will therefore treat these subjects below88. 
                                                 
85 Skinner, B.F. “The Verbal Community” in Verbal Behaviour (New York, 1957) p 462) 
 
86 Whitehead, A.N. Adventures of Ideas (Harmondsworth, 1933) p 254-255 
 
87 Whitehead, A.N. “Expression” in Modes of Thought (New York, 1938) p 29 
 
88 For a detailed discussion of desire see Giles Pearson’s Aristotle on Desire (Cambridge, 2012) 
and Hendrik Lorenz’s The Brute Within: Appetitive Desire in Plato and Aristotle (Oxford, 
2006); for sympathetic accounts of Aristotle’s desire see Julia Annas’ “Aristotle on Pleasure and 
Goodness” in Amélie O. Rorty (ed.) Essays on Aristotle’s Ethics (Berkeley, 1980) and David 
Charles’ “Desire in Action: Aristotle’s Move” in Michael Pakaluk & Giles Pearson’s (eds.) 
Moral Psychology and Human Action in Aristotle (Oxford, 2012); and for critiques of the 
modern “propositional” account of desire see Giles Pearson’s essay “Aristotle and Scanlon on 
Desire and Motivation” in Michael Pakaluk & Giles Pearson (eds.) Moral Psychology and 
Human Action in Aristotle (Oxford, 2012) and Talbot Brewer’s “Three Dogmas of Desire” in 





4 Aristotle on Choice 
 
Having considered the drive of “desire” which flows through time and being(s), 
let us consider human “choice” which is, I suggest, something which (as also “action”) 
clearly oversteps and falls outside of time and is both an outcome of “habit” and 
conditioning and also an expression of formed “value” or “good” in the sense explained 
by Iris Murdoch, as follows:  
 
“…if we consider what the work of attention is like, how continuously it goes on, and 
how imperceptibly it builds up structures of value round about us, we shall not be 
surprised that at crucial moments of choice most of the business of choosing is already 
over.  This does not imply that we are not free, certainly not.  But it implies that the 
exercise of our freedom is a small piecemeal business which goes on all the time and 
not a grandiose leaping about unimpeded at important moments.  The moral life, on this 
view, is something that goes on continually, not something that is switched off in 
between the occurrence of explicit moral choices89”  
 
and we find that Aristotle argues similarly regarding “choice” (a) that choice is itself a 
complex phenomenon and hence: “Choice is neither simply wish nor opinion, but 
opinion and desire, whenever these follow as a conclusion out of deliberation (ὅταν ἐκ 
τοῦ βουλεύσασθαι συμπερανθῶσιν) (E.E. II 1227a3-5)”, (b) that choice is not a sudden 
act of movement but a considered disposition to act and hence: “…no one makes a 
deliberate choice suddenly, but men do suddenly think they ought to act and wish to act 
(ἐξαίφνης γὰρ προαιρεῖται μὲν οὐθείς, δοκεῖ δὲ πράττειν καὶ βούλονται) (E.E. II 
1226b3-4)” (c) that human choice is a deliberate act of self and individuality rather than 
being a generic act of will, mind, accident, or necessity and hence: “…choice seems to 
relate to the things that are in our own power (ὅλως γὰρ ἔοικεν ἡ προαίρεσις περὶ τὰ ἐφ᾽ 
ἡμῖν εἶναι) (N.E. III 1111b29-30)” and (d) that choice as a human decision point 
necessarily represents an expression of an active and informed guiding or moving 
principle regarding which we see (i) that: “Virtue (ἡ ἀρετὴ) makes choice free from 
                                                 
89 Murdoch, Iris “The Idea of Perfection” in The Sovereignty of Good (London, 1970) p 37.  I 
note that Murdoch also comments that: “Man is not a combination of an impersonal rational 
thinker and a personal will.  He is a unified being who sees, and who has some continual slight 
control over the direction and focus of his vision (Ibid. p 40).” 
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error and the end correct (τέλος ὀρθόν) in such a way that one chooses with a view to 
the things that one should (E.E. II 1227b13-14)” (ii) that: “…it is possible for the goal 
to be right (σκοπὸν ὀρθὸν), but for error to occur in what lies on the way to that goal 
(E.E. II 1227b20-21)” and (iii) that: “…vice corrupts the starting point (ἔστι γὰρ ἡ 
κακία φθαρτικὴ ἀρχῆς) (N.E. 1140b19-20)”. 
We find additionally (e) that we should differentiate the voluntary action of 
animals (and of human children) from the choice of adult human beings on the basis 
that: 
 
“…both children and the lower animals share in voluntary action (τοῦ μὲν γὰρ ἑκουσίου 
καὶ παῖδες καὶ τἆλλα ζῷα κοινωνεῖ), but not in choice (προαιρέσεως δ᾽ οὔ), and acts 
done on the spur of the moment we describe as voluntary, but not as chosen (καὶ τὰ 
ἐξαίφνης ἑκούσια μὲν λέγομεν, κατὰ προαίρεσιν δ᾽ οὔ) (N.E. III 1111b8-10)”  
 
and on the basis, as Charles Chamberlain explains, that choice must be seen an active 
and mature expression of human thought, as follows: “…we can agree that children and 
animals do not in fact share in commitment, and for the same reason that Aristotle 
would give.  In children the rational part of the soul is undeveloped; therefore the 
function of dianoia is lacking, and a prohairesis cannot technically begin… According 
to Aristotle, we may say, a child is capable of saying whether he or she wants peas or 
beans (choice), but not of deciding to become a vegetarian (commitment)90” and (f) that 
human choice is transcendent both in the sense that it is teleological or end-directed, as 
follows: “…every choice is of something and for the sake of something (ἔστι γὰρ πᾶσα 
προαίρεσις τινὸς καὶ ἕνεκα τινός) (E.E. II 1227b37)” and also, as Deborah Achtenberg 
explains, in the sense that it is an expression of value, as follows: “…according to 
Aristotle, the cognitive component of ethical value and of emotion is not just perception 
of particulars, but also perception of something about particulars, namely, perception of 
their value, that is, perception of them as good or beautiful…The virtuous person, for 
Aristotle, sees particulars in the light of the wholes they could compose91”.  
We also find (g) that human choice represents a real act of original creation on 
the basis that a man is: “…a starting point and begetter of praxeis just as he is of 
                                                 
90 Chamberlain, Charles “The Meaning of Prohairesis in Aristotle’s Ethics” in Transactions of 
the American Philological Association (1984) p 156 
 
91 Achtenberg, Deborah Cognition of Value in Aristotle’s Ethics (New York, 2002) p 5 & 9   
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children (N.E. III 1113b18-19)” and I add that Aristotle’s generative example should be 
taken semi-literally, i.e. that our actions exist in a similar context as our children do as 
natural possibilities which are consequent to our own existence and naturally flow, or 
do not flow, from it and with Aristotle expanding upon this example as follows: 
“…there is no necessity, because your father came-to-be, that you should come-to-be; 
but if you are to come-to-be, he must have done so (GC II 338b10-11)” and (h) that the 
power of creation that we find in respect to biological reproduction is paralleled by the 
mental reproduction that we find in respect to the human mind in the sense that:  
 
“…even in the case of external praxeis, the one who above all does them in the full 
sense is the architectonic craftsman who directs them by his thoughts (μάλιστα δὲ καὶ 
πράττειν λέγομεν κυρίως καὶ τῶν ἐξωτερικῶν πράξεων τοὺς ταῖς διανοίαις 
ἀρχιτέκτονας) (Pol. VII 1325b21-23)” 
 
which is a power for original acts of creation that Joseph Owens explains (and relates to 
human character, choice, and virtue) as follows: 
 
“The choice is an intellectual action and accordingly is fully aware of itself.  It knows 
that it is doing the deciding and that it consequently is the cause of what follows.  It 
cannot help but be aware of its responsibility…To be an originator in so profound a 
sense, to be master of a new series of events in the universe, to be responsible for what 
happens in a way that brings either credit or blame, are aspects that present themselves 
spontaneously to one’s reflection.  That seems to be the meaning of doing a thing as one 
ought92”  
 
and with this paradigm suggesting that our actions and other productions flow both from 
our human maturity (i.e. from our “akmē”) and from our own formed character or self 
(as an “architectonic craftsman”).   
I also note in respect to this philosophical pathway Nicolas Berdyaev’s argument 
that: “Personality is like nothing else in the world, there is nothing with which it can be 
compared, nothing which can be placed on a level with it.  When a person enters the 
world, a unique and unrepeatable personality, then the world process is broken into and 
compelled to change its course, in spite of the fact that outwardly there is no sign of 
                                                 
92 Owens, Joseph “The Grounds of Ethical Universality in Aristotle” in Aristotle: The Collected 
Papers of Joseph Owens (New York, [orig. 1969] 1981) p 160 
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this.  Personality finds no place in the continuous complex process of world life, it 
cannot be a moment or an element in the evolution of the world.  The existence of 
personality presupposes interruption; it is inexplicable by any sort of un-interruption; it 
is inexplicable by any sort of uninterrupted continuity93.”  I add regarding “choice” 
Søren Kierkegaard’s stress that we need to be “…fighting …for the future, for either / 
or94” on the basis that: “…when a man is merely a moment he has his teleology not in 
himself but outside himself95”, i.e. we see that Kierkegaard defends the the projection of 
human self as “choice” and as “ends” on the basis that he is thereby defending the 
personhood and free will of man.   
 Having worked through the various dimensions of “choice” from its being the 
product of a disposition to its being a form of transcendent expression of personality 
and of creation in the world, let us restate our argument again to clarify on various 
point.  First, (1) let us consider that the possibility for the transcendence of choice arises 
from out of the biological stability of human maturity and hence:  
 
“…the possession of understanding and knowledge is produced by the soul’s settling 
down out of the restlessness natural to it.  Hence, too, in learning and in forming 
judgements on matters relating to their sense-perceptions children are inferior to adults 
owing to the great amount of restlessness and motion in their souls.  Nature itself causes 
the soul to settle down and come to a state of rest for the performance of some of its 
functions, while for the performance of others other things [i.e. education, experience, 
etc.] do so (Phys. VII 247b18–248a3)”  
 
which shows us that Aristotle regards human being as a biological and worldly 
phenomenon which needs to be considered on a holistic and developmental basis, i.e. as 
something becoming someone, if we are to fully represent and appreciate it.  Although 
not stated explicitly here I add that Aristotle makes clear elsewhere that this human self 
exists in a contingent world in which it may be able to express itself, to develop, to 
become educated etc. in order to be able to “choose” or it may find itself impeded from 
                                                 
93 Berdyaev, Nicolas Slavery and Freedom (London, 1943) p 21 
 
94 Kierkegaard, Søren Either / Or II (Princeton, [orig. 1843] 1944) p 180 
 
95 Kierkegaard, Søren Ibid. II p 278 (Cf. “For me the instance of choice is very serious…The 
personality is already interested in the choice before one chooses, and when the choice is 
postponed the personality chooses unconsciously, or the choice is made by obscure powers 
within it (Ibid. II p 168)”). 
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doing so.  We therefore see the full implications of Aristotle’s insistence that a (human) 
being must be seen as something in the world and not as an abstraction. 
Second, (2) let us consider that “choice” arises from the flow of human life but 
also implies a certain “finality” or “teleology” in the broad sense that it is the “origin” of 
man to produce the “good action” of “choice”, as follows:  
 
“…good action is an end, and desire aims at this (ἡ γὰρ εὐπραξία τέλος, ἡ δ᾽ ὄρεξις 
τούτου).  Hence choice is either desiderative reason or ratiocinative desire, and such an 
origin is a man (διὸ ἢ ὀρεκτικὸς νοῦς ἡ προαίρεσις ἢ ὄρεξις διανοητική, καὶ ἡ τοιαύτη 
ἀρχὴ ἄνθρωπος) (N.E. VI 1139b4-5)”  
 
and with Aristotle adding regarding these “ends” that: “…purposive choice is 
deliberative appetition of things within one’s power (ἡ προαίρεσις μέν ἐστιν ὄρεξις τῶν 
ἐφ᾽ αὑτῷ βουλευτική) (E.E. II 1226b17-18)” and also that: 
 
“…everyone able to live according to his own purposive choice should set before him 
some object for noble living to aim at (ἅπαντα τὸν δυνάμενον ζῆν κατὰ τὴν αὑτοῦ 
προαίρεσιν θέσθαι τινὰ σκοπὸν τοῦ καλῶς ζῆν) (E.E. I 1214b7-8)”  
 
but also adding the important caveat that: “…purposive choice is not of Ends 
(προαίρεσις δ᾽ οὐκ ἔστιν [i.e. τοῦ τέλους]) (E.E. II 1226a17)” which shows us that 
Aristotle insists that we are shaped by our ends but that these “ends” stand beyond our 
conscious choices and that we only choose the means in order to achieve or fulfil those 
ends. 
Third, (3) let us consider how our “choice” is derived from “deliberation” as a 
form of the awareness outlined by A.N. Whitehead as follows: “The growth of 
consciousness is the uprise of abstractions.  It is the growth of emphasis.  The totality is 
characterised by a selection from its details.  That selection claims attention, enjoyment, 
action, and purpose, all relative to itself.  This concentration evokes an energy of self-
realisation.  It is a step towards unification with that drive towards realisation which 
dislocates the unity of aim in the historic process96”.  We find that Aristotle describes 
this “awareness” of being which allows “deliberation”, as follows:  
 
                                                 
96 Whitehead, A.N. “Civilised Universe” in Modes of Thought (New York, 1938) p 123 
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“Now of things that can both be and not be (ἔστι δὴ τῶν δυνατῶν καὶ εἶναι καὶ μὴ), 
some are such that it is possible to deliberate about them, but about others it is not 
possible.  Some things can either be or not be but their coming into being does not rest 
with us (ἐφ᾽ ἡμῖν), but in some cases is due to the operation of nature and in others to 
other causes; and about these things nobody would deliberate unless in ignorance of the 
facts.  But with some things not only their existence or non-existence is possible, but 
also for human beings to deliberate about them; and these are all the things that it rests 
with us to do or not to do…Now nobody deliberates about his End (περὶ μὲν δὴ τοῦ 
τέλους οὐδεὶς βουλεύεται) – this everybody has fixed; but men deliberate about the 
means leading to their End – does this contribute to it, or does this? or when a means 
has been decided on, how will it be procured? and this deliberation as to means we all 
pursue until we have carried the starting-point in the process of producing the End back 
to ourselves (ἕως ἂν εἰς ἡμᾶς ἀναγάγωμεν τῆς γενέσεως τὴν ἀρχήν) (E.E. II 1226a20–
1226b14)” 
 
and with the circularity of our engagement with the world – i.e. “…this deliberation as 
to means we all pursue until we have carried the starting-point in the process of 
producing the End back to ourselves” – being resolved through the explicitly human 
power of “choice” in the sense that:  
 
“…generally, one who makes a choice always makes it clear both what his choice is and 
what its object is, “object” meaning that for the sake of which he chooses something 
else (οὗ ἕνεκα προαιρεῖται ἄλλο) and “choice” meaning that which he chooses for the 
sake of something else (τὸ δὲ τί, ὃ προαιρεῖται ἕνεκα ἄλλου) (E.E. II 1226a12-14)”   
 
but with Aristotle’s exceedingly subtle account suggesting that although we “choose” 
and “create” we are still bound to a certain circularity of nature in the sense that we do 
not formally choose our ends but are habituated to them and merely choose as a means 
to achieve the ends which are open to us as individual human beings.  
Fourth, (4) we see how the “means” and “choices” a man takes shows us his 
“ends” and hence Aristotle suggests that a man’s choices show us and express the man 
in the sense that: “…a thing purposively chosen must necessarily be something that 
rests with oneself (ἀνάγκη τὸ προαιρετὸν τῶν ἐφ᾽ αὑτῷ τι εἶναι) (E.E. II 1225b37-38)” 
and also in the sense that: 
 
 69 
“…it is by a man’s purposive choice that we judge his character – that is, not by what 
he does but what he does it for (καὶ διὰ τοῦτο ἐκ τῆς προαιρέσεως κρίνομεν ποῖός τις: 
τοῦτο δ᾽ ἐστὶ τὸ τίνος ἕνεκα πράττει, ἀλλ᾽ οὐ τί πράττει) (E.E. II 1228a3-4)” 
 
with the fundamental quality of choice as a projection of self being explained by C.D.C 
Reeve as a fundamental quality of “action” itself, as follows: 
 
“…energeiai and kinēseis are types of being, not types of verbs.  A poiēsis or kinēsis is 
something that takes time to complete and, like the time it takes, is infinitely divisible 
(Phys. III 207b21-25; Met. Δ 1020a26-32).  It has a definite termination point or limit, 
before which it is incomplete and after which it cannot continue (N.E. X 1174b12-13).  
A praxis, by contrast, does not take time to complete, and so does not really occur “in 
time” (Phys. VIII 262b20-21) but is temporally point-like (N.E. Λ 1174b12-130).  
Having no definite termination, while it may stop, it need never finish (Met. Θ 
1048b25-27).  As an energeia, then, a praxis is an end, and so is complete at every 
moment.  As the result of deliberate choice, it presupposes a state of character, such as 
virtue or vice (N.E. VI 1139a33-34)97” 
 
and with Claudia Baracchi also explaining “choice” as “action” along these lines, as 
follows: “In its highest manifestation…the end is not an outcome separate from the 
activity leading to it (we should especially avoid a naïve temporal understanding of 
finality here), but, rather, the activity itself.  The end is manifest in and as the action, 
from the start.  It already informs the unfolding of the activity, of a certain way of 
living98” and adding that we can extrapolate from the projection of self through action 
and choice to the projection of self through life, as follows: “The word bios designates 
precisely the manner and shape of one’s living, a definite mode of zēn, of metabolic or 
physiological life…One’s task is actualising, realising oneself.  It is the movement from 
potentiality to actuality, from one’s potentiality to one’s self-realisation99”. 
                                                 
97 Reeve, C.D.C. Action, Contemplation, and Happiness: An Essay on Aristotle (Cambridge, 
Mass., 2012) p 141 
 
98 Baracchi, Claudia Aristotle’s Ethics as First Philosophy (Cambridge, 2008) p 97-8 (and for 
existential time see see Erwin W. Straus’ “An Existential Approach to Time” in Annals New 
York Academy of Sciences (1967)) 
 
99 Baracchi, Claudia Ibid. p 87 & 91 
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Fifth (5) we see that Aristotle’s “choice” shows us that not only does man have 
the power for choice but that the exercise of this power of human creativity is actually 
unavoidable in the sense that: 
 
“…artefacts like houses and statues which arise “from thought” never arise from 
necessity (Post. An. II 95a4-5)”100  
 
and, as is often the case, we find a parallel with the thought of A.N. Whitehead who 
argues, as follows: 
 
“What we have to explain is the trend towards order which is the overwhelming 
deliverance of experience.  What we have also to explain is the frustration of order, and 
the absence of necessity in any particular form of order101”  
 
and with this “frustration of order” being significant for Whitehead, as for Aristotle, not 
because it shows that the machine of nature can encounter a glitch but that it shows that 
nature is not determinate and mechanical but is, rather, creative and expressive and with 
Whitehead’s conclusion being: 
 
“The nature of any type of existence can only be explained by reference to its 
implication in creative activity, essentially involving three factors: namely, data, 
process with its form relevant to these data, and issue into datum for further process – 
data, process, issue.  The alternative is the reduction of the universe to a barren 
tautological absolute, with a dream of life and motion.  The discovery of mathematics, 
like all discoveries, both advanced human understanding, and also produced novel 
modes of error.  Its error was the introduction of the doctrine of form, devoid of life and 
motion102” 
                                                 
100 I note that William Charlton comments on this passage that: “A skill is an ability to cause 
whichever of two opposed changes you like.  You cannot exercise a skill without exercising – 
or, as it might be, refraining from exercising – causal power…Rather than causal powers, then, 
skill and desire should be reckoned precisely as non-causal sources of change (“Aristotelian 
Powers” in Phronesis (1987) p 280)” (and see also Gavin Lawrence’s “Acquiring Character: 
Becoming Grown Up” in Michael Pakaluk and Giles Pearson (eds.) Moral Psychology and 
Human Action in Aristotle (Oxford, 2012)). 
 
101 Whitehead, A.N. “Forms of Process” in Modes of Thought (New York, 1938) p 88 
 




and I add that Whitehead comes to such “Aristotelian” conclusions as in respect to 
“individuality” that: “…every individual thing infects any process in which it is 
involved, and thus any process cannot be considered in abstraction from particular 
things involved.  Also the converse holds103” and in respect to the limitation of our 
human logic that: “Science can find no creativity in nature; it finds mere rules of 
succession104” and that: “…rationalisation is the partial fulfilment of the ideal to recover 
concrete reality within the disjunction of abstraction105”.  
 I add, finally, (6) that we find that the duality of “choice” in human nature (of 
doing or not doing) is premised upon the prior existence of a duality of “being” in 
nature itself (of being and not being) which is such that: 
 
“…this coat may be cut in two halves; yet it may not be cut in two halves.  It may wear 
out before that can happen: then it may not be cut in two.  For, unless that were really 
the case, then its wearing out first were not possible.  The same with all other events 
which in any such sense are potential (ὥστε καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων γενέσεων, ὅσαι κατὰ 
δύναμιν λέγονται τὴν τοιαύτην).  Thus it is clear that not everything is or takes place of 
necessity (φανερὸν ἄρα ὅτι οὐχ ἅπαντα ἐξ ἀνάγκης οὔτ' ἔστιν οὔτε γίγνεται).  Cases 
there are of contingency (ἀλλὰ τὰ μὲν ὁπότερ' ἔτυχε)… Some cases, moreover, we find 
that, at least, for the most part and commonly, tend in a certain direction (τὰ δὲ μᾶλλον 
μὲν καὶ ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ θάτερον), and yet they may issue at times in the other or rarer 
direction (οὐ μὴν ἀλλ' ἐνδέχεται γενέσθαι καὶ θάτερον, θάτερον δὲ μή) (De Int. 19a14-
23)”   
 
and I add that Aristotle elsewhere discusses this order of nature which may “issue at 
times in the other or rarer direction”, as follows: 
 
                                                 
103 Whitehead, A.N. Ibid. p 97-8 (cf. “The laws of nature are large average effects which reign 
impersonally.  Whereas, there is nothing average about expression.  It is essentially individual.  
In so far as an average dominates, expression fades.  Expression is the diffusion, in the 
environment, of something initially entertained in the experience of the expressor.  No 
conscious determination is necessarily involved; only the impulse to diffuse.  This urge is one of 
the simplest characteristics of animal nature (“Expression” in Modes of Thought (New York, 
1938) p 21)”).  
 
104 Whitehead, A.N. “Nature Alive” in Modes of Thought (New York, 1938) p 154 
 
105 Whitehead, A.N. “Civilised Universe” in Modes of Thought (New York, 1938) p 124 (and 
for a useful study of Whitehead’s conceptualisation of creativity see Sydney E. Hooper’s 
“Whitehead’s Philosophy: The World as Process” in Philosophy (1948)). 
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“…if coming-to-be and passing-away are always to be continuous (εἴ γε ἀεὶ ἔσται 
συνεχὴς γένεσις καὶ φθορά), there must be some body always being moved (ἀεὶ μέν τι 
κινεῖσθαι) (in order that these changes may not fail) and moved with a duality (δύο δ') 
of movements (in order that both changes, not only one, may result) (ὅπως μὴ θάτερον 
συμβαίνῃ μόνον) (GC II 336b1-4)” 
 
from which we clearly see the fundamentality of Aristotle’s “principle of non-
contradiction” – which is the fundamental switch underlying his account of the physical 
world, of truth and logic, and also of human “choice” – on the basis that it is the “gap” 
of possibility for beings which reveals the real internal impulse of beings and their free 
will for moving themselves independently within a quasi-determinate world106.  In other 
words, then, we see that the elemental potentiality of the world – of being or not being – 
is first transformed into the possibility for self-movement in animals – of moving one 
way or another – and then into the “choice” of human beings – of choosing one thing or 
another – and with this “choice” arising from an ability to pause and then to harness 



















                                                 
106 On the principle of non-contradiction see Alessandro de Cesaris’ “Aristotle on non-




5 Aristotle on the Activity of Pleasure 
 
Having considered how “states” of character and “choices” (or “commitments”) 
arise in human beings, let us consider the nature of “pleasure”.  Aristotle’s basic 
position on pleasure is (a) that it is an “activity” and hence: “It is not right to say that 
pleasure is perceptible process (διὸ καὶ οὐ καλῶς ἔχει τὸ αἰσθητὴν γένεσιν φάναι εἶναι 
τὴν ἡδονήν), but it should rather be called activity of the natural state (ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον 
λεκτέον ἐνέργειαν τῆς κατὰ φύσιν ἕξεως), and instead of “perceptible” “unimpeded” 
(ἀντὶ δὲ τοῦ αἰσθητὴν ἀνεμπόδιστον) (N.E. VIII 1153a12-15)” (b) that it is a 
“completion” and hence “happiness” is produced when:  
 
“…pleasure (ἡ ἡδονὴ) completes the activities (τελειοῖ τὰς ἐνεργείας), and therefore life 
(καὶ τὸ ζῆν δή), which they [i.e. people] desire (οὗ ὀρέγονται) (N.E. X. 1175a15-16)”  
 
and “imagination” is fuelled by this desire for “pleasure” and for “happiness”, as 
follows: 
 
“…if pleasure consists in the sensation of a certain emotion (ἐστὶν τὸ ἥδεσθαι ἐν τῷ 
αἰσθάνεσθαί τινος πάθους), and imagination is a weakened sensation (ἡ δὲ φαντασία 
ἐστὶν αἴσθησίς τις ἀσθενής), then both the man who remembers and the man who hopes 
will be attended by an imagination of what he remembers or hopes.  This being so, it is 
evident that there is pleasure both for those who remember and for those who hope, 
since there is sensation.  Therefore all pleasant things must either be present in 
sensation (ὥστ᾽ ἀνάγκη πάντα τὰ ἡδέα ἢ ἐν τῷ αἰσθάνεσθαι εἶναι παρόντα), or past in 
recollection, or future in hope; for one senses the present, recollects the past, and hopes 
for the future (αἰσθάνονται μὲν γὰρ τὰ παρόντα, μέμνηνται δὲ τὰ γεγενημένα, ἐλπίζουσι 
δὲ τὰ μέλλοντα) (Rhet. I 1370a27–1370b1)” 
 
and we also find (c) that “pleasure” arises when we are unimpeded in our being and also 
that there is both “internal” and “external” pleasure in the sense that:  
 
“Neither practical wisdom nor any state of being is impeded by the pleasure arising 
from it (ἐμποδίζει δὲ οὔτε φρονήσει οὔθ᾽ ἕξει οὐδεμιᾷ ἡ ἀφ᾽ ἑκάστης ἡδονή); it is 
foreign pleasures that impede (ἀλλ᾽ αἱ ἀλλότριαι) (N.E. VIII 1153a21-22)”  
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and Aristotle adds that: “In most things the error seems to be due to [presumably 
“external”] pleasure (N.E. III 1113a33-4)”.   
We ultimately find (d) that Aristotle’s basic position on “pleasure” is that it is a 
regulator of the “natural state” and hence: “Let it be assumed that pleasure is a certain 
movement of the soul, a sudden and perceptible settling down into its natural state (εἰς 
τὴν ὑπάρχουσαν φύσιν), and pain the opposite (Rhet. I 1369b33-35)” and I add that 
Aristotle suggests that our “natural state” is a conflict between the “irrational” or animal 
desires which Aristotle explains, as follows:  
 
“I call irrational…all those [desires] which are called natural; for instance, those which 
come into existence through the body – such as the desire of food, thirst, hunger, the 
desire of such and such food in particular; the desires connected with taste, sexual 
pleasures, in a word, with touch, smell, hearing, and sight (Rhet. I 1370a20-25)”  
 
and “rational” and peculiarly human desires which Aristotle explains, as follows: “I call 
those desires rational which are due to our being convinced (Rhet. I 1370a25)”.  I add, 
however, (e) that this “natural state” for man is that he is a strange creature who seems 
to be peculiarly conflicted and handicapped, as follows:  
 
“…appetites may conflict, and this happens wherever reason and desire are opposed, 
and this occurs in creatures which have a sense of time (γίνεται δ' ἐν τοῖς χρόνου 
αἴσθησιν ἔχουσιν) (for the mind advises us to resist with a view to the future, while 
desire only looks to the present (ἡ δ' ἐπιθυμία διὰ τὸ ἤδη); for what is momentarily 
pleasant seems to be absolutely pleasant and absolutely good, because desire cannot 
look to the future) (De An. III 433b5-8)” 
 
and with my conclusion here being that Aristotle’s “pleasure” is the crest of human 
being (as it is for all animals) which is complex, conflicted, and nuanced simply 
because human being itself is such.  I also note that Aristotle assumes that we will 
derive a pleasure from the active expression of our worldly nature and that our human 
pleasure is rooted in a peculiar sense in the human power for rationality – and a sense of 
time – which underpins our human functioning107. 
                                                 
107 Aristotle asserts regarding the simple pleasure of animals that: “…all animals have one sense 
(μίαν γε τῶν αἰσθήσεων) at least, viz. touch (ἁφή), and whatever has a sense (ᾧ δ' αἴσθησις 
ὑπάρχει) has the capacity for pleasure and pain (τούτῳ ἡδονή τε καὶ λύπη) and therefore has 
pleasant and painful objects present to it (καὶ τὸ ἡδύ τε καὶ λυπηρόν), and wherever these are 
 75 
As regards how Aristotle moves forward from our animality to our humanity we 
find (a) that our animality is an essential element of our humanity and hence: 
“…pleasure …is thought to be most intimately connected with our human [or generic] 
nature (μάλιστα γὰρ δοκεῖ συνῳκειῶσθαι τῷ γένει ἡμῶν), which is why in educating the 
young we steer them by the rudders of pleasure and pain (ἡδονῇ καὶ λύπῃ) (N.E. X 
1172a19-21)”108 and (b) that man is peculiar in the sense that his life can take on many 
possible activities and hence: 
 
“…life is an activity (ἡ δὲ ζωὴ ἐνέργειά τις ἐστί), and each man is active about those 
things and with those faculties that he loves most (καὶ ἕκαστος περὶ ταῦτα καὶ τούτοις 
ἐνεργεῖ ἃ καὶ μάλιστ᾽ ἀγαπᾷ); e.g. the musician is active with his hearing in reference to 
tunes, the student with his mind in reference to theoretical questions, and so on in each 
case; now pleasure completes the activities, and therefore life, which they desire (ἡ δ᾽ 
ἡδονὴ τελειοῖ τὰς ἐνεργείας, καὶ τὸ ζῆν δή, οὗ ὀρέγονται).  It is with good reason, then, 
that they aim at pleasure too, since for every one it completes life, which is desirable 
(N.E. X 1175a12-17)” 
 
and with Aristotle both stressing (i) that the different activities of man through the 
exercise of different organs (ears, mind etc.) cause a conflict of possibilities and of 
focus within him109 and (ii) that each of these permutations of possibility is in some 
sense meaningful and “divine” on the basis that: “…no one nature or state either is or is 
thought the best for all (ἐπεὶ οὐχ ἡ αὐτὴ οὔτε φύσις οὔθ᾽ ἕξις ἡ ἀρίστη οὔτ᾽ ἔστιν οὔτε 
δοκεῖ), neither do all pursue the same pleasure (οὐδ᾽ ἡδονὴν διώκουσι τὴν αὐτὴν 
πάντες)…for all things have by nature something divine in them (πάντα γὰρ φύσει ἔχει 
τι θεῖον) (N.E. VII 1153b29-32)”.   
                                                 
present, there is desire, for desire (ἐπιθυμία) is just appetition (ὄρεξις) of what is pleasant (τοῦ 
ἡδέος) (De An. II 414b3-7)” and more aporetically argues regarding the complex pleasure of 
man (which could run contrary to nature itself), as follows: “Are there not desires in the soul, 
some from reason, but others from irrational drives and which are prior?  For if the drive arising 
from desire for pleasure exists by nature, then by nature everything would march to the good 
(E.E. VIII 1247b18-21)” 
  
108 Cf. “...pleasure…is common to the animals, and also accompanies all objects of choice (περὶ 
τὴν ἡδονήν: κοινή τε γὰρ αὕτη τοῖς ζῴοις, καὶ πᾶσι τοῖς ὑπὸ τὴν αἵρεσιν παρακολουθεῖ) (N.E. II 
1104b34-35)” 
 
109 Hence the akratic man is (unhealthily) focussed upon his organs or “parts” as follows: “…the 
contact characteristic of the self-indulgent man does not affect the whole body but only certain 
parts (N.E. III 1118b7-8)” 
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I add (c) as regards the peculiarity of the human situation and of human 
“pleasure” that Aristotle argues that: 
 
“…to feel that a thing is one’s private property makes an inexpressibly great difference 
in one’s pleasure (πρὸς ἡδονὴν ἀμύθητον ὅσον διαφέρει τὸ νομίζειν ἴδιόν τι); for the 
universal feeling of love for oneself is surely not purposeless but is a natural instinct (μὴ 
γὰρ οὐ μάτην τὴν πρὸς αὑτὸν αὐτὸς ἔχει φιλίαν ἕκαστος, ἀλλ᾽ ἔστι τοῦτο φυσικόν).  
Selfishness on the other hand is justly blamed (τὸ δὲ φίλαυτον εἶναι ψέγεται δικαίως) 
(Pol. II 1263a41–1263b2)” 
 
from which we see in outline how a human being transforms animal instinct through his 
thought and individual self-awareness110.  I add that Aristotle explains the individuality 
(and typology, plasticity, and creativity) of human being further as that: “…pleasure is a 
state of soul, and to each man what he is said to be a lover of is pleasant (τὸ μὲν γὰρ 
ἥδεσθαι τῶν ψυχικῶν, ἑκάστῳ δ᾽ ἐστὶν ἡδὺ πρὸς ὃ λέγεται φιλοτοιοῦτος) (N.E. I 
1099a10-11)” and that: “We must take as an indication of people’s states of character 
the pleasure and pain that supervenes on their deeds (σημεῖον δὲ δεῖ ποιεῖσθαι τῶν 
ἕξεων τὴν ἐπιγινομένην ἡδονὴν ἢ λύπην τοῖς ἔργοις) (N.E. II 1104b4-5)”111.  As regards 
our human ability to transcend the pleasure principle Aristotle argues that: 
 
“…there are many things we should be keen about even if they brought no pleasure, e.g. 
seeing, remembering, knowing, possessing the virtues (οἷον ὁρᾶν, μνημονεύειν, εἰδέναι, 
τὰς ἀρετὰς ἔχειν).  If pleasures necessarily do accompany these, that makes no odds; we 
should choose these even if no pleasure resulted (N.E. X 1174a4-7)”112  
 
and I comment that this transcendence should perhaps be understood as being a basic 
requirement of our human being in a complex and conflicted world.  I suggest, then, in 
                                                 
110 On the development of “self” through the pleasure of association see especially April 
Flakne’s “Embodied and Embedded: Friendship and the Sunaisthetic Self” in Epoché (2005)  
 
111 Cf. “…one cannot get the pleasure of the just man without being just, nor that of the musical 
man without being musical and so on (N.E. X 1173b29-31)” 
 
112 Cf. “…those who love for the sake of utility love for the sake of what is good for themselves 
(οἵ τε δὴ διὰ τὸ χρήσιμον φιλοῦντες διὰ τὸ αὑτοῖς ἀγαθὸν στέργουσι), and those who love for 
the sake of pleasure do so for the sake of what is pleasant to themselves (καὶ οἱ δι᾽ ἡδονὴν διὰ τὸ 
αὑτοῖς ἡδύ), and not in so far as the other is the person loved but in so far as he is useful or 
pleasant (καὶ οὐχ ᾗ ὁ φιλούμενός ἐστιν, ἀλλ᾽ ᾗ χρήσιμος ἢ ἡδύς) (N.E. VIII 1156a14-16)” 
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outline conclusion (i) that for Aristotle pleasure is a manifestation of awareness or 
“nous” and also of fulfilled desire since it arises from out of the struggle for realisation 
and fulfilment which each animal being experiences113, (ii) that Aristotle takes “man” to 
be a microcosm of nature in the sense that he can take on a range of different types in 
himself as animals do in nature generically, and (iii) that man is a peculiarly conflicted 
animal who possesses a touch of the “divine” within himself and whose pleasure 
reflects this human situation in its conflicted nature and also in its transcendent and self-
aware quality. 
I add that we also find the interesting peculiarity of humanity – and of its 
“activity” or “actuality” – expressed in the fact that we not only have a peculiarly 
individual expression of pleasure but that our human individuality comes about through 
communal activity in the sense that:  
 
“…it falls to one to share bodily pleasure, to another artistic study, to another 
philosophy; and so it is pleasanter to be with one’s friend (E.E. VII 1245a22-23)”  
 
and we also find that the pleasures of our common human life lead us to explore and 
develop our individual “self” by reflection, imitation, and sympathy, as follows: “To 
perceive and to know a friend…is necessarily in a manner to perceive and in a manner 
to know oneself (τὸ οὖν τοῦ φίλου αἰσθάνεσθαι τὸ αὑτοῦ πως ἀνάγκη αἰσθάνεσθαι 
εἶναι, καὶ τὸ τὸν φίλον γνωρίζειν τὸ αὑτόν πως γνωρίζειν) (E.E. VII 1245a35-37)”.  In 
other words, we find that we only seem to become human and to become a person 
through our engagement with, imitation of, and rejection of the human possibilities 
offered by or transmitted by other persons and Mary Margaret McCabe explains 
regarding this engagement that it is not (only) an intellectual engagement with other 
people (i.e. a conversation) but also a perceptual one (i.e. a living together), as follows:  
 
“I may see that grey wagtail over there just because we have practised bird-recognition 
on our ornithological expeditions; and my doing so is itself a part of our joint reflective 
                                                 
113 Cf. “…“Each animal is thought to have a proper pleasure, as it has a proper function (δοκεῖ 
δ᾽ εἶναι ἑκάστῳ ζῴῳ καὶ ἡδονὴ οἰκεία)”; viz. that which corresponds to its activity (ἡ γὰρ κατὰ 
τὴν ἐνέργειαν).  If we survey them species by species, too, this will be evident; horse, dog, and 
man have different pleasures (N.E. X 1176a3-6)” 
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perception…Why should we not be able to think of a rich perceptual life together, just 
as we might have rich shared intellectual life?114”   
 
and I add that we even find that we must have, draw upon, and generate a communal 
“world” or “society” in order to even possess a corresponding individual “world” or 
“mind” or sense of “self”115.  Ultimately, then, I suggest that we find (i) that a man in 
some sense channels the “activity” of nature and of animality as his own “activity”, (ii) 
that a man must transcend himself and reshape himself in order to unify himself as an 
individual and with this self-transformation also affecting his engagement with nature, 
and (iii) that a man exhibits an “activity” in himself which is also shaped by his 
engagement with the wider human “world” of his society. 
Returning to basics, however, we find that although we do create a human world 
we also find that the “impulses” that we find in nature and which we can reflect upon 
and build upon actually ultimately themselves depend upon the “possible” and / or the 
“good” of nature itself, as follows: 
 
“…action follows unless there is some hindrance or compulsion…I ought to create a 
good, and a house is good, I immediately create a house.  Again, I need a covering, and 
a cloak is a covering, I need a cloak.  I ought to make a cloak.  And the conclusion “I 
ought to make a cloak” is an action.  The action results from the beginning of the train 
of thought (πράττει δ' ἀπ' ἀρχῆς).  If there is to be a cloak, such and such a thing is 
necessary, if this thing then something else; and one immediately acts accordingly.  
That the action is the conclusion is quite clear; but the premises which lead to the doing 
of something are of two kinds, through the good and through the possible (ὅτι μὲν οὖν ἡ 
πρᾶξις τὸ συμπέρασμα, φανερόν· αἱ δέ προτάσεις αἱ ποιητικαὶ διὰ τε τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ καὶ 
διὰ τοῦ δυνατοῦ) (MA 701a15-25)” 
 
and with the relationship between “action” and “pleasure” being that living, living well, 
thinking, being (and also presumably being pleased) are the fullest expressions of an 
organism which are high states of “actuality” in the sense that: “Pleasure does not occur 
                                                 
114 McCabe, Mary Margaret “With Mirrors or Without?  Self-Perception in Eudemian Ethics 
VII.12” in Fiona Leigh (ed.) The Eudemian Ethics on the Voluntary, Friendship, and Luck 
(Leiden, 2012) p 71-72 
 
115 See John von Heyking’s “”Sunaisthetic” Friendship and the Foundations of Political 
Anthopology” in International Political Anthropology (2008) and April Flakne’s “Embodied 
and Embedded: Friendship and the Sunaisthetic Self” in Epoché (2005) 
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except in action (οὐ γίνεται δὲ ἡδονὴ μὴ ἐν πράξει) (E.E. VIII 1249a19)” and are also 
beyond or above the soul / body complex of that organism in the sense that: “Pleasure 
completes the activity...as an end which supervenes as the bloom of youth does on those 
in the flower of their age (N.E. X 1174b31-33)”116.  As regards our relationship with 
nature I add that Jonathan Beere summarises Aristotle as that: “Sight is for the sake of 
seeing; the art of house-building is for the sake of building houses; contemplative 
knowledge is for the sake of contemplating.  In each case, the capacity is for the sake of 
the energeia117” and I add that Aristotle concludes that human pleasure is a satisfaction 
of human desire and also of human nature both in individual and generic terms and it is 
hence that: “Happiness…is activity of soul (τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν δὲ ψυχῆς ἐνέργειαν) (N.E. 
I 1102a17-18)” and that: “…happiness is assumed to be acting well (τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν 
εὐπραγίαν θετέον) (Pol. VII 1325b14-15)”.   
I suggest, then, that the problem we are now left with is as regards where our 
human capacity for activity, fulfilment, and pleasure comes from (for want of a better 
term) and how it relates to a potentiality expressed in nature generally.  I suggest that 
we find that Aristotle moves to solve this problem by considering “nous” and the 
pleasure involved in its activity on the basis that:  
 
“…the activities of thought differ from those of the senses, and both differ among 
themselves in kind; so, therefore, do the pleasures that complete them (N.E. X 1175a26-
28)”  
 
and with Aristotle arguing that: “…happiness is a kind of contemplation (ἡ εὐδαιμονία 
θεωρία τις) (N.E. X 1178b32)” which suggests, I argue, that the higher “activity” of 
human “nous” (and its pleasure) is in some way a purer “resting” and internal “activity” 
                                                 
116 See Robert Heinaman’s “Rationality, Eudaimonia and Kakodaimonia in Aristotle” in 
Phronesis (1993)  
 
117 Beere, Jonathan “The Priority of Being in Energeia” in Michel Crubellier et al. Dunamis: 
Autour de la Puissance chez Aristote (Paris, 2008) p 441 (cf. “…the object of a thing is its 
principle; and generation has as its object the end (ἀρχὴ γὰρ τὸ οὗ ἕνεκα, τοῦ τέλους δὲ ἕνεκα ἡ 
γένεσις).  And the actuality is the end, and it is for the sake of this that the potentiality is 
acquired (τέλος δ᾽ ἡ ἐνέργεια, καὶ τούτου χάριν ἡ δύναμις λαμβάνεται); for animals do not see 
in order that they may have sight, but have sight in order that they may see (οὐ γὰρ ἵνα ὄψιν 
ἔχωσιν ὁρῶσι τὰ ζῷα ἀλλ᾽ ὅπως ὁρῶσιν ὄψιν ἔχουσιν).  Similarly men possess the art of 
building in order that they may build, and the power of speculation that they may speculate; 
they do not speculate in order that they may have the power of speculation – except those who 
are learning by practice; and they do not really speculate, but only in a limited sense, or about a 
subject about which they have no desire to speculate (Met. Θ 1050a8-15)”) 
 
 80 
whereas “desire” or “orexis” (and desiring thought) gives rise to a less pure “moving” 
and (more) external “activity”.  I add that it is upon this basis that we approach “God” 
(and the pleasure of grounded and knowing activity) on the basis that:  
 
“…the activity of this (sc. the unmoved mover) is also pleasure (ἡδονὴ ἡ ἐνέργεια 
τούτου).  And on account of this, waking and perceiving and thinking are most pleasant, 
and hopes and memories (are pleasant) on account of these (Met. Λ 1072b17-18)”118  
 
from which we see that it is purely in the sense that we find “good” in our own thought 
and in our “activity” that we do in Aristotelian terms encounter or, at least, divine the 
“divine” and I suggest that this is a perfectly reasonable assessment of our cosmic 
situation. 
I therefore suggest that it is by seeing “activity” as a generic realisation of nature 
that we can understand how “pleasure” counts as an “activity” and also see (A) that 
Aristotle regards “pleasure” as being a generic expression of worldly being which is 
derived from both “internal” and “external” stimuli – or, using Aristotle’s term, 
“hormai” or impulses – which flows through nature and hence can be impeded or can 
“rest” in a realisation (B) that Aristotle generically argues that the “external” can hinder 
the “internal” potentiality of an ousia at Met. Θ 1049a (“a thing is potentially all those 
things which it will be of itself if nothing external hinders it”) which suggests that the 
“end” and its satisfaction are the result of unimpeded activity or work119 and (C) that 
human pleasure is both a natural generic expression of animal existence whilst also 
being an adjunct of the peculiarly human ability to transcend reality.  I add regarding 
this human power for transcendence (D) that the transcendence of knowing is based 
upon the “wonder” regarding which Aristotle writes:  
 
“All [people] begin, as we have said, by wondering that things should be as they are, 
e.g. in regard to marionettes, or the solstices, or the incommensurability of the diagonal 
                                                 
118 Jonathan Beere comments on this point as follows: “As [Met.] Λ.7 said, our own activity of 
thinking gives us an inkling of what god does.  God’s activity counts as thinking in that we 
understand god’s activity, to the extent that we understand it at all, in the following way: 
starting with human thinking, or at least a certain view of it, we solve certain problems and 
clarify certain confusions to arrive at a clearer view of god’s activity (“Thinking Thinking 
Thinking: On God’s Self-thinking in Aristotle’s Metaphysics Λ.9” (online, 2010) p 27)” 
  
119 For an interesting discussion of “external” and “internal” see Susan Sauvé Meyer’s “Self-
Movement and External Causation” in Mary Gill & James Lennox (eds.) Self-Motion from 
Aristotle to Newton (Princeton, 1994) 
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of a square; because it seems wonderful to everyone who has not yet perceived the 
cause that a thing should not be measurable by the smallest unit (Met. A 983a13-17)” 
 
and we find that Aristotle also argues that: “Imitation is natural to man from childhood, 
one of his advantages over the lower animals being this, that he is the most imitative 
creature in the world, and learns at first by imitation (τὰς μαθήσεις ποιεῖται διὰ 
μιμήσεως τὰς πρώτας)…[and there is] the further fact: to be learning something is the 
greatest of pleasures not only to the philosopher but also to the rest of mankind, 
however small their capacity for it (Poet. 1448b 6-15)”.  I note that the desire to know 
and imitate and also the development of “care” which is a transcendent form of desire 
are aspects of human development which are connected by the learning through 
friendship which is such that: “…they [i.e. friends] correct each other’s faults for each 

























6 Aristotle on Human Development 
 
Let us, then, place the above analysis of desire, choice, and pleasure into a 
human framework / context and consider Aristotle’s overall assessment of human 
development which is that:  
 
“Children live (ζῶσι τὰ παιδία) in accordance with bodily desire (κατ᾽ ἐπιθυμίαν), and 
the appetite for pleasure is particularly strong in them (καὶ μάλιστα ἐν τούτοις ἡ τοῦ 
ἡδέος ὄρεξις); so if it is not made submissive and subject to some control (ὑπὸ τὸ 
ἄρχον), it will grow to a large extent.  The appetite for pleasure is insatiable and attacks 
the thoughtless person (ἄπληστος) from all sides, and the actual occurrence of bodily 
desires increases that aspect of our nature (ἡ τῆς ἐπιθυμίας ἐνέργεια αὔξει τὸ συγγενές), 
especially if they are strong and intense, and if they drive out rational thought (τὸν 
λογισμὸν ἐκκρούουσιν) (N.E. III 1119b5-10)”  
 
and let us also consider his conclusion that we must engage with the fact of pleasure 
which:  
 
“…has grown up with us from our infancy; this is why it is difficult to rub off this 
passion (τὸ πάθος), engrained as it is in our life.  And we measure even our actions, 
some of us more and others less, by the rule of pleasure and pain (ἡδονῇ καὶ λύπῃ).  For 
this reason, then, our whole inquiry must be about these (διὰ τοῦτ᾽ οὖν ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι 
περὶ ταῦτα τὴν πᾶσαν πραγματείαν); for to feel delight and pain rightly or wrongly has 
no small effect on our actions (N.E. II 1105a1-7)”  
 
in order to thereby be able to control and manage it within ourselves on the basis that: 
“…by abstaining from pleasures we become temperate, and it is when we have become 
so that we are most able to abstain from them (ἔκ τε γὰρ τοῦ ἀπέχεσθαι τῶν ἡδονῶν 
γινόμεθα σώφρονες, καὶ γενόμενοι μάλιστα δυνάμεθα ἀπέχεσθαι αὐτῶν) (N.E. II 
1104a33-35)” and I note the circularity of the emphasis upon habit and character which, 
we see, are formed by and then form our response to the world120. 
                                                 
120 Cf. “…good action is an end, and desire aims at this (ἡ γὰρ εὐπραξία τέλος, ἡ δ᾽ ὄρεξις 
τούτου).  Hence choice is either desiderative reason or ratiocinative desire, and such an origin is 
a man (διὸ ἢ ὀρεκτικὸς νοῦς ἡ προαίρεσις ἢ ὄρεξις διανοητική, καὶ ἡ τοιαύτη ἀρχὴ ἄνθρωπος) 
(N.E. VI 1139b4-5)”  
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As regards how we shape, channel, and to some extent overcome our innate 
desire we should, I suggest, begin by considering the mimēsis which is consequent to a 
child’s interaction with his elders which is described by Aristotle as that:  
 
“Imitation is natural to man from childhood, one of his advantages over the lower 
animals being this, that he is the most imitative creature in the world, and learns at first 
by imitation (τὰς μαθήσεις ποιεῖται διὰ μιμήσεως τὰς πρώτας)…[and there is] the 
further fact: to be learning something is the greatest of pleasures not only to the 
philosopher but also to the rest of mankind, however small their capacity for it (Poet. 
1448b6-15)” 
 
and with Socrates being the perfect example of a intellectual “midwife” who helps a 
youth to explore and develop himself through imitation of role models, instruction by 
teachers, and challenges by peers (and seniors)121.  I add in respect to the peculiar nature 
of human development that the theory of “neoteny” provides us with an interesting 
biological hypothesis regarding the need of human beings to develop through imitation 
as they do and that rather than just being a biological hypothesis this is also a hypothesis 
about nature which suggests a dynamic relationship in which a regression back into 
nature can lead to a heightened and compensating enagement with nature.  We could 
perhaps employ Leibniz’s dictum that “one draws back to leap higher” to explain this 
relationship. 
We also find that our engagement with nature – and the remediation we need to 
take if we are to achieve stable thought and human fulfilment – can perhaps be seen as 
leading to the fact that “man” can in some sense act as a substitute for “nature” himself 
through his ability to hold on to and to reflect upon the “nous” of the world which, as 
Gavin Lawrence explains, is a human development which takes place as follows:  
 
“…“the appetitive and generally desiderative part (N.E. I 1102b30)”…is the sole source 
of action and emotion in beasts and young children.  But in humans this part is, of its 
nature, reason-apt, capable of being brought, or moulded, into a condition where it 
listens to and obeys the voice of reason – first the external voice of one’s father and 
mother, tutor or paidagogos, and so on (N.E. X 1180b3-7; Protag. 325C-E; N.E. III 
                                                 
121 I follow Karl Popper’s thought that: “I know how little I know; and even this I have not 
discovered: I have learnt it from someone else – from Socrates (“The Place of Mind in Nature” 
in Mind in Nature: Nobel Conference XVII (San Francisco, 1982) p 31).” 
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1119b13-15 etc), and then the internalised “fatherly” voice of one’s own reason (N.E. I 
1102b13-03a3; E.E. II 1220a10-11; Pol. VII 1333a16-18)122” 
 
and I add that our heightened engagement with nature can also be seen in the poet (and 
the maker more generally) regarding whom Aristotle argues that: 
 
“...existence (τὸ εἶναι) is to all men a thing to be chosen and loved (αἱρετὸν καὶ 
φιλητόν), and...we exist by virtue of activity (ἐσμὲν ἐνεργείᾳ) (i.e. by living (ζῆν) and 
acting (πράττειν)), and... the handicraft (ἔργον) is in a sense, the producer in activity; he 
loves his handicraft, therefore, because he loves existence (διότι καὶ τὸ εἶναι).  And this 
is rooted in the nature of things (τοῦτο δὲ φυσικόν); for what he is in potentiality (ὃ γάρ 
ἐστι δυνάμει), his handiwork manifests in activity (τοῦτο ἐνεργείᾳ τὸ ἔργον μηνύει) 
(N.E. IX 1168a 5-9)”   
 
which should suggest to us that our nature allows us to take the world and its 
“principles” into ourselves and then to express ourselves through our own products, e.g. 
our poems, and with this engagement also being an observable principle in respect to 
the scientist and the “master craftsman” etc.   I comment that how we move from 
childhood imitation to independent expression, mastery, and understanding is clearly a 
consideration which occupies Aristotle throughout all his work. 
 We generally see, then, that Aristotle assumes that human development should 
be understood as an essential process which leads to the stabilisation and revealing of 
self through human experience and the development of the care and mind required to 
live in the world.  I add here that the critical feature of Aristotle’s account of human 
being and of human excellence / virtue is that man has the ability to pause and reflect 
upon (and contemplate) something – and note this typically Greek conceptual nexus of 
resting in space, pausing in time, and completing an action by revealing the truth – 
which Gavin Lawrence explains as that:  
 
                                                 
122 Lawrence, Gavin “Acquiring Character: Becoming Grown Up” in Michael Pakaluk and Giles 
Pearson (eds.) Moral Psychology and Human Action in Aristotle (Oxford, 2012) p 243 (for an 
interesting discussion of “private speech” see Hope May’s Aristotle’s Ethics: Moral 
Development and Human Nature (London, 2010) p 126-8) and for a detailed discussion of 
Aristotle’s “mimesis” see Francis Wolff’s “The Three Pleasures of Mimēsis According to 
Aristotle’s Poetics” in Bernadette Bensuade-Vincent & William R. Newman (eds.) The 
Artificial and the Natural: An Evolving Polarity (Cambridge Mass., 2007)) 
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“…“Episteme” is a coming to a stop, a stand-still: eph-istemai (an etymology Aristotle 
explicitly plays with in Post. An. II 100a3-b5).  Taking episteme here to be a matter of 
understanding, of having the why as well as the that (for example Meta. A.1), the idea is 
that when one understands, one has come to a stop: enquiry is now ended, and the soul 
is stilled and settled, properly stable – not (so) capable of being misled or overturned by 
a false theory  as when someone only has the thats123” 
 
which shows us the critical role that intellectual reflection plays in human (but not 
animal) being and, in more detail, the critical roles that both ethical maturation – i.e. the 
ethical development and controlling of self – and also educational instruction – i.e. the 
training and instruction which informs a child’s mind – play in human development 
towards a good human “equilibrial state”.  As regards the value of Aristotle’s 
perspective here I note that we can reasonably describe this power for stabilisation of 
self and ability to self-reflect with Howard Curzer as honesty, as follows: “Once a 
person acquires a disposition for truthful self-presentation, a disposition to avoid 
falsehood about all sorts of things in all sorts of situations follows more or less 
automatically124” or with Iris Murdoch as “humility”, or with Cheshire Calhoun as 
“integrity”, or with Voltaire as “humanity”, or with Whitehead as “peace”.  Whichever 
term we choose, however, I suggest that we can see the powerful validity of Aristotle’s 
approach here and that the error of conflating “nous” with intellection should also be 
evident. 
 In conlusion, then, I comment that Aristotle’s positive understanding of human 
development is that as people we are shaped by nature, by society, and through our 
activities within society and that it is hence that we do not merely “choose” our own 
lives but are guided to achieve our ends.  I suggest that this positive position is well 
explained by C.S. Lewis, as follows:  
 
“Aristotle says that the aim of education is to make the pupil like and dislike what he 
ought.  When the age for reflective thought comes, the pupil who has been thus trained 
in “ordinate affections” or “just sentiments” will easily find the first principles in 
                                                 
123 Lawrence, Gavin “Acquiring Character: Becoming Grown Up”  in Michael Pakaluk and 
Giles Pearson (eds.) Moral Psychology and Human Action in Aristotle (Oxford, 2012) p 274 
 
124 Curzer, Howard Aristotle and the Virtues (Oxford, 2012) p 199 
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Ethics; but to the corrupt man they will never be visible at all and he can make no 
progress in that science [see N.E. I 1095b].  Plato before him had said the same125” 
 
and I add regarding Aristotle’s negative understanding of human development that 
Aristotle’s “man” possesses an intrinsic nature which if untempered by society and 
humanity is such that he:  
 
“…must be [that of] either a beast or a god (Pol. I 1253a29)”  
 
and with this contingency leading Aristotle to posit a need for guidance or “force”, as 
follows: “…he who lives as passion directs will not hear argument that dissuades him, 
nor understand it if he does…in general passion seems to yield not to argument but to 
force (ὅλως τ᾽ οὐ δοκεῖ λόγῳ ὑπείκειν τὸ πάθος ἀλλὰ βίᾳ) (N.E. X 1179b28-29)”.  I add 
that the idea that a person possesses an internal “voice” of reason which is derived from 
the external “voice” of his father moves us away from the modern liberal viewpoint that 
we simply form our own reason as an “individual”.  Regarding the contrary significance 
of “community” and of “personhood” Robert Paul Wolff contends that: 
 
“…liberalism has made the mistake of supposing that man is no more than a 
combination of the bestial and the angelic, the passionate and the rational.  From such 
an assumption it follows naturally that man, like the beasts and angels, is essentially a 
lonely creature.  But, Aristotle tells us, man has a mode of existence peculiar to his 
species, based on the specifically human faculty for communication.  That mode of 
existence is society, which is a human community bound together by rational discourse 
and shared values126” 
 
and we also find that Carl Jung also criticises our romantic Faustian or Promethean 
worldview as being a “…demonism of Nature, which man had apparently triumphed 
over, [and which] he has unwittingly swallowed into himself and so become the devil’s 
marionette127”.  We ultimately find, then, that we are caught up in a battle of 
                                                 
125 Lewis, C.S. The Abolition of Man (Oxford, 1943) p 14 
 
126 Wolff, Robert Paul “Beyond Tolerance” in A Critique of Pure Tolerance (Boston, 1965) p 30   
 
127 Jung, Carl The Earth Has a Soul: C.G. Jung on Nature, Technology & Modern Life 
(Berkeley, 2002) p 132.  See also Kurt von Fritz’s “Aristotle’s Anthropological Ethics and its 
Relevance to Modern Problems” in Journal of the History of Ideas (1981) and Deborah 
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worldviews regarding which I note that Aristotle’s worldview and his critique of other 































                                                 
Achtenberg’s “Human Being, Beast and God: The Place of Human Happiness According to 
Aristotle and Some Twentieth-Century Philosophers” in May Sim (ed.) The Crossroads of 




7 Aristotle on Imagination 
 
Having considered (good) “human development” as being a channelling of 
“desire” into “habits” and “choices” through the control provided by “reason” let us 
now step away the development of man to consider the underlying structures of human 
“imagination” (and then “memory”) which is a shared resource of animal “sensation” 
and of human “rationality” which arises from out of the human control over time.  
Regarding “imagination” we find in outline that:  
 
“…imagination is a weakened sensation (ἡ δὲ φαντασία ἐστὶν αἴσθησίς τις 
ἀσθενής)…both the man who remembers and the man who hopes will be attended by an 
imagination of what he remembers or hopes (ἀεὶ ἐν τῷ μεμνημένῳ καὶ τῷ ἐλπίζοντι 
ἀκολουθοῖ ἂν φαντασία τις οὗ μέμνηται ἢ ἐλπίζει) (Rhet. I 1370a28-30)” 
 
and with our elemental task being to consider how this human “imagination” translates 
into the motivating activity of animals which act without reason as exemplified by the 
sponge which when it “...becomes aware that someone is attempting to pull it off, it 
contracts itself and is then difficult to detach (HA V 548a11-13)” (and Aristotle 
questions the veracity of this suggestion but this is not significant here).  We will see 
below that Aristotle introduces “imagination” in order to explain the “instinct” of 
animals and also consider on what terms even mature human beings act when they are 
“sleeping or mad or drunk (N.E. VII 1147a13-14)” and to therefore reach an 
understanding of the world which contains all of its phenomena.  I suggest here that we 
must be willing to think outside the box and consider, say, regarding the nature of a 
plant’s “life” that: “…plants seem to participate in [static and unconscious] life of that 
kind; and so do children too, inasmuch as at their first procreation in the motion, 
although alive, they stay asleep all the time (E.E. I 1216a6-8)” if we are to engage with 
Aristotle’s perspective.  We will see below that Aristotle’s thorough assessment of 
“imagination” will show how man possesses an animal platform for his existence which 
he should embrace whilst seeking, as a human being, to go beyond. 
I suggest that we find in outline regarding “imagination” that Aristotle seeks to 
explain animal nutrition, perception, desire, and movement which operates without 
reason on the basis that: “…because imaginations persist in us and resemble sensations 
(διὰ τὸ ἐμμένειν καὶ ὁμοίας εἶναι ταῖς αἰσθήσεσι), living creatures frequently act in 
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accordance with them, some, viz., the brutes, because they have no mind, and some, viz., 
men, because the mind is temporarily clouded over by emotion, or disease, or sleep (De 
An. III 429a5-8)” and on the basis that:  
 
“…the animal is moved and walks from desire or purpose (ὀρέξει ἤ προαιρέσει), when 
some alteration has been caused as the result of sensation or imagination (κατὰ τὴν 
αἴσθησιν ἤ τὴν φαντασίαν) (MA 701a4-6)” 
 
and on the basis that: “My appetite says (ἡ ἐπιθυμία λέγει), I must drink; this is drink, 
says sensation or imagination or thought (ἡ αἴσθησις εἶπεν ἤ ἡ φαντασία ἤ ὁ νοῦς), and 
one immediately drinks (MA 701a32-34)”128.  Regarding “imagination” per se we also 
find that Aristotle notes that: “Since sight is the chief sense, the name phantasia 
(imagination) is derived from phaos (light), because without light it is impossible to see 
(De An. III 428b4)” which shows us that Aristotle is on one level at least (we will 
consider other levels later on) using the concept of “imagination” in order to represent 
how organic beings which are not plants can see and / or move in the world even if they 
lack human reason absolutely or, in the case of the drunk, insane, and asleep, 
contingently. 
 Building our account from this base, then, let us consider the clear and intimate 
relationship of “imagination” with “desire” regarding which Hendrik Lorenz observes 
that: “It is phantasia’s role, as Aristotle puts it, to “prepare desire accordingly (MA 
702a17-19)”129” and that:  
 
“…“What pleases the lion”, he [i.e. Aristotle] insists, “is not the sight of “a stag or wild 
goat”, but that he is going to get a meal (N.E. III 1118a18-23).”  The lion’s pleasure, 
Aristotle thinks, is a pleasure of anticipation, and so he must take it to involve 
apprehending the prospect of having a meal130”   
 
                                                 
128 I suggest that Aristotle uses this “drink” to suggest that the natural ideal for purely animal 
“pleasure” is nutritive “continuousness”, as follows: “…a drink fails to be pleasant not because 
of its result, but because its pleasantness is not continuous (τὸ μὴ συνεχές), although at first it 
quite takes one in (E.E. VII 1238a29-30)” 
 
129 Lorenz, Hendrik The Brute Within: Appetitive Desire in Plato and Aristotle (Oxford, 2006) p 
206 
 
130 Lorenz, Hendrik Ibid. p 149 
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and with this relationship being evident in the situation that: “…“Each animal is thought 
to have a proper pleasure, as it has a proper function (δοκεῖ δ᾽ εἶναι ἑκάστῳ ζῴῳ καὶ 
ἡδονὴ οἰκεία)”; viz. that which corresponds to its activity (ἡ γὰρ κατὰ τὴν ἐνέργειαν).  If 
we survey them species by species, too, this will be evident; horse, dog, and man have 
different pleasures (N.E. X 1176a3-6)” and, as Cynthia Freeland comments, that:  
 
“A berry does not “cause” a bird to eat it by simply being there in the bird’s 
environment, or even by being seen by the bird.  It can only enter into a causal story 
about the bird’s behaviour if the bird sees this round red shiny thing as food.  For this, 
imagination is required131”  
 
and with Malcolm Schofield adding that:  
 
“By phantasia here Aristotle must have in mind something like visualisation…No 
longer is it a matter of: “I need a drink”, but instead: “I need this drink”.  In other 
words, sense-perception or phantasia or thought shapes a desire that is on that account 
now determinate, ready to function at once as the immediate cause of movement132”  
 
from which we clearly see the basic point here that there must be some impulse and 
capacity which enables an individual animal, however primitive, to be able to identify 
the objects in nature which it needs in order to satisfy its living needs.  This evident 
natural capacity is explained by Aristotle through his concept of “imagination”.  
 Now, moving onwards and upwards, let us consider that Aristotle finds a scala 
naturae in nature regarding which the “basic” power of nutrition (which includes the 
power of reproduction) drives the “higher” power of sensation in living and self-moving 
beings, and with the power of sensation then informing the “higher” power of 
speculative thought in man133.  Aristotle’s position regarding this last relationship is 
that: 
                                                 
131 Freeland, Cynthia “Aristotle on Perception, Appetition, and Self Motion” in Self-Motion: 
From Aristotle to Newton eds. Mary Louise Gill & James G. Lennox (Princeton, 1994) p 49 
 
132 Schofield, Malcolm “Phantasia in De Motu Animalium” in Michael Pakaluk & Giles Pearson  
(eds.) Moral Psychology and Human Action in Aristotle (Oxford, 2011) p 124-7 
 
133 Regarding the bodily nature of “imagination” – and therefore its focus upon nutrition and 
reproduction – we find that Aristotle responds to his thought that “nous” is not related to the 
body, as follows: “…possibly thinking is an exception (μάλιστα δ' ἔοικεν ἰδίῳ τὸ νοεῖν)” by 
considering “imagination”, as follows: “But if this too is a kind of imagination, or at least is 
dependent upon imagination (εἰ δ' ἐστὶ καὶ τοῦτο φαντασία τις ἢ μὴ ἄνευ φαντασίας), even this 
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“By nature animals are born with the faculty of sensation, and from sensation memory 
is produced in some of them, though not in others (φύσει μὲν οὖν αἴσθησιν ἔχοντα 
γίγνεται τὰ ζῷα, ἐκ δὲ ταύτης τοῖς μὲν αὐτῶν οὐκ ἐγγίγνεται μνήμη, τοῖς δ᾽ ἐγγίγνεται).  
And therefore the former are more intelligent and apt at learning than those which 
cannot remember; those which are incapable of hearing sounds are intelligent though 
they cannot be taught, e.g. the bee, and any other race of animals that may be like it; and 
those which besides memory have this sense of hearing, can be taught.  The animals 
other than man live by appearances and memories, and have but little of connected 
experience; but the human race lives also by art and reasonings (τὰ μὲν οὖν ἄλλα ταῖς 
φαντασίαις ζῇ καὶ ταῖς μνήμαις, ἐμπειρίας δὲ μετέχει μικρόν: τὸ δὲ τῶν ἀνθρώπων 
γένος καὶ τέχνῃ καὶ λογισμοῖς).  And from memory experience is produced in men; for 
many memories of the same thing produce finally the capacity for a single experience 
(γίγνεται δ᾽ ἐκ τῆς μνήμης ἐμπειρία τοῖς ἀνθρώποις: αἱ γὰρ πολλαὶ μνῆμαι τοῦ αὐτοῦ 
πράγματος μιᾶς ἐμπειρίας δύναμιν ἀποτελοῦσιν).  Experience seems to be very similar 
to science and art, but really science and art come to men though experience; for 
“experience made art”, as Polus says, “but inexperience luck”.  And art arises, when 
from many notions gained by experience one universal judgement about similar objects 
is produced (γίγνεται δὲ τέχνη ὅταν ἐκ πολλῶν τῆς ἐμπειρίας ἐννοημάτων μία καθόλου 
γένηται περὶ τῶν ὁμοίων ὑπόληψις) (Met. A 980a28-981a6)” 
 
and Aristotle expands on the subject of “higher” and “lower” life further, as follows: 
“…a higher degree of sensation is a property of a higher degree of living thing, a lower 
degree of sensation would be a property of a lower degree of living thing (τοῦ μᾶλλον 
ζῶντος τὸ μᾶλλον αἰσθάνεσθαί ἐστιν ἴδιον, καὶ τοῦ ἧττον ζῶντος τὸ ἧττον αἰσθάνεσθαι 
εἴη ἂν ἴδιον) (Top. V 137b24-26)” and also argues for the “evolutionary” principle that 
there is an “…aim of all things, or of all things that possess sensation or reason; or 
would be, if they could acquire the latter (εἰ λάβοι νοῦν) (Rhet. I 1362a23-24)” which is 
explained well by Aryeh Kosman, as follows: “…Aristotle’s hint at the end of Posterior 
Analytics that animals have a rudimentary form of νοῦς in the general capacity of 
discrimination that is αἴσθεσις (Posterior Analytics 2 99b34-100a1)… must mean that 
                                                 




νοῦς is only the purest form of that general power that is increasingly revealed in scala 
naturae134”.  
We see, then, that Aristotle finds a development, refinement, and increase in the 
powers of living being when he considers plants, animals, and then man and also that he 
expects the “lower” powers to be built upon by the “higher” powers but also to be 
transformed thereby in a similar way as we have already seen that human movement 
becomes “choice” and human desire when matched with reason becomes prudence and 
“care”.  I stress here that man should be seen in a worldly context and as a worldly 
object and also as a whole – as an organism, as an animal, and as a human being – and 
hence I suggest that it is important for us to see that all the dimensions of human being 
– his imagination, reason, desire, care, choice etc. – are all fused into a single picture of 
which Aristotle gives us an example, as follows: 
 
“…why is it that thought sometimes results in action and sometimes does not, 
sometimes in movement and sometimes not?  Apparently, the same kind of thing 
happens as when one thinks and forms an inference about immovable objects.  But in 
the latter case, the end is speculation (for when you have conceived the two premises, 
you immediately conceive and infer the conclusion); but in the former case the 
conclusion drawn from the two premises becomes the action [and in respect to human 
thought Aristotle suggests that]…action follows unless there is some hindrance or 
compulsion…I ought to create a good, and a house is good, I immediately create a 
house.  Again, I need a covering, and a cloak is a covering, I need a cloak.  I ought to 
make a cloak.  And the conclusion “I ought to make a cloak” is an action.  The action 
results from the beginning of the train of thought (πράττει δ' ἀπ' ἀρχῆς).  If there is to be 
a cloak, such and such a thing is necessary, if this thing then something else; and one 
immediately acts accordingly.  That the action is the conclusion is quite clear; but the 
premises which lead to the doing of something are of two kinds, through the good and 
through the possible (ὅτι μὲν οὖν ἡ πρᾶξις τὸ συμπέρασμα, φανερόν· αἱ δέ προτάσεις αἱ 
ποιητικαὶ διὰ τε τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ καὶ διὰ τοῦ δυνατοῦ) [and Aristotle concludes that] 
Alteration is caused by imagination and sensations and thoughts (ἀλλοιοῦσι δ' αἱ 
φαντασίαι καὶ αἱ αἰσθήσεις καὶ αἱ ἔννοιαι) (MA 701a7–701b18)” 
 
                                                 
134 Kosman , Aryeh “What Does the Maker Mind Make?” in Virtues of Thought: Essays on 
Plato and Aristotle (Cambridge Mass., [orig. 1992] 2014) p 135-6).  I note that Jonathan Beere 
also comments that: “…νοῦς is perception-like in that it is a faculty for cognition of objects 
(rather than propositions or states of affairs)” (“Thinking Thinking Thinking: On God’s Self-
thinking in Aristotle’s Metaphysics Λ.9” (online, 2010) p 3)” 
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which shows us (i) the nature of human desire and thought (and imagination and 
memory) fusing into an action which is creative and projected in the sense man does not 
immediately create a house in a literal sense but is, rather, immediately set in motion 
through this image in wishing and then acting to create one, and (ii) the fact that worldly 
being is a contingent reality (and a complex reality) which requires the existence of a 
suspended reality of impulses which continue as trains of thought, desire, imagination, 
and action (and a hierarchy of ends) in order for a concrete action or product to ensue 
and with the “possible, “need”, and “good” being possible spurs to action.   
 In summary so far, then, I suggest that we see above that Aristotle is able to find 
and to systematically draw out such structurings and parallelisms in nature as that 
between animal imagination and human thought, and between the physical being of 
something and its mental being and I add that Aristotle expands upon the distinction 
between animal and human “imagination” elsewhere as that: 
 
“Sensitive imagination (αἰσθητικὴ φαντασία), as we have said, is found in all animals, 
deliberative imagination (βουλευτικὴ) only in those that are calculative (λογιστικοῖς): 
for whether this or that shall be enacted is already a task requiring calculation (λογισμοῦ 
ἤδη ἐστὶν ἔργον); and there must be a single standard to measure by, for that is pursued 
which is greater (καὶ ἀνάγκη ἑνὶ μετρεῖν· τὸ μεῖζον γὰρ διώκει).  It follows that what 
acts in this way must be able to make a unity out of several images (ὥστε δύναται ἓν ἐκ 
πλειόνων φαντασμάτων ποιεῖν) (De An. III 434a8-10)”  
 
from which we see that Aristotle (i) draws a clear and precise distinction between 
animal (sensitive) and human (deliberative / calculative) imagination (ii) reminds us that 
we are broadly speaking about images, anticipations, and wishes (as a stag being an 
intended dinner) and also memories regarding which: “…memory, even of the objects 
of thought, implies a mental picture (ἡ δὲ μνήμη καὶ ἡ τῶν νοητῶν οὐκ ἄνευ 
φαντάσματός ἐστιν) (Mem. 450a12-13)” (iii) explains the peculiarity of “calculative” 
human thought as its ability to think objectively and hence to “make a unity out of 
several images” (and we also see that Aristotle argues that only man has the 
sophistication and hence possibility to actually be “incontinent”135) and (iv) implicitly 
                                                 
135 Cf. “…lower animals are not incontinent, viz. because they have no universal judgement but 
only imagination and memory of particulars (τὰ θηρία οὐκ ἀκρατῆ, ὅτι οὐκ ἔχει καθόλου 
ὑπόληψιν ἀλλὰ τῶν καθ᾽ ἕκαστα φαντασίαν καὶ μνήμην) (N.E. VII 1147b4-5)”  
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suggests that it is our “calculative” part which enables us to contemplate what is “good” 
rather than just to follow our functional animal desires.   
I add that Aristotle argues that “mental pictures” or “phantasmata” are even an 
essential part of our “higher” or explicitly “calculative” mental activities in the sense 
that:  
 
 “…no one could ever learn or understand anything without the exercise of perception, 
so even when we think speculatively, we must have some mental picture of what to 
think (ὅταν τε θεωρῇ, ἀνάγκη ἅμα φάντασμά τι θεωρεῖν); for mental images are similar 
to objects perceived except that they are without matter (τὰ γὰρ φαντάσματα ὥσπερ 
αἰσθήματά ἐστι, πλὴν ἄνευ ὕλης) (De An. III 432a7-11)”136  
 
regarding which Ned O’Gorman correctly observes that: “…an Aristotelian cognitive 
“virtue” does not suppress or disregard phantasia in favour of higher modes of thought.  
Rather, higher modes of thought – for example, contemplative reason – incorporate and 
build on the mental images cultivated by phantasia137”.   Regarding these “higher 
modes of thought” we find that Aristotle argues that we possess “universals” or “forms” 
which are “within the soul”, as follows:  
 
“…a man can exercise his knowledge when he wishes (διὸ νοῆσαι μὲν ἐπ' αὐτῷ) 
[because] what knowledge apprehends is universals (ἡ δ' ἐπιστήμη τῶν καθόλου), and 
these are in a sense within the soul (ταῦτα δ' ἐν αὐτῇ πώς ἐστι τῇ ψυχῇ) (De An. II 
417b23-24)138”  
 
and with Aristotle adding further the parallelism between the human hand and the 
human soul, as follows: “…the soul is analogous to the hand (ὥστε ἡ ψυχὴ ὥσπερ ἡ 
χείρ ἐστιν); for as the hand is a tool of tools (καὶ γὰρ ἡ χεὶρ ὄργανόν ἐστιν ὀργάνων), so 
the mind is the form of forms (καὶ ὁ νοῦς εἶδος εἰδῶν) (De An. III 432a1-2)” from 
                                                 
136 Cf. “…it is impossible even to think without a mental picture (νοεῖν οὐκ ἔστιν ἄνευ 
φαντάσματος).  The same affection is involved in thinking (συμβαίνει γὰρ τὸ αὐτὸ πάθος ἐν τῷ 
νοεῖν) as in drawing a diagram (ἐν τῷ διαγράφειν) (Mem. 450a1-2)” 
 
137 O’Gorman, Ned “Aristotle’s “Phantasia” in the “Rhetoric”: “Lexis”, Appearance, and the 
Epideictic Function of Discourse” in Philosophy and Rhetoric (2005) p 34 
 
138 Cf. “It has been well said that the soul is the place of forms (εἶναι τόπον εἰδῶν), except that 
this does not apply to the soul as a whole, but only its thinking capacity, and the forms occupy it 
not actually but only potentially (πλὴν ὅτι οὔτε ὅλη ἀλλ' ἡ νοητική, οὔτε ἐντελεχείᾳ ἀλλὰ 
δυνάμει τὰ εἴδη) (De An. III 429a27-30)”  
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which we see that Aristotle insists (a) that we have the further power than animals to 
transform our experience of the world into “universals” and “forms” and (b) that this 
power gives us a power to actively engage with the world – and to have a sense of self 
and of time – rather than passively responding to its images and stimuli. 
 Now, I suggest that whereas the value of “reason” and of “mind” is, of course, a 
general preoccupation of our thinking about the world, the significance of imagination 
is not properly appreciated in our thought (and memory and perception are also left 
generally unexplored).  In respect to “imagination” we see that Aristotle suggests that it 
is a important part of our “creative” world in the sense that:  
 
“…mental pictures (φαντασμάτα) are like reflections in water (Div. 464b8-10)”  
 
and with the positive value of “phantasia” as opposed to “nous” residing in the wealth 
of imagery which Erick R. Jiménez explains as follows:  
 
“…every time I mean to think something, for Aristotle, I am always drawing an image 
that has a few too many details.  “Think elephants,” says mind.  “I’ll make it grey,” says 
imagination.  Mind of course does not specify the colour, is not even concerned with the 
colour, but it must be of some colour.  Inasmuch as mind involves these acts of 
phantasia, and these acts of phantasia are not possible except for embodied perceivers, 
mind is an act too that is embodied.  Intelligible contents, Aristotle is claiming, are 
made out only through sensible ones139” 
 
and I add that Eric Sanday also observes that: “Rather than assuming that mind can 
recognise images, it is my conclusion that body must first be able to experience itself 
imagistically, or in a way preparatory to the image, in order that the embodied soul can 
have an image in a way that would matter to it.  The power to have an image is the very 
thing we should be trying to explain, not presuppose140” and I conclude (a) that 
imagination differs from sensation in being a space for or world of wish, memory, 
dreams, appearance, etc. (which can be true and false) which emanates from the bodily 
world but is not wholly limited to it, (b) that imagination differs from mind in being a 
world of experience and of images which affects us and makes us think whereas mind is 
                                                 
139 Jiménez, Erick R. “Mind and Body in Aristotle” in Claudia Baracchi (ed.) The Bloomsbury 
Companion to Aristotle (London, 2013) p 97 
 
140 Sanday, Eric “Phantasia in De Anima” in Claudia Baracchi (ed.) The Bloomsbury Companion 
to Aristotle (London, 2013) p 119 
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a more active and internal power to extract meaning from the world and then apply the 
self to the world and (c) that our creative human possibilities are actually opened up by 
our animal “imagination” in the sense Erick R. Jiménez  explains, as follows: “…it is 
not just the “escape” or “fantasy” of phantasia that is an issue in thinking but the 
perception of a reality that is occasioned by an image141.” 
 I suggest, then, that our human thought or “nous” is always coloured by our 
human being and our “imagination” as Michael Wedin explains, as follows: 
 
“At the centre [of Aristotle’s account] is the conviction that human thought is 
irrevocably representational and that the explanation of thinking must ultimately come 
to rest in representational structures that are peculiar to embodied persons142”.   
 
and with this human being itself being, as Carl Jung rightly observes, a natural arc 
centred around an “akmē” of a rational and mature manhood which is bookended by 
dreams and phantasms, as follows: “Conscious problems fill out the second and third 
quarters [of a human life]…Childhood and extreme old age, to be sure, are utterly 
different, and yet they have one thing in common: submersion in unconscious psychic 
happenings143.”  I add, finally, that we have an interesting case study for our human 
situation in the reflections of Patrick Suppes, as follows:  
 
“Perhaps my memory [i.e. of his joint sessions with Dagfinn Føllesdal] is the most vivid 
of the seminars on Aristotle and Aquinas we gave over many years.  It was in these 
seminars that I came to a much deeper understanding of Aristotle’s theory of 
perception.  I value this experience above all, because it clarified once and for all that 
the simple slogan “same form, different matter” was a succinct but pregnant way of 
describing the fundamental distinction between form and matter in Aristotle’s 
philosophy.  Many aspects of it are formulated by Plato, and to a lesser extent, by other 
Greek philosophers.  But what was and is important is that I realised how fundamental 
this idea is in trying to face up to the nature of the accuracy and speed of human 
perception, and also of many animals as well.  I reach into my pocket and hold up a key, 
                                                 
 
141 Jiménez, Erick R. “Mind and Body in Aristotle” in Claudia Baracchi (ed.) The Bloomsbury 
Companion to Aristotle (London, 2013) p 98 
 
142 Wedin, Michael “Aristotle on the Mechanics of Thought” in Ancient Philosophy (1989) p 85.   
 
143 Jung, Carl G. “The Stages of Life” in Modern Man in Search of a Soul (London, [orig. 1933] 
1961) p 131 
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I ask you, “What is this?”  In a matter of milliseconds really, your brain has computed 
the answer.  How could such rapid and accurate answers be computed when the number 
of objects I could exhibit of this kind is so large?  From a formal standpoint of 
systematic theory, especially of the kind of mathematical psychology that has interested 
me all my academic career, the depth and clarity of this discussion of how perceptual 
recognition of objects and processes is computed, that is, by recognising the form of the 
object, in the way that Aristotle so clearly explains, has been a model of qualitative 
psychology and philosophy.  A beautiful concept of isomorophism is behind this 
fundamental explanation.144” 
 
which surely shows us how hard it is – and how pointless it is – to seek to break down 
the obvious interrelation and unity between the images of instinct, memory, thought, 





















                                                 
144 Suppes, Patrick “[Commentary on] Dagfinn Føllesdal” in Crangle, Colleen E. et al (eds.) 




8 Aristotle on Memory 
 
After “imagination” let us consider “memory” before moving on to “rationality”.   
We find that the essential features of “memory” are (a) that memory allows us to move 
through “time” in the sense that it provides us with a starting point to begin our search 
and hence:  
 
“…when a man wishes to recall anything, this will be his method; he will try to find a 
starting point for an impulse (ἀρχὴν κινήσεως) which will lead to the one he seeks 
(Mem. 451b30-32)” 
 
and in the sense that it is a mechanism through which we can find answers for our 
searches on the basis that: “Memory, then, is neither sensation nor judgement (οὔτε 
αἴσθησις οὔτε ὑπόληψις), but is a state or affection (τινὸς ἕξις ἢ πάθος) of one of these, 
when time has elapsed (ὅταν γένηται χρόνος) (Mem. 449b24-26)” (b) that memory is 
immediate, i.e. is not mediated, in the sense that:  
 
“The reason (αἴτιον) why the effort of recollection is not under the control of their will 
(ἐπ΄ αὐτοῖς) is that, as those who throw a stone cannot stop it at their will when thrown, 
so he who tries to recollect and “hunts” [after an idea] sets up a process in a material 
part (σωματικόν τι κινεῖ), in which resides the affection (ἐν ᾧ τὸ πάθος) (Mem 453a20-
23)” 
 
and (c) that memory is an element of our “habit forming” and “skill learning” capability 
in the sense that: “…we remember things quickly which are often in our thoughts (διὸ ἃ 
πολλάκις ἐννοοῦμεν͵ ταχὺ ἀναμιμνησκόμεθα); for as in nature one thing follows 
another, so also in the actualisation of these stimuli; and the frequency has the effect of 
nature (ὥσπερ γὰρ φύσει τόδε μετὰ τόδε ἐστίν͵ οὕτω καὶ ἐνεργείᾳ· τὸ δὲ πολλάκις 
φύσιν ποιεῖ) (Mem. 452a28-31)” and with this leading to a situation in which “…custom 
now takes the place of nature (γὰρ φύσις ἤδη τὸ ἔθος) (Mem. 452a28)”145.  In short, if 
                                                 
145 Cf. “…that which has become habitual becomes as it were natural (καὶ γὰρ τὸ εἰθισμένον 
ὥσπερ πεφυκὸς ἤδη γίγνεται); in fact, habit is something like nature (ὅμοιον γάρ τι τὸ ἔθος τῇ 
φύσει) for the distance between “often” and “always” is not great, and nature belongs to the idea 
of “always”, “habit” to that of “often” (ἐγγὺς γὰρ καὶ τὸ πολλάκις τῷ ἀεί, ἔστιν δ᾽ ἡ μὲν φύσις 
τοῦ ἀεί, τὸ δὲ ἔθος τοῦ πολλάκις) (Rhet. I 1370a5-8)” 
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we reflect on what memory is, we see that it is a channelling of self through experience 
as well as being a psychic faculty which we practically employ. 
 We see, then, that “memory” is not something that we just happen to have but 
that it is a natural mechanism which channels our thoughts and to some extent channels 
our selves by forming us through “habits” or “customs” and we could even say that 
memory is a means for development in accordance with our environment which could 
be described as a mechanism for evolutionary learning.  In respect to the nature of this 
mechanism of “memory” and its relationship with “sensation” and “thought” we find 
that Aristotle is very explicit, as follows: 
 
“…out of sense-perception comes to be what we call memory (Ἐκ μὲν οὖν αἰσθήσεως 
γίνεται μνήμη, ὥσπερ λέγομεν), and out of frequently repeated memories of the same 
thing develops experience (ἐκ δὲ μνήμης πολλάκις τοῦ αὐτοῦ γινομένης ἐμπειρία); for a 
number of memories constitute a single experience (αἱ γὰρ πολλαὶ μνῆμαι τῷ ἀριθμῷ 
ἐμπειρία μία ἐστίν).  From experience again (ἐκ δ' ἐμπειρίας) – i.e. from the universal 
now stabilised in its entirety within the soul (ἢ ἐκ παντὸς ἠρεμήσαντος τοῦ καθόλου ἐν 
τῇ ψυχῇ), the one beside the many which is a single identity within them all (τοῦ ἑνὸς 
παρὰ τὰ πολλά, ὃ ἂν ἐν ἅπασιν ἓν ἐνῇ ἐκείνοις τὸ αὐτό) – originate the skill of the 
craftsman and the knowledge of the man of science (τέχνης ἀρχὴ καὶ ἐπιστήμης), skill 
in the sphere of coming to be and science in the sphere of being (ἐὰν μὲν περὶ γένεσιν, 
τέχνης, ἐὰν δὲ περὶ τὸ ὄν).  We conclude that these states of knowledge are neither 
innate in a determinate form, nor developed from other higher states of knowledge 
(ἐπιστήμης. οὔτε δὴ ἐνυπάρχουσιν ἀφωρισμέναι αἱ ἕξεις, οὔτ' ἀπ' ἄλλων ἕξεων γίνονται 
γνωστικωτέρων), but from sense perception (ἀλλ' ἀπὸ αἰσθήσεως)…The soul is so 
constituted as to be capable of this process (ἡ δὲ ψυχὴ ὑπάρχει τοιαύτη οὖσα οἵα 
δύνασθαι πάσχειν τοῦτο) (Post. An. II 100a3-14)” 
 
though I suggest that it is important to add that the fact that we understand the world in 
general and its forms, genera etc. through sensation, through memory, through habit 
etc., derives ultimately from the fact that “The soul is so constituted as to be capable of 
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this process (ἡ δὲ ψυχὴ ὑπάρχει τοιαύτη οὖσα οἵα δύνασθαι πάσχειν τοῦτο)”146 and does 
not allow us to reduce the world or our knowledge to sense data147. 
 I add that it is also interesting to consider that Aristotle is concerned with how 
and why we mis-remember as well as why we remember (and also with why our 
understanding of the facts of experience can be correct or wrong or misguided) and with 
his assessment on this point being that:  
 
“…since in purely natural phenomena some things occur contrary to nature, and owing 
to chance, (ἐπεὶ δ΄ ὥσπερ ἐν τοῖς φύσει γίγνεται καὶ παρὰ φύσιν καὶ ἀπὸ τύχης) so still 
more in matters of habit, to which the term “natural” does not belong in the same sense 
(ἔτι μᾶλλον ἐν τοῖς δι΄ ἔθος͵ οἷς ἡ φύσις γε μὴ ὁμοίως ὑπάρχει); so that the mind is 
sometimes impelled not only in the required direction but also otherwise, especially 
when something diverts it from that direction, and turns it towards itself.  This is why 
when we want to remember a name, we remember one rather like it, but fail to 
enunciate the one we want (Mem. 452b1-6)”  
 
and with this point in principle being that: 
 
“…in the realm of nature (φύσει) occurrences take place which are even contrary to 
nature (παρὰ φύσιν), or fortuitous (ἀπὸ τύχης), [and] the same happens a fortiori in the 
sphere swayed by custom (δι΄ ἔθος) (Mem. 452b1-2)”   
 
which shows us (i) that the “slips” of our memory are one manifestation of the slips of 
nature itself (ii) that Aristotle assumes that we are a natural product which simply 
exhibits the nature of Nature in our nature (cf. “The soul is so constituted as to be 
                                                 
146 John von Heyking comments that: “The intellect, like the tablet, is suited to receive the form 
of the intelligible (thereby indicating that Aristotle’s version of the blank slate emphasises it is a 
slate, and not simply its blankness, which seems emphasised in modern accounts 
(“”Sunaisthetic” Friendship and Political Anthropology” in International Political 
Anthropology (2008) p 185).” 
 
147 Cf. “When one of a number of logically indiscernible particulars has made a stand, the 
earliest universal is present in the soul (στάντος γὰρ τῶν ἀδιαφόρων ἑνός, πρῶτον μὲν ἐν τῇ 
ψυχῇ καθόλου): for though the act of sense-perception is of the particular, its content is 
universal – is man, for example, not the man Callias (καὶ γὰρ αἰσθάνεται μὲν τὸ καθ' ἕκαστον, ἡ 
δ' αἴσθησις τοῦ καθόλου ἐστίν, οἷον ἀνθρώπου, ἀλλ' οὐ Καλλίου ἀνθρώπου).  A fresh stand is 
made among these rudimentary universals, and the process does not cease until the indivisible 
concepts, the true universals, are established (πάλιν ἐν τούτοις ἵσταται, ἕως ἂν τὰ ἀμερῆ στῇ καὶ 
τὰ καθόλου), e.g. such and such a species of animal is a step towards the genus animal, which 
by the same process is a step towards a further generalisation (οἷον τοιονδὶ ζῷον, ἕως ζῷον, καὶ 
ἐν τούτῳ ὡσαύτως) (Post. An. II 100a15-100b2)” 
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capable of this process (ἡ δὲ ψυχὴ ὑπάρχει τοιαύτη οὖσα οἵα δύνασθαι πάσχειν τοῦτο)”) 
and (iii) that Aristotle’s conceptualisation of nature calmly identifies and incorporates 
the existence of these “slips” and irregularities in respect to the circumstances in which 
they are observable and appropriate (see also Phys. II 199a33 f.).   I suggest in 
conclusion (A) that Aristotle represents nature as we actually encounter it, (B) that 
Aristotle assumes that there is some guiding mechanism behind this irregular but 
structured reality of our acquaintance, and this may, I suggest, be what he is referring to 
when he comments that: “…nature is only one particular genus of being (ἓν γάρ τι γένος 
τοῦ ὄντος ἡ φύσις) (Met. Γ 1005a34)” (this presumably meaning that there is a 
supersensible realm which is in some sense distinct from worldly “nature”) and (C) that 
Aristotle argues on the basis of observed reality that there is structure and form in nature 
from which we can draw abstractions but that evidence of this structuring does not 
allow us to reduce the world to abstractions. 
As regards how our modern viewpoint on “memory” agrees or disagrees with 
Aristotle’s I would suggest that modern scientific research supports and is to some 
degree the same as Aristotle’s position (as stated above) but with its approach often 
being purely descriptive and localised (for either practical or positivistic reasons148).  
First, we find that memory is not just data storage (whatever “just” means in this 
context) but that it is a structured engagement with time in the sense that our working 
short-term memory is a necessary enabler of a moving human self in the world149 – 
which can go wrong as amnesia or as an inability to regulate data150 – as is attention, 
                                                 
148 I suggest, for instance, that we see “positivism” behind Richard Rorty’s position that: “…we 
can content ourselves with saying that the nature of a mental state is to be the sort of state of the 
human organism which psychologists study (“Mind as Ineffable” in Richard Q. Elvee (ed.) 
Mind in Nature; Nobel Conference XVII (San Francisco, 1982) p 76)” on the basis that his 
position is held primarily for ideological / philosophical rather than for practical / scientific 
reasons.  
 
149 We find that Alan Baddeley explains that human “memory” contains both a “long term 
memory” and also a “working memory” which is an “episodic buffer” which is a: “…temporary 
store” which is: “…assumed to be controlled by the central executive, which is capable of 
retrieving information from the store in the form of conscious awareness, of reflecting on that 
information and, where necessary, manipulating and modifying it.  The buffer is episodic in the 
sense that it holds episodes whereby information is integrated across space and potentially 
extended across time (“The episodic buffer: a new component of working memory?” in Trends 
in Cognitive Sciences (2000) p 421)” (and Jeffrey M. Ellenborgen et al notes that memory needs 
to be “consolidated” through “sleep consolidation” (“Interfering with Theories of Sleep and 
Memory: Sleep, Declarative Memory, and Associative Inference” in Current Biology (2006)). 
 
150 For the inability to forget or put aside information – this being the reverse of amnesia – see 
the example of Jill Price in Sven Bernecker’s Memory: A Philosophical Study (Oxford, 2010) p 
2. 
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attention span, and the ability to intellectually focus on an object / task.  Second, we 
find that human “memory” is connected both with our animal “perception” and also 
with our human “self” and hence that human beings possess not only explicit 
“declarative” memory which allows us to consciously retrieve facts, arguments, and 
opinions but also implicit “non-declarative” memory which represents the un-conscious 
and non-verbal storage of emotions and habits151.  As regards scientists willing (for 
whatever reason) to engage with philosophy, however, we find such arguments as those 
of David Bohm that: 
 
“What is the process of thought?  Thought is, in essence, the active response of memory 
in every phase of life.  We include in thought the intellectual, emotional, sensuous, 
muscular and physical responses to memory…It is clear, however, that the whole 
meaning of such a memory is just the conjunction of the image with its feeling152” 
 
and I note that quantum physics seems to suggest that there is “memory” in elemental 
nature in the sense of the “entanglement” outlined for instance by Bernard d’Espagnat 
in his “The Quantum Physics and Reality” in Scientific American (1979) and I suggest 
that this “new” approach to the world is actually quintessentially Aristotelian (and see 
also the work of Werner Heisenberg, Henry P. Stapp, Walter Elsasser, David Bohm, 
Hans Primas, Rupert Sheldrake among others). 
I add as regards philosophers willing to treat memory philosophically that we 
find (for instance) Michel Foucault arguing that:  
 
“It seems to me that these are the three major forms (memory, meditation, and method) 
which in the West have successively dominated the practice and exercise of philosophy 
or, if you like, the practice of life as philosophy153” 
 
                                                 
 
151 We find that, as Grey Walter explains, “memory” for all animals includes implicit learning 
from environmental influence and hence that “habituation” is actually “the reverse of habit-
forming” and is found in such (non-cognitive) natural facts as that: “When an animal is 
subjected to monotonous stimuli there is usually a progressive reduction in the response in the 
central nervous system (discussion on W. Ross Ashby’s paper “The Mechanism of Habituation” 
in  The Mechanization of Thought Processes (London, 1960) p 115)”. 
  
152 Bohm, David Wholeness and the Implicate Order (London, 1980) p 50 
 
153 Foucault, Michel The Hermeneutics of the Subject (New York, [orig. 1981-2] 2005) p 460 
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and with (on Foucault’s account) (a) memory reaching its apogee in Platonic 
recollection, (b) meditation reaching its apogee in Stoic philosophy and Christian 
religion and (c) method reaching its apogee in Cartesian rationalism and Baconian 
empiricism.  I add that Foucault’s further important thoughts on “memory” (which are, I 
note, fully compatible with Aristotle’s) are that it is an important and, importantly, 
integrated aspect of “man” in the sense that:  
 
“One is a philosopher even in one’s everyday actions, and the practice of philosophy is 
translated into three abilities, three forms of attitude and aptitude: one is eumathēs, 
which is to say one can learn easily; one is mnēmōn, which is to say one has a good 
memory and permanently retains everything one has learned in a lively, present, and 
active way, since one was eumathēs.  So, one is eumathēs, one is mnēmōn (one retains 
what one has learned), and finally one is logizesthai dunatos (one can reason, that is to 
say, in a given situation and conjecture one knows how to use reasoning and apply it to 
make the right decision).  So you see, there is a first set of indications marking what the 
philosophical choice consists in, in its principle, permanence, and interrupted effort, 
and, on the other hand, a set of indications showing how this philosophical choice links 
up with and immediately and continually engages with everyday activity154.”  
 
and I suggest that Foucault is absolutely correct in his identification of modern thought 
with “method” and with its desire to standardise, intellectualise, and mathematicise the 
world even if we must reject not only reality but also our own personality in order to do 











                                                 





9 Aristotle on Rationality 
   
Let us move on to consider “reason” with the fact in mind that human rationality 
has infused all areas of our study up to this point.  Let us also consider that Aristotle’s 
idea of “reason” or “nous” radically diverges from our idea of “rationalism” as the 
application of our thought and self to the world on the basis of “…the Newtonian 
System of Nature…[according to which] Where we formerly obeyed, we now direct155”.  
As regards Aristotle’s “reason” in outline I suggest (1) that Aristotle understands 
“reason” as being something which is generally present in nature but which is somehow 
channelled by man in a particular way in the sense that:  
 
“…reason in each of its possessors chooses what is best for itself, and the good man 
obeys his reason (πᾶς γὰρ νοῦς αἱρεῖται τὸ βέλτιστον ἑαυτῷ, ὁ δ᾽ ἐπιεικὴς πειθαρχεῖ τῷ 
νῷ) (N.E. IX 1169a17-18)”  
 
(2) that this reason is something which allows us to see the things of nature in the right 
way rather than merely being a capacity to be logically or factually right about 
something and with there being a disjunction between this “logical” and “scientific” 
understanding of something and a “true” and “full” understanding of that something on 
the basis that:  
 
“…it is not merely the state in accordance with the right rule, but the state that implies 
the presence of the right rule, that is virtue (ἔστι γὰρ οὐ μόνον ἡ κατὰ τὸν ὀρθὸν λόγον, 
ἀλλ᾽ ἡ μετὰ τοῦ ὀρθοῦ λόγου ἕξις ἀρετή ἐστιν)…Socrates…thought the virtues were 
                                                 
155 Whitehead, A.N. Adventures of Ideas (Harmondsworth, 1933) p 185.  I note that F. A. Hayek 
expands on this point as that: “Since for Descartes reason was defined as logical deduction from 
explicit premises, rational action also came to mean only such action as was determined entirely 
by known and demonstrable truth.  It is almost an inevitable step from this to the conclusion that 
only what is true in this sense can lead to successful action, and that therefore everything to 
which man owes his achievements is a product of his reasoning thus conceived.  Institutions and 
practices which have not been designed in this manner can be beneficial only by accident.  Such 
became the characteristic attitude of Cartesian constructivism with its contempt for tradition, 
custom, and history in general.  Man’s reason should enable him to construct society anew.  
This “rationalist” approach, however, meant in effect a relapse into earlier, anthropomorphic 
modes of thinking.  It produced a renewed propensity to ascribe the origin of all institutions to 
invention or design.  Morals, religion and law, language and writing, money and the market, 
were thought of as having been deliberately constructed by somebody, or at least as owing 
whatever perfection they possessed to such design (Law, Legislation and Liberty: A new 
statement of the liberal principles of justice and political economy (London, 1993) p 10)” 
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rules or rational principles (for he thought they were, all of them, forms of scientific 
knowledge (ἐπιστήμας γὰρ εἶναι πάσας)), while we think they involve a rational 
principle (ἡμεῖς δὲ μετὰ λόγου) (N.E. VI 1144b26-30)”  
 
and (3) that Aristotle argues that “science” and “knowledge” are not “products” or 
“facts” but are rather a “habit of being” (and a having a feel for the subject matter) and 
so we find that Aristotle separates out (a) the end product of “science” or “epistēmē” 
(and also “apodeixis” or “scientific demonstration”; see Post. An. II 71b16-19) and (b) 
our faculty to understand the facts of the world or “epistēmonikon” but also argues (c) 
that science is produced by the activation and development of the faculty for science 
and by the formation of a habit which has become a fixed part of our character (i.e. the 
“demonstrative habit” or “hexis apodeiktike” (N.E. VI 1139b31-2)) by means of which 
we can “see” the world through a scientific lens (see De An. III 429b6-10).   
Expanding upon Aristotle’s realism and upon his insistence upon groundedness 
and rejection of abstraction and idealism, we find that he insists upon the principle that: 
“A habit is a habit of something, knowledge is knowledge of something, position 
position of something (Cat. 6b4-6)”, that our “knowing” is of something in the sense 
that:  
 
“…there is knowledge of something that it is something (ἐπιστήμη τοῦ τινὸς ὄντος ὅτι 
τὶ ὄν)…for ex hypothesi the expression “that which is something” refers to the thing’s 
particular form of being (τὸ τὶ ὄν τῆς ἰδίου σημεῖον οὐσίας) (Pr. An. I 49a33-37)”  
 
and that our knowing is based upon our perceiving and also, ultimately, upon the world 
itself on the basis that: “The object…would appear to be prior to the act of perception.  
Suppose that you cancel the perceptible, you cancel the perception as well (Cat. 7b36-
38)” and on the basis that: “We gain knowledge, commonly speaking, of things that 
already exist, for in very few cases or none can our knowledge have come into being 
along with its own proper object.  Should the object of knowledge be removed, then the 
knowledge itself will be cancelled (Cat. 7b24-29)”.  I add that Aristotle also makes the 
observation along these “realist” lines that: 
 
“…every disposition and every affection naturally comes into being in that of which it 
is a disposition or affection (πᾶσα γὰρ διάθεσις καὶ πᾶν πάθος ἐν ἐκείνῳ πεφυκε 
γίνεσθαι οὗ ἐστὶ διάθεσις ἢ πάθος), for example, knowledge in the soul, since it is a 
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disposition of soul (καθάπερ καὶ ἡ ἐπιστήμη ἐν ψυχῇ διάθεσις οὖσα ψυχῆς) (Top. VI 
145a35-37)” 
  
and I add that the relationship of “nous” with “sensation” is explained by Jonathan 
Beere as that: “…νοῦς is perception-like in that it is a faculty for cognition of objects 
(rather than propositions or states of affairs)156”, i.e. we see that human “reason” is an 
expansion or extension of animal “sensation” (and is a movement towards the “Nous” of 
“God” itself). 
We can also unravel Aristotle’s complex thought and see its remarkable 
consistency and profundity by considering that Aristotle divides human reason or, 
rather, the rational “part” of the soul, into two “parts” (i) the “logistikon” or the faculty 
of deliberating (N.E. VI 1139a12) regarding which we see that:  
 
“The end…[is] what we wish for (ὄντος δὴ βουλητοῦ μὲν τοῦ τέλους)…[and] the 
means [are] what we deliberate about (βουλευτῶν δὲ καὶ προαιρετῶν τῶν πρὸς τὸ 
τέλος) (N.E. III 1113b3-4)”  
 
and (ii) the “epistēmonikon” which is essentially a “seeing through” of the 
“phantasmata” of worldly being in order to detect its underlying “forms” and hence: 
“The faculty of thinking…thinks the forms in the images (τὰ μὲν οὖν εἴδη τὸ νοητικὸν 
ἐν τοῖς φαντάσμασι νοεῖ) (De An. III 431b2-3)” and with it being: “…through the 
sensation connected with sight that we recognise the form which is in each thing (διὰ 
γὰρ περὶ τὴν ὄψιν αἰσθήσεως τὴν ἐν ἑκάστῳ μορφὴν γνωρίζομεν) (Top. II 113a2-3)”.  
We also find that Aristotle explains our seeing through images (intermittently), as 
follows: 
 
“It is clear that demonstration and knowledge of intermittent events, such as an eclipse 
of the moon, are eternal in so far as they refer to events of a specific kind; but in so far 
as they are not eternal, they are particular.  Attributes may apply intermittently to other 
subjects just as an eclipse does to the moon (Post. An. I 75b33-36)”  
 
and he explains our ability to “see” the “forms” because we are able to “make a unity 
out of several images” as follows: “…when we are able to render an account in 
                                                 
156 Beere, Jonathan “Thinking Thinking Thinking: On God’s Self-thinking in Aristotle’s 
Metaphysics Λ.9” (online, 2010) p 3 
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accordance with the appearance (ἐπειδὰν γὰρ ἔχωμεν ἀποδιδόναι κατὰ τὴν φαντασίαν) 
of the consequent attributes (περὶ τῶν συμβεβηκότων), either all or some of them, then 
we shall also be able to speak excellently about the substance (περὶ τῆς οὐσίας) (De An. 
I 402b21-25)”.  I suggest that we see here to some extent the relationship between 
“nous” and “phantasia” in the difference between our engagement with the formal 
intellectual world and the material practical world. 
In respect to the detailed structuring of Aristotle’s “reason” we see that he 
breaks down human rationality into five forms, i.e. craft (technē), practical wisdom 
(phronēsis), scientific knowledge (epistēmē), philosophical wisdom (sophia), and 
intuitive reason (nous), and that he defines “scientific knowledge” as follows: 
 
“Scientific knowledge (ἐπιστήμη) is judgement (ὑπόληψις) about things (ὄντων) that 
are universal (καθόλου) and necessary (ἐξ ἀνάγκης), and the conclusions of 
demonstration (τῶν ἀποδεικτῶν), and of all scientific knowledge, follow from first 
principles (ἀρχαὶ) (for scientific knowledge involves apprehension of a rational ground 
(μετὰ λόγου)) …[but] the wise man (τὸ σοφὸν) must not only know what follows from 
the first principles (μὴ μόνον τὰ ἐκ τῶν ἀρχῶν εἰδέναι), but must also possess truth 
about the first principles (ἀλλὰ καὶ περὶ τὰς ἀρχὰς ἀληθεύει).  Therefore wisdom (ἡ 
σοφία) must be intuitive reason (νοῦς) combined with scientific knowledge (ἐπιστήμη) 
– scientific knowledge of the highest objects (τιμιωτάτων) which has received as it were 
its proper contemplation (N.E. VI 1140b31-1141a20)” 
 
and that he adds both that: “…no other kind of knowledge except intuition (νοῦς) is 
more accurate than scientific knowledge (Post. An. II 100b8-9)” and that: “…we hold 
not only that scientific knowledge is possible, but that there is a definite first principle 
of knowledge [i.e. “nous”] by which we recognise ultimate truths (ταῦτά τ' οὖν οὕτω 
λέγομεν, καὶ οὐ μόνον ἐπιστήμην ἀλλὰ καὶ ἀρχὴν ἐπιστήμης εἶναί τινά φαμεν, ᾗ τοὺς 
ὅρους γνωρίζομεν) (Post. An. I 72b23-25)”.    
Now, we see that Aristotle’s main conclusion above is that “philosophical 
wisdom” (sophia) is “reason” (nous) and “scientific knowledge” (epistēmē) in respect to 
“the highest objects” and I add regarding “practical wisdom” (phronēsis) and “craft” 
(technē) that Aristotle argues that:  
 
“…intuitive reason (νοῦς) is of the limiting premises (τῶν ὅρων), for which no reason 
(λόγος) can be given, while practical wisdom (ἡ φρόνησις) is concerned with the 
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ultimate particular (τοῦ ἐσχάτου), which is the object not of scientific knowledge 
(ἐπιστήμη) but of perception (αἴσθησις) (N.E. VI 1142a25-27)”   
 
and also that: “Practical wisdom is a virtue of reason, which enables men to come to a 
wise decision in regard to good and evil things, which have been mentioned in 
connection with happiness (φρόνησις δ᾽ ἐστὶν ἀρετὴ διανοίας καθ᾽ ἣν εὖ βουλεύεσθαι 
δύνανται περὶ ἀγαθῶν καὶ κακῶν τῶν εἰρημένων εἰς εὐδαιμονίαν) (Rhet. I 1366b20-
22)” which shows us that phronēsis is a virtue for good decision making in respect to 
merely human affairs.  Regarding “technē” we find that Aristotle argues that: “…virtue 
is more exact and better than any art, as nature also is (ἡ δ᾽ ἀρετὴ πάσης τέχνης 
ἀκριβεστέρα καὶ ἀμείνων ἐστὶν ὥσπερ καὶ ἡ φύσις) (N.E. II 1106b14-15)” which shows 
us that “good” and “truth” flows from the man to his products whereas I suggest that the 
modern position tends to see the wealth of science and of art as being greater than the 
human individual (and I note that “technē” is a weaker subsidiary of “phronēsis” in a 
parallel sense as “epistēmē” is an applied subsidiary of “sophia”).  A further point of 
emphasis is the distinction between practical and intellectual thinking regarding which 
Aristotle declares that: 
 
 “It is hard…to see how a weaver or a carpenter will be benefited in regard to his own 
craft by knowing this “good itself”, or how the man who has viewed the Idea will be a 
better doctor or general thereby (N.E. I 1097a8-11)”  
 
which stresses the important point that there are literally two radically different 
directions and dimensions of our thinking – i.e. practical and intellectual – within us and 
Malcolm F. Lowe explains this distinction from a further interesting angle as follows: 
“Aristotle distinguishes between two basic kinds of thinking: apprehensive thinking 
about things having matter by means of sensation, which is also the process by which 
the mind first learns, and autonomous thinking about things without matter by means of 
the imagination, which includes both the contemplative thinking of mathematics and 
natural philosophy and also thinking about concrete objects in their absence157”.   
                                                 
157 Lowe, Malcolm F. “Aristotle on Kinds of Thinking” in Phronesis (1983) p 27.  I note for the 
sake of completeness that Aristotle explains his position on “opinion” as being that: “…the only 
things that are true are intuition, knowledge, and opinion (νοῦς καὶ ἐπιστήμη καὶ δόξα), and the 
discourse resulting from these.  Therefore we are left with the conclusion that it is opinion that 
is concerned with that which is true or false (ὥστε λείπεται δόξαν εἶναι περὶ τὸ ἀληθὲς μὲν ἢ 
ψεῦδος) and which may be otherwise (ἐνδεχόμενον δὲ καὶ ἄλλως ἔχειν).  In other words opinion 
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I summarise our conclusions, then, as being (A) that we are capable of going 
beyond the “images” we encounter in our everyday life and of seeing the scientific 
“forms” which lie beneath, (B) that we must recognise that various “objects” of the 
world differ in themselves and in their relationship with us and we are hence capable 
both of “deliberating” about human affairs and also of “contemplating” upon divine 
matters, and (C) that we gather that the world possesses “ends” and “goods” and “God” 
by contemplating the “eternal” structuring of nature and that we understand that we 
must apply the right “means” to achieve our ends by considering how we live our 
everyday lives in the sense that: “…the one determines the end (τὸ τέλος) and the other 
makes us do (ποιεῖ πράττειν) the things that lead to the end (τὰ πρὸς τὸ τέλος) (N.E. VI 
1145a5-6)”158.  I add further (D) that Aristotle never ignores the fact that it is always an 
individual person who possesses reason and (E) that Aristotle maintains that we must 
accept that the scientist, say, acquires and has a distinct perspective on the world and 
disposition within himself (as is the case with all other types of person) and with 
Aristotle’s virtue here being that he is able and willing to make distinctions and also to 
preserve them, and hence he does not take the artist, philosopher, scientist, mother, poet 
etc. as representing some sort of absolute truth but does, rather, regard all of these 
perspectives as true perspectives capturing various aspects of reality.  We find, then, 
that Aristotle both avoids anthropocentrism and also recognises the specialness of man 
which is the creativity and power of thought which arises as a corrective for the 
alienation of the human condition.  For Aristotle, then, the importance of man is his 
peculiarity which is, A.N. Whitehead observes, that: “Mankind is that factor in Nature 
which exhibits in its most intense form the plasticity of nature159”. 
As regards the provenance of Aristotle’s position on “reason” I note that Plato 
outlines in his Meno the basic problem regarding (A) how knowledge arises and / or (B) 
where knowledge comes from and also posits solutions (a) through his story of Socrates’ 
drawing out of (geometrical) knowledge from a slave and (b) through his own doctrine 
                                                 
is the assumption (ἐστὶν ὑπόληψις) of a premise which is neither mediated nor necessary (τῆς 
ἀμέσου προτάσεως καὶ μὴ ἀναγκαίας) (Post. An. I 89a1-5)”  
 
158 I note that Aristotle’s position on this point is in more detail that: “The work (τὸ ἔργον) of 
both the intellectual parts (τῶν νοητικῶν μορίων) [i.e. the deliberative and calculative]…is truth 
(ἀλήθεια) (N.E. VI 1139b12)” but that generally “…choice will not be right (ὀρθὴ) without 
practical wisdom (ἄνευ φρονήσεως) (N.E. VI 1145a4-5)” which shows us Aristotle’s emphatic 
rejection of a purely a priori approach to the world (and it is this, I stress, which is the key 
emphasis of Aristotle’s disagreement with Plato and not whether “forms” appear in nature). 
 
159 Whitehead, A.N. Adventures of Ideas (Harmondsworth, 1933) p 98 
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that knowledge is in Nature as Ideas which we must recollect which Aristotle explains 
and criticises as follows:  
 
“…with the theory in the Meno that learning is recollection (ὅτι ἡ μάθησις ἀνάμνησις) 
…in no case do we find that we have previous knowledge of the individual, but we do 
find that in the process of induction we acquire knowledge of particular things just as 
though we could remember them (οὐδαμου γὰρ συμβαίνει προεπίστασθαι τὸ καθ' 
ἕκαστον, ἀλλ' ἅμα τῇ ἐπαγωγῇ λαμβάνειν τὴν τῶν κατὰ μέρος ἐπιστήμην ὥσπερ 
ἀναγνωρίζοντας); for there are some things which we know immediately (ἔνια γὰρ 
εὐθὺς ἴσμεν); for e.g. if we know that X is a triangle we know that the sum of its angles 
is equal to two right angles.  Similarly too in all other cases.  Thus whereas we observe 
particular things by universal knowledge, we do not know them by the knowledge 
peculiar to them.  Hence it is possible to be mistaken about them, not because we have 
contrary knowledge about them, but because, although we have universal knowledge of 
them, we are mistaken in our particular knowledge (Pr. An. II 67a22-30)” 
 
(and see also Post. An. II 99b25-30) which reveals the provenance of certain typical 
aspects of Aristotle’s position which we have already touched upon, namely (a) his 
emphasis upon immediacy and upon how we know some things immediately (i.e. by 
deduction) and other things mediately (i.e. by induction) which is largely Aristotle’s 
distinction between “divine” (abstract) and “sublunary” (material) being and (b) his 
consideration of the importance and nature of our “memory” and of our collective 
memory or culture regarding which it is reasonable to say, I suggest, that our “culture” 
is essentially a form of common “imagination” rather than being merely common 
“experience” or “memory”160. 
As regards Aristotle’s opposition to Plato and to his idealism I suggest that 
Aristotle provides us with an excellent account of the reasons for his rejection of a 
reality based upon “ideas” and consequently upon “flux”, as follows:  
 
“The supporters of the ideal theory (περὶ τῶν εἰδῶν δόξα) were led to it because on the 
question of the truth of things they accepted the Heraclitean sayings which describe all 
sensible things as ever passing away (ὡς πάντων τῶν αἰσθητῶν ἀεὶ ῥεόντων), so that if 
knowledge or thought is to have an object (ὥστ᾽ εἴπερ ἐπιστήμη τινὸς ἔσται καὶ 
φρόνησις), there must be some other and permanent entities, apart from those which are 
                                                 
160 See Ned O’Gorman’s “Aristotle’s “Phantasia” in the “Rhetoric”: “Lexis”, Appearance, and 
the Epideictic Function of Discourse” in Philosophy and Rhetoric (2005) 
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sensible (ἑτέρας δεῖν τινὰς φύσεις εἶναι παρὰ τὰς αἰσθητὰς μενούσας); for there could 
be no knowledge of things which were in a state of flux (οὐ γὰρ εἶναι τῶν ῥεόντων 
ἐπιστήμην) (Met. M 1078b12-17)” 
 
which shows us in clear relief Aristotle’s critique of Plato which is that we must over-
empahsise the ideals of the mind if we do not recognise the values inherent in the world 
itself.  In more detail, we find that Aristotle concludes contra Plato that we actually 
develop knowledge through the substantiation of hypotheses (cf. “…we go on packing 
the space between until the intervals are indivisible or unitary (Post. An. I 84b35-36)”) 
and through an increase in our experience (cf. “…experience, that is the universal when 
established as a whole in the soul…provides the starting-point of of art and science: art 
in the world of process and science in the world of facts (ἐὰν μὲν περὶ γένεσιν, τέχνης, 
ἐὰν δὲ περὶ τὸ ὄν, ἐπιστήμης) (Post. An. II 100a6-9)”) in this world rather than through 
the “recollection” of the Ideas of another and / or previous world (and see also Post. An. 
I 71a29-30: “Unless we make this distinction, we shall be faced with the dilemma 
reached in the Meno: either one can learn nothing, or one can only learn what is already 
known”).  I add finally that the Meno raises the further point that knowledge must 
somehow be replicable and “tied down”, as Michael Ferejohn explains, as follows:  
 
“…the central insight that drives the entire project of Aristotle’s Analytics is the 
Platonic idea, briefly floated in the Meno 98 A, that what distinguishes knowledge from 
other types of true belief is that it is somehow “tied down” by the possession of an 
explanatory account, which I interpreted earlier to mean an account that explains the 
truth of what is known161”  
 
and, generally, that we find that the Meno leaves us (as it left Aristotle) with the 
problems (i) regarding the sense in which the Truth is innate in us162 (ii) regarding the 
sense in which the Truth is learned by the individual (iii) regarding the sense in which 
the Truth is learned from or transmitted from other people / teachers (iv) regarding how 
                                                 
161 Ferejohn, Michael Formal Causes: Definition, Explanation, and Primacy in Socratic and 
Aristotelian Thought (Oxford, 2013) p 66 
 
162 I note that the Meno was the object of significant interest in the early modern period with 
René Descartes, for instance, arguing that: “…according to Plato, Socrates asks the slave boy 
about the elements of his geometry and thereby makes the boy able to dig out certain truths 
from his own mind which he had not previously recognised were there, thus attempting to 
establish the doctrine of reminiscence.  Our knowledge of God is of this sort (“Letter to Voetius 
May 1643”, CSM III §167, p. 222-3)”. 
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the Truth is in Nature and how we actually come to know the Truth and (v) regarding 
how we “tie down” the Truth through our formulations of it.   
 As regards how we stand vis-à-vis Aristotle I comment that our standard 
“modern” position is often taken to be (in my opinion illegitimately) the “analytic” 
position of Richard Rorty that: “We no more know “the nature of mind” by 
introspecting mental events than we know “the nature of matter” by perceiving tables.  
To know the nature of something is not a matter of having it before the mind, of 
intuiting it, but of being able to utter a large number of true propositions about it163” and 
that: 
 
“It may seem weird to say that there might turn out to be no living bodies, or that there 
might turn out to be no minds.  It was of course weird to say it turned out that the earth 
was not at rest.  It seems to be that what we need to explain is not the truth of a 
proposition, but the inclination of human beings to assert the proposition164” 
 
which strikes me as a sort of special pleading for nothingness and for a cold, deadly, 
“practical” nihilism which represents a perversity that could only, I think, be entertained 
and defended by people seeking to push its underlying message, i.e. that if nothing 
really matters then everything goes.  As regards the problem with this position I put 
forward A.N. Whitehead’s argument that our intellect is limited in the sense that: “A 
moment’s introspection assures one of the feebleness of human intellectual operations, 
and of the dim massive complexity of our feelings of derivation.  The point for 
discussion is how in animal experience this simplification is effected165” but that our 
                                                 
163 Rorty, Richard “Mind as Ineffable” in ed. Richard Q. Elvee’s Mind in Nature; Nobel 
Conference XVII (San Francisco, 1982)  p 69 (cf. “…we do not start with visual images.  We do 
not “start” with anything.  We are just trained to make reports – some perceptual, some 
introspective – as part of our general training in uttering true sentences, our learning of the 
language.  There is no more or less mystery and paradox in our species having learned to 
manipulate sentences than in bower-birds having learned to manipulate plant stems and vines.  
Huxley and Darwin thus turn out to have told us all we need to know about our place in nature – 
for what needs to be explained is simply our behaviour (Ibid. p 71)”). 
 
164 Rorty, Richard Ibid. p 90 (cf. “What we need to explain is the popularity of our present 
speech habits, which classify things as living, non-living, cognitive, noncognitive, morally 
relevant, morally irrelevant.  Our explanation may or may not preserve those propositions; but, 
in my view, a phenomenon is merely our inclination to assert to certain propositions.  That 
inclination, if you like, is the phenomenon that has to be explained (Ibid. p 90)”) 
 
165 Whitehead, A.N. Adventures of Ideas (Harmondsworth, 1933) p 247  
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intellect is clearly limited not in the sense that it may not exist but, rather, in the sense 
that it may delude itself into believing or saying that it does not exist on the basis of the 
error that: “…the substratum [of the world] with its complex of inherent qualities is 
wrongly conceived as bare realisation, devoid of self-enjoyment, that is to say, devoid 
of intrinsic worth.  In this way, the exclusive reliance on sense-perception promotes a 
false metaphysics.  This error is the result of high-grade intellectuality.  The instinctive 
interpretations which govern human life and animal life presuppose a contemporary 
world throbbing with energetic values.  It requires considerable ability to make the 
disastrous abstraction of our bare sense-perceptions from the massive insistency of our 
total experiences.  Of course, whatever we can do in the way of abstraction is for some 


















                                                 
166 Whitehead, A.N. Adventures of Ideas (Harmondsworth, 1933) p 254-255.  I also recommend 
on Aristotle’s “reason” David Wiggins’ “Deliberation and Practical Reason” in ed. Amélie O. 
Rorty Essays on Aristotle’s Ethics (Berkeley, 1980), Gaёlle Fiasse’s “Aristotle’s Phronēsis: A 
True Grasp of Ends as Well as Means?” in Review of Metaphysics (2001), Robert Heinaman’s 
“Rationality, Eudaimonia and Kakodaimonia in Aristotle” in Phronesis (1993), Terence Irwin’s 
“Vice and Reason” in The Journal of Ethics (2001), and C.D.C. Reeve’s  Action, 
Contemplation, and Happiness: An Essay on Aristotle (Cambridge Mass., 2012).  On reason 
generally I particularly recommend Aldous Huxley’s “Varieties of Intelligence” in Proper 
Studies (London, 1927), F. A. Hayek’s “Types of Mind” in Men & Ideas (1975), and Edmund 
Husserl’s “The Vienna Lecture” in The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental 
Philosophy: An Introduction to Phenomenological Philosophy (Evanston, [orig. 1935] 1970). 
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10 Aristotle on Limits, Boundedness, and Determinateness 
 
Having generally considered how Aristotle approaches the various aspects or 
“parts” of the human psyche let us step back and consider some wider metaphysical 
(and temporal or spatial) structures below – i.e. boundedness, priority, symmetry, the 
“mean”, and proportion – before returning to consider Aristotle’s conceptualisation of 
integrated human being or “soul”.  In respect to “boundedness” we find (1) that there is 
a “bounded being” which possesses a “boundedness” on the basis that: “…there must be 
something, the shape or form, apart from the concrete whole (ἀνάγκη τι εἶναι παρὰ τὸ 
σύνολον, τὴν μορφὴν καὶ τὸ εἶδος) (Met. B 999b24)” and with its “boundedness” (or, 
perhaps, being-ness) underlying and enabling its states and attributes in the sense that:  
 
“…it is that which walks or sits or is healthy that is an existent thing.  Now these [i.e. 
the attributes of human being] are seen to be more real because there is something 
definite which underlies them (διότι ἔστι τι τὸ ὑποκείμενον αὐτοῖς ὡρισμένον) (i.e. the 
substance or individual) which is implied in such a predicate (Met. Z 1028a24-28)”  
 
and (2) that this boundary or “peras” is definite in place, i.e. is something determinate 
in the sense that:  
 
“…“the place” means the boundary of that which encloses it (ὁ τόπος ἐστὶ τὸ τοῦ 
περιέχοντος πέρας) (De Cael. IV 310b8)”  
 
and with this “place” signifying physicality in the sense that: “…its parts must be 
perceptible; for they cannot consist of mathematical abstractions (ἀλλ΄ ἀναγκαῖον· οὐ 
γὰρ δὴ ἔκ γε τῶν μαθηματικῶν) (Sens. 445b14-15)” and also “body” in the negative 
sense that: “…the mathematician… treats of these things [but] does not treat of them as 
the limits of a physical body (ἀλλ' οὐχ ᾗ φυσικοῦ σώματος πέρας ἕκαστον); nor does he 
consider the attributes indicated as attributes of such bodies.  That is why he separates 
them; for in thought [viz. though not the world itself] they are separable from motion 
(χωριστὰ γὰρ τῇ νοήσει κινήσεώς ἐστι) (Phys. II 193b)”.  
 I add (3) that definiteness also suggests that something is “formed” and that it is 
in a sense a “product” or “end” and hence:  
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“…complete difference implies an end (τέλος γὰρ ἔχει ἡ τελεία διαφορά), just as all 
other things are called complete because they imply an end.  And there is nothing 
beyond the end (τοῦ δὲ τέλους οὐθὲν ἔξω); for in everything the end is the last thing, 
and forms the boundary (ἔσχατον γὰρ ἐν παντὶ καὶ περιέχει).  There is nothing beyond 
the end, and that which is complete lacks nothing (διὸ οὐδὲν ἔξω τοῦ τέλους, οὐδὲ 
προσδεῖται οὐδενὸς τὸ τέλειον) (Met. I 1055a13-17)”  
 
and with this “complete difference” or “teleia diaphora” not merely representing the 
determinateness, autonomy, or “self” of an individual substance but also the 
determinateness of its genus and of its species on the basis of the principle that:  
 
“…everything which is different differs either in genus or in species – in genus, such 
things as have not common matter and cannot be generated into or out of each other, 
e.g. things which belong to different categories (πᾶν γὰρ τὸ διαφέρον διαφέρει ἢ γένει ἢ 
εἴδει, γένει μὲν ὧν μὴ ἔστι κοινὴ ἡ ὕλη μηδὲ γένεσις εἰς ἄλληλα, οἷον ὅσων ἄλλο σχῆμα 
τῆς κατηγορίας) (Met. I 1054b28-30)”167  
 
and with “art” being used as an example of this situation, as follows: “…after going 
through many changes tragedy ceased to evolve, since it had achieved its own nature 
(ἐπαύσατο, ἐπεὶ ἔσχε τὴν αὑτῆς φύσιν) (Poet. 1449a13-15)” and also an “idea”, as 
follows: “Nor, indeed, can any Idea be defined; for the Idea is an individual, as they say, 
and separable (τῶν γὰρ καθ᾽ ἕκαστον ἡ ἰδέα, ὡς φασί, καὶ χωριστή) (Met. Z 1040a8-9)”, 
i.e. we see that even an idea has an individual “definition” or “being”.  We see generally 
that Aristotle argues that the value and nature of things is exhibited by their 
“appearances” and by their “boundary conditions” generally, as follows: “…that which 
produces the part of health, is the limiting-point (ἔσχατόν), - and so too with a house 
(the stones are the limiting-point here) and in all other cases (Met. Z 1032b28-29)” and 
as expressed in human affairs, as follows: “…no one would try to do anything if he 
were not going to come to a limit (ἐπὶ πέρας); nor would there be reason in the world 
(οὐδ᾽ ἂν εἴη νοῦς ἐν τοῖς οὖσιν)); the reasonable man, at least, always acts for a purpose, 
and this is a limit; for the end is a limit (ἕνεκα γάρ τινος ἀεὶ πράττει ὅ γε νοῦν ἔχων, 
τοῦτο δέ ἐστι πέρας) (Met. α 994b13-16)”. 
                                                 
167 Cf: “…one science treats of one class of things, in which complete difference is the greatest 
(καὶ γὰρ ἡ ἐπιστήμη περὶ ἓν γένος ἡ μία: ἐν οἷς ἡ τελεία διαφορὰ μεγίστη) (Met. I 1055a33-34)” 
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 I add (4) that Aristotle puts forward a principle of “being” or “body” as: “…that 
which surrounds is on the side of the form, that which is surrounded is on the side of 
matter (τὸ μὲν περιέχον τοῦ εἴδους εἶναι, τὸ δὲ περιεχόμενον τῆς ὕλης) (De Cael. IV 
312a12-13)” which Leslie Jaye Kavanaugh explains as that: 
 
“No gap in the material continuum, no vacancy in place is accepted in Aristotle’s 
account of the continuum.  The notion of the limit, peras, in [Phys. IV] 211b14 – 212a7 
is exceedingly complex and subtle.  Specifically at [Phys. IV] 211b12, he says: “…for 
the limiting surfaces of the embracing and the embraced coincide (ἐν ταὐτῷ γὰρ τὰ 
ἔσχατα τοῦ περιέχοντος καὶ τοῦ περιεχομένου)” … “Place” is the surrounding limit, 
perichomenon, of the limited body itself, periechontos.  Place is the surrounding, the 
limit encircling.  The final definition of place that Aristotle gives is: “…place is “the 
innermost motionless boundary of what contains it” ([Phys. IV] 212a21-2)”168” 
 
and which clearly shows us that the “limit” is, for Aristotle, “form” enclosing “matter” 
and with the matter being a limiting factor as well as being a channel through which 
form is transmitted.  As regards how Aristotle distinguishes his position here from that 
of Plato and his “receptacle” we find in Aristotle’s own words that: 
 
“…they [i.e. Empedocles and Democritus] speak of each element “inhering” and “being 
separated out,” as if generation were emergence from a receptacle instead of from a 
material, and did not involve change in anything (ἐνυπάρχον γὰρ ἕκαστον ἐκκρίνεσθαί 
φασιν, ὥσπερ ἐξ ἀγγείου τῆς γενέσεως οὔσης, ἀλλ' οὐκ ἔκ τινος ὕλης, οὐδὲ γίγνεσθαι 
μεταβάλλοντος) (De Cael. III 305b3-6)” 
 
and with Hendrik Lorenz explaining that Aristotle distinguishes his position, as follows:  
 
“I mean to capture a certain Aristotelian notion of being τὸ δεκτικόν (“what is 
receptive”) of something or other.  This is the notion of being the bearer of some 
attribute, form, or actuality.  Examples include bronze as the receptacle of statue-form, 
the body as that of health or disease (1023a12-13), the intellect as the receptacle of 
knowledge, and, I shall presently suggest, the senses as the receptacles of perceptual 
                                                 
168 Kavanaugh, Leslie Jaye The Architectonic of Philosophy: Plato, Aristotle, Leibniz 
(Amsterdam, 2007) p 121  
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operation.  Being in something as in a receptacle is a way of being in (ἐν) something 
that is recognised in Aristotle’s philosophical lexicon at Met. Δ 1023a11-13169”   
 
and I suggest from a wider perspective that A.N. Whitehead very correctly summarises 
our overall situation as being that: “Centuries ago Plato divined the seven main factors 
interwoven in fact: The Ideas, The Physical Elements, The Psyche, The Eros, The 
Harmony, The Mathematical Relations, The Receptacle.  All philosophical systems are 
endeavours to express the interweaving of these components170.”  In short, then, I 
comment that how we see the world, bounded beings, and bounded beings in the world 
is an age-old conversation which is both extremely subtle and extremely well defined 
even if our conclusions will always be subject to challenge and controversy171. 
As regards the nature of being and (its) boundaries I add that Aristotle puts 
forward the detailed example of “colour” to explain his position on “limit” or 
“boundary” as (a) that colour only exists in things in the sense that: “…all colour 
implies some such basis as what we intend by a body (ἅπαν γὰρ χρῶμα ἐν σώματι) (Cat. 
1a29)”, that “…colour always inheres in the bounding surface (φαίνεται χρῶμα ἴδιον 
ὑπάρχειν, κατὰ τὸ ἔσχατον) (Sens. 439b13-14)” and that:  
 
“Colour, again, is in body; so also in this or that body (πάλιν τὸ χρῶμα ἐν σώματι· 
οὐκοῦν καὶ ἐν τινὶ σώματι).  For were there no bodies existing wherein it could also 
exist, it could not be in body at all (εἰ γὰρ μὴ ἐν τινὶ τῶν καθ' ἕκαστα, οὐδὲ ἐν σώματι 
ὅλως).  In fine, then, all things whatsoever, save what we call primary substances, are 
predicates of primary substances or present in such as their subjects (ὥστε τὰ ἄλλα 
πάντα ἤτοι καθ' ὑποκειμένων λέγετάι τῶν πρώτων οὐσιῶν ἢ ἐν ὑποκειμέναις αὐταῖς 
ἐστίν).  And were there no primary substances, nought else could so much as exist (μὴ 
οὐσῶν οὖν τῶν πρώτων οὐσιῶν ἀδύνατον τῶν ἄλλων τι εἶναι) (Cat. 2b2-7)” 
 
                                                 
169 Lorenz, Hendrik “Aristotle’s Assimilation of Sense to Sense-Object” in Oxford Studies in 
Ancient Philosophy XXXIII (2007) p 203 
 
170 Whitehead, A.N. Adventures of Ideas (Harmondsworth, 1933) p 188 
 
171 I note that Martin Heidegger argues contra Immanuel Kant that: “In the negative form, 
Kant’s thesis about Being as “merely position” means: Being is neither a real predicate with 
content nor any predicate at all of any thing or object whatever…What was without question for 
Kant is for us worthy of question: the essential origin of “position” in terms of letting what is 
present lie present in its presence (“Sketches for a History of Being as Metaphysics” in The End 
of Philosophy (New York, [orig. 1961] 1973) p 65).” 
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and (b) that the structuring of the world which we actually encounter in respect to 
colour, light, and sight is such that: 
 
“…the faculty of sight informs us of many differences of all kinds, because all bodies 
have a share of colour (τὸ πάντα τὰ σώματα μετέχειν χρώματος), so that it is chiefly by 
this medium that we perceive the common sensibles (ὥστε καὶ τὰ κοινὰ διὰ ταύτης 
αἰσθάνεσθαι μάλιστα).  (By these I mean shape (σχῆμα), magnitude (μέγεθος), 
movement (κίνησιν) and number (ἀριθμόν)) (Sens. 437a6-9)”   
 
and I note that Eric Sanday argues regarding these “common sensibles” generally that: 
“Aristotle’s account of the common sensibles would allow us to say that a particular 
shape (e.g. round or square) speaks of motion and rest, for instance, as a square shape 
implies stability and a round shape implies instability172”, i.e. that they enable us to 
dimly but clearly see the underlying structuring of our world. 
Regarding the example of colour I suggest that we see (a) that object, medium, 
and sense are in some sense compatible and complementary and I note that not only is 
“colour” a medium but also “light” as follows: “...light…is, indirectly, the colour of the 
transparent (ὅτι ἐστὶ χρῶμα τοῦ διαφανοῦς κατὰ συμβεβηκός) (Sens. 439a18-20)” (b) 
that colours are part of a “scale” that we find in nature generally and which is a part of 
its innate structuring as follows: “…colours are determined like musical intervals (Sens. 
439b31-32)” and (c) that we understand the world and “see” it through its “boundaries” 
and this is a fundamental determination we find in nature not as an abstract form but in 
the sense that: “…a thing that is white for many days is not more white than a thing that 
is white for one day, so that the good is no more good by being eternal (E.E. I 1218a13-
14)” and Sydney Hooper explains further (following Whitehead), as follows: “A colour 
is something that transcends physical events.  It “ingresses” into nature to lend its 
quality to any event that may require it for a period, but when its function for the time 
being is over, it disappears, to return when its presence is again relevant.  But, when it 
returns, it is the same colour173”.  I suggest that it is notable that this question regarding 
                                                 
172 Sanday, Eric “Phantasia in De Anima” in Claudia Baracchi (ed.) The Bloomsbury 
Companion to Aristotle (London, 2013) p 109 
 
173 Hooper, Sydney E. “Whitehead’s Philosophy: The World as Process” in Philosophy (1948) p 
150.  I note, however, that Hooper explains Whitehead’s Platonism and disagreement with 
Aristotle, as follows: “…the things that are temporal arise by their participation in the things 
which are eternal (Ibid. p 149)”. 
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what colour tells us about nature is an ontological question that only some philosophers 
such as Aristotle and A.N. Whitehead are willing to tackle174. 
With this overall context in mind, then, let us consider how Aristotle regards the 
principle of “determinateness” in the context of living and human being as (i) that 
“…life is among the things that are good and pleasant in themselves, since it is 
determinate and the determinate is of the nature of the good (τὸ δ᾽ ὡρισμένον τῆς 
τἀγαθοῦ φύσεως) (N.E. IX 1170a19-21)” (ii) that “…a [wicked] life is indeterminate, as 
are its attributes (ἀόριστος γὰρ ἡ τοιαύτη, καθάπερ τὰ ὑπάρχοντα αὐτῇ) (N.E. IX 
1170a24)” (iii) that:  
 
“…the good is determinate, while pleasure is indeterminate (τὸ μὲν ἀγαθὸν ὡρίσθαι, 
τὴν δ᾽ ἡδονὴν ἀόριστον εἶναι) (N.E. X 1173a16)”  
 
and (iv) that: “In all the states of character we have mentioned (ἐν πάσαις γὰρ ταῖς 
εἰρημέναις ἕξεσι), as in all other matters (καθάπερ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων), there is a mark 
to which the man who has the rule looks (ἔστι τις σκοπὸς πρὸς ὃν ἀποβλέπων ὁ τὸν 
λόγον ἔχων), and heightens or relaxes his activity accordingly, and there is a standard 
which determines the mean states (καί τις ἔστιν ὅρος τῶν μεσοτήτων) which we say are 
intermediate between excess and defect, being in accordance with the right rule (κατὰ 
τὸν ὀρθὸν λόγον) (N.E. VI 1138b21-25)” which shows us that the “mean” can be seen 
as a centring or channelling which naturally expresses the right “proportion” of a 
determinate body which Eric Sanday correctly explains as that: “…the soul demands a 
certain bodily ratio (logos), capable of supporting a mean, in order to perform its 
functions175.”  I add, finally, that the rule or “measure” or “mean” of physical life maps 
onto the psychic mean and proportion discussed above on the basis that: 
                                                 
174 On “colour” see Richard Sorabji’s “Aristotle, Mathematics, and Colour” in The Classical 
Quarterly (1972) and Alan Code’s “Aristotelian Colours as Causes” in D. Follesdall & J. 
Woods (eds.) Festschrift for Julius Moravcsik (London, 2008) and for a further discussion of 
Aristotle on colour and for a general discussion of colour see Werner Heisenberg’s “Goethe and 
Newton on Colour” in Philosophical Problems of Modern Physics (Woodbridge, [orig. 1941] 
1979), Stephen Yablo’s “Singling out Properties” in Philosophical Perspectives (1995), and 
also (noting that my view is that Levine should consider the ontological nature of his ripe red 
tomato further) Joseph Levine’s “Secondary Qualities: Where Consciousness and Intentionality 
Meet” in The Monist (2008)). 
 
175 Sanday, Eric “Phantasia in De Anima” in Claudia Baracchi (ed.) The Bloomsbury 
Companion to Aristotle (London, 2013) p 111 (cf. “…as long as the determining proportion 





“…it is clear in perceptible objects, too, that it is impossible for there to be movement if 
nothing is at rest – and, above all, in animals, our present concern.  For if one of the 
parts moves, there must be some part at rest; and it is for this reason that animals have 
joints.  For they use their joints like a centre, and the whole section containing the joint 
becomes both one and two, both straight and bent, potentially and actually by reason of 
the joint (MA 698114-21)” 
 
which Sanday explains as that: “One part holds itself in place impassively so that the 
other part can express this impassivity in and through motion.  For example, it is 
possible for a foot to be lifted forward for the purposes of walking as long as the other 
foot is fixed in place.  The determinate impassivity of the part at rest is in some sense 
expressed by the determinate freedom of the part in motion…This process works 
because the animal is tacitly aware of itself as a limit, that is, as one and two: at one 
moment pulling itself forward, and in this moment it is “two”, self-opposed….This 
awareness of self as limit expresses itself as locomotion176.”  I suggest that we see that 
the “centre” or “mean” can itself be a “limit” and I note that we will flesh out this 
picture when we come to discuss the duality of symmetry, the proportionality of being, 
and the guiding and limiting centrality of the “mean” in respect to organic being. 
 I add as regards the underlying principles of our human situation (v) that human 
“being” possesses a determinateness which gives it its own formal limit in the sense 
that:  
 
“…every disposition and every affection naturally comes into being in that of which it 
is a disposition or affection, for example, knowledge in the soul, since it is a disposition 
of soul (πᾶσα γὰρ διάθεσις καὶ πᾶν πάθος ἐν ἐκείνῳ πέφυκε γίνεσθαι οὖ ἐστὶ διάθεσις ἢ 
πάθος, καθάπερ καί ἡ ἐπιστήμη ἐν ψυχῇ διάθεσις οὗσα ψυχῆς) (Top. VI 145a35-37)” 
 
and (vi) that our “nous” is in a sense a structuring and framing and a defining and 
centering of being which is itself a “limit” in the sense that:  
 
“…intuitive reason (νοῦς) is of the limiting premises (τῶν ὅρων), for which no reason 
(λόγος) can be given, while practical wisdom (ἡ φρόνησις) is concerned with the 
                                                 
176 Sanday, Eric Ibid. p 113-114 
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ultimate particular (τοῦ ἐσχάτου), which is the object not of scientific knowledge 
(ἐπιστήμη) but of perception (αἴσθησις) (N.E. VI 1142a25-27)”177 
 
and I suggest, in conclusion, that we see that there is an impulse for “good” or 
“determinateness” in nature which is somehow also our intuition of that “good” or 
possibility for “determinateness”, i.e. the “nous” of nature is also our “intuitive reason” 
or “nous”.    
Moving away from the example of “man” I suggest that Aristotle is clearly 
interested in how any “something” determinately comes-to-be in the world, that 
Aristotle argues that we should not forget or deny that substance has priority, and that 
“determinateness” is identified (by Aristotle) with “being” and “completion” (i.e. with 
“wholeness” or attained substantiveness) and with “good”.  I add that “determinateness” 
shows Aristotle that we must pass through and beyond the abstraction of “logos” in 
order to understand the (to some extent unknowable178) being beneath and beyond and 
hence:  
 
“…it is impossible (ἀδύνατον) for it [i.e. the “being” of something] to be so numerically 
(ἀριθμῷ), since the “being” of things (ἡ οὐσία τῶν ὄντων) is to be found in the 
particular (ἐν τῷ καθ' ἓκαστον) (GA II 731b33-34)”  
 
i.e. we must pass through seeing something numerically or abstractly or “arithmōi” to 
the deeper and more engaged seeing of that something in itself and both as a form and 
as an individual or “eidei” (and Aristotle insists in his Metaphysics Z that our 
engagement with “ousia” or “substance” is such that we both generically see something 
and also particularly, and with a human example in mind, see someone).  In other 
words, we find that individuality (which is also to some extent unknowable) is itself a 
form of “determinateness” or “limit” for Aristotle. 
                                                 
177 Cf. “…intuitive reason (ὁ νοῦς) is concerned with the ultimates (τῶν ἐσχάτων) in both 
directions (ἐπ᾽ ἀμφότερα); for both the first terms (πρώτων ὅρων) and the last (ἐσχάτων) are 
objects of intuitive reason (νοῦς) and not of argument (λόγος), and the intuitive reason which is 
presupposed by demonstration (κατὰ τὰς ἀποδείξεις) grasps the unchangeable first terms 
(ἀκινήτων ὅρων καὶ πρώτων), while the intuitive reason involved in practical reasonings (ὁ δ᾽ 
ἐν ταῖς πρακτικαῖς)  grasps the last and variable fact (τοῦ ἐσχάτου καὶ ἐνδεχομένου) (N.E. VI 
1143a35-1143b3)” 
 
178 Cf. “…it is right to say that we cannot undertake to try to discover a starting-point (a first 
principle) (ἀρχὴ) in all things and everything…for of course the first principle (ἀρχὴ) does not 
admit of demonstration (ἀπόδειξις), but is apprehended by another mode of cognition (ἄλλη 
γνῶσις) [i.e. “nous”] (GA II 742b30-34)”   
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I add in respect to the determinateness and limits of “substance” generally that 
Aristotle argues that “form” is clearly necessary from the outset of generation in order 
to bring something to completion and also that the process of becoming is a “limit” in 
the sense that it is a projection of a completion, as follows: 
 
“…that which cannot be completely generated cannot begin to be generated, and that 
which has been generated must be as soon as it has been generated (γίγνεσθαί τε οὐχ 
οἷόν τε τὸ ἀδύνατον γενέσθαι: τὸ δὲ γεγονὸς ἀνάγκη εἶναι ὅτε πρῶτον γέγονεν) (Met. 
B999b11-13)” 
 
and with Aristotle adding that (substantive) “becoming” is due to a chain effect of 
discrete and ordered (natural) processes and completions rather than being mere 
material interaction and cause-and-effect, as follows: 
 
“It is surely obvious that a present process is not contiguous with a past completion; no 
more than one completed process is with another (ἢ δῆλον ὅτι οὐκ ἔστιν ἐχόμενον 
γεγονότος γινόμενον; οὐδὲ γὰρ γενόμενον γενομένου).  Such completions are limits and 
indivisible (πέρατα γὰρ καὶ ἄτομα) (Post. An. II 95b4-5)” 
 
and with Aristotle’s explicit conclusion on this matter being stated as that: “…of all 
things naturally composed there is a limit or proportion of size and growth; this is due to 
soul, not to fire, and to the essential formula rather than to matter (τῶν δὲ φύσει 
συνισταμένων πάντων ἔστι πέρας καὶ λόγος μεγέθους τε καὶ αὐξήσεως· ταῦτα δὲ ψυχῆς, 
ἀλλ' οὐ πυρός, καὶ λόγου μᾶλλον ἢ ὕλης) (De An. II 416a17-18)” which shows us that 
Aristotle stresses (a) that natural processes are grounded in being and in beings and are 
structured by nature (b) that the world cannot be reduced to material cause-and-effect or 
to material processes because it also exhibits formal structuring, ordering, and finality 
(and hence is quasi-deteterminate179) and (c) that both the possibilities open to beings 
                                                 
179 Cf. “…that which is probable is that which generally happens (τὸ μὲν γὰρ εἰκός ἐστιν ὡς ἐπὶ 
τὸ πολὺ γινόμενον), not however unreservedly, as some define it, but that which is concerned 
with things that may be other than they are (ἀλλὰ τὸ περὶ ἐνδεχόμενα ἄλλως ἔχειν), being so 
related to that in regard to which it is probable as the universal to the particular.  As to signs, 
some are related as the particular to the universal, others as the universal to the particular (τῶν 
δὲ σημείων τὸ μὲν οὕτως ἔχει ὡς τῶν καθ' ἕκαστόν τι πρὸς τὸ καθόλου, τὸ δὲ ὡς τῶν καθόλου 
τι πρὸς τὸ κατὰ μέρος).  Necessary signs are called tekmeria; those which are not necessary 
have no distinguishing name.  I call those necessary signs from which a logical system can be 
constructed, wherefore such a sign is called tekmerion; for when people think that their 
arguments are irrefutable, they think that they are bringing forward a tekmerion, something as it 
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are “limits” and that the being itself is a determinate “limit” in respect to what it is and 
can become180. 
As regards what Aristotle’s position is not, we find that W.V. Quine argues that: 
“To be assumed as an entity is, purely and simply, to be reckoned as the value of a 
variable181” which removes the being and reduces the world to our abstractions (in 
Aristotelian terminology it is “forgetting that substance…is prior (Met. Γ 1004b9)”) and 
it essentially brings us back to Aristotle’s criticism of his predecessors that: 
 
“…although they studied the truth about reality (περὶ τῶν ὄντων μὲν τὴν ἀλήθειαν 
ἐσκόπουν), they supposed that reality is confined to sensible things (τὰ δ᾽ ὄντα 
ὑπέλαβον εἶναι τὰ αἰσθητὰ μόνον), in which the nature of the Indeterminate, i.e. of 
Being in the sense which we have explained, is abundantly present (ἐν δὲ τούτοις πολλὴ 
ἡ τοῦ ἀορίστου φύσις ἐνυπάρχει καὶ ἡ τοῦ ὄντος οὕτως ὥσπερ εἴπομεν) (Met. Γ 
1010a1-4)” 
 
and with Aristotle’s general position on the “relative” being that: “…it is not true that 
the beholder sees, and the object is seen, in virtue of some merely abstract relationship 
between them, such as between equals (οὐ γὰρ δὴ τῷ πως ἔχειν τὸ μὲν ὁρᾷ τὸ δ΄ ὁρᾶται, 
ὥσπερ ἴσα ἐστίν).  For if it were so, there would be no need [as there is] that either [the 
beholder or the thing beheld] should occupy some particular place; since to the 
equalisation of things their being near to, or far from, one another makes no difference 
(Sens. 446b10-13)”, that: “…that which can heat is called relative to that which can be 
heated, because it can heat; and again the thing heating is called relative to the thing 
heated, and the thing cutting to the thing cut, because their potentialities are actualised 
(Met. Δ 1021a17-19)” and that: “…medicine is reckoned as relative because its genus, 
science, is thought to be a relative thing (Met. Δ 1021b6-8)”. 
 In respect to “determinateness”, then, I suggest that the conflict that we clearly 
find is between Aristotle regarding whom Aryeh Kosman explains that:  
 
                                                 
were proved and concluded; for in the old language tekmar and peras have the same meaning 
(limit, conclusion) (Rhet. I 1357a35-1357b11)” 
 
180 Cf. “…he who assigns “able to affect, or be affected by, something” (τὸ δυνατὸν παθεῖν ἢ 
ποιῆσαι) as a property of “being” (ἴδιον τοῦ ὄντος), by assigning the property potentially, has 
assigned it in relation to what exists (πρὸς ὂν) (Top. V 139a5-7)” 
 
181  Quine, W.V. “On What There Is” in From a Logical Point of View (Cambridge, Mass., 
1953) p 13  
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“A basic ingredient of Aristotle’s ontology is the relation between determinacy and 
openness to determination.  It is because and only because substances are the 
determinate beings they are that they are capable of exhibiting that most characteristic 
feature of substance identified early in the Categories as the ability to take on further 
determination without being overwhelmed by it, the ability to remain one and the same 
individual while undergoing accidental affection (Cat. 4a10ff).  For human beings, this 
openness to further determination is centred in perception and thought, but it is a 
general feature of human psychic powers as set forth in De Anima.  The nutritive 
capacity – the capacity to eat – is a capacity to take in other matter (the power of 
digestion); thus De Anima begins its discussion of psychic powers with an account of 
nutrition, and specifically of nutriment, that is, of food.  In the same way, the capacity 
to perceive is a power to take in the sensible forms of the world and transform them into 
consciousness…Such transformations are grounded in the bodily nature of the 
nutritional and perceptive powers.  A significantly different story will therefore have to 
be told about knowing, and particularly about nous, which is the archē of the perceptive 
and knowing powers in general, the highest form of consciousness182” 
 
and the “scientific” viewpoint which David Chalmers explains as that: “Physics requires 
information states but cares only about their relation, not their intrinsic nature; 
phenomenology requires information states but cares only about the intrinsic nature183”.   
I add here that Ernst Cassirer describes this conflict as a conflict over the nature 
and acceptance of “limits”, as follows: 
 
“They [i.e. modern philosophical systems] strive, so to speak, to turn the apparent curse 
of the new cosmology into a blessing.  Giordano Bruno was the first thinker to enter 
upon this path, which in a sense became the path of all modern metaphysics…In 
Bruno’s doctrine infinity no longer means a mere negation or limitation.  On the 
contrary, it means the immeasurable and inexhaustible abundance of reality and the 
unrestricted power of the human intellect184” 
 
                                                 
182 Kosman, Aryeh “What Does the Maker Mind Make?” in Virtues of Thought: Essays on Plato 
and Aristotle (Cambridge Mass., [orig. 1992] 2014) p 136 
 
183 Chalmers, David The Conscious Mind: In Search of a Fundamental Theory (Oxford, 1996) p 
305 
 
184 Cassirer, Ernst An Essay on Man (New York, [orig. 1944] 1970) p 16-17 
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and I conclude that we ultimately find that Aristotle finds intrinsic significance in 
respect to the limits (and hence being) of beings in nature whereas the modern 
approach, as Ernst Cassirer argues, finds its meaning in infinity and abstractions.  We 
find, then, that our real argument is between the “idealism” regarding which Cassirer 
explains: “Mathematical reason is the bond between man and the universe; it permits us 
to pass freely from the one to the other185” and Aristotle’s “realist” objection that: 
“Philosophy has become mathematics for modern thinkers, although they profess that 
mathematics is only to be studied as a means to some other end (Met. A 992a33-
992b2)”186. 
I add that although this dispute seems to be one between “science” and 
“philosophy” (and this is how it is often represented) it is actually a philosophical 
dispute between “idealism” and “realism” and that we even see that “science” itself 
does not make the philosophical assertion that the world can be reduced to mathematics 
or process etc.  Hence we easily find that Aristotle’s insistence upon the structuring of 
being is reflected in the “systems biology” understanding of organic nature which 
William B. Hurlblut explains as follows: 
 
“The new perspective of systems biology forms the intellectual grounding for 
appreciating the physical and moral difference between an embryo and an entity such as 
a teratoma. A teratoma is an inadequately constituted biochemical system, a partial 
trajectory of development with an inherent potential for only incomplete and 
unorganized growth. According to systems biology, the important distinguishing 
characteristic of an entity having only partial developmental potential is not the visible 
appearance of its temporary development, however ‘normal’ it may initially seem; 
rather it is the lack, at the molecular level, of the structure and organization necessary 
for an integrated system. With the full complement of coordinated parts, an organismal 
system subsumes and sustains the parts; it exerts a downward causation that binds and 
balances the parts into a patterned program of integrated growth and development. 
Incompletely constituted or separated from the whole, the parts, as subsystems of 
growth (cells, tissues and organs), may temporarily proceed forward in partial 
                                                 
185 Cassirer, Ernst Ibid. p 18.   
 
186 Cf. “In a way these thinkers [physiologoi] too [i.e. along with the Pythagoreans /Platonists] 
are saying that everything that exists is numbers, or evolved from numbers (Τρόπον γάρ τινα 
καὶ οὗτοι πάντα τὰ ὄντα ποιοῦσιν ἀριθμοὺς καὶ ἐξ ἀριθμῶν); they may not show it clearly, but 
nevertheless that is what they mean (καὶ γὰρ εἰ μὴ σαφῶς δηλοῦσιν, ὅμως τοῦτο βούλονται 
λέγειν) (De Cael. III 303a8-11)”.  
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development, but without the self-regulating powers of the organismal system they will 
ultimately become merely disorganized cellular growth187 
 
and also in the “general systems theory” representation of the universe as explained by 
Francis Heylighten et al., as follows:  
 
“The idea of open system immediately suggests a number of fundamental concepts that 
help us to give holism a more precise foundation.  First, each system has an 
environment, from which it is separated by a boundary.  This boundary gives the system 
its own identity separating it from other systems.  Matter, energy and information are 
exchanged across that boundary.  Incoming streams determine the system’s input, 
outgoing streams its output.  This provides us with a simple way to connect or couple 
different systems: it suffices that the output of one system be used as input by another 
system.  A group of systems coupled via different input-output relations forms a 
network.  If this network functions in a sufficiently coherent manner, we will consider it 
as a system in its own right, a supersystem, that contains the initial systems as its 
subsystems188” 
 
regarding which Aristotle’s “ousia” from the Metaphysics could be seen as an “open 
system” and his “kosmos” from the De Caelo could be seen as a “supersystem” (see De 
Cael. II 284a2-9).  I note that Aristotle’s term for “boundary” is “peras” and for 
“environment” it is “periechōn”.   
I add that it is an accepted and obvious part of science that the “boundary 
conditions” of something are essential to our understanding of that something and of the 
world itself, as Robert B. Laughlin explains, as follows:  
 
“Water and steam seem so different that it is hard to imagine that they would be 
different to tell apart, but they sometimes are…The emergent phenomena distinguishing 
the liquid and vapour phases is thus not the development of order but the development 
of a surface.  Like the lattice of a crystalline solid or the laws of hydrodynamics in the 
fluid, this surface and the rules for its motion become increasingly well defined at large 
                                                 
187 Hurlblut, William B. “Framing the Future: Embryonic Stem Cells, Ethics and the Emerging 
Era of Developmental Biology” in Pediatric Research (2006) p 10 
 
188 Heylighten, Francis et al. “Complexity and Philosophy” in Jan Bogg & Robert Geyer (eds.) 
Complexity, Science and Society (Oxford, 2007) 
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distance and time scales but lose their meaning in the opposite limit.  This is the effect 
that brings us clouds, rain, and the magnificent violence of the sea189” 
 
and as Michael Polanyi explains, as follows:  
 
“Mechanisms, whether man-made or morphological, are boundary conditions 
harnessing the laws of inanimate nature, being themselves irreducible to those laws.  
The pattern of organic bases in DNA which functions as a genetic code is a boundary 
condition irreducible to physics and chemistry.  Further controlling principles of life 
may be represented as a hierarchy of boundary conditions extending, in the case of man, 
to consciousness and responsibility190” 
 
and I add regarding biological “evolution” that Ernst Cassirer explains that: “The theory 
of evolution in a general philosophical sense was by no means a recent achievement.  It 
had received its classical expression in Aristotle’s psychology and in his general view of 
organic life.  The characteristic and fundamental distinction between the Aristotelian 
and the modern version of evolution consisted in the fact that Aristotle gave a formal 
interpretation whereas the moderns attempted a material interpretation191” and I suggest 
that Dennis Des Chene clearly shows us the philosophical implications of the distinction 
between Aristotle’s “realism” and modern “materialism” – centred around the inclusion 
/ exclusion of “form” – as follows: “What in the twentieth century appeared as the 
“problem of emergence” has its parallel in the Aristotelian tradition as the problem of 
the education of forms: if the forms of plants and animals do not exist potentially in 
matter, where do they come from?  The standard answer, for higher animals and humans 
at least, is that they come from the heavens or from God.  Descartes did not solve the 
problem of education.  He gets rid of it.  There are no souls in animals or plants, and 
                                                 
189 Laughlin, Robert B. A Different Universe (Reinventing physics from the bottom down) (New 
York, 2005) p 41-2 
 
190 Polanyi, Michael “Life’s Irreducible Structure” in Science (1968) p 1312. On Aristotle’s 
relevance to “general system theory” see Ludwig von Bertalanffy’s “The History and 
Development of General System Theory” in Perspectives on General System Theory: Scientific-
Philosophical Studies (New York, [orig. 1972] 1975), on “boundary conditions” see Andrew 
Newman’s “On the Constitution of Solid Objects out of Atoms” in The Monist (2013) and on 
homeostatic systems see Mae-Wan Ho’s “Circular Thermodynamics of Organisms and 
Sustainable Systems” in Systems (2013).   
 
191 Cassirer, Ernst An Essay on Man (New York, [orig. 1944] 1970) p 20.   
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thus no education of forms.  In the vocabulary of the present day: there are no emergent 
properties in the world of Descartes192”. 
 As regards the significance of this matter I finally make note of Albert Camus’ 
political comments bearing upon the meaning of “determinateness” as an expression of 
human “self”, as follows: 
 
“In order to exist, man must rebel, but rebellion must respect the limits that it discovers 
in itself – limits where minds meet and, in meeting, begin to exist.  Revolutionary 
thought, therefore, cannot dispense with memory: it is in a perpetual state of tension193”  
 
and Camus adds that:  
 
“Rebellion, though apparently negative since it creates nothing, is profoundly positive 
in that it reveals the part of man which must always be defended194”  
 
and on “limits” he argues explicitly that the “rebel” is occupied with “demanding a 
justifiable limit195” and also that: “…his “no” affirms the existence of a borderline196”.  
In respect to human being and its limits, then, I suggest that we ultimately end up with a 
battle regarding how we conceptualise existence, identity, personhood, and freedom and 
with our critical difference being between (a) an Aristotelian position which accepts that 
we exist and grow within and by means of “limits” and (b) a modern position that we 
exist in order to explore “infinity” and with the world and man being in some sense 
“plastic” and subordinate to these infinite abstractions.  I add, however, that we should 
also recognise that there is something tragic about the limitedness and temporality of 
man, and hence of Aristotle’s picturing of man, which Lawrence J. Hatab explains as 
that: “…the very activity of living is striving toward the impossibility of sheer 
                                                 
192 Des Chene, Dennis Spirits and Clocks: Machines and Organism in Descartes (Ithaca, 2001) 
p 154-5 
 
193 Camus, Albert The Rebel (London, 1953) p 27 
 
194 Camus, Albert Ibid. p 25 
 
195 Camus, Albert Ibid. p 248 
 
196 Camus, Albert Ibid. p 19 
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actuality197” which revises our difference as being between (a) an Aristotelian position 
of philosophical and paradoxical striving for knowledge about immortality and (b) a 
modern position which describes the world scientifically and descriptively, which does 
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11 Aristotle on Priority and Posteriority 
 
Having considered that something must be a determinate something which 
occupies a “place” and exists in some relationship with its “ends” and its determinate 
“limits” and possibilities we will consider below how this being should have its own 
“symmetry” and “proportion” in order to express itself and also that it should have a 
“mean” which is a channel through which this being expresses itself.  Here, though, let 
us consider the temporal aspect of the expression of organic being which reflects the 
fact that beings have their own “history” or “life” in the world (which does in some 
sense reflect the structured process that we find generally in nature) and we find a 
paradigmatic example of this, as follows:  
 
“…the growing thing changes its place like a metal that is being beaten (τὸ δ' 
αὐξανόμενον ὥσπερ τὸ ἐλαυνόμενον), retaining its position as a whole while its parts 
change their places (τούτου γὰρ μένοντος τὰ μόρια μεταβάλλει κατὰ τόπον) (GC I 
320a21-23)” 
 
with my general emphasis here being that the development of beings in time is critical 
to Aristotle’s thinking due to his focus on becoming or coming-to-be198.  I comment on 
Aristotle’s underlying motivation that he is not merely concerned with defending 
“form” as a “Theory of Forms” but that he is, rather, concerned with how nature 
engages in the “education of forms”.  I suggest that Aristotle’s “realism” is concerned 
with the temporal phenomena of this world and does not see them as being mere 
reflections of some eternal – religious, scientific, or mathematical – realm.    
Whilst noting that “priority” and “posteriority” are most obviously concepts 
used in respect to how we corporeally and logically engage with the world and educate 
ourselves in the Prior and Posterior Analytics let us first consider these concepts in 
outline by considering the role that they play in Aristotle’s ousiology (a) in the biology 
                                                 
198 Aristotle argues regarding the philosophical importance of “becoming” or “coming-to-be” as 
follows: “Plato, it is true, investigated coming-to-be and passing-away, but only as to the 
manner in which passing-away is inherent in things, and as regards coming-to-be he did not deal 
with it in general but only that of the elements; he never inquired how flesh or bones or any 
other similar things come-to-be, and, further, he did not discuss how “alteration” and “growth” 
are present in things.  In fact no one at all has applied himself to any of these subjects, except in 
a superficial manner, with the single exception of Democritus (GC I 315a29-35)”. 
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of his Parts of Animals which argues that organic being is evidently formal in the sense 
that: 
 
“…the best way of putting the matter would be to see that because the essence of man is 
what it is, therefore a man has such and such parts, since there cannot be a man without 
them (PA I 640a33-36)” 
 
and (b) in the philosophy of the Metaphysics which argues that there is a transmission 
of forms in the sense that:  
 
“…the actually existent is always generated from the potentially existent by something 
which is actually existent (ἀεὶ γὰρ ἐκ τοῦ δυνάμει ὄντος γίγνεται τὸ ἐνεργείᾳ ὂν ὑπὸ 
ἐνεργείᾳ ὄντος) – e.g. man by man, cultured by cultured – there is always some prime 
mover; and that which initiates motion exists already in actuality (Met. Θ 1049b24-27)”  
 
and with this transmission of being being realised through and in individuals on the 
basis that: “…nature also is in the same genus as potency; for it is the principle of 
movement – not, however, in something else but in the thing itself qua itself (καὶ γὰρ ἡ 
φύσις ἐν ταὐτῷ γίγνεται: ἐν ταὐτῷ γὰρ γένει τῇ δυνάμει: ἀρχὴ γὰρ κινητική, ἀλλ᾽ οὐκ ἐν 
ἄλλῳ ἀλλ᾽ ἐν αὐτῷ ᾗ αὐτό) (Met. Θ 1049b8-10)” from which we see that Aristotle’s 
principle of movement remains “in the thing itself qua itself” whereas the modern 
Newtonian approach to motion abstracts the motion from a thing and treats it only in the 
sense that it is “mass”199.    
In outline, then, we see that Aristotle is concerned with the cycles of life and 
with the history of organic being by observing that there is reproduction of being in 
time and place on the basis of the principle that: “…adult is prior to child, and man to 
                                                 
199 I note that A.N. Whitehead explains the (Aristotelian) argument against Newton, as follows: 
“There is a rhythm of process whereby creation produces natural pulsation, each pulsation 
forming a natural unit of historic fact.  In this way, amid the infinitude of the connected 
universe, we can discern vaguely finite units of fact.  If process be fundamental to actuality, 
then each ultimate individual fact must be describable as process.  The Newtonian description of 
matter abstracts matter from time.  It conceives matter “at an instant.”  So does Descartes’ 
description.  If process be fundamental such abstraction is erroneous (“Forms of Process” in 
Modes of Thought (New York, 1938) p 88-89)” and Whitehead critically asserts that: “None of 
these laws of nature gives the slightest evidence of necessity (“Nature Alive” in Modes of 
Thought (New York, 1938) p 154-5)” and positively asserts that: “…the modern evolutionary 
view of the physical universe should conceive of the laws of nature as evolving concurrently 
with the things constituting the environment.  Thus the conception of the Universe as evolving 
subject to fixed, eternal laws regulating all behaviour should be abandoned (Adventures of Ideas 
(Harmondsworth, 1933) p 134)”  
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semen, because the one already possesses the form, but the other does not (τὸ μὲν γὰρ 
ἤδη ἔχει τὸ εἶδος τὸ δ᾽ οὔ) (Met. Θ 1050a5-7)” and with Aristotle stressing that this 
principle moves through natural processes unidirectionally in the sense that: “…a child 
cannot come from man (Met. α 994a32)”.  I suggest in broad brush, then, that Aristotle 
is seeking to explore the real lived experience of being and of living, i.e. what it means 
to be something and to be aware of being something, and that he is not merely seeking 
to document or formularise forms and processes and theories regarding this being and 
living – or regarding motion per se – but is, rather, tracking through the meaning of life 
in philosophical terms.  Life is evidently an individual and temporal phenomenon and 
this is, of course, the reason why Aristotle insists upon including temporal concepts into 
his study of the phenomenon of life.  As regards why such facts are often avoided I note 
that Aristotle draws the conclusion that there is an element of finality and of direction in 
the structuring and cycling of living beings on the basis that: “…everything which is 
generated moves towards a principle, i.e. its end (καὶ ὅτι ἅπαν ἐπ᾽ ἀρχὴν βαδίζει τὸ 
γιγνόμενον καὶ τέλος) (Met. Θ 1050a7-8)” whereas neither Descartes nor Newton can 
account for living being in their accounts of worldly being, this being, of course, an 
evidently significant omission.  I add that Aristotle is not only concerned about life for 
life’s sake but is also considering what the existence of life suggests regarding the 
nature of the world which could and did produce that phenomenon and I note that this 
ontological approach and the belief that there is a structuring in nature and / or that man 
is a part of “nature” are both (for various reasons) controversial. 
 I suggest, then, that we see that “prior” and “posterior” are essential concepts for 
Aristotle’s ontology and I note that the foundation of Aristotle’s position here is the 
basic principle of “continuity” which shows us that Aristotle is concerned with how 
form passes through matter and with the critical concept here being that something 
becomes something and expresses itself as something by possessing a “continuous” 
movement defined as follows:  
 
““Continuous” means that whose motion is essentially one, and cannot be otherwise; 
and motion is one when it is indivisible, i.e. indivisible in time (συνεχὲς δὲ λέγεται οὗ 
κίνησις μία καθ᾽ αὑτὸ καὶ μὴ οἷόν τε ἄλλως: μία δ᾽ οὗ ἀδιαίρετος, ἀδιαίρετος δὲ κατὰ 
χρόνον) (Met. Δ 1016a5-7)”  
 
and with this “continuity” ultimately achieving “determinateness”, “autonomy”, and 
“being” (and hence losing its “middle” and its “becoming”) as follows:  
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“…“to be one” means “to be indivisible” (being essentially a particular thing, distinct 
and separate in place or form or thought), or “to be whole and indivisible” (διὸ καὶ τὸ 
ἑνὶ εἶναι τὸ ἀδιαιρέτῳ ἐστὶν εἶναι, ὅπερ τόδε ὄντι καὶ ἰδίᾳ χωριστῷ ἢ τόπῳ ἢ εἴδει ἢ 
διανοίᾳ, ἢ καὶ τὸ ὅλῳ καὶ ἀδιαιρέτῳ) (Met. I 1052b16-18)” 
 
from which we see Aristotle’s position that to be “one” is to be “something” 
determinate and eternally “active” or “actual” which does not change and hence has no 
“prior” and “posterior” in (for Aristotle) any meaningful sense.    
 I suggest, then, that the “prior” and “posterior” only become significant concepts 
when we are dealing with the ousiology and aetiology of the sublunary or entangled 
world in which we observe principles feeding through the world (according to the four 
causes) and also forms feeding through the world as (individual) substances moving or 
cycling though matter.  Regarding Aristotle’s ousiology we find that he argues that the 
relationship between a “substance” and its “matter” is such that: 
 
“The underlying nature is an object of scientific knowledge, by an analogy (ἡ δὲ 
ὑποκειμένη φύσις ἐπιστητὴ κατ' ἀναλογίαν).  For as the bronze is to the statue, the 
wood to the bed, or the matter to the formless before receiving form ([ἡ ὕλη καὶ] τὸ 
ἄμορφον ἔχει πρὶν λαβεῖν τὴν μορφήν) to any thing which has form (πρὸς τῶν ἄλλων τι 
τῶν ἐχόντων μορφὴν), so is the underlying nature to substance (οὕτως αὕτη πρὸς 
οὐσίαν ἔχει), i.e. the “this” or existent (καὶ τὸ τόδε τι καὶ τὸ ὄν) (Phys. I 191a7-12)” 
 
or, in other words, Aristotle argues that the lesser is prior to the more in the sense that it 
is required to grow, accumulate, become enformed, or expand, as follows:  
 
“…[the prior thing] does not reciprocate as to implication of existence.  For example, 
one is prior to two because if there are two it follows at once that there is one whereas if 
there is one there are not necessarily two, so that the implication of the other’s existence 
does not hold reciprocally from one; and that from which the implication of existence 
does not hold reciprocally is thought to be prior (Cat. 14a30-35)”  
 
which shows us that being and becoming represents the real action of nature, the real 
movement of processes of nature (which can be hindered) and with this channelling of 
becoming being described by John Bowin as that: “…in each case, the relative 
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proximity to the goal state of these changes represents the degree of assimilation of the 
patient to the agent200”.   
Regarding Aristotle’s aetiology I comment that Aristotle insists that there are 
causes in nature which drive change.  Most famously, Aristotle gives us “four causes” 
for tracking substances through the world through a “formal cause” being supported by 
a “material cause” but with there also being the “moving cause” which represents 
becoming and the “final cause” which represents being or why something is, i.e. that we 
see the movement of something from, through, and to something201.  We find, however, 
that Aristotle also argues that:  
 
“…these classes of cause are six in number, each used in two senses.  Causes are (i) 
particular, (ii) generic, (iii) accidental, (iv) generically accidental; and these may be 
stated singly or (v, vi) in combination [i.e. (per Loeb footnote) the cause of a statue may 
be said to be (i) a sculptor, (ii) an artist, (iii) Polyclitus, (iv) a man, (v) the sculptor 
Polyclitus (combination of (i) and (iii)), (vi) an artistic man (combination of (ii) and 
(iv)]; and further they are all either actual or potential (Met. Δ 1014a16-21)” 
 
and, in general, that: “…the question is why the matter is some definite thing; e.g. why 
are these materials a house (δῆλον δὴ ὅτι τὴν ὕλην ζητεῖ διὰ τί τί ἐστιν: οἷον οἰκία ταδὶ 
διὰ τί)?...And why is this individual thing, or this body having a form, a man (καὶ 
ἄνθρωπος τοδί, ἢ τὸ σῶμα τοῦτο τοδὶ ἔχον)?  Therefore what we seek is the cause (ὥστε 
τὸ αἴτιον ζητεῖται τῆς ὕλης), i.e. the form (τοῦτο δ᾽ ἐστὶ τὸ εἶδος), by reason of which 
the matter is some definite thing (ᾧ τί ἐστιν); and this is the substance of the thing 
(τοῦτο δ᾽ ἡ οὐσία) (Met. Z 1041b4-9)”.  As regards this underlying “form” we find that 
Aristotle argues in principle that: “…the activity is the end, and the actuality is the 
activity; hence the term “actuality” is derived from “activity,” and tends to have the 
meaning of “complete reality” (τὸ γὰρ ἔργον τέλος, ἡ δὲ ἐνέργεια τὸ ἔργον, διὸ καὶ 
τοὔνομα ἐνέργεια λέγεται κατὰ τὸ ἔργον καὶ συντείνει πρὸς τὴν ἐντελέχειαν) (Met. Θ 
1050a 22-23)” and that: 
 
                                                 
200 Bowin, John “Aristotle on the Order and Direction of Time” in Apeiron (2009) p 49 
 
201 For a good consideration of Aristotle’s “four causes” see Mariska E.M.P.J. Leunissen’s “The 
Structure of Teleological Explanations in Aristotle: Theory and Practice” in Oxford Studies in 
Ancient Philosophy XXXIII (2007) and also Francis Wolff’s “The Three Pleasures of Mimēsis 
According to Aristotle’s Poetics” in Bernadette Bensaude-Vincent & William R. Newman (eds.) 
The Artificial and the Natural: An Evolving Polarity (Cambridge Mass., 2007) 
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“…what stays still and is definite is prior to what is indefinite and in motion (πρότερον 
γὰρ τὸ μένον καὶ τὸ ὡρισμένον τοῦ ἀορίστου καὶ ἐν κινήσει ὄντος) (Top. VI 141b20-
21)” 
 
and in practice that: “…man builds because he is a builder, and a builder builds in virtue 
of his art of building (οἷον ἅνθρωπος οἰκοδομεῖ ὅτι οἰκοδόμος, ὁ δ' οἰκοδόμος κατὰ τὴν 
οἰκοδομικήν).  This last cause then is prior: and so generally (τοῦτο τοίνυν πρότερον τὸ 
αἴτιον, καὶ οὕτως ἐπὶ πάντων) (Phys. II 195b23-25)” which shows us that whereas we 
have seen above “prior” principles feeding through the world we also see that the 
principle is “prior” also in being the end at which the feeding through is due to arrive.   
I suggest that Rémi Brague explains this complexity well as that: “…logos 
is…at the basis of movement, insofar as it is logos that the potential as such, whose 
entelechy is movement, manifests itself202” and with time and numeration being on this 
view a form of collection and of ordering rather than of mere measuring, as follows:  
 
“Time is the articulation of the prior-posterior structure of movement…Time 
“advances” down the middle, through the present that simultaneously ejects the past and 
the future203” 
 
which suggests that the “now” or temporal “present” is an example of an Aristotelian 
“mean” or channelling – which is also the “actuality” or concrete worldly realisation 
that we actually experience – which we will consider in a later chapter and I add that 
Eric Sanday also explains Aristotle’s “now” well as that: “In order to perceive anything 
at all, the perceiving being must take a stand at a “when” (De Anima III 2).  Just to say 
that two things are different, for instance, we must do so at a when, a now, a “now” that 
inherently means “now, time for…”204”. 
 I also suggest that we see that “prior” and “posterior” are essential concepts for 
Aristotle’s epistemology (noting that ontology and epistemology are two sides of the 
same coin in Aristotle’s thought) on the basis that we can only (epistemologically) 
know the (ontologically) knowable and hence: 
                                                 
202 Brague, Rémi “On Aristotle’s Formula ὅ ποτε ὄν: Physics IV.11, 14” in Claudia Baracchi 
(ed.) The Bloomsbury Companion to Aristotle (London, [orig. 1982] 2013) p 85 
  
203 Brague, Rémi Ibid. p 84-85 
 
204 Sanday, Eric “Phantasia in De Anima” in Claudia Baracchi (ed.) The Bloomsbury 




 “We gain knowledge, commonly speaking, of things that already exist, for in very few 
cases or none can our knowledge have come into being along with its proper object.  
Should the object of knowledge be removed, then the knowledge itself will be 
cancelled.  The converse of this is not true.  If the object no longer exists, there can no 
longer be any knowledge, there being now nothing to know.  If, however, of this or that 
object no knowledge has yet been acquired, yet that object itself may exist.  Take the 
squaring of the circle, for instance, if that can be called such an object.  Although it 
exists as an object, the knowledge does not yet exist.  If all animals ceased to exist, 
there would then be no knowledge at all, though there might in that case, 
notwithstanding, be still many objects of knowledge.  The same may be said of 
perception.  The object, I mean, would appear to be prior to the act of perception.  
Suppose that you cancel the perceptible; you cancel the perception as well…But the 
taking away of perception does not take such objects away.  If the animal itself is 
destroyed, then perception is also destroyed.  But perceptibles yet will remain, such as 
body, heat, sweetness and bitterness and everything else that it sensible (Cat. 7b24-
8a6)” 
 
and with Aristotle’s “common sense” outline position here being simply that we are in 
the world and know and perceive it and its objects and with his additional emphasis 
being that we must reflect upon the world and upon our actual experience in the world 
in order to understand the underlying principles of the world.  In other words, I suggest 
that Aristotle argues that in order to truly philosophise we must perform the difficult 
task of going back to the “first principles” of nature in order to follow the principles of 
nature through to their realisation in the perceptibles that we encounter in the world205.  
I add that we ultimately find that there is a cascading of actuality in the world which 
originates in the “Unmoved Mover” that we as human beings pick up upon and tap in to 
but, significantly, only derivatively, partially, and reflectively. 
For conclusion and reiteration I add that Aristotle’s conclusions on the “prior” 
and “posterior” of “change” from Metaphysics Θ is as follows: 
                                                 
205 Aristotle famously argues that our intellect in some way created through its engagement with 
the world, as follows: “…mind thinks itself (αὑτὸν νοεῖ ὁ νοῦς) by sharing in the object of 
thought (κατὰ μετάληψιν τοῦ νοητοῦ), for it becomes an object of thought by coming into 
contact with and thinking its objects (νοητὸς γὰρ γίγνεται θιγγάνων καὶ νοῶν), so that mind and 
the object of thought are the same (ταὐτὸν νοῦς καὶ νοητόν).  For the mind is that which is 
capable of receiving the object of thought (τὸ γὰρ δεκτικὸν τοῦ νοητοῦ), i.e. the essence (καὶ 
τῆς οὐσίας νοῦς); and it is active when it possesses the object (ἐνεργεῖ δὲ ἔχων) (Met. Λ 




“Now, since we have distinguished the several senses of priority, it is obvious that 
actuality is prior to potentiality (πρότερον ἐνέργεια δυνάμεώς ἐστιν).  By potentiality I 
mean not that which we have defined as “a principle of change which is in something 
other than the thing changed, or in that same thing qua other,” but in general any 
principle of motion or of rest; for nature also is in the same genus as potentiality, 
because it is a principle of motion, although not in some other thing, but in the thing 
itself qua itself.  To every potentiality of this kind actuality is prior, both in formula and 
in substance; in time it is sometimes prior and sometimes not (Met. Θ 1049b 4-13)” 
 
and we find that Aristotle adds regarding “formula” and “substance” that: 
 
“That actuality is prior in formula is evident (τῷ λόγῳ μὲν οὖν ὅτι προτέρα, δῆλον); for 
it is because it can be actualised that the potential, in the primary sense, is potential (τῷ 
γὰρ ἐνδέχεσθαι ἐνεργῆσαι δυνατόν ἐστι τὸ πρώτως δυνατόν), I mean, e.g., that the 
potentially constructive is that which can construct, the potentially seeing that which 
can see, and the potentially visible that which can be seen”…it is also prior in 
substantiality; (a) because things which are posterior in generation are prior in form and 
substantiality (ἀλλὰ μὴν καὶ οὐσίᾳ γε, πρῶτον μὲν ὅτι τὰ τῇ γενέσει ὕστερα τῷ εἴδει καὶ 
τῇ οὐσίᾳ πρότερα); e.g. adult is prior to child, and man to semen, because the one 
already possesses the form, but the other does not; and (b) because everything which is 
generated moves towards a principle, i.e. its end.  For the object of a thing is its 
principle; and generation has as its object the end (ἀρχὴ γὰρ τὸ οὗ ἕνεκα, τοῦ τέλους δὲ 
ἕνεκα ἡ γένεσις).  And the actuality is the end, and it is for the sake of this that the 
potentiality is acquired; for animals do not see in order that they may see.  Similarly 
men possess the art of building in order that they may build, and the power of 
speculation that they may speculate; they do not speculate in order that they may have 
the power of speculation – except those who are learning by practice (Met. Θ 1049b14-
1050a14)” 
 
and with the nub of Aristotle’s position here being that: “…just as teachers think that 
they have achieved their end when they have exhibited their pupil performing, so it is 
with nature (Met. Θ 1050a18-19)” from which we see (a) that the controversy which has 
arisen from Aristotle’s position here is clearly its emphasis on “finality” and the 
principle that: “…everything that is produced is something that is produced from 
something and by something, and that the same in species as it (πᾶν τὸ γιγνόμενον 
γίγνεται ἔκ τινος τι καὶ ὑπό τινος, καὶ τοῦτο τῷ εἴδει τὸ αὐτό) (Met. Θ 1049b28-29)” (b) 
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that Aristotle supports his position by observing that there are such cycles of (generic 
and individual) fulfilment evident in nature and (c) that Aristotle argues that there is a 
power of “actuality” in nature through which nature enables being to become actively 
actualised in the world and with this positive force of “actuality” being, of course, 
interpretable as “God”206. 
 I add in respect to “time” and the “prior” and “posterior” that Aristotle 
concludes that: “In time it is prior in this sense: the actual is prior to the potential with 
which it is formally identical (εἴδει), but not to that with which it is identical 
numerically (ἀριθμῷ) (Met. Θ 1049b 18-19)” and with this “numerical” and material 
world being a messy but structured reality (which we can partly but only partly and 
intermittently understand and represent) and with the “prior” and “posterior” being 
necessary for us to be able to consider the human individual and the entangled history of 
individuals, as follows: 
 
“…in formula universals are prior, in perception individuals (κατὰ μὲν γὰρ τὸν λόγον τὰ 
καθόλου πρότερα κατὰ δὲ τὴν αἴσθησιν τὰ καθ᾽ ἕκαστα).  And in formula also the 
accident is prior to the whole, e.g. musical to musical man, for the formula cannot exist  
as a whole without the part; yet musicalness cannot exist unless there is someone who is 
musical (καίτοι οὐκ ἐνδέχεται μουσικὸν εἶναι μὴ ὄντος μουσικοῦ τινός) (Met. Δ 
1018b31-36)”  
 
and in respect to human knowledge Aristotle argues that: “…it is better to aim at 
knowledge (πειρᾶσθαι γνωρίζειν) of the posterior by means of what is prior; for such a 
method is more scientific (ἐπιστημονικκώτερον γὰρ τὸ τοιοῦτόν ἐστιν) (Top. VI 
141b15-17)”207 and also that: 
                                                 
206  I note, however, regarding Aristotle’s “God” that Aryeh Kosman argues that: 
“Beings…imitate divinity in being, acting out, what they are; imitatio dei consists in striving not 
to be God, but to be one’s self, to emulate that being who is totally active, i.e. who totally is 
what he is (“Aristotle’s definition of motion” in Phronesis (1969) p 60).” 
 
207 I note that Klaus Oehler explains the important principle that: “…the knowable would seem 
to be prior to knowledge…[and] the perceptible seems to be prior to perception…[and it is 
hence that] Aristotle formulates this thesis of the primacy of reality over knowledge (Met. 
1010b30; 1053a31; 1056b35; 1057a9-17) (“Aristotle on Self-Knowledge” in Proceedings of the 
American Philosophical Society (1974) p 496)” and Thomas Kjeller Johansen adds on this point 
that: “…when Aristotle at De An. II 412a26-7 says that “knowledge is prior in coming into 
being for the individual” he is using a notion of priority which is the flipside of priority in being.  
As we read in Met. Θ 1050a4-5 “the things that are later in coming into being are prior in being 




“…different things are more intelligible to different people, and not the same things 
equally intelligible to all; and so a different definition would have to be given to each 
individual, if the definition has to be framed as the basis of what is intelligible to each 
of them.  Furthermore, to the same persons different things are more intelligible at 
different times – first of all the objects of sense-perception, and then, when their 
knowledge becomes more accurate, the converse occurs (Top. VI 141b37-142a4)”  
 
and I suggest in conclusion that Aristotle’s “time” should ultimately be set in the 
context that: “A middle is that which both follows a preceding event and has further 
consequences (Poet. 1450b30-31)” and that: “…proof must proceed through a middle 
term (ἀνάγκη γὰρ διὰ τοῦ μέσου δεῖξαι) (Post. An. II 92a11)” in the sense that we are 
ultimately situated in a world of change and space and with it only being through this 
world that we can see and unpack the nature of the world and we will explore this last 















                                                 
208 On Aristotle’s priority and posteriority see also Phil Corkum’s “Aristotle on Ontological 
Dependence” in Phronesis (2008), Jonathan Beere’s “The Priority of Being in Energeia” in 
Michel Crubellier et al. Dunamis: Autour de la Puissance chez Aristote (Paris, 2008), 
Christopher Shields’ “The priority of soul in Aristotle’s De anima: Mistaking categories?” in D. 
Frede & B. Reis (eds.) Body and Soul in Ancient Philosophy (Hamburg, 2009) and David 
Charles’ “Actuality and Potentiality in Metaphysics Θ” in James G. Lennox & Robert Bolton 
(eds.) Being, Nature, and Life in Aristotle (Cambridge, 2010).  On “education” in nature see 




12 Aristotle on Symmetry 
 
Moving on to “symmetry” I suggest to the reader that this concept supports the 
further concepts of “proportion” and “middle” (or “mean”) as a “centre” or “channel” 
and that all these concepts together present us with a philosophical map of reality based 
upon a very physical and biological picture of a “centred” physical being moving 
through time and space.  Hence we see in principle that Aristotle associates “symmetry” 
with “order” (proportion) and “definiteness” (middle) and “beauty”, as follows:  
 
“The chief forms of beauty [are] order (τάξις) and symmetry (συμμετρία) and 
definiteness (τὸ ὡρισμένον) (Met. M 1078a36-1078b1)”  
 
and that he adds that “symmetry” is an “equilibrium” as follows:  
 
“…in the statement that “coming-to-be is a channel [or leading] towards being” (ὅτι ἡ 
γένεσις ἀγωγὴ εἰς οὐσίαν) or that “health is a balancing [symmetry] of hot and cold” 
(ὅτι ἡ ὑγίεια συμμετρία θερμῶν καὶ ψυχρῶν).  The words “channel [or leading]” and 
“balancing [symmetry]” are equivocal (ὁμώνυμος γὰρ ἡ ἀγωγὴ καὶ ἡ συμμετρία) (Top. 
VI 139b20-22)”  
 
and also that  “symmetry” is part of the framework within which “being” exists in the 
sense that: “…“disposition,” (διάθεσις) “state” (ἕξις) and “[symmetry]” (συμμετρία)… 
these terms cannot possibly exist anywhere else except in the things in relation to which 
they are employed (Top. IV 125a35-37)” which shows us that such concepts are generic 
natural phenomena but ones which are always locally realised in response to the needs 
of “the things in relation to which they are employed”.  I suggest that we generally see 
both that Aristotle finds a general natural structuring (and symmetricity) in nature which 
is realised locally and variously in individual beings and also that his conceptual view 
of the world – and his use of such terms as priority, symmetry, limit, mean, 
determinateness etc. – recognisably identifies the same reality as our own but does so in 
a philosophical rather than in a merely descriptive mode. 
Let us consider these points by considering Aristotle’s detailed discussion of 
“symmetry” in respect to the human body, as follows: 
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“In fact, all of them [i.e. the organs] are double (διφυᾶ).  And the reason for this is that 
the structure of the body is double (διφυὴς), though its halves are combined 
(συντελοῦσα) under one source (πρὸς μίαν ἀρχήν) (PA III 669b18-20)”  
 
and with Aristotle arguing that: “In all animals the brain is double.  Beyond this, at the 
far end, is the cerebellum as it is called; its form is different from that of the brain, as 
can be both felt and seen (HA I 494b31-4)209” and going to extraordinary lengths to 
show the general “symmetricity” of the body by pointing out that even the tongue is 
divided (PA II 657a1-2) which Peck interprets (p. 180 of his Loeb translation) as 
referring to forked tongues but which Lennox relates to the fact that the tongue in most 
animals has a clear “midline” (p. 227 of his Oxford translation)).  We also find that 
Aristotle extends symmetricity to the human soul (as well as to the human body) and 
hence that he argues that reason and desire are two “sides” (or “parts”) of the soul and 
with the “epistēmonikon” and the “logistikon” being the two “sides” of the reasoning 
part of the soul and “nous” being a fifth “middle” or “central” part.   
I add that we find additionally to the two “sides” of the body and the “five” 
aspects of reason (with “nous” as a human intellectual intermediate) that Aristotle 
explains the five senses in his “On Sense and Sensibles” as follows: 
 
“The senses making up an odd number, and an odd number having always a middle unit 
(μέσον), the sense of smell occupies in itself as it were a middle position between the 
tactual senses, i.e. touch and taste, and those which perceive through a medium, i.e. 
sight and hearing.  Hence the object of smell, too, is an affection (πάθος) of nutrient 
substances (which fall within the class of tangibles), and is also an affection of the 
audible and the visible; whence it is that creatures have the sense of smell both in air 
and water.  Accordingly, the object of smell is something common to both of these 
provinces, i.e. it appertains both to the tangible on the one hand, and on the other to the 
audible and translucent (Sens. 445a5-11)”   
 
which suggests that “smell” is an animal perceptual intermediate regarding which I note 
that the nose is normally set between the eyes and ears in animals.  I note that Aristotle 
also suggests that a human “self” must have a “centre” or “middle” and also a natural 
                                                 
209 Aristotle also points out that animals have a clear symmetry in respect to kidneys and lungs 
and he also tries, more disputably, to add the heart since its cavities make it bipartite (PA III 
669b22-26) and more obviously incorrectly he regards the spleen as the “double” of the liver 
(PA III 669b15-18 & 669b36-670a3) (though Aristotle expresses doubts on this matter just as he 
also doubts that the sense of touch can be symmetrically explained as opposed to other senses).   
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“duality” in the sense that: “…the origin of movement must be that which lies above 
both sides [of the body], it necessarily follows that the origin of movement in the 
moving soul must be between them (ἀνάγκη ἐν τῷ μέσῳ εἶναι τὴν ἀρχὴν τῆς ψυχῆς τῆς 
κινούσης) (MA 702a14-16)” and I suggest that this is very physical, very immediate, 
and very literal but also a powerfully valid assessment of what it entails to possess a 
grounding to physically be a moving person (and, generally, an organic being) in the 
world210.  I comment on the strangeness of the fact that we are so used to thinking in 
abstractions that we find such an obviously real assessment of reality to be itself 
strange. 
As regards the interesting subject of “asymmetry” we find that Aristotle 
correctly points out that asymmetry sometimes exists in places in which we would 
normally expect to find symmetry for which he exemplifies the mole (though “…even 
the mole, we find, has eyes under the skin (De An. III 425a11-12)”) and, most 
obviously, the sponge (“…it has sensation of a sort (HA I 487b9)” even if “…the whole 
thing is similar to a lung (HA V 549a8)”) and hence we see that he observes that there 
are animals in the world which do not possess all five senses since their way of life does 
not require them to have all five senses.  I add that Aristotle explains this principle of 
local selection from a palate of generic organic possibilities, as follows:  
 
“…some animals possess all the modes of sense-perception (ἔχει τὰς αἰσθήσεις πάσας), 
and some not all, not, for example, sight, while all possess touch and taste, except such 
animals as are imperfectly developed (πλὴν εἴ τι τῶν ζῴων ἀτελές) a class of which we 
have already treated in our work on the soul [i.e. the De Anima] (Somn. 455a5-9)”211  
 
and I note that Aristotle even contends that there may be other senses of which we are 
not aware and hence we find that he is willing to suggest that it is possible that insects 
may smell through “…some other sense not included in the ordinary five (Sens. 
444b19-20)”.  I add, however, that aside from this observed physical and literal 
asymmetry in nature we find that there is an asymmetry in the very principle that: 
                                                 
210 See Eric Sanday’s “Phantasia in De Anima” in Claudia Baracchi (ed.) The Bloomsbury 
Companion to Aristotle (London, 2013) 
 
211 Cf. “…all animals have one sense (μίαν γε τῶν αἰσθήσεων) at least, viz. touch (ἁφή), and 
whatever has a sense  (ᾧ δ' αἴσθησις ὑπάρχει) has the capacity for pleasure and pain (τούτῳ 
ἡδονή τε καὶ λύπη) and therefore has pleasant and painful objects present to it (καὶ τὸ ἡδύ τε καὶ 
λυπηρόν), and wherever these are present, there is desire, for desire (ἐπιθυμία) is just appetition 
(ὄρεξις) of what is pleasant (τοῦ ἡδέος) (De An. II 414b3-7)”   
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“…there is no necessity, because your father came-to-be, that you should come-to-be; 
but if you are to come-to-be, he must have done so (GC II 338b10-11)” and that even 
the basic existence of organisms as independent “self-movers” can be represented as 
that they have become disconnected from the wider generic cycles of nature, i.e. their 
impulse to be is in some sense an asymmetrical spin-off from the main unified cycle of 
being and from the “activity” and “movement” of the “unmoved mover”.  I add that 
both “male” and “female” and also the craftsman and his product regarding which: 
“…the house and the builder do not perish together (Met. Δ 1014a24-25)” can be 
represented as asymmetries212. 
I suggest in conclusion that Aristotle finds a “happy medium” between order and 
disorder (i.e. he does not insist that there is a “divine” order to all things or that such 
order as clearly exists is merely a figment of our imagination) and this assessment is 
supported by Mark Schiefsky, as follows: 
 
“…while Aristotle is certainly concerned to show that the parts of a human being are 
“useful” and “suitable for an intelligent animal”, it is no part of his project to argue that 
the parts are so well constructed that they could not be any better.  For Aristotle, the 
goal is just to show that a certain feature or structure makes some contribution to the 
organism’s activities, especially survival or reproduction; for Galen this is only the 
beginning.  This explains the abundance of counterfactual argument in De usu partium: 
Galen often argues that if a certain part were any larger or smaller, or placed differently 
in any way, the activities of the organism would somehow be impaired.  Such 
arguments play no role in Aristotle’s accounts of living things.  In general Galen’s 
teleology is comprehensive in a way that Aristotle’s is not213” 
 
and Schiefsky adds that: “…Aristotle, by contrast [with Galen], is more willing to 
acknowledge that some parts [of the body] are present for no purpose…The spleen is a 
case in point (PA III 670a30-31)214”.  I add that this indeterminacy within Aristotle’s 
position is not necessarily a defect or even a subtetly but that it is an absolutely 
fundamental element of his philosophical position in the sense that it leads us to A.N. 
                                                 
212 See Phil Corkum’s “Aristotle on Ontological Dependence” in Phronesis (2008) 
 
213 Schiefsky, Mark “Galen’s Teleology and Functional Explanation” in Oxford Studies in 
Ancient Philosophy XXXIII (2007) p 392 
 
214 Schiefsky, Mark Ibid. p 392 
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Whitehead’s position that: “What we have to explain is the trend towards order which is 
the overwhelming deliverance of experience.  What we have also to explain is the 
frustration of order, and the absence of necessity in any particular form of order215” and 
to the conclusion that we find “creativity” in nature and not (just) mechanical 
determinism.  
Moving on to consider the validity of Aristotle’s position on “symmetry” vis-à-
vis modern research I observe that the physicist P.W. Anderson explains the underlying 
and ongoing physical (rather than biological) significance of “symmetry”, as follows: 
 
“…symmetry is of great importance in physics.  By symmetry we mean the existence of 
different viewpoints from which the system appears the same.  It is only slightly 
overstating the case to say that physics is the study of symmetry…In quantum 
mechanics there is always a way, unless symmetry forbids, to get from one state to 
another.  Thus, if we start from any one unsymmetrical state, the system will make 
transitions to others, so only by adding up all the possible unsymmetrical states in a 
symmetrical way can we get to a stationery state216”  
 
and Anderson adds regarding asymmetry that: “…the internal structure of a piece of 
matter need not be symmetrical even if the total state of it is217”.  I add that the physicist 
Erwin Schrӧdinger argues that an organism exists by:  
 
“…concentrating a “stream of order” on itself and thus escaping the decay into atomic 
chaos – of “drinking orderliness” from a suitable environment218”  
 
and hence insists that the world is ordered and also that this order exists within the 
context of disorder.  I note that Aristotle similarly assumes that an organism does 
necessarily possess order in order to exist and also has the capacitiy to select and 
prioritise forms of order according to individual and local needs and desires.  I add that 
Aristotle similarly observes that our “sense” sucks orderliness from the world (as does 
                                                 
215 Whitehead, A.N. “Forms of Process” in Modes of Thought (New York, 1938) p 88 
 
216 Anderson, P.W. “More is Different: Broken symmetry and the nature of the hierarchical 
structure of science” Science (1972) p 394 
 
217 Anderson, P.W. Ibid. p 394 
 




our “nutrition”) and he adds that our “mind” pushes orderliness into the world.  
Regarding Aristotle’s symmetry generally, I suggest that he seems to be correct (or at 
least to be in line with modern thinking) in thinking (A) that there is a fundamental 
symmetry in the world (B) that there are many forms and instantiations of symmetry in 
the world and (C) that it is also a fundamental aspect of the world that this symmetry is 
broken and reformulated (but with change normally being change from one state to 
another state).   
I add further in respect to the biological significance of “symmetry” that Aldous 
Huxley first observes that: 
 
“There is the symmetry of the free living animal, which is a bilateral symmetry: the two 
sides of the animal match one another, but it is different fore and aft; it has a head and a 
tail and it moves in one direction.  This is radically different from radial symmetry, 
which we find in many flowers and in those kinds of animals which are either sessile or 
free219” 
 
and that Gregory Bateson adds that there are (i) dynamic and (ii) external elements of 
such natural processes as the act of fertilisation, as follows:  
 
“…in biological systems, the step from radical symmetry to bilateral symmetry 
commonly requires a piece of information from the outside…consider the case of the 
frog’s egg.  The two poles and the point of entry of the spermatozoon determine a plane 
of bilateral symmetry.  To achieve symmetry, the egg requires information at right 
angles to this plane, i.e., something which will make the right half different from the 
left220”  
 
which shows us that there is reason to believe that symmetry breaking is normally due 
to some external intervention or impulse entering into the situation which Aristotle 
                                                 
219 Huxley, Aldous “Art” in The Human Situation (St Albans, [orig. 1959] 1980) p 186 
 
220 Bateson, Gregory “A Reexamination of “Bateson’s Rule”” in Steps to an Ecology of Mind 
(New York, 1972) p 382-6.  I note that Robert Rosen also argues that: “The component may be 
thought of as the particle of function…a component possesses an inherent polarity or 
asymmetry…there is an input side or afferent side, reflecting the collective influence of the rest 
of Ω [natural system], and the environment of Ω, on the component itself…Likewise, there is an 
output side, or efferent side, reflecting the influence of the component (and hence its specific 
function) on Ω, and on the environment of Ω (Life Itself: A Comprehensive Inquiry Into the 
Nature, Origin, and Fabrication of Life (New York, 1991) p 120-3)”  
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explains as “nous” in the context of embryonic formation on the basis that: “…reason 
alone enters in, as an additional factor from outside (τὸν νοῦν μόνον θύραθεν 
ἐπεισιέναι) (GA II 736b27-29)”.  As is always the case, we find that Aristotle is seeking 
to understand the world in its detail whilst accounting for the fact that there is a formal 
structuring lying beneath and hence we see that the concept of “symmetry” is recycled 



























                                                 
221 On the subject of symmetry in nature (and as nature) see research into Fibonacci series / 
spirals and fractals and also Harald Atmanspacher & Hans Primas’ “Pauli’s ideas on mind and 




13 Aristotle on the “Mean” 
 
Let us now move to the “centre” of our discussion and consider the “mean” or 
“middle” or “centre” or “channelling” which is conceptualised by Aristotle through his 
famous concept of “to meson” which is in principle that: “…the mean…everywhere… 
also produces the best state (τὸ μέσον… πανταχοῦ δὲ τοῦτο καὶ ποιεῖ τὴν βελτίστην 
ἕξιν) (E.E. II 1220b28-30)” and I comment (and will show below) that this single 
principle informs Aristotle’s study of each of the different subject matters that he treats 
in his various treatises.  I therefore suggest that the “mean” is a guiding principle or 
“mean” of Aristotle’s own thought and work. 
As regards (1) how we are ourselves a “mean” we see that Aristotle argues in his 
De Anima that our senses are a “mean” or “measure” we use to engage with the world 
outside and hence:  
 
“…we have no sensation of what is as hot, cold, hard, or soft as we are, but only what is 
more so, which implies that sense is a sort of mean (μεσότητός τινος) between the 
relevant sensible extremes (De An. II 424a3-5)”  
 
and in his Movement of Animals we see that the human body itself has a physical 
“mean” or “centre” in the sense that: “…the middle is the limit of both extremes 
(ἀμφοτέρων γὰρ τῶν ἄκρων τὸ μὲσον ἔσχατον)…And the central part of the body is 
potentially one, but must actually become more than one; for the limbs are set in motion 
simultaneously from the origin of movement, and when one is at rest the other is in 
motion (MA 702b16-28)”.   In respect to the structuring of our own ethical characters 
we see from Aristotle’s Ethics that: 
 
“…right principle…is the mean between excess and deficiency relative to ourselves 
[and] it follows that as these actions are contrary to each other and to the mean, so also 
the states of character that cause them are contrary to each other and to virtue (ὡς ταῦτ᾽ 
ἀλλήλοις ἐναντία καὶ τῷ μέσῳ, οὕτω καὶ τὰς ἕξεις ἀλλήλαις ἐναντίας εἶναι καὶ τῇ 
ἀρετῇ) (E.E. II 1222a9-22)” 
 
and with Aristotle importantly explaining this channelling of self (and of energy) as a 
direction and intensity of movement, as follows: “…from the start our nature does not 
diverge from the mean in the same way as regards everything, but in energy we are 
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deficient and in self-indulgence excessive (E.E. II 1222a37-39)”.  I add, however, that 
the fact that there are different kinds of or applications of energy leads Aristotle to argue 
that: “…what is capable of desiring and what is capable of fleeing are not different, 
either from one another or from what is capable of perceiving, but their being is 
different (De An. III 431a12-14)” which suggests to Aristotle that we should recognise 
that our basic situation is of an active “self” or “substance” which employs “energy” as 
a means to achieve its ends. 
I add that we also find that Aristotle’s “means” are the channels and 
“mechanisms” through which we achieve our “ends” in the sense that: 
 
“The End is…the object for which the thing chosen is the mean, of which End goodness 
is the cause by its act of choice (οὗ μὲν οὖν ἕνεκα τὸ μέσον ἐστίν, οὗ αἰτία ἡ ἀρετὴ τῷ 
προαιρεῖσθαι οὗ ἕνεκα) – though the choice is not of the End but of the means adopted 
for the sake of the End (ἔστι μέντοι ἡ προαίρεσις οὐ τούτου, ἀλλὰ τῶν τούτου ἕνεκα) 
(E.E. II 1227b38-40)”  
 
and regarding the relationship between “phronēsis” and “sophia” Aristotle argues that: 
“…the one determines the end and the other makes us do the things that lead to the end 
(N.E. VI 1145a5-6)” and regarding knowledge as a “measure” he argues that: “…it 
would seem that knowledge is a measure, and the knowable to be that which is 
measurable by it (δόξειε μὲν γὰρ ἂν μέτρον ἡ ἐπιστήμη εἶναι τὸ δὲ ἐπιστητὸν τὸ 
μετρούμενον) (Met. I 1057a9-11)” from which I suggest that Aristotle models human 
being upon (a) the projection of being as achieved through action, forethought, and 
intelligence and (b) our ability to measure and manage the world and to achieve results 
through doing so for which Aristotle’s paradigmatic example is the art of teaching222.  I 
also add here that the mature man is also himself a virtuous “mean” position between 
the immaturity of youth and the decrepitude of old age on the basis that such men are 
fully developed and “measured” (and in the prime of life) and hence: “…are guided not 
by the sole consideration either of what is noble or of what is useful, but by both, 
neither by parsimony nor by prodigality, but by what is fit and proper (πρὸς τὸ 
                                                 
222 Cf. “And that the end stands in a causal relation to the means subordinate to it is shown by 
teaching (ὅτι δ᾽ αἴτιον τὸ τέλος τοῖς ὑφ᾽ αὑτό, δηλοῖ ἡ διδασκαλία).  For, having defined the end 
they show, regarding other things, that each of them is a good, because that for the sake of 
which is explanatory.  For example, since “being healthy” is such-and-such a thing, then 
necessarily this other thing will be what is useful for it.  And what is healthy will be the efficient 




ἁρμόττον) (Rhet. II 1390b1-3)” (and I also note that Aristotle famously argues in his 
Politics that a “middling” state is best for human character and a middle class is best for 
the governing of a polity; see Pol. IV 1295a). 
As regards (2) the “mean” as an instrument we find in the On Sense and 
Sensibles that Aristotle argues contra Democritus that the eye cannot work “…as mere 
mirroring…that takes place in an eye due to the fact that the eye is smooth (Sens. 
438a7-8)” because this mirroring “…exists not in the eye but in the observer; for the 
phenomenon (τὸ πάθος) is only reflection (Sens. 438a8-9)” whereas on Aristotle’s 
schema the eye itself is a medium between the self and the world and its seeing takes 
place through the further medium of light, as follows: 
 
“…vision is caused by a process through this medium (ἡ διὰ τούτου [i.e.through 
μεταξύ] κίνησίς ἐστιν ἡ ποιοῦσα τὸ ὁρᾶν) (Sens. 438b4-5)” 
 
and it takes place through the further medium of colour, as follows:  
 
“…the faculty of sight informs us of so many differences of all kinds, because all bodies 
have a share of colour, so that it is chiefly by this medium that we perceive the common 
sensibles.  (By these I mean shape, magnitude, movement and number) (Sens. 437a6-
9)”  
 
and with such “common sensibles” being, in a sense, even further mediums which are 
only seen thought the “medium” of “motion” which for Aristotle is synonymous with 
“change”223.  Now, as regards Aristotle’s point here I suggest that he is emphasising, as 
he does often, that the world is comprised of responsive and interconnected structures 
which we perceive, think, use etc. and in respect to the example of sight itself we find 
that Aristotle stresses that it is not consequent to the simple material property of 
something but that it is, rather, the specific interaction between an object being seen by 
something through the medium of light (and of air or water and of colour) and through 
the specialised organ of the eye.  I note that the eye itself is an instrument, means, or 
                                                 
223 Cf. “…we perceive all these things [motion, rest, shape, magnitude, number and unity] by 
movement; for instance we perceive magnitude by movement and shape also; for shape is a 
form of magnitude.  What is at rest is perceived by an absence of movement; number by the 
negation of continuity (De An. III 425a17-19)” (and on “motion” see Aryeh Kosman’s 
“Aristotle’s definition of motion” in Phronesis (1969)).  
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medium which does, interestingly, observably take on its many forms and do so as 
required by the circumstances of the life of its organism (see GA V 778b16-19)224.   
We see, then, that the act of seeing is certainly heavily mediated through 
instruments and across media but with the critical point here being not the mediation 
itself but that the end result remains immediate in the sense that sight is of “co-
instantaneous wholes (ἅπαν ἅμα)” (Sens. 446b3) and also natural in the sense that:  
 
“…it is not true that the beholder sees, and the object is seen, in virtue of some merely 
abstract relationship between them, such as between equals.  For if it were so, there 
would be no need [as there is] that either [the beholder or the thing beheld] should 
occupy some particular place; since to the equalisation of things their being near to, or 
far from, one another makes no difference (Sens. 446b10-13)”      
 
and I suggest that Aristotle’s world – and the world itself – is a world with a natural 
pregnancy of purpose which comes to fruition when it is not hindered and regarding this 
“pregnancy” of being Russell Winslow comments that: 
 
“…Aristotelian intellectual perception discovers the being under inquiry in its 
singularity by becoming impregnated by the ousia of the other being.  I will argue that it 
is precisely this impregnation and coming-to-be of the essential activity of the other 
being in the soul that is noetic perception, or what we might otherwise call the thinking 
that Aristotle names nous…[and this] nous must be itself completely without attributes 
but receptive of the form and capable of becoming the noetic matter in potency without 
the material225” 
                                                 
224 I note that Aristotle uses eyes to show how different animals are adapted according to their 
needs, as follows: “…two animals may both have eyes, but in one those eyes are hard, while in 
the other they are of fluid consistency; and while the one does not have eyelids, the other does – 
both being for the sake of a greater accuracy of vision (PA II 648a19)” (for which see Monte 
Ransome Johnson’s “Luck in Aristotle’s Physics and Ethics” in Devin Henry & Karen 
Margrethne Nielsen (eds.) Bridging the Gap between Aristotle’s Science and Ethics 
(Cambridge, 2015)). 
 
225 Winslow, Russell “On the Life of Thinking in Aristotle’s De Anima” in Epoché (2009) p 
309-310.  Winslow adds that: “…nous does not have attributes, it does not have an organ, it 
does not have shape, except as the form in potency of what it perceives.  Nous is the most 
primordially open part of the soul.  It can become any intelligible thing that works upon it.  If 
there is such a thing as primary matter in Aristotle, from this description it would seem that, 
rather than some sort of lowly material substrate, nous – the highest potency in the cosmos – is a 
kind of primary matter.  After all, nous can potentially become all forms, for Aristotle: “…it 
will be said that the soul is a place of forms, except that this is not the whole soul but the noetic 




from which we see that both “matter” and “nous” are, for Aristotle, positive channels of 
“potentiality” and are the medium through which our world emerges in all its depth, 
subtlety, and meaningfulness.  I add that Aristotle also maintains that “sense” is a flow 
and transmission of meaning in the sense that: “…sense perception (αἴσθησις) [is] a 
movement of the soul through the body (ὡς ἐνέργεια κίνησίς τις διὰ τοῦ σώματος τῆς 
ψυχῆς ἐστι) (Somn. 454a10)” which portrays sense perception itself as being a medium 
or instrument of the body (or perhaps vice versa) and as being a real and literal 
movement of energy within the body (and note the meaning of the word “conduct”) and 
I suggest that Aristotle sees “sight”, “nous”, “matter”, and “sense” as media through 
which the pregnant potentiality of the world is actualised. 
As regards (3) the “mean” as a “form” passing through a “channel” or “duct” we 
find that Aristotle argues in his On coming-to-be and passing-away (i) in principle that:  
 
“The form of which we have spoken is a kind of power immersed in matter – a duct, as 
it were (Τοῦτο δὲ τὸ εἶδος ἄνευ ὕλης, οἷον αὐλός, δύναμίς τις ἐν ὕλῃ ἐστίν) (GC I 
322a28)”  
 
(ii) that from another angle it is the “matter” (i.e. rather than the “form” as above) which 
is the “mean” through which “substances” come-to-be and hence:  
 
“…it is “matter” that is the “mean” between the two contraries, and matter is 
imperceptible and inseparable from them (ἡ γὰρ ὕλη τὸ μέσον ἀναίσθητος οὖσα καὶ 
ἀχώριστος) (GC II 332a35-332b1)”  
 
and (iii) that chemical compounds are expressions of “means” of form in matter 
(perhaps this “means” can be considered as a “substratum” or “hupokeimenon”) and 
hence: 
 
“The “mean”, however, is of considerable extent and is not indivisible…it is qua 
reduced to a “mean” condition that the dry and the moist, as well as the contraries we 
have used as examples, produce flesh and bone and the remaining compounds (τὸ δὲ 
μέσον πολὺ καὶ οὐκ ἀδιαίρετον. Ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ τὸ ξηρὸν καὶ ὑγρὸν καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα κατὰ 
μεσότητα ποιοῦσι σάρκα καὶ ὀστοῦν καὶ τἆλλα) (GC II 334b28-30)”  
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and I suggest that there is significant similarity between Aristotle’s “mean” here and the 
compounds or “equilibrial” states of modern physics and biology.    
I also note here that Rémi Brague explains that “time” is also a channelling 
through which “potentiality” unfolds itself through natural processes thereby enabling 
“actuality” to become concretised in the “now”, as follows:  
 
“The unity of the now is its unifying function ([Phys. II] 222a15).  It is devoid of its 
own unity, which it attains only by unifying what it is not.  By unifying that which is 
two, it passes into the two: the two becomes one, but the one passes into the two.  This 
pulsation of gathering and division constitutes time.  Time “advances” down the middle, 
through the present that simultaneously ejects the past and the future.  The “movement” 
of time is centrifugal226”  
 
and, ultimately, that: “…logos is…at the basis of movement, insofar as it is logos that 
the potential as such, whose entelechy is movement, manifests itself227”.  I suggest that 
we see that it is not only substance but also being itself – the “now” – that is a 
channelling of actuality (which arises from out of potentiality and then passes into 
history) and I add that we see this sustained and structured being through “logos” or 
“proportion” and that it exists by means of “nous”.  
As regards (4) the “mean” as energy and as form feeding through matter we find 
that Aristotle argues in his Parts of Animals (and from another perspective in the 
embryology of his Generation of Animals) that animals come-to-be through energy 
flowing through channels from a “centre” and hence we see that hot-blooded animals 
are produced when:  
 
“…the hot substance prevails in the body (ἡ γὰρ τοῦ θερμοῦ φύσις ἐνισχύουσα) it 
induces growth, beginning from the centre (ποιεῖ τὴν αὔξησιν ἀπο τοῦ μέσου) along its 
own line of travel (κατὰ τὴν αὑτῆς φοράν) (PA II 653a31-33)”  
 
and that cold-blooded animals are produced when:  
 
                                                 
226 Brague, Rémi “On Aristotle’s Formula ὅ ποτε ὄν: Physics IV.11, 14” in Claudia Baracchi 
(ed.) The Bloomsbury Companion to Aristotle (London, [orig. 1982] 2013) p 84 
  
227 Brague, Rémi Ibid. p 85 
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“…the principle of the soul (ἡ τῆς ψυχῆς ἀρχὴ) is sluggish and corporeal (δυσκίνητός 
ἐστι καὶ σωματώδης).  And if the heat which raises the organism up wanes still further, 
while the earthly matter waxes, then the animals’ bodies wane, and they will be many-
footed; and finally they lose their feet altogether and lie full length on the ground (PA 
IV 686b29-31)”  
 
(and hence we see that it is the strength or intensity of the line of energy shaping the 
matter which produces, in principle either a millipede or a snake) from which we see 
that Aristotle literally sees life coming-into-being and being shaped by the “principles” 
of channelled energy (or “heat” 228).  I add that Aristotle explores this literal channelling 
of energy in detail in his Generation of Animals and that an example of his thinking 
(and I note that this approach is effective throughout his study of embryos) here is as 
follows: 
 
“Genesis from seeds (ἥ τε γὰρ ἐκ τῶν σπερμάτων γένεσις) always starts from the 
middle (ἐκ τοῦ μέσου).  All seeds are bivalvular, and the place of juncture is situated at 
the point of attachment (to the plant), an intermediate part belonging to both halves.  It 
is from this part that both root and stem of growing things emerge; the starting-point is 
a central position between them (ἡ δ΄ ἀρχὴ τὸ μέσον αὐτῶν ἐστιν).  In the case of grafts 
and cuttings this is particularly true of the buds (Juv. 468b18-24)” 
 
which is a “branching out” model which Aristotle also interestingly uses for our own 
animal limbs, as follows: “…they use their joints like a centre (ὥσπερ γὰρ κέντρῳ), and 
the whole section containing the joint becomes both one and two (καὶ ἓν καὶ δύο), both 
straight and bent, changing potentially and actually (δυνάμει καὶ ἐνεργείᾳ) by reason of 
the joint (MA 698a18-21)”.  I suggest that Aristotle presents us with a picture of nature 
which is of principles logically and functionally branching out through the energy of a 
“mean” and through its movements through natural symmetries which are somehow 
                                                 
228 I note regarding “hotbloodedness” that it gives the animal the internal energy to allow it to be 
independently detached from its environment on a constant basis (apart from taking in food 
regularly) and that it is on this basis that hotbloodedness is a feature of the “higher” animals.  I 
add regarding this “energy” and regarding the “heat” of the blood that Aristotle argues that: 
“The nature of the blood is the cause of many features of animals with respect to both character 
and perception, as is reasonable (PA II 651a13-14)” which does surely seem like a reasonable 
and true observation regarding “heat” and “blood” and “bloodedness”.  
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grounded in the world (and I note that our logic also branches out in a comparable 
way)229.  
As regards (5) the “means” as a tool for our representation of the world which 
enables the relationship between a subject (e.g. an artist’s “vision”), a medium (e.g. 
shapes and colours), and an object (e.g. an artwork) we find that Aristotle argues in his 
Poetics, as follows:  
 
“Now, epic and tragic poetry, as well as comedy, dithyramb, and most music for aulos 
and lyre, are all, taken as a whole, kinds of mimesis.  But they differ from one another in 
three respects: namely, by producing mimesis in different media, of different objects, or 
in different modes (ἢ γὰρ τῷ ἐν ἑτέροις μιμεῖσθαι ἢ τῷ ἕτερα ἢ τῷ ἑτέρως καὶ μὴ τὸν 
αὐτὸν τρόπον).  Just as people (some by formal skill, others by a knack) use colours and 
shapes to render mimetic images of many things [i.e. as artists], while others again use 
the voice [i.e. as actors], so too all the poetic arts mentioned produce mimesis in rhythm 
[i.e. dance], language [i.e. poetry], and melody [i.e. music], whether separately or in 
combinations (Poet. 1447a13-22)” 
 
and with this “means” as “art” in some way becoming its own independent principle 
working through the medium of the artist or man, as follows: “…the genre’s own nature 
teaches poets to choose what is apt for it (αὐτὴ ἡ φύσιν διδάσκει τὸ ἁρμόττον αὐτῇ 
αἱρεῖσθαι) (Poet. 1460a3-4)” and having its own independent “end”, as follows: 
“…after going through many changes tragedy ceased to evolve, since it had achieved its 
own nature (ἐπαύσατο, ἐπεὶ ἔσχε τὴν αὑτῆς φύσιν) (Poet. 1449a13-15)”.  I add that 
Aristotle refers to “craft” as a medium which is suited to its material in his Ethics, as 
follows: “…every art [or form of understanding] (πᾶσα ἐπιστήμη) does its work well 
(τὸ ἔργον εὖ ἐπιτελεῖ) – by looking to the intermediate (πρὸς τὸ μέσον) and judging its 
works by this standard (so that we often say of works of art that it is not possible either 
to take away or to add anything, implying that excess and defect destroy the goodness 
of works of art, while the mean preserves it; and good artists (οἱ ἀγαθοὶ τεχνῖται), as we 
                                                 
229 I make note of Aristotle’s willingness to move from study of physical facts to the theoretical 
consideration of the cosmos itself, as follows: “Any quality of rest…in an animal is of no effect 
unless there is absolutely at rest and immovable.  And it is worth while to stop and consider this 
dictum; for the reflection which it involves applies not merely to animals, but also to the motion 
and progression of the universe (MA 698b8-13)” 
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say, look to this in their work) (N.E. II 1106b8-14)” which shows us Aristotle’s 
assertion that we follow the principles of nature in our attempts at artistic creation230.  
I note that Aristotle maintains that even our actions and creations – such as 
computers, cars etc. – which clearly add to and build upon nature imitate the principles 
of nature and as regards (6) the “mean” as a “middle” in our thinking we find that 
Aristotle argues in his logical works that: “…proof must proceed through a middle term 
(ἀνάγκη γὰρ διὰ τοῦ μέσου δεῖξαι) (Post. An. II 92a11)” and that: 
 
“Some things have a cause distinct from themselves, and other have not.  Thus it is clear 
that of essences too some are immediate (ἄμεσα); i.e. they are first principles, and both 
their existence and their definition have to be assumed or exhibited in some other way.  
(This is what an arithmetician does: he assumes both what a unit is, and that it exists.)  
As for things which have a middle term (τῶν δ' ἐχόντων μέσον), i.e. something distinct 
from themselves which is a cause of their being (καὶ ὧν ἔστι τι ἕτερον αἴτιον τῆς 
οὐσίας), it is possible (as we have said) to exhibit their essence by demonstration, 
although we do not actually demonstrate it (Post. An. II 93b22-28)” 
 
from which we see that Aristotle believes that we can only reveal “first principles” by 
unpacking worldly phenomena and processes through the consideration of worldly 
objects which possess “middles” and by means of which we can see “first principles” at 
work.  I add that we follow nature in the sense that the “middle” of our logic or of our 
(scientific) demonstration must map back to reality and follow its course (which is 
clearly not meaningfully random) on the basis that:  
 
“A middle is that which both follows a preceding event and has further consequences 
(Poet. 1450b30-31)”   
 
and with the cause-and-effect of the “middle” (taking place in the “interval”) merely, for 
Aristotle, showing us the structured and meaningful nature of nature which we also see 
in nature immediately and in an unmediated manner, i.e. as ἄμεσα or “first principles”, 
as follows:  
 
                                                 
230 See Francis Wolff’s “The Three Pleasures of Mimēsis According to Aristotle’s Poetics” in 
Bernadette Bensaude-Vincent & William R. Newman (eds.) The Artificial and the Natural: An 
Evolving Polarity (Cambridge Mass., 2007) 
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“…the question suggests itself whether, as is commonly supposed, events which do not 
occur simultaneously in continuous time can be related as cause and effect (ἐπὶ δὲ τῶν 
μὴ ἅμα ἆρ' ἔστιν ἐν τῷ συνεχεῖ χρόνῳ) – a past effect having a cause in the remoter 
past, a future effect a cause in the nearer future, and a present effect too a cause prior to 
it?...The interval between cause and effect can neither be indefinite nor definite (ἔτι 
οὔτε ἀόριστον ἐνδέχεται εἶναι τὸν χρόνον τὸν μεταξὺ οὔθ' ὡρισμένον); because during 
the interval it will be false to assert the effect (ψεῦδος γὰρ ἔσται τὸ εἰπεῖν ἐν τῷ 
μεταξύ).  We must investigate what is the bond of continuity that makes a present 
process follow the completion of a past event (ἐπισκεπτέον δὲ τί τὸ συνέχον ὥστε μετὰ 
τὸ γεγονέναι τὸ γίνεσθαι ὑπάρχειν ἐν τοῖς πράγμασιν) (Post. An. II 95a24-95b4)”   
 
and I note that it is interesting to see how close Aristotle’s unmediated principles or 
“first principles” are to Plato’s Forms (and to our scientific laws).  I ultimately suggest 
that Aristotle’s reason for holding on to the mess of our “limited” thinking and of our 
“entangled” sublunary world is simply that he recognises that even if we can infer the 
existence of immediate “first principles” we must accept and recognise that we live in a 
real world of human limitedness and worldly mess.  I suggest that Aristotle simply 
accepts that our worldly mess (for want of a better word) is the necessary possibility 
within which our human personality, creativity, and individuality is shaped and exists 
and therefore should not without very good reason be reduced to or dismissed through 
formal abstractions231.   
 Finally, as regards (7) the “mean” as the sublunary entanglement we find in the 
world we see that it is explained by Aristotle in his Metaphysics as that: 
 
“By intermediates we mean those things into which that which changes must first 
change (μεταξὺ μὲν γὰρ ταῦτα λέγομεν εἰς ὅσα μεταβάλλειν ἀνάγκη πρότερον τὸ 
μεταβάλλον) (Met. I 1057a21-22)” 
 
and that: “…all intermediates are between certain opposites, for it is only from these per 
se that change is possible (ἀλλὰ μὴν πάντα γε τὰ μεταξύ ἐστιν ἀντικειμένων τινῶν: ἐκ 
τούτων γὰρ μόνων καθ᾽ αὑτὰ ἔστι μεταβάλλειν).  Hence there can be no intermediate 
between things which are not opposites (διὸ ἀδύνατον εἶναι μεταξὺ μὴ ἀντικειμένων: 
                                                 
231 I note the appearance here in the context of cause-and-effect of Aristotle’s “principle of non-
contradiction” and suggest that Aristotle recognises the importance of leaving room for 
“creativity” and I note that Paul Feyerabend wisely defines “creativity” as being a 
“…secularised version…[of] the divine element (“Aristotle” in Conquest of Abundance: A Tale 
of Abstraction versus the Richness of Being (Chicago, 1999) p 218).” 
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εἴη γὰρ ἂν μεταβολὴ καὶ μὴ ἐξ ἀντικειμένων) (Met. I 1057a30-33)” which emphasises 
that nature is structured and changes in a structured manner in phases (or “states”) from 
something to something in the sense that: “…everything that changes is something and 
is changed by something and into something (πᾶν γὰρ μεταβάλλει τὶ καὶ ὑπό τινος καὶ 
εἴς τι) (Met. Λ 1069b36-1070a1)” and I add Aristotle’s further thought that:  
 
“…a thing is potentially all those things which it will be of itself if nothing external 
hinders it (καὶ ὅσων δὴ ἐν αὐτῷ τῷ ἔχοντι, ὅσα μηθενὸς τῶν ἔξωθεν ἐμποδίζοντος ἔσται 
δι᾽ αὐτοῦ (Met. Θ 1049a13)”  
 
and that: “…nature also is in the same genus as potency; for it is the principle of 
movement – not, however, in something else but in the thing itself qua itself (καὶ γὰρ ἡ 
φύσις ἐν ταὐτῷ γίγνεται: ἐν ταὐτῷ γὰρ γένει τῇ δυνάμει: ἀρχὴ γὰρ κινητική, ἀλλ᾽ οὐκ ἐν 
ἄλλῳ ἀλλ᾽ ἐν αὐτῷ ᾗ αὐτό) (Met. Θ 1049b8-10)” (cf. De An. II 417a27-8) which shows 
us how an organism is itself a moving force or being which can be understood as being 
a “moving principle” (which is itself a “mean”).    
Ultimately, then, I suggest that we see (A) that the “mean” is the dynamic 
movement of a “principle” or a “being” or “substance” finding its “right” path through 
the “medium” of the world and through matter and with Aristotle’s world being one of 
living principles seeking to realise themselves rather than being a world of inert matter 
happening to interact and (B) that Aristotle’s approach both recognises our practical 
limitations in the sense that  he argues that: “…it must be grasped that in every 
continuum that is divisible there is excess and deficiency and a mean, and these either in 
relation to one another or in relation to us (ληπτέον ὅτι ἐν ἅπαντι συνεχεῖ καὶ διαιρετῷ 
ἐστιν ὑπεροχὴ καὶ ἔλλειψις καὶ μέσον, καὶ ταῦτα ἢ πρὸς ἄλληλα ἢ πρὸς ἡμᾶς) (E.E. II 
1220b21-24)” and also recognises our spiritual possibility in the sense that he argues 
that we can discern both in reality and in principle that:  
 
“…reason in each of its possessors chooses what is best for itself, and the good man 
obeys his reason (πᾶς γὰρ νοῦς αἱρεῖται τὸ βέλτιστον ἑαυτῷ, ὁ δ᾽ ἐπιεικὴς πειθαρχεῖ τῷ 
νῷ) (N.E. IX 1169a17-18)”  
 
and with this “reason” or “nous” actually being the “channel” or “mean” through which 
beings become and are sustained and through which we can see “meaning”, “good”, 
“God” etc., and this is the space or zone the mystic Meister Eckhart describes as a 
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“…silent “middle”, for no creature ever entered there and no image” and which Arthur 
J. Deikman describes as “awareness” or “pure consciousness232”. 
As regards how Aristotle’s “mean” resonates in sensitive modern thinking I note 
that Aldous Huxley uses a concept of “canalisation” philosophically as follows:  
 
“Habits of behaviour facilitate activity in one particular direction – canalising it, so to 
speak, in a certain channel.  In the same way habits of thought canalise thinking, scoop 
out a course along which it must flow, unless more or less violently deviated233”  
 
and that Carl Jung argues (by reference to Aristotle’s “ὁρμή”) that: “The damming up of 
libido is analogous to a specific obstruction in the direction of the flow, such as a dike, 
which transforms the kinetic energy of the flow into the potential energy of a reservoir.  
Thus damned back, the water is forced into another channel, if as a result of the 
damming it reaches a level that permits it to flow off in another direction234” and that:  
 
“Libido moves not only forward and backward, but also outwards and inwards235”  
 
and he argues in his sub-chapter “The Canalisation of Libido” that “man” has an 
additional energy (an “excess of libido”) which pushes him to detach himself from 
nature and hence: “…man can never rest content with the natural course of things, 
because he always has an excess of libido that can be offered a more favourable 
                                                 
232 Deikman, Arthur J. “I=Awareness” in Journal of Consciousness Studies (1996) 
 
233 Huxley, Aldous “Varieties of Intelligence” in Proper Studies (London, 1927) p 69 
 
234 Jung, Carl “On Psychic Energy” in The Structure and Dynamics of the Psyche (London, 
[orig. 1928] 1960) p 38 
 
235 Jung, Carl Ibid. p 41.  (Cf. “…no sooner are one or two of the channels of psychic activity 
blocked, than we are reminded of a stream that is damned up.  The current flows backward to its 
source; the inner man wants something which the visible man does not want, and we are at war 
with ourselves.  Only then, in this distress, do we discover the psyche; or, more precisely, we 
come upon something which thwarts our will, which is strange and even hostile to us, or which 
is incompatible with our conscious standpoint…No psychic value can disappear without being 
replaced by another of equivalent intensity.  This is a rule which finds its pragmatic sanction in 
the daily practice of the psychotherapist; it is repeatedly verified and never fails (“The Spiritual 
Problem of Modern Man” in Modern Man in Search of a Soul (London, [orig. 1933] 1961) p 
233 & 242)”)   
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gradient than the merely natural one236”.  I add that Jung argues further that “nature” is 
to some extent a “pathway” in the sense that: “…every child is born with an immense 
split in his make-up: on the one side he is more or less like an animal, on the other side 
he is the final embodiment of an age-old and endlessly complicated sum of hereditary 
factors…Although our inheritance consists of psychological paths, it was nevertheless 
mental processes in our ancestors that traced these paths237” and that “sex” and 
reproduction is the founding “pathway” of human being in the sense that: “…sexuality 
has an ancient claim upon the spirit, which it once – in procreation, pregnancy, birth, 
and childhood – contained within itself, and whose passion the spirit can never dispense 
with in its creations238”. 
I add from a different perspective that Janna Hastings et al. have sought to 
rehabilitate “pathways” as biological and ontological facts of nature on the basis that:  
 
“Pathways form the units of meaningful knowledge into which many aspects of 
biological research are conducted…Complex pathways can be defined as aggregations 
of simpler pathways, which should at least consist of several reactions organised into a 
coherent whole by virtue of fulfilling some biological objective239”  
 
and that this process is dynamic and energy dependent – and is effectively “active” 
rather than “passive” – on the basis that: “Understanding the rates of processes is crucial 
to adequate modelling, as fast processes can dominate a system even if the number of 
                                                 
236 Jung, Carl Ibid. p 49.  I note that Jung argues elsewhere that human “will” is “disposable 
energy” (The Earth Has a Soul: C.G. Jung on Nature, Technology & Modern Life (Berkeley, 
2002) p 94). 
 
237 Jung, Carl Ibid. p 51-3 
 
238 Jung, Carl Ibid. p 57.  I note that Jung argues contra Freud on sex that: “Surely, straight 
thinking will grant that it is more important to open up drainage canals.  We should try to find, 
in a change of attitude or in new ways of life, that difference of potential which the pent-up 
energy requires.  If this is not achieved a vicious circle is set up, and this is in fact the menace 
which Freudian psychology appears to offer.  It points no way that leads beyond the inexorable 
cycle of biological events (“Freud and Jung – Contrasts” in Modern Man in Search of a Soul 
(London, [orig. 1933] 1961) p 139)” (see also Sigmund Freud’s Three Essays on the Theory of 
Sexuality (London, [orig. 1905] 1949)). 
 
239 Hastings, Janna et al., “Collective bio-molecular processes: The hidden ontology of systems 
biology” in eds. Anthony Galton & Zena Wood Understanding and Modelling Collective 
Phenomena (online, 2012) p 3-4 
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participating molecules in the process is small240”.   I suggest that once we throw off the 
artificial philosophical constraints of Francis Bacon and René Descartes’ supposed 
scientific methods which, as Gottfried Leibniz notes, are: “…like the precepts of some 
chemist; take what you need and do what you should, and you will get what you 
want241” we should be able to appreciate that: “The assumption of pure extension 
destroys the whole of this wonderful variety [of nature]; mass alone (if it were possible 
to conceive of it) is as much inferior to a substance which is perceptive and a 
representation of the whole universe according to its point of view and the impressions 
(or rather relationships) which its body receives mediately or immediately from all 
others, as a corpse is inferior to an animal or rather as a machine is to a man242”.  I 
suggest that Michel Foucault is correct to see a movement from “memory” through 
“meditation” to “method”243 and I express the hope that the subtlety and close attention 
to the world of modern science as represented in the fields of quantum physics and 
epigenetic biology will ultimately allow Aristotle and Leibniz’s philosophical positions 














                                                 
240 Hastings, Janna et al. Ibid. p 3.  See also Gregory Bateson’s “A Reexamination of “Bateson’s 
Rule”” in Steps to an Ecology of Mind (New York, 1972). 
 
241 Gottfried, Leibniz “Untitled Essay” in Die philosophischen Schriften (ed.) C.I. Gerhardt IV 
(Berlin, 1875-90) 329 (and see also Descartes’ four rules from his Discourse on the Method § 
18-19, CSM I p. 120) 
 
242 Leibniz, Gottfried The Leibniz-Arnaud Correspondence (Manchester, 1967) p 123 
 




14 Aristotle on Proportion 
 
 We have seen, then, that for Aristotle a principle is a “mean” moving though 
space and time continuously, that it has a “symmetry” which makes the direction for the 
movement possible, and with the movement having a “prior” and “posterior”.  I add that 
we also see that a structured being has a “proportion” which is effectively a dynamic 
extention of the principle of “symmetry” and which Aristotle explains as follows:  
 
“…of all things naturally composed there is a limit or proportion of size and growth; 
this is due to soul, not to fire, and to the essential formula rather than to matter (τῶν δὲ 
φύσει συνισταμένων πάντων ἔστι πέρας καὶ λόγος μεγέθους τε καὶ αὐξήσεως· ταῦτα δὲ 
ψυχῆς, ἀλλ' οὐ πυρός, καὶ λόγου μᾶλλον ἢ ὕλης) (De An. II 416a17-18)” 
 
and with Aristotle adding elsewhere in another context that: “…due proportion (τὸ 
πρέπον) consists in contraction and amplification as the subject requires (Rhet. III 
1404b15-16)”.  I comment that we can clearly see from the glossary at the back of this 
work – which may be specifically Aristotelian but which is also clearly based upon and 
derived from Greek language and culture – how rich, how different, and how physical 
and immediate the Greek view of the world and vocabulary for the world is.  I suggest 
that a good example of this physicality of language is “μέθοδος” which means literally 
“through a path” and that a good example of the richness of language is “λόγος” which 
means speech, language, account, word, thought, reason and bringing these definitions 
together “that by which the inward thought is expressed”.   I add in respect to how this 
thought engages with the world that we find that “λόγος” means “ratio”, due relation, 
and proportion and I suggest that the contrary of this richness of language is the 
“nominalism” which regards words as “names” or “labels” and I therefore suggest that 
in exploring Aristotle’s thought we are actually exploring the expression of the richness 
of the Greek language and culture and, by contrast, the flattened nature (to some degree) 
of our own. 
 Ultimately, then, I suggest that we see here and throughout a contrast between 
our thinking as typified by René Descartes, as follows: 
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“…a man who walks across a room shows much better what motion is than a man who 
says “It is the actuality of a potential being in so far as it is potential”, and so on244” 
 
which is in (explicitly) direct contrast with Aristotle’s thinking, as follows: 
 
“…it must be grasped that in every continuum that is divisible there is excess and 
deficiency and a mean, and these either in relation to one another or in relation to us 
(ληπτέον ὅτι ἐν ἅπαντι συνεχεῖ καὶ διαιρετῷ ἐστιν ὑπεροχὴ καὶ ἔλλειψις καὶ μέσον, καὶ 
ταῦτα ἢ πρὸς ἄλληλα ἢ πρὸς ἡμᾶς) (E.E. II 1220b21-24)”245 
 
and with proportionality as a quality which enables analogy being explained as follows: 
 
“This proportion is not continuous (ἔστι δ᾽ οὐ συνεχὴς αὕτη ἡ ἀναλογία); for we cannot 
get a single term standing for a person and a thing (οὐ γὰρ γίνεται εἷς ἀριθμῷ ὅρος, ᾧ 
καὶ ὅ) (N.E. V 1131b14-15)” 
 
and I note that the stress upon “continuity” here shows us that we are not in this instance 
considering “moving principles” but are rather considering objects which have the 
capacity to act at a distance across space with other objects and through other “objects”.  
In other words, I suggest that when we are talking about “proportion” here we are not 
just talking about the proportions of physical and organic objects themselves but also 
about the proportions of all the various forces and conceptual “objects” such as love, 
desire, thought, justice, functionality etc. which enable some physical objects such as 
human beings to engage with other objects, e.g. other human beings, animals, stones 
etc. in the world.   
In respect to human affairs we find that Aristotle represents this basic principle 
of proportionality as being (ideally) reflected in friendship and also in economic 
exchange, as follows:  
 
“In all friendships between dissimilars it is, as we have said, proportion that equalises 
the parties and preserves the friendship (τὸ ἀνάλογον ἰσάζει καὶ σῴζει τὴν φιλίαν); e.g. 
in the political form of friendship the shoemaker gets a return for his shoes in 
                                                 
244 Descartes, René “Letter To Mersenne 16th October 1639”, CSM III §597 p 139 
 
245 Cf. “The just necessarily involves at least four terms.  Indeed, there are two people involved 
in a just relation, and two aspects under which a relation is termed just (N.E. V 1131a18-20)” 
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proportion to his worth, and the weaver and all other craftsmen do the same.  Now here 
a common measure has been provided in the form of money (N.E. IX 1163b32-
1164a1)”  
 
(and Aristotle also refers to business partnerships at N.E. V 1131b30 and see also E.E. 
VII 1242b) and regarding ethics Aristotle argues that “values” are proportional to the 
“good man” in the sense that:  
 
“…virtue and the good man seem, as has been said, to be the measure of every class of 
thing (μέτρον ἑκάστων ἡ ἀρετὴ καὶ ὁ σπουδαῖος εἶναι) (N.E. IX 1166a12-13)”   
 
and I add that “justice” provides Aristotle with a paradigmatic example of a situation in 
which proportionality is observed and (explicitly and artificially) acted out, as follows:  
 
“The just…is a species of the proportionate (ἔστιν ἄρα τὸ δίκαιον ἀνάλογόν τι) 
(proportion being not a property only of the kind of number which consists in abstract 
units, but of number in general (τὸ γὰρ ἀνάλογον οὐ μόνον ἐστὶ μοναδικοῦ ἀριθμοῦ 
ἴδιον, ἀλλ᾽ ὅλως ἀριθμοῦ)).  For proportion is equality of ratios, and involves four terms 
at least (ἡ γὰρ ἀναλογία ἰσότης ἐστὶ λόγων, καὶ ἐν τέτταρσιν ἐλαχίστοις) (N.E. V 
1131a29-32)”  
 
and we see, further, that: “…for the persons for whom it is in fact just are two, and the 
things in which it is manifested, the objects distributed, are two.  And the same equality 
will exist between the persons and between the things concerned (N.E. V 1131a19-21)”.  
I comment that Aristotle’s full position here is that there are various “substantive” 
objects – i.e. the judge, the plaintiff, the claimant, the (current) written law, and the 
(historical) customary law – at play and that these “substances” have a generic 
relationship in which they are constantly changing and interacting.  As regards the 
philosophical significance of this account I comment that if we accept with Aristotle 
that “justice” is not (only) a mechanism but a real interaction between parties and forces 
in a given place and circumstance then it clearly follows that our world is not flat and 
transactional but is, rather, a suspended reality which is infused with meaningfulness 
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(and see my Aristotle on the Meaning of Man esp. p xxxiii-xxxix for further 
discussion)246. 
 As regards the “proportion” of “forces” I add that we find  that “love” and 
“reason” and many other “forces” in the world are structured in such a way that they act 
at distance in a proportionate manner.  Regarding “reason” and “mind” (and “memory”) 
we see that: 
 
“…the mind (τὴν διάνοιαν) does not think of large things at a distance by stretching out 
to them, as some think that vision operates (for the mind will think of them equally if 
they are not there), but one thinks of them by a proportionate mental impulse (ἀλλὰ τῇ 
ἀνάλογον κινήσει); for there are similar figures and movements in the mind (ἔστι γὰρ ἐν 
αὐτῇ τὰ ὅμοια σχήματα καὶ κινήσεις)…all internal things are smaller, and as it were, 
proportionate to those outside (πάντα γὰρ τὰ ἐντὸς ἐλάττω͵ καὶ ἀνὰλόγον [καὶ τὰ 
ἐκτός]).  Perhaps, just as we may suppose that there is something in man proportionate 
to the forms (ἔστι δ΄ ἴσως ὥσπερ καὶ τοῖς εἴδεσιν ἀνάλογον λαβεῖν ἄλλο ἐν αὑτῷ), we 
may assume that there is something similarly proportionate to their distances.  E.g. if 
one experiences the impulses AB, BE, he can imagine CD; for AC and CD are in the 
same ratio as AB: BE (Mem. 452b9-19)”  
 
and as regards “mind” being a chanelling of being or “measure” in the world we find 
that: “…mind thinks itself (αὑτὸν νοεῖ ὁ νοῦς) by sharing in the object of thought (κατὰ 
μετάληψιν τοῦ νοητοῦ), for it becomes an object of thought by coming into contact with 
and thinking its objects (νοητὸς γὰρ γίγνεται θιγγάνων καὶ νοῶν), so that mind and the 
object of thought are the same (ταὐτὸν νοῦς καὶ νοητόν).  For the mind is that which is 
capable of receiving the object of thought (τὸ γὰρ δεκτικὸν τοῦ νοητοῦ), i.e. the essence 
(καὶ τῆς οὐσίας νοῦς); and it is active when it possesses the object (ἐνεργεῖ δὲ ἔχων) 
(Met. Λ 1072b19-24)”.   
 I add that we also find that Aristotle’s “love” also acts at a distance in a 
proportionate manner in the sense that:  
 
“Let loving, then, be defined as wishing for anyone the things which we believe to be 
good, for his sake but not our own, and procuring them for him as far as lies in our 
power.  A friend is one who loves and is loved in return, and those who think their 
                                                 
246 On justice see Carlo Natali’s “The search for definitions of justice in Nicomachean Ethics 5” 
in Devin Henry and Karen Margrethe Nielsen (eds.) Bridging the Gap between Aristotle’s 
Science and Ethics (Cambridge, 2015) 
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relationship is of this character consider themselves friends.  This being granted, it 
necessarily follows that he is a friend who shares our joy in good fortune and our 
sorrow in affliction, for our own sake and not for any other reason…those are friends 
who have the same ideas of good and bad, and love and hate the same persons, since 
they necessarily wish the same things; wherefore one who wishes for another what he 
wishes for himself seems to be the other’s friend (Rhet. II1380b36-1381a20)”  
 
and as regards the expending of energy on something due to the intensity and 
proportionality of a relationship we find Aristotle’s thoughts on the “philoprogenitive 
instinct” as an investment of care and attention by parents at E.E. I 1241a-b.  I add that 
Aristotle relates this “relationship” between objects to the human “sense” of “touch” 
and hence argues that: ...if anything causes motion without being itself moved, it might 
touch that which is moved, though not itself touched by anything; for we say sometimes 
that a man who grieves us “touches” us, though we ourselves do not “touch” him.  So 
much for our definition of contact in the realm of Nature (GC I 323a32-35)” from which 
we see how the example of our physical relationship with the world informs Aristotle’s 
thinking about our mental and emotional engagement with the world and also regarding 
the nature of a world which enables that engagement to take place. 
 I suggest that we can see this account as being Aristotle’s response to Plato’s 
“third man” which retains the ideas of “forms” and of a metaphysical reality but which 
also holds onto the physical and real world around us and hence, as Aryeh Kosman 
correctly explains, we see that:  
 
“In none of these teachings does the individual subject disappear; whether in friendship, 
polity, or contemplation, the self is enhanced by incorporation, not diminished247”  
 
and with G.W.F. Hegel correctly explaining the value of Aristotle’s perspective as a 
whole, as follows: 
 
“He [i.e. Aristotle] gets the sensuous phenomenon before him in its entire completeness, 
and omits nothing, be it ever so common.  All sides of knowing enter his mind, all 
interest him; all are handled by him with depth and exhaustiveness…[and] Aristotle… 
abandons a determination only when he has traced it to another sphere wherein it retains 
                                                 
247 Kosman, Aryeh “Aristotle on the Desirability of Friends” in Virtues of Thought: Essays on 
Plato and Aristotle (Cambridge Mass., [orig. 2004] 2014) p 182 
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no longer its former shape…[and] sometimes Aristotle does not aim to reduce all to 
unity, or at least to a unity of antithetic elements; but, on the contrary, to hold fast each 
one in its determinateness, and thus to preserve it248” 
 
from which we see that the depth and richness of Greek thinking, and of Aristotle’s 
thinking, allows Aristotle to both see the whole and investigate the detail and, 
ultimately, we see that Aristotle does not lose sight of the “whole”, of the “form”, and 
of the “individual”.  Generally, then, I stress that Aristotle never loses sight of the fact 
that an “ousia” is both a generic something (a such) and an individual being (a this) and 
I suggest that this emphasis on determinate being(s) acting in the world places him in 
direct conflict with a modern (positivistic) emphasis upon accounting for the natural 


















                                                 
248 Hegel, G.W.F. “The Philosophy of Aristotle” The Journal of Speculative Philosophy ([orig. 
1825-6]1871) p 73-75) (and for an interesting modern account of “objective” rather than 
“propositional” reality see Colin McGinn’s “Consciousness as Knowledge” in The Monist 
(2008)).   
 
249 On the flexibility of ancient thought generally – and the excessive literalness of our own – 
see especially Pierre Duhem’s To Save the Phenomena: An Essay on the Idea of Physical 




15 Aristotle on the Soul 
 
Let us now consider that all of the aspects of humanity we have hitherto 
considered up to this point are covered by Aristotle’s single concept of “soul” which is 
as follows: 
 
“The capacities [of the soul] we mentioned were: the nutritive faculty, the perceptual 
faculty, the desiderative faculty, the faculty of motion with respect to place, and the 
faculty of understanding (De An. II 414a29-33)” 
 
and which is explained by Richard Sorabji as follows: 
 
“…the soul [should be thought of] as a set of capacities.  The conception does, 
incidentally, have one great advantage, namely that we undeniably have a soul of the 
kind Aristotle describes.  At least, we have a soul, if this means that we have a capacity 
to grow, perceive and think.  But it must be admitted that Aristotle sometimes adds the 
difficult idea that we have a capacity to perceive and grow which explains our 
perceiving and growing250” 
 
and by Alan Code and Julius Moravcsik as follows:  
 
“…Aristotle views the soul as both (i) structures in the living body (De An. II 424b1-3) 
and (ii) ensuing powers (e.g. De An. II 413a25-8).  This way of taking the notion of the 
soul as the “form” of the living body seems strange only to those who think of “form” 
as necessarily to be analysed in terms of universals or properties of the sort familiar to 
us from the philosophies of Moore and Russell.  However, if one considers the proposal 
from within a biological context, then the identification seems quite natural.  There 
must be something in the organism that makes certain kinds of growth and development 
possible, and this is linked also to certain powers and potentialities that the actual 
processes realise251”  
 
                                                 
250 Sorabji, Richard “Body and Soul in Aristotle” in Philosophy (1974) p 65 
 
251 Code, Alan and Moravcsik, Julius “Explaining Various Forms of Living” in Martha 
Nussbaum & Amélie O. Rorty (eds.) Essays on Aristotle’s De Anima (Oxford, 1992) p 133 
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from which we can see that Aristotle does not regard soul as a synonym of mind and he 
does not strongly differentiate physical body from ethereal soul since soul is the 
working principles and faculties of the body and with Aristotle’s own basic position 
being that: “...the movement does not take place in the soul, but sometimes penetrates to 
it, and sometimes starts from it.  For instance perception starts from particular objects 
and reaches the soul (οἷον ἡ μὲν αἴσθησις ἀπὸ τωνδί); recollection starts from the soul 
and extends to the movements or resting points in the sense organs (ἡ δ' ἀνάμνησις ἀπ' 
ἐκείνης ἐπὶ τὰς ἐν τοῖς αἰσθητηρίοις κινήσεις ἢ μονάς) (De An. I 408b16-19)”252.  In 
other words, we see that Aristotle’s basic principle of the “soul” is that it is something 
which can receive the movements from worldly objects and apply its own movements to 
the world253. 
Having seen that Aristotle’s soul and body go hand in hand let us now consider 
William Heinaman’s observation that all “activities” are of the soul rather than of the 
body, as follows: 
 
“Not only do activities occur in souls, they occur only in souls.  This claim receives 
support from the examples listed by Aristotle which are all psychic occurrences: 
thinking, perceiving, living well, pleasure.  And the clear implication of N.E. 1173b7-13 
is that the soul is the subject even of activities that are bodily pleasures254” 
 
and with Aristotle himself explaining knowledge (of something) as being an “activity” 
of the “soul”, as follows:  
 
                                                 
252 Cf. “Since the exercise of sense-perception does not belong exclusively either to soul or to 
body (ἐπεὶ δὲ οὔτε τῆς ψυχῆς ἴδιον τὸ αἰσθάνεσθαι οὔτε τοῦ σώματος) (for a potentiality and its 
actuality reside in the same subject; and what we call sensation, as actuality, is a movement of 
the soul through the agency of the body (οὗ γὰρ ἡ δύναμις͵ τούτου καὶ ἡ ἐνέργεια· ἡ δὲ 
λεγομένη αἴσθησις ὡς ἐνέργεια κίνησίς τις διὰ τοῦ σώματος τῆς ψυχῆς ἐστι)), it is clear that the 
affection is not peculiar to the soul, nor is a body without soul capable of sensation (φανερὸν ὡς 
οὔτε τῆς ψυχῆς τὸ πάθος ἴδιον͵ οὔτ΄ ἄψυχον σῶμα δυνατὸν αἰσθάνεσθαι) (Somn. 454a8-12)” 
 
253 I note that Aristotle’s soul represents the various structures of personhood and is not 
equivalent to the Christian concept of “spirit” which is concerned with the individual spark of 
human personality and shapes itself accordingly, as Robert Pasnau explains, as follows: “For the 
human soul to be immortal, it must evidently be capable of existence apart from the body, 
inasmuch as the human body does not ordinarily survive death (“Mind and Hylomorphism” in J. 
Marenbon (ed.) The Oxford Handbook of Medieval Philosophy (Oxford, 2012) p 497)” 
 
254 Heinaman, William “Aristotle and the Mind-Body Problem” in Phronesis (1990) p 94 
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“…“knowledge” is said to be of the “knowable,” but is a “state” or “disposition” not of 
the “knowable” but of the “soul” (ἡ γὰρ ἐπιστήμη ἐπιστητοῦ λέγεται, ἕξις δὲ καὶ 
διάθεσις οὐκ ἐπιστητοῦ ἀλλὰ ψυχῆς) (Top. IV 124b34-35)”  
 
and with Aristotle explaining how “virtues” arise from out of the various “parts” of the 
soul as “good” arises in nature generally, as follows: 
 
“…the [soul] has two parts (δύο μέρη τῆς ψυχῆς), and the virtues are divided between 
them (καὶ αἱ ἀρεταὶ κατὰ ταῦτα διῄρηνται), one set being those of the rational part (τοῦ 
λόγον ἔχοντος), intellectual virtues, whose work is true (ὧν ἔργον ἀλήθεια), whether 
about the nature of a thing or about its mode of production, while the other set belongs 
to the part that is irrational but possesses appetition (αἱ δὲ τοῦ ἀλόγου, ἔχοντος δ᾽ 
ὄρεξιν) (E.E. II 1221b28-32)” 
 
from which we see that the relationship between body and soul for Aristotle is holistic 
in the sense that Christopher Shields explains, as follows: “…the body would not so 
much as be a body without its being directed towards the soul which is its actuality255” 
and also that the soul itself is structured in a certain way as to reveal its functioning, the 
functioning of the body, the functioning of the being itself, and the functioning of being 
itself through human knowledge of it. 
We see, then, that Aristotle does distinguish “body” and “soul” (and also 
“mind”) but that he always seeks to see them as a unified and meaningful whole.  In 
respect to how this project is reflected in Aristotle’s work we see particularly that the 
“parts” of the body are philosophically analysed in Aristotle’s On the Parts of Animals 
and that the “parts” of the soul are philosophically analysed in his De Anima.  As 
regards the particular importance of the human body and of the human soul I suggest 
that we follow A.N. Whitehead’s thought that: “Mankind is that factor in Nature which 
exhibits in its most intense form the plasticity of nature256” and see that Aristotle 
similarly argues that the (human) soul is important because “…in a sense the soul is all 
existing things”, as follows:  
 
                                                 
255 Shields, Christopher “The Priority of Soul in Aristotle’s De Anima: Mistaking Categories?” 
in D. Frede & B. Reis (eds.) Body and Soul in Ancient Philosophy (Hamburg, 2009) p 281 
 
256 Whitehead, A.N. Adventures of Ideas (Harmondsworth, 1933) p 98 
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 “…summing up what we have said about the soul, let us assert once more that in a 
sense the soul is all existing things (ἡ ψυχὴ τὰ ὄντα πώς ἐστι πάντα).  What exists is 
either sensible or intelligible; and in a sense knowledge is the knowable and sensation 
the sensible (ἢ γὰρ αἰσθητὰ τὰ ὄντα ἢ νοητά, ἔστι δ' ἡ ἐπιστήμη μὲν τὰ ἐπιστητά πως, ἡ 
δ' αἴσθησις τὰ αἰσθητά).  We must consider in what sense this is so.  Both knowledge 
and sensation are divided to correspond to their objects, the potential to the potential, 
and the actual to the actual (τέμνεται οὖν ἡ ἐπιστήμη καὶ ἡ αἴσθησις εἰς τὰ πράγματα, ἡ 
μὲν δυνάμει εἰς τὰ δυνάμει, ἡ δ' ἐντελεχείᾳ εἰς τὰ ἐντελεχείᾳ).  The sensitive and 
cognitive faculties of the soul are potentially these objects, viz., the sensible and the 
knowable (τῆς δὲ ψυχῆς τὸ αἰσθητικὸν καὶ τὸ ἐπιστημονικὸν δυνάμει ταὐτά ἐστι, τὸ μὲν 
<τὸ> ἐπιστητὸν τὸ δὲ <τὸ> αἰσθητόν).  These faculties, then, must be identical either 
with the objects themselves or with their forms.  Now they are not identical with the 
objects; for the stone does not exist in the soul, but only the form of the soul (ἀνάγκη δ' 
ἢ αὐτὰ ἢ τὰ εἴδη εἶναι. αὐτὰ μὲν δὴ οὔ· οὐ γὰρ ὁ λίθος ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ, ἀλλὰ τὸ εἶδος).  The 
soul, then, acts like a hand; for the hand is an instrument which employs instruments, 
and in the same way the mind is a form which employs the forms of sensible objects 
(ὥστε ἡ ψυχὴ ὥσπερ ἡ χείρ ἐστιν· καὶ γὰρ ἡ χεὶρ ὄργανόν ἐστιν ὀργάνων, καὶ ὁ νοῦς 
εἶδος εἰδῶν καὶ ἡ αἴσθησις εἶδος αἰσθητῶν) (De An. III 431b20-432a3)” 
 
from which we see that the importance of the soul for Aristotle is that it is a nexus of 
being which mirrors the world both in respect to replicating its structuring but also in 
showing us how different things relate to and engage with each other.  I note that the 
parallelism between the human soul and the human hand is significant since it 
emphasises the peculiar subtlety and plasticity of humanity in its physical engagement 
with the world (through the human hand) as also in its mental engagement with the 
world (through the human mind).   
I add that Aristotle’s core figuration is to cut nature at the joints on the basis that 
the core function of the “soul” of plants is “nutrition” just as the core function of 
animals is “sensation” and that of human being is “thought” which is a distinction from 
which we see (A) that the important inclusion of plants dismisses the common sloppy 
identification of “soul” with “mind” and then with “brain”, i.e. since plants do not have 
a “brain”, and (B) that the mind / body problem is resolved by seeing the body as an 
embodiment of the soul in the sense that the (animal) body is a particular vehicle for a 
particular species of animal soul to sense as the plant body is a particular vehicle for a 
plant’s nutrition and the human body is also a particular vehicle for human thought.  I 
note that Aristotle’s emphasis upon the whole body as being the “organ” of the whole 
soul is explained (as well as the  necessary cooperation of the “parts” within the whole), 
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as follows: “…the same relationship must hold good of the whole of sensation to the 
whole sentient body qua sentient as obtains between their respective parts (ἀνάλογον 
γὰρ ἔχει ὡς τὸ μέρος πρὸς τὸ μέρος, οὕτως ἡ ὅλη αἴσθησις πρὸς τὸ ὅλον σῶμα τὸ 
αἰσθητικόν, ᾗ τοιοῦτον) (De An. II 412b24-26)”257. 
From a further perspective I add that we have previously seen in our discussion 
of the “mean” that a being is in some sense a “moving principle” in the “hylomorphic” 
sense of being a “form” moving through “matter” and I suggest that this is certainly a 
useful simplification whilst not being a fully correct representation of how Aristotle 
understands “soul” which is that: 
 
“It has been well said that the soul is the place of forms (εἶναι τόπον εἰδῶν), except that 
this does not apply to the soul as a whole, but only its thinking capacity, and the forms 
occupy it not actually but only potentially (πλὴν ὅτι οὔτε ὅλη ἀλλ' ἡ νοητική, οὔτε 
ἐντελεχείᾳ ἀλλὰ δυνάμει τὰ εἴδη) (De An. III 429a27-30)” 
 
and I also comment here that the soul is a “place of forms” and uses forms but is itself 
not the same as these forms.  We see further that man himself has a soul but is not 
equivalent to his soul and hence:  
 
“Since in similar ways soul stands to body and craftsperson to tool and master to slave, 
there is no koinonia [community] of these with one another, but the one is an individual 
and the other is something belonging to the individual (οὐ γὰρ δύ᾽ ἐστίν, ἀλλὰ τὸ μὲν 
ἕν, τὸ δὲ τοῦ ἑνός οὐδέν).  Nor <in these relationships> is the good divided between 
                                                 
257 I note that Aristotle continues by arguing that the whole body is the organ of the soul and that 
soul is not obviously separable from the body, as follows:  
 
“That which has the capacity to live is not the body which has lost its soul, but that 
which possesses its soul; so seed and fruit are potentially of this kind.  The waking state 
is actuality in the same sense as the cutting of the axe or the seeing of the eye, while the 
soul is actuality in the same sense as the faculty of the eye for seeing, or of the 
implement for doing its work (ἡ δύναμις τοῦ ὀργάνου).  The body is that which exists 
potentially (τὸ δὲ σῶμα τὸ δυνάμει ὄν); but just as the pupil and the faculty for seeing 
make an eye, so in the other case the soul and the body make a living creature.  It is 
quite clear, then, that neither the soul nor certain parts of it, if it has parts, can be 
separated from the body (ὅτι μὲν οὖν οὐκ ἔστιν ἡ ψυχὴ χωριστὴ τοῦ σώματος, ἢ μέρη 
τινὰ αὐτῆς); for in some cases the actuality belongs to the parts themselves (De An. II 
412b26-413a6)” 
 
and with the full situation being perhaps that the active male “principle” of soul unites with the 
passive female “principle” of body (and hence the male/female dichotomy stands at the base of 
the composite active/passive and soul/body nature of organic being). 
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each, but the <good> of both is for the sake of the individual (οὐδὲ διαιρετὸν τὸ ἀγαθὸν 
ἑκατέρῳ, ἀλλὰ τὸ ἀμφοτέρων τοῦ ἑνὸς οὗ ἕνεκα ἐστίν) (E.E. VII 1241b17-22)” 
 
from which I suggest in outline conclusion that the individual is himself a mean both as 
being a fusion (and, in a purely figurative sense, a coming-together) of soul and body 
and also (potentially) as a locus or nexus for the channelling for the good, i.e. the good 
for a concrete individual in the world258.  
I add further that we find that Aristotle is not merely concerned with our soul as 
regarding how it represents our individual human experience but that he also wishes to 
consider how it relates to the nature of the universe itself, as follows: 
  
“The dunamis of every soul seems to have something of a sōma different from and 
more divine that the so-called elements; and the differences in worth or unworth 
between souls correspond with the differences in this active substance (phusis).  For the 
semen of everything (that lives) contains within itself its cause of being fertile, viz. so-
called (vital) heat.  This (vital) heat is not fire or any such power but the pneuma which 
is enclosed within the semen and in the foam-like stuff; it is the active substance which 
is in pneuma, which is an analogue of the astral element [i.e. the “ether”] (GA 736b29-
737a1)” 
 
which shows us (A) that Aristotle is a “vitalist” in the sense that he argues that organic, 
living being must have its own living medium (and matter) and that we can therefore 
expect a local “soul” to be expressed through a medium which he calls “pneuma” and 
Abraham Bos explains this “epigenetic” principle (and I refer here to the modern 
scientific theory which maintains that traits dynamically feed through organic being) 
further from a specifically Aristotelian perspective as form feeding through a specific 
medium of matter, as follows: 
 
                                                 
258 Aristotle explains the relationship between “body” and “soul” further as that: “…formal 
causes coexist with their effects.  For it is when the man becomes healthy that health exists, and 
the shape of the bronze sphere comes into being simultaneously with the bronze sphere.  
Whether any form remains also afterwards is another question.  In some cases there is nothing 
to prevent this, e.g. the soul may be of this nature (not all of it, but the intelligent part (μὴ πᾶσα 
ἀλλ᾽ ὁ νοῦς); for presumably all of it cannot be) (Met. Λ 1070a23-28)”  and he also comments 
that: “Probably it is better not to say that the soul pities, or learns, or thinks, but to say rather 
that the soul is the instrument whereby man does these things (ἀλλὰ τὸν ἄνθρωπον τῇ ψυχῇ) 
(De An. I 408b13-15)” 
 
 173 
“A-body-which-receives-soul that has the potentiality only to be a biotic instrument will 
never produce anything else than a plant or a tree.  A-body-which-receives-soul that has 
a potentiality to be a nutritive and sensitive soul-instrument will in due course manifest 
animal life259”  
 
and I note that the fact of nature that most animals do in nature have a very specific 
source of food accords with the Aristotelian perspective regarding which the material or 
“matter” of a given ousia or “being” is a means or channel for that certain form of being 
and it is hence that its materials are “…not found apart from the thing itself whose 
materials they are (PA I 645a37)”260.  I add (B) that Aristotle assumes that the universe 
will operate on the same or analogous principles throughout (with the qualification that 
these are not purely physical principles) and hence Aristotle suggests that there should 
be an “ether” as a medium for the “divine” as an analogue for the “pneuma” which is a 
medium for “life” and (C) that Aristotle argues that we must account both for the fact 
that living beings are themselves formal or speciate beings and also for the fact that 
living beings are somehow able to locally and individually transmit their own particular 
“principle” or “archē” of becoming and being, i.e. their entelechy, to other such beings.  
Overall, when we look at the world in the full we see that “form” is not the same as 
“soul” and also that we must consider both how organic beings live and reproduce 
themselves in principle (through their “form”) and also how they reproduce themselves 
in practice (through their “seed” or “sperm”)261.   
 I hope to have shown above, then, that Aristotle’s “soul” possesses coherence, 
nuance, and good sense and I note that this good sense is continued and mirrored in 
some modern philosophy (and we will come to the dismissive attitude of the other part 
of modern philosophy presently).  Hence we find that Edmund Husserl argues in basic 
outline that: “…the expression “I” encompasses the whole man, Body and soul.  It can 
                                                 
259 Bos, Abraham “Why the Soul Needs an Instrumental Body According to Aristotle ([De An.] 
I. 3, 407b13-26)” in Hermes (2000) p 30 
 
260 I note that Aristotle argues that: “It is clear that we must posit as many differences of matter 
as there are bodies (Ὅτι δ' ἀναγκαῖον ποιεῖν ἴσας τὰς διαφορὰς αὐτοῖς, δῆλον) (De Cael. IV 
312b20)” and I suggest that we should also consider the concept of “krasis” from his biological 
works and also see Aristotle’s thoughts on “food” as set out in the following section. 
 
261 For “pneuma” and its relation to “soul” see Abraham Bos’ The Soul and Its Instrumental 
Body: A Reinterpretation of Aristotle’s Philosophy of Living Nature (Leiden, 2003) 
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therefore very well be said: I am not my Body, but I have my Body; I am not my soul, 
but I have a soul262” and in more detail that: 
 
“People and animals have material Bodies, and to that degree they have spatiality and 
materiality.  According to what is specifically human and animal, that is, according to 
what is psychic, they are, however, not material, and, consequently, taken also as 
concrete totalities, they are not material realities in the proper sense.  Material things 
are open to fragmentation, something which accompanies the extension that belongs to 
their essence.  But men and animals cannot be fragmented.  Men and animals are 
spatially localised; and even what is psychic about them, at least in virtue of its 
essential foundedness in the Bodily, partakes of the spatial order.  We will even say that 
much of what is included under the broad – and, at first, unclarified – heading of the 
psychic has something like spread (although not extension in space).  In principle, 
however, nothing on this side is extended in the proper sense, in the specific sense of 
the extension we described263” 
 
and Maurice Merleau-Ponty similarly argues that we should not see the body “…as an 
external instrument but as the living envelope of our actions264” and also that: “I 
perceive things directly without my body forming a screen between them and me; it is a 
phenomenon just as they are, a phenomenon (gifted, it is true, with an original structure) 
which precisely presents the body to me as an intermediary between the world and 
myself although it is not as a matter of fact.  I see with my eyes, which are not an 
ensemble or transparent or opaque tissues and organs, but the instruments of my 
looking265”.   
                                                 
262 Husserl, Edmund Ideas II (New Delhi, [orig. 1928] 2013) p 99 
 
263 Husserl, Edmund Ibid. p 36 
 
264 Merleau-Ponty, Maurice “Relations of Soul and Body” in The Essential Writings of Merleau-
Ponty (New York, [orig. 1963] 1969) p 142 (cf. “…the body is not a self-enclosed mechanism 
on which the soul could act from the outside.  It is defined only by its functioning, which can 
present all degrees of integration.  To say that the soul acts on the body is wrongly to suppose a 
univocal notion of the body and to add to it a second force which accounts for the rational 
signification of certain conducts.  In this case it would be better to say that bodily functioning is 
integrated with a level which is higher than that of life and that the body has truly become a 
human body (Ibid. p 157)”). 
 
265 Merleau-Ponty, Maurice Ibid. p 176 (cf. “The mental, we have said, is reducible to the 
structure of behaviour.  Since this structure is visible from the outside and for the spectator at 
the same time as from within and for the actor, another person is in principle accessible to me as 
I am to myself; and we are both objects laid out before an impersonal consciousness…I am then 
drawn into a coexistence of which I am not the unique constituent and which founds the 
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I add to these modern observations that of Carl Jung that the “ego” is necessary 
both physical and psychical and also that the body is fundamentally psychic even if we 
only seem to encounter the psychic as a seemingly disembodied consciousness, as 
follows:  
 
“Experience shows that it [i.e. the ego] rests on two seemingly different bases: the 
somatic and the psychic.  The somatic basis is inferred from the totality of endosomatic 
perceptions, which for their part are already of a psychic nature and are associated with 
the ego, and are therefore conscious.  They are produced by endosomatic stimuli, only 
some of which cross the threshold of consciousness.  A considerable proportion of these 
stimuli occur unconsciously, that is, subliminally.  The fact that they are subliminal 
does not necessarily mean that their status is merely physiological, any more than this 
would be true of a psychic content266” 
 
and I conclude that when we honestly face up to the detail of the world we immediately 
and indisputably encounter an “Aristotelian” reality constituted of whole beings in 
which “body” and “soul” are clearly intimately intertwined in a highly complex, 
structured, and highly localised relationship.  As a further example of a thoughtful 
philosophical position I note that A.N. Whitehead argues that: “Each animal body is an 
organ of sensation.  It is a living society which may include in itself a dominant 
“personal” society of occasions.  This “personal” society is composed of occasions 
enjoying the individual experiences of the animals.  It is the soul of man.  The whole 
body is organised, so that a general co-ordination of mentality is finally poured into the 
successive occasions of this personal society267.” 
 I suggest that it is certainly possible and that it is possibly persuasive to treat the 
soul as Aristotle and the modern philosophers cited above do, i.e. as the structuring of 
                                                 
phenomenon of social nature as perceptual experience founds that of physical nature (Ibid. p 
178-9)”).  On Husserl and Merleau-Ponty see Jenny Slatman’s “The Sense of Life: Husserl and 
Merleau-Ponty on Touching and Being Touched” in Life and Individuation (Memphis, 2005). 
 
266 Jung, Carl G. “The Ego” in Aion: Researches into the Phenomenology of the Self (London, 
1959) p 3-4 (cf. “Although its bases are in themselves relatively unknown and unconscious, the 
ego is a conscious factor par excellence.  It is even acquired, empirically speaking, during the 
individual’s lifetime.  It seems to arise in the first place from the collision between the somatic 
factor and the environment, and, once established as a subject, it goes on developing from 
further collisions with the outer world and the inner (“The Ego” in Aion: Researches into the 
Phenomenology of the Self (London, 1959) p 5)”) 
 
267Whitehead, A.N. Adventures of Ideas (Harmondsworth, 1933) p 245 (and on the soul see also 
Nicolas Berdyaev’s Slavery and Freedom (London, 1943) p 30-32) 
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organic being, and I add that a contrasting position on the soul or spirit is to treat it as 
human personality, as something exceptional and individual.  I suggest regarding this 
“Christian” conception that it clearly raises essential issues which Aristotle treats 
though not as part of his discussion of the “soul” but, rather, under the heading of 
“person” or “nous”.  I note further that it is clearly this Christian “soul” or “spirit”, its 
eternity, its otherworldly character, and its Christian message which is the target of the 
modern philosophical assault upon the existence of the soul.  I add that my own general 
view on these positions is (a) that the Christian position, i.e. that “soul” is an expression 
of God, is perfectly tenable since the “soul” is definitely a meaningful something which 
seems to have an inexplicable origin but that this account goes beyond the facts of this 
world by accounting for the reality of the soul as a creation of the “mind of God” (and 
this position then causes a further problem for us by insisting that we account for the 
world on the basis of its presumptions) (b) that the modern naturalist position is 
obviously untenable and lacks explanatory power since human “soul” and human being 
(and being in general) obviously cannot be seen as being the simple consequence of 
chemical or physical interaction however we dress the matter up (and I add here that 
this sort of reductionism is not merely wrong but also perniciously wrong since it 
essentially seeks to deny such things as human free will, human mind, human 
individuality etc. in order to promote its aims and ideas) and (c) that Aristotle’s account 
does possess explanatory power without making unsubstantiated assertions or accepting 
“convenient” reductions – and I will show below that Aristotle himself refutes the 
various reductionisms which have been proposed by modern “scientific” philosophers.   
Before we begin this exercise let us note that Aristotle treats the “soul” in detail 
throughout his work and gives us (1) a dedicated logical assessment of the nature of 
“soul” in his De Anima and also applies his concept of soul and fits it and develops it to 
the various subject matters of (2) animal biology, (3) human ethics and (4) the 
philosophical account of reality itself. 
First, let us consider that we see (1) in Aristotle’s De Anima (A) that in principle 
Aristotle defines the “soul” (i) as that “…the soul must be a substance (ἀναγκαῖον ἄρα 
τὴν ψυχὴν οὐσίαν εἶναι) in the sense of the form of a natural body having life 
potentially within it (ὡς εἶδος σώματος φυσικοῦ δυνάμει ζωὴν ἔχοντος) (De An. II 
412a20-21)” (ii) as being “…substance in the sense of formula (οὐσία γὰρ ἡ κατὰ τὸν 
λόγον); i.e. the essence of such-and-such a body (τοῦτο δὲ τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι τῷ τοιῳδὶ 
σώματι) (De An. II 412b10-11)” and (iii) as being “…the first [entelechy] of a natural 
body which serves the soul as instrument (ἐντελέχεια ἡ πρώτη σώματος φυσικοῦ 
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ὀργανικοῦ) (De An. II 412b5-6)” from which it is clear that Aristotle defines the concept 
and actuality of “soul” as being that which is essential to the being of life and to the 
being and natural development of living things (see also De An. II 413a20 ff.).  I add (B) 
that Aristotle also defines “soul” as being an underlying structuring of nature which is 
comparable to the underlying mathematical quality of existence in the sense that:  
 
“…a single definition can be given of soul only in the same sense as one can be given of 
figure (De An. II 414b20-21)”  
 
which shows us that although “soul” is an abstraction which we legitimately employ to 
represent reality it is not a real manifestation of that reality itself.   I suggest that 
Aristotle’s flexibility of philosophical thinking stands in contrast with the narrowness of 
perspective which Karl Popper rightly attributes to the modern “analytic” philosophers 
on the basis that:  
 
“…most philosophers mix up the idea of truth with the idea of a criterion of truth.  They 
think that if there is an idea of truth, there has to be a criterion of truth attached to it.  In 
other words, they are operationalists.  There has to be an operation by which we find out 
whether or not a thing is true.  Now it is quite clear that such an operation does not 
exist268” 
 
although we see that Popper himself recommends a hamstrung “scientific” or 
“sceptical” view of the world in which things are only “true” if an experiment can prove 
that they are so and which is a narrowness that leads to the “correspondence theory of 
truth” regarding which: “This theory is, as it ought to be, trivial.  It is so simple and so 
trivial that one cannot believe that it solves the problem.  “Snow is white” unquote 
corresponds to the facts if, and only if, snow is white269”.  Contrary to all these 
positions, then, I suggest that Aristotle is clearly correct in assuming that words are not 
merely tokens or propositions or simples (which can be true or false) but that all words, 
especially such generalising terms as “animal”, “health”, “thing” or “being”, “truth”, 
                                                 
268 Popper, Karl “Description, Argument, and Imagination” in Knowledge and the Body-Mind 
Problem: In defence of interaction (London, [orig. 1969]1994) p 96 
  
269 Popper, Karl Ibid. p 103.   
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“element”, “part”, “good” etc., are complex and must be understood as forms and 
thought of as analogies270. 
 Second, let us consider (2) how Aristotle’s ideas on the soul translate into his 
thinking on biology.  Fred D. Miller Jr. shows us how Aristotle rejects materialism (in 
my opinion devastatingly) through the following three questions:  
 
“(1) Why do organisms grow in particular directions (De An. II 415b28-416a5)? (2) 
What holds the organism’s body together (De An. II 416a6-9)? (3) Why is growth a 
self-limiting process (De An. II 416a9-18)?271”  
 
and Miller then quotes John Searle arguing for the “materialist” and “emergentist” 
principle that: “…higher-level psychic properties emerge from a basal level of material 
properties”, as follows: 
 
“The brain causes certain “mental” phenomena, such as conscious mental states, and 
these conscious states are simply higher-level features of the brain.  Consciousness is a 
“higher-level” or emergent property of the brain in the utterly harmless sense of 
“higher-level” or “emergent” in which solidity is a higher-level emergent property of 
H2O molecules when they are in a lattice structure (ice), and liquidity is similarly a 
higher-level emergent property of H2O molecules when they are, roughly speaking, 
rolling around on each other (water).  Consciousness is a mental, and therefore physical, 
property of the brain in the sense in which liquidity is a property of systems in 
molecules272” 
 
and Miller rejects this “emergentism” on Aristotle’s behalf on the basis that it: 
 
“…evidently conflicts with Aristotle’s own claim that the soul exercises a causal power 
which cannot itself be explained in terms of more elementary powers in the living 
organism’s body.  Even in a plant, psychic causation is needed to explain why growth is 
directed, why opposed materials are held together, and why growth is self-limiting.  The 
                                                 
270 See Aristotle’s concept of “focal reference” (e.g. Cat. 1a6ff) and also Robert Rosen’s 
comments on “analogy” in his Life Itself: A Comprehensive Inquiry Into the Nature, Origin, and 
Fabrication of Life (New York, 1991). 
 
271 Miller Jr., Fred D. “Aristotle’s Philosophy of Soul”  Review of Metaphysics (1999) p 323 
 
272 Searle, John The Rediscovery of Mind (Cambridge Mass. 1992) p 14 
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presence of psychic power cannot be explained as the mere result of the material 
components or their combination273”  
 
and following Aristotle’s own thoughts we find (1) that creation must arise from out of 
a definite directed force and hence: “…the power of originating movement cannot 
belong to a harmony (τὸ κινεῖν οὐκ ἔστιν ἁρμονίας) (De An. I 407b36)” (2) that creation 
and even being itself cannot arise (routinely or systematically) through chance and 
hence:  
 
“….it is by this association [between body and soul] that the one acts and the other is 
acted upon, that one moves and the other is moved; and no such mutual relation is 
found in haphazard combinations (τούτων δ' οὐθὲν ὑπάρχει πρὸς ἄλληλα τοῖς τυχοῦσιν) 
(De An. I 407b17-20)”  
 
and (3) that creation is formal and controlled and hence Aristotle argues that a hand is 
“…form immersed in matter (ἐν ὕλῃ εἶδος) (GC I 321b20-1)” and grows 
“proportionately (ἀνάλογον) (GC I 321b29)” according to its “form”, i.e. additional 
matter does not act as an amorphous “blob” but does, rather, transform a small hand into 
a larger hand274.   
                                                 
273 Miller Jr., Fred D. “Aristotle’s Philosophy of Soul” Review of Metaphysics (1999) p 332.  I 
also refer the reader to Jaegwon Kim’s “The myth of nonreductive materialism” in Proceedings 
and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association (1989) for a contemporary 
assessment of the inherent problems of the emergence hypothesis and one which also shows 
through its argument (though it does not argue for) the weakness of materialism as a coherent 
explanation of observed reality per se. 
 
274 Aristotle asserts in principle that: 
 
“…of all things naturally composed there is a limit or proportion of size and growth; 
this is due to soul, not to fire, and to the essential formula rather than to matter (τῶν δὲ 
φύσει συνισταμένων πάντων ἔστι πέρας καὶ λόγος μεγέθους τε καὶ αὐξήσεως· ταῦτα δὲ 
ψυχῆς, ἀλλ' οὐ πυρός, καὶ λόγου μᾶλλον ἢ ὕλης) (De An. II 416a17-18)” 
 
and, in more detail, that: “…we must think of the tissue [i.e. flesh] after the image of flowing 
water that is measured by one and the same measure…the matter of the flesh grows, some 
flowing out and some flowing in fresh…[but that] growth has taken place proportionally, is 
more manifest in the organic parts – e.g. in the hand.  For there the fact that the matter is distinct 
from the form is more manifest than in flesh, i.e. than in the tissues…in one sense it is true that 
any and every part of the flesh has grown; but in another sense it is false.  For there has been an 




I add that Fred D. Miller explains Aristotle’s epigenetic conclusion that we can 
only realistically explain the forms and structures of organic being if we treat them as 
being the result of forms and structures traversing through, entering into, and then en-
forming the passive matter of the world, as follows:  
 
“The epigenesist interpretation helps to explain why Aristotle insists that a living 
organism can come to be with a soul only if it is brought to existence by another 
substance which has this soul in actuality: he says, “the movement of nature exists in 
the product itself, issuing from another nature which has the form in actuality (ἐνεργείᾳ) 
(GA II 735a4)”275”  
 
and I add that Alfred and Maria Miller explain the dynamic and structured character of 
biological reality as seen through an Aristotelian lens, as follows: 
 
“This unified functioning maintains itself as the uninterrupted process of being-alive 
and also continuously renews the bodily parts and potentials.  Thus, the existing of an 
organism is not simply the persisting presence of material structures that are stable in 
themselves and function only secondarily.  Existing as being-alive (psuchē as eidos / ti 
ēn einai) is itself the dynamic process by which an organism maintains itself as the 
entity it is…since an organism’s existing is constituted by the dynamic physiological 
process of self-preservation, its persisting identity as an individual also cannot derive 
from some unchanging substance that underlies this functioning existing.  Continuing 
identity is also dynamically constituted as the self-preserving species-figuration [ousian 
kata ton logon] that comprises the functional organisation of the process of self-
maintenance276” 
 
from which we see that Aristotle’s epigenetic biological account of the “soul” seeks to 
recognise and include the facts of being (i) that an organic being is both concrete and 
structured in its “static” being, (ii) that an organic being behaves in both a dynamic and 
in a structured way in its actual living existence, and (iii) that an organic being 
possesses a structured cyclical quality of entelechy which is “programmed” into its 
                                                 
275 Miller Jr., Fred D. “Aristotle’s Philosophy of Soul”  in Review of Metaphysics (1999) p 336 
  
276 Miller, Alfred and Maria “Aristotle’s Metaphysics as the Ontology of Being-Alive and its 
Relevance Today” in Proceedings of the Boston Area Colloquium in Ancient Philosophy (2004) 
p 4-6.   
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overall makeup.   I suggest (iv) that Aristotle’s “epigenetic” “picture” of organic being 
as forms and “principles” feeding through nature convincingly repudiates the 
materialistic view of being as arising from matter interacting in the world and (v) that 
modern biological science has matured and in finding itself has returned to face up to 
and then to accept the specifically epigenetic quality of the organic world277.  
Let us move on to consider (3) how Aristotle’s ideas on the soul are used in his 
Ethics.  Interestingly, we find that Aristotle’s ethical discussions are built upon an 
explicitly biological and scientific take on the soul which divides the soul into the 
“nutritive” (the basic organic principle of nutrition and reproduction) shared by all 
organic creatures including plants, the “sensitive” (which is also possessed by animals), 
and the “intellective” (which is most fully possessed by man)278.  On this foundation we 
see that Aristotle concludes Book I of his Ethics (i) with an assessment of the “nutritive 
soul”, as follows: 
 
“Of the irrational element [of the soul] one division seems to be widely distributed, and 
vegetative in its nature (τοῦ ἀλόγου δὲ τὸ μὲν ἔοικε κοινῷ καὶ φυτικῷ), I mean that 
which causes nutrition and growth (λέγω δὲ τὸ αἴτιον τοῦ τρέφεσθαι καὶ αὔξεσθαι); for 
it is this kind of power of the soul that one must assign to all nurselings and to embryos 
(τὴν τοιαύτην γὰρ δύναμιν τῆς ψυχῆς ἐν ἅπασι τοῖς τρεφομένοις θείη τις ἂν καὶ ἐν τοῖς 
ἐμβρύοις), and this same power to grown-up creatures (τὴν αὐτὴν δὲ ταύτην καὶ ἐν τοῖς 
τελείοις); this is more reasonable than to assign some different power to them 
(εὐλογώτερον γὰρ ἢ ἄλλην τινά)…this part (τὸ μόριον) or faculty (ἡ δύναμις) seems to 
function most in sleep (N.E. I 1102a32-1102b6)” 
 
                                                 
277 For some good examples of the “new” thinking in biology see Gerd B. Muller & Stuart A. 
Newman’s (eds.) Origination of Organismal Form; Beyond the Gene in Developmental and 
Evolutionary Biology (Cambridge Mass., 2003), Susan Oyama, Paul E. Griffith, & Russell D. 
Gray’s (eds.) Cycles of Contingency: Developmental Systems and Evolution (Cambridge Mass., 
2001), Carl Woese’s “A New Biology for a New Century” in Microbiol. Mol. Biol. Rev (2004), 
Mae-Wan Ho’s The Rainbow and the Worm (Singapore, 1993), and Harald Atmanspacher & 
Hans Primas’ “Pauli’s ideas on mind and matter in the context of contemporary science” in 
Journal of Consciousness Studies (2006).  For the revival of essentialism in biology see Olivier 
Rieppel’s “New Essentialism in Biology” in Philosophy of Science (2010) and Denis M. 
Walsh’s “Evolutionary Essentialism” in British Society for the Philosophy of Science (2006).  
 
278 This is a distinction which may, perhaps, be found in modern garb in the modern tri-une 
brain theory of the reptilian, limbic, and neo-cortex brains (reptilian – found in reptiles – being 
the “oldest” brain covering basic functions, limbic – found in mammals – enabling memory and 
emotions, and neocortex – found in primates – enabling thought and imagination). 
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which is a passage which explains the important point that the “nutritive soul” of plants, 
i.e. their feeding, growth, maturation, reproduction, and death, is the essential or “first” 
entelechy of all organic being and with other layers of being – namely, sensation and 
thought (and sleep279) – being built upon this basic entelechy and it also being notable 
that Aristotle breaks down his explanation of the soul in order to clearly show this point.  
We find that Aristotle then proceeds to (ii) assess the relationship between the “rational” 
and the “irrational” in man as being such that:  
 
“…the irrational element [of the soul]…appears to be twofold (φαίνεται δὴ καὶ τὸ 
ἄλογον διττόν)…the vegetative element in no way shares in a rational principle, but the 
appetitive and in general desiring element in a sense shares in it, so far as it listens to 
and obeys it (τὸ μὲν γὰρ φυτικὸν οὐδαμῶς κοινωνεῖ λόγου, τὸ δ᾽ ἐπιθυμητικὸν καὶ ὅλως 
ὀρεκτικὸν μετέχει πως, ᾗ κατήκοόν ἐστιν αὐτοῦ καὶ πειθαρχικόν) (N.E. I 1102b28-31)”  
 
and with Aristotle concluding that the complication arising from these divergent 
“brains” per footnote 278 is (iii) that: “…the impulses of incontinent people move in 
contrary directions (ἐπὶ τἀναντία γὰρ αἱ ὁρμαὶ τῶν ἀκρατῶν) (N.E. I 1102b21)”, i.e. the 
conflicted nature of the human situation is due to the existence of different “souls” and 
the conflict which arises between desire the “sensitive soul” (desire) and the 
“intellective soul” (reason), and see also De An. III 433a22-28.   
We see, then, that the train of Aristotle’s argument is that man possesses (i) the 
wholly irrational “nutritive” soul / being, (ii) the partly rational “sensitive” and desiring 
soul / being (iii) the possibility of an “intellective” soul / being which can control his 
desiring self and (iv) that man is regarded (by Aristotle) as being peculiar or notable 
precisely owing to his ability to shape his life through his rational aspect and also 
because he must be able to shape his life in this manner in order to (properly and 
meaningfully) actually be a man (and here we clearly see, in Aristotelian terms, the full 
synthetic expression of “form”, “body”, and “soul”).  We also find that Aristotle’s uses 
the fact of human reason and the example of man as the essential touchstone for an 
explanation of nature which moves from the unity of man to explain the structuring of 
nature and which Joseph Owens explains as follows:  
 
                                                 
279 Cf. “…both sleep and waking depend upon the presence of the soul, and waking is analogous 
to the exercise of knowledge (ἀνάλογον δ' ἡ μὲν ἐγρήγορσις τῷ θεωρεῖν), sleep to its possession 
but not its exercise (De An. II 412a24-26)” 
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“Aristotle is unhesitant in maintaining the fundamental unity of the human agent, and in 
seeing in soul a unifying principle “with which we primarily live, perceive, and think”.  
He realises that our privileged awareness of life as specifically differentiated is on the 
operational level, and has to be read back into its qualitative and its substantial 
source…the penalty is that key issues have to remain in a state of aporia280”  
 
and I suggest that the notable thing here is the capacity for allowing “key issues…to 
remain in a state of aporia” and with my suggestion here being that the problem of the 
modern mind – and perhaps of idealism in general – is that it refuses to admit or accept 
its limits or limitations and often chooses to distort reality rather than admit its 
incompleteness (which explains the strange shallowness and naïve investment in 
dogmatic -isms of many modern philosophical representations of reality).  Conversely, I 
suggest that it is one of Aristotle’s strengths that he is willing to accept the existence of 
“gaps” in our knowledge of the world and to own up to the limitedness of our attempts 
to overcome these “gaps” (even if he seeks to overcome such gaps as far as he can by 
exploring what we can infer as well as prove about the world).  The alternative position 
merely ignores the gaps either by claiming either that we are rapidly working towards 
finally filling them in à la Descartes or by claiming that: “All events seem entirely loose 
and separate” with Hume. 
Finally, then, let us consider (4) the philosophical consequences of Aristotle’s 
scientific picture of the “soul” in the world and let us begin by considering that 
Aristotle’s basic position is that we must understand that there is a necessary complexity 
in the world itself in the sense that:  
 
“The soul is the cause or source of the living body (ἔστι δὲ ἡ ψυχὴ τοῦ ζῶντος σώματος 
αἰτία καὶ ἀρχή)…in all three senses which we explicitly recognise [which are as] (a) the 
source or origin of movement (ὅθεν ἡ κίνησις) [as] (b) the end (οὗ ἕνεκα) [and as] (c) 
the essence of the whole living body (ὡς ἡ οὐσία τῶν ἐμψύχων σωμάτων ἡ ψυχὴ αἰτία) 
(De An. II 415b9-13)” 
 
or, in other words, that the soul is in itself an expression of the (a) efficient (b) final and 
(c) formal causes of the world and exists within the context of (d) the material cause 
regarding which Aristotle argues that “the appropriate matter” (“τῇ οἰκείᾳ ὕλῃ” De An. 
                                                 
280 Owens, Joseph “Aristotle’s Definition of Soul” in Aristotle: The Collected Papers of Joseph 
Owens (New York, [orig. 1971] 1981) p 120 
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II 414a27) is also a sine qua non for substantive being (and see also Met. Θ 1050a16 ff).  
I add my suggestion that Aristotle requires this complex philosophical position on the 
(in my opinion correct) presumption that both idealism which neglects the efficient and 
final causes and merely sees forms arising in matter and materialism which neglects the 
formal and final causes and merely sees individual materialisations happening in the 
world are partial and hence inadequate accounts of being (and for this distinction see De 
An. I 403b4-9).   
I add that Michael Frede explains the underlying motivation of Aristotle’s 
metaphysics, and his emphasis upon organisation and essence, as follows: 
 
“Only if we give organisation …priority over its constituents will it count as an 
essence… Aristotle wants to hold on to the metaphysical primacy of objects, natural 
objects, living objects, human beings.  He does not want these to be mere configurations 
of more basic entities, such that the real things turn out to be these more basic 
entities…[and hence] he introduces essences which guarantee this status281” 
 
and with Aristotle’s detailed explanation regarding how the functional “parts” of soul 
and body must combine to become the whole entity which cannot come-into-being or 
viably exist without them being that:  
 
“…the parts of the soul are prior, either all or some of them, to the concrete “animal” 
and so too with each individual animal (ὥστε τὰ ταύτης μέρη πρότερα ἢ πάντα ἢ ἔνια 
τοῦ συνόλου ζῴου, καὶ καθ᾽ ἕκαστον δὴ ὁμοίως); and the body and its parts are 
posterior to this, the essential substance, and it is not the substance but the concrete 
thing that is divided into these parts as its matter (τὸ δὲ σῶμα καὶ τὰ τούτου μόρια 
ὕστερα ταύτης τῆς οὐσίας, καὶ διαιρεῖται εἰς ταῦτα ὡς εἰς ὕλην οὐχ ἡ οὐσία ἀλλὰ τὸ 
σύνολον):- this being so, to the concrete thing these are in a sense prior, but in a sense 
they are not.  For they cannot even exist if severed from the whole; for it is not a finger 
in any and every state that is the finger of a living thing, but a dead finger is a finger 
only in name.  Some parts are neither prior nor posterior to the whole, i.e. those which 
are dominant and in which the formula, i.e. the essential substance, is immediately 
present (ἔνια δὲ ἅμα, ὅσα κύρια καὶ ἐν ᾧ πρώτῳ ὁ λόγος καὶ ἡ οὐσία), e.g. perhaps the 
heart or the brain (Met. Z 1035b18-27)”  
 
                                                 
281 Frede, Michael “On Aristotle’s Conception of the Soul” in Martha Nussbaum & Amélie O. 
Rorty (eds.) Essays on Aristotle’s De Anima (Oxford, 1992) p 99 
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from which we see that Aristotle is concerned (i) with the meaning of the “concreteness 
/ individuality” and “essentiality / speciate-ness” of organic being, i.e. the generic 
structuring of life as expressed in individuals in which some things are essential and 
some things are optional / peripheral and (ii) with the “prior” and the “posterior” and 
with the dynamic fact that things are in the world and that we must know what 
something is before we can understand how it is and behaves (and that everything 
organic is something and has become that something)282. 
I add that Aristotle is also concerned (iii) with exactly how an organism has a 
range of “powers” of the soul and of “parts” of the body and with how it has a graded 
functionality such that some of its parts are necessary or “essential” to the organism and 
some are peripheral to its essential viability while also being of potentially functional 
importance, e.g. a finger.  I add that the “finger” is an excellent example of Aristotle’s 
thinking and representation of the world in the sense that it is clear that it is not essential 
to the survival of man whilst being perfectly defined as a peculiarly human part, as 
follows: 
 
“…the finger is defined by means of the whole body; for a finger is a particular kind of 
part of a man (Met. Z 1035b11-12)”  
 
and with man being (in an important sense) defined by and completed by his finger, as 
follows: 
 
“Now it would be wrong to say, as some do, that the structure of man is not good, in 
fact, that it is worse than any other animal.  Their grounds are: that man is barefoot, 
unclothed, and void of any weapon of force.  Against this we may say that all the other 
animals have just one method of defence and cannot change it for another: they are 
forced to sleep and perform all their actions with their shoes on the whole time, one 
might say…For man, on the other hand, many means of defence are available, and he 
can change them at any time…Take the hand, this is as good as a talon, or a claw, or a 
horn, or again, a spear or a sword, or any other weapon or tool: it can be all of these, 
because it can seize and hold them all.  And nature has admirably contrived the actual 
                                                 
282 I note that the existential statement that something must be something – that “…there is 
knowledge of something that it is something (ἐπιστήμη τοῦ τινὸς ὄντος ὅτι τὶ ὄν)…for ex 
hypothesi the expression “that which is something” refers to the thing’s particular form of being 




shape of the hand so as to fit in with this arrangement…One finger is placed sideways: 
this is short and thick, not long like the others.  It would be impossible to get a hold if 
this were not placed sideways as if no hand were there at all (PA IV 687a23-687b14)” 
 
which gives us a complex reality which cannot, as we have seen above, be explained (a) 
through a “propositional” or logical representation of the world or (b) through 
identifying worldy meaning with simple material, physical, or chemical “emergence” 
and with the underlying issue with both of these positions being (c) their refusal to face 
up to the richness of the world and to accept our limitedness and subservience in respect 
to our engagement with the world.  I add that a further modern approach is to dismiss 
the world (d) through pathologising it (by adopting the stance of a doctor) and with a 
fashionable example of this approach being the use of Roger Sperry’s research into 
split-brain malfunctions which is often cited to prove that the “mind” is not a “spirit” or 
a unified whole283 (i) which does not entail that there is no normal functioning (and in 
fact it requires this since it is a pathology of this normality) and (ii) which if anything 
supports Aristotle since these “split-brain malfunctions” confirm the Aristotelian 
position that “parts” have “principles” and also that principles do normally come to 
fruition in clearly defined “ends” if they are not “hindered”284. 
Having shown that Aristotle’s “soul” stands up well vis-à-vis modern positions 
let us move on to consider Aristotle’s “soul” vis-à-vis Descartes’ “soul” taken as 
representing a quintessentially Christian position285.  We find that Aristotle and 
Descartes differ on the grounds (a) that Descartes is primarily concerned with the 
                                                 
283 On this subject see Tim Bayne’s “The Unity of Consciousness and the Split-Brain 
Syndrome” in The Journal of Philosophy (2008) 
 
284 Cf. “…a thing is potentially all those things which it will be of itself if nothing external 
hinders it (καὶ ὅσων δὴ ἐν αὐτῷ τῷ ἔχοντι, ὅσα μηθενὸς τῶν ἔξωθεν ἐμποδίζοντος ἔσται δι᾽ 
αὐτοῦ).  E.g. the seed is not yet potentially a man; for it must be deposited in something other 
than itself and undergo a change.  But when through its own motive principle it has already got 
such and such attributes, in this state it is already potentially a man (ἤδη τοῦτο δυνάμει); while 
in the former state it needs another motive principle, just as earth is not yet potentially a statue 
(for it must first change in order to become brass) (Met. Θ 1049a13-18)” 
 
285 The full title of Descartes’ Meditations is, of course, Meditations on First Philosophy - In 
Which the Existence of God and the Immortality of the Soul are Demonstrated (1641) (cf. “You 
say that I have not said a word about the immortality of the soul.  You should not be surprised.  
I could not prove that God could not annihilate the soul, but only that it is by nature entirely 
distinct from the body, and consequently is not bound by nature to die with it.  This is all that is 
required as a foundation for religion, and is all that I had any intention of proving (“Letter to 
Mersenne, 24th Dec. 1640”, CSM III §266, p 163)”). 
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positive and “higher” aspects of being which he identifies in “mind” and in the “innate 
ideas” which he supposes are planted by God in man and (b) that Aristotle identifies 
such “higher” aspects in the “forms” and “thought” and “states” and “virtues” etc. 
which emerge in us though our ability to develop them through our development of 
mind and self in the world (through our individual human “soul” and “substance”).  I 
add, however, that Descartes and Aristotle agree on the “soul” on the basis that the soul 
should be understood in essentially “holonmereic” terms with Descartes writing that:  
 
“…I now understand the mind to be coextensive with the body – the whole mind in the 
whole body and the whole mind in any one of its parts286”  
 
and Robert Pasnau explains the implications of Descartes’ position, as follows:  
 
“To see what they [i.e. merechronic and holonmeric concepts] involve, begin with an 
ordinary physical event, like kicking a football.  The event takes place over time, and 
we can distinguish between parts of the event, such as the motion of the foot before 
contact and the motion of the foot after contact.  Now try to extend the same idea to a 
substance that changes over time, like a growing boy.  Just as we talked about parts of 
an event, it seems that we might talk about the six-year-old part of the boy and the 
seven-year-old part of the boy.  Inasmuch as the boy is something that exists through 
time, it seems possible to conceive of him as having parts, temporal parts, just as he had 
spatial parts such as his right half and his left half.  To have temporal parts in this way is 
to be a merechronic entity…To say that a boy has himself has temporal parts – e.g., his 
six-year-old part and his seven-year-old part – strains our ordinary mode of expression.  
It is far more natural to say that the whole boy exists each and every day of his life287” 
 
and Aristotle’s account of substance also depending upon a parallel concept of “aeonic” 
being which is assumed in his concept of “entelecheia” and which is stated as that: “The 
                                                 
286 Descartes, René, Sixth Replies, CSM II §442 p 298 
 
287 Pasnau, Robert “On Existing All at Once” in C. Tapp (ed.) God, Eternity, and Time 
(Ashgate, 2011) p 12 & 25.  I add that Erwin W. Straus explains that: “Existential time cannot 
be detached from the life and history of the individual; the relation present-past-future cannot be 
reduced to the schema earlier-later; existential time is finite; events situated between beginning 
and end have a positional value; a year in youth and a year in old age are not commensurable; 
existential time is not quantifiable (“An Existential Approach to Time” in Annals New York 
Academy of Sciences (1967) p759)” (and also consider in this context the holonomic theory of 
Karl Pribram and David Bohm). 
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total time which circumscribes the length of every creature, and which cannot in nature 
be exceeded, they [i.e. Aristotle’s ancestors] named the aeon of each (Τὸ γὰρ τέλος τὸ 
περιέχον τὸν τῆς ἑκάστου ζωῆς χρόνον, οὗ μηθὲν ἔξω κατὰ φύσιν, αἰὼν ἑκάστου 
κέκληται) (De Cael. I 279a23-25)” (and see also GC II 337a-b)288.   
I therefore conclude that Aristotle and Descartes differ on the basis (a) that 
Descartes believes that we possess “innate ideas” (and that we must clear away the 
distraction of the empirical world in order to see these ideas) whereas Aristotle argues 
that, whilst we possess the capacity to formulate ideas, we must engage with the world 
in order to develop our ideas and our selves as people (according to our human nature) 
(and I note that Aristotle criticises Plato’s – and hence also Descartes’ and hence our – 
routine conflation of “soul” with “mind” at De An. I 407a; and this is an essential 
distinction if we are to recognise that organic beings are living rather than logical 
entities) and (b) that Aristotle regards the world and soul and organism in epigenetic 
terms and therefore sees organisms as being en-souled and structured substances 
feeding through and coming-to-be in nature (and with the paradigmatic statement of this 
position being that “man produces man”) whereas Descartes accounts for our souls and 
our being as being directly derived from God (and on this basis insists that animals are 
machines which lack soul289).  I finally suggest that we see that Descartes and Aristotle 
are participants in a common philosophical discussion of being which possesses only 
certain logical possibilities once we accept that the overall picture of the world is 
observably one of moving principles feeding through and coming to be in the world in 
determinate and structured material forms and with these options being (i) that the 
world is a plenum of potentiality which is activated locally by principles and forces (ii) 
that the world is a vacuum within which and across which discrete atoms interact 
according to their inherent properties and also natural “covering laws” or (iii) that the 
world is a creation controlled by and ordered by the Ideas of an all-powerful God and I 
                                                 
288 I note that another point of intersection between Descartes and Aristotle is that both assert 
that the world operates as a plenum with Descartes arguing on this point as follows: “…nothing 
has no properties, and that what is commonly called empty space is not nothing, but a real body 
deprived of all its accidents (“Letter to More, August 1649”, CSM III §403, p 381)”. 
 
289 Descartes argues that: “…the souls of animals are nothing but their blood, the blood which is 
turned into spirits [i.e. animal spirits] by the warmth of the heart…This theory involves such an 
enormous difference between the souls of animals and our own that it provides a better 
argument than any yet thought of to refute the atheists and establish that human minds cannot be 




add for good measure the alternative “solution” (iv) that the world is a chance material 



























                                                 
290 Further works on Aristotle’s soul are Thomas Kjeller Johansen’s The Powers of Aristotle’s 
Soul (Oxford, 2012), Wilfrid Sellars’ “Substance and Form in Aristotle” in The Journal of 
Philosophy (1957), and Philip van der Eijk’s “Aristotle’s Psycho-Physiological Account of the 
Soul-Body Relationship” in Psyche and Soma: Physicians and Metaphysicians on the Mind-
Body Problem from Antiquity to Enlightenment, ed. John Wright and Paul Potter (Oxford, 2000) 
and for more detail on Aristotle’s “aeonic” time see W. von Leyden’s “Time, Number, and 
Eternity in Plato and Aristotle” in The Philosophical Quarterly (1964) and for more detail on 
Descartes see Robert Pasnau’s “Mind and Extension (Descartes, Hobbes, More)” in Studies of 




16 Aristotle on Matter 
 
Having considered the expansive and real nature of Aristotle’s “soul” let us 
move on to consider the expansive and real nature of Aristotle’s conceptualisation of 
“matter”.  I suggest that Aristotle’s basic questioning regarding “matter” or “hulē” is as 
follows: 
 
“There are three kinds of substance (οὐσίαι δὲ τρεῖς) – the matter, which is a “this” by 
being perceived (ἡ μὲν ὕλη τόδε τι οὖσα τῷ φαίνεσθαι) (for all things that are 
characterised by contact and not by organic unity are matter and substratum (ὅσα γὰρ 
ἁφῇ καὶ μὴ συμφύσει, ὕλη καὶ ὑποκείμενον)); the nature, a “this” and a state that it 
moves towards (ἡ δὲ φύσις τόδε τι καὶ ἕξις τις εἰς ἥν); and, again, thirdly, the particular 
substance which is composed of these two, e.g. Socrates or Callias (ἔτι τρίτη ἡ ἐκ 
τούτων ἡ καθ᾽ ἕκαστα, οἷον Σωκράτης ἢ Καλλίας).  Now, in some cases the “this” does 
not exist apart from the composite substance (ἐπὶ μὲν οὖν τινῶν τὸ τόδε τι οὐκ ἔστι 
παρὰ τὴν συνθετὴν οὐσίαν), e.g. the form of house does not so exist, unless the art of 
building exists apart (nor is there generation and destruction of these forms, but it is in 
another way that the house apart from its matter, and health, and all things of art, exist 
and do not exist); but if it does it is only in the case of natural objects (ἀλλ᾽ εἴπερ, ἐπὶ 
τῶν φύσει) (Met. Λ 1070a9-18)” 
 
which shows us that Aristotle’s overall concerns are (a) perception, (b) change through 
“generation and destruction”291, (c) individuality292, (d) forms, abstractions, and ideas 
and (e) “craft” acting through the forms located in the mind of man and “nature” acting 
through its own forms293.   
                                                 
291 Cf. “…all things that change have matter, but different matter (πάντα δ᾽ ὕλην ἔχει ὅσα 
μεταβάλλει, ἀλλ᾽ ἑτέραν); and of eternal things those which are not generable but are movable 
in space have matter – not matter for generation, however, but motion from one place to another 
(καὶ τῶν ἀϊδίων ὅσα μὴ γενητὰ κινητὰ δὲ φορᾷ, ἀλλ᾽ οὐ γενητὴν ἀλλὰ ποθὲν ποί) (Met. Λ 
1069b25-27)”  
 
292 I note that Aristotle’s assumption regarding individuality stated contra Plato’s “participation” 
in Forms is that: “…anything may both be and become like something else without being 
imitated (μὴ εἰκαζόμενον) from it…a man may become just like Socrates whether Socrates 
exists or not, and even if Socrates were eternal, clearly the case would be the same (Met. A 
991a23-28)” (and for Callias as an individual example of a type see Post. An. II 100a15-100b2). 
 
293 Cf. “…all things produced either by nature or by art have matter (ἅπαντα δὲ τὰ γιγνόμενα ἢ 
φύσει ἢ τέχνῃ ἔχει ὕλην); for each of them is capable both of being and of not being (δυνατὸν 
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More specifically on “matter” itself we find that Aristotle describes “matter” as 
follows: 
 
“It is better…to suppose that the matter in anything is inseparable (ἀχώριστον), being 
the same and numerically one, though not one by definition.  Further, for the same 
reasons also, we ought not to regard the matter of the body as points or lines; matter is 
that which has points or lines as its limits and cannot possibly exist without qualities 
and without form (Ἐκεῖνο δὲ οὗ ταῦτα ἔσχατα ἡ ὕλη, ἣν οὐδέποτ' ἄνευ πάθους οἷόν τε 
εἶναι οὐδ' ἄνευ μορφῆς).  Now one thing comes-to-be, in the unqualified sense, out of 
another, as has been determined elsewhere and by the agency of something which is 
actually of the same species or of the same genus – for example, Fire comes-to-be 
through the agency of Fire and Man through that of Man (GC I 320b13-21)” 
 
which shows us further that Aristotle argues (a) that matter necessarily is something 
with “limits”, (b) that “matter”, or “energy”, is necessarily of something and hence is 
inseparable from the “form” of that something, (c) that “matter” individuates species 
into individuals and thereby differentiates the actual individual from the “idea” of a 
“species” which is itself a matterless abstraction (though we will consider this point 
further in our discussion of “noetic matter”294), and (d) that “matter” is a channel or 
epigenetic medium for a species and hence “Fire comes-to-be through the agency of 
Fire [i.e. fire spreads] and Man through that of Man [i.e man reproduces]” and with the 
pregnancy of matter being a point of considerable complication and importance. 
Let us consider further that Aristotle gives us three paradigmatic situations in 
order to show us the nature of “matter”, these being the processes of (a) craft (b) 
digestion / nutrition and (c) reproduction.   
In respect to (a) craft we find that Aristotle argues that “matter” should be 
regarded as a limiting factor and also as providing the possibility for realising the 
channelling and fulfilment of a moving principle in the sense that: 
 
                                                 
γὰρ καὶ εἶναι καὶ μὴ εἶναι ἕκαστον αὐτῶν), and this capacity is the matter in each (τοῦτο δ᾽ 
ἐστὶν ἡ ἐν ἑκάστῳ ὕλη) (Met. Z 1032a20-22)” 
 
294 Cf. “…knowledge, like knowing, is spoken in two ways – as potential and as actual.  The 
potentiality, being, as matter, universal and indefinite, deals with the universal and indefinite; 
but the actuality, being definite, deals with a definite object, - being a “this”, it deals with a 
“this” (Met. M 1087a15-19)” 
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“…it is obvious that only one table can be made from one piece of timber, and yet he 
who imposes the form upon it, although he is but one, can make many tables.  Such too 
is the relationship of male to female: the female is impregnated in one coition, but one 
male can impregnate many females.  And these relations are analogues of the principles 
referred to (Met. A 988a3-8)”295 
 
and the obvious limitation of matter lies basically in the fact that it captures, concretises, 
and actualises worldly possibility in a certain time, space and given quantum of matter 
(and hence only one table can be made out of the materials for one table, a female is 
impregnated at a point in time and as a completed action etc.).  I add that Aristotle 
clearly argues that something’s material being is an essential element of that 
something’s being and “place” in the world in the sense that: “…evidently there are 
many differences; e.g. some things are defined by the way in which their materials are 
combined, as, for example, things which are unified by mixture, as honey-water; or by 
ligature, as a faggot; or by glue, as a book; or by clamping, as a chest; or by more than 
one of these methods.  Other things are defined by their position, e.g. threshold and 
lintel (for these differ in being situated in a particular way); and others by place <or 
direction>, e.g. the winds; others by time, e.g. dinner and breakfast; and others by the 
attributes peculiar to sensible things, e.g. hardness and softness, density and rarity, 
dryness and humidity.  Some are distinguished by some of these differences, and others 
by all of them; and in general some by excess and some by defect (Met. H 1042b16-
25)”. 
I add, however, that we also see the matter has its own specificity and powers 
and limitations on the basis that it always has its own certain quality, as follows: 
 
                                                 
295 Cf. “…nothing passes from the carpenter into the pieces of timber, which are his material, 
and there is no part of the art of carpentry present in the object which is being fashioned: it is 
the shape and the form which passes from the carpenter, and they come into being by means of 
the movement in the material (ἀλλ' ἡ μορφὴ καὶ τὸ εἶδος ἀπ' ἐκείνου ἐγγίνεται διὰ τῆς κινήσεως 
ἐν τῇ ὕλῃ).  It is his soul, wherein is the “form”, and his knowledge which cause his hands (or 
some other part of his body) to move in a particular way (different ways for different products, 
and always the same way for any one product); his hands move his tools and his tools move the 
material (αἱ δὲ χεῖρες τὰ ὄργανα τὰ δ' ὄργανα τὴν ὔλην).  In a similar way to this, Nature acting 
in the male of semen-emitting animals uses the semen as a tool (χρῆται τῷ σπέρματι ὡς 
ὀργάνῳ), as something that has movement in actuality (καὶ ἔχοντι κίνησιν ἐνεργείᾳ); just as 
when objects are being produced by any art the tools are in movement, because the movement 
which belongs to the art is, in a way, situated in them (ἐν ἐκείνοις γάρ πως ἡ κίνησις τῆς τέχνης) 
(GA I 730b11-25)” 
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“…different things can be generated by the moving cause (τὴν κινοῦσαν αἰτίαν) when 
the matter is one and the same, e.g. a chest and a bed from wood.  But some different 
things must necessarily have different matter; e.g. a saw cannot be generated from 
wood, nor does this lie in the power of the moving cause, for it cannot make a saw of 
wool or wood (Met. H 1044a25-30)” 
 
from which we see that Aristotle uses the example of “craft” to make us think about the 
point regarding what it entails to create something in the world296 and, in detail, to show 
us (i) that “matter” is what makes being possible (though with this Aristotelian 
possibility being highly graduated297) but only being possibility in a transitional sense 
on the basis that: “…wood does not make a bed, nor bronze a statue, but something else 
is the cause of the change (ἀλλ᾽ ἕτερόν τι τῆς μεταβολῆς αἴτιον)…the source of motion 
(ὅθεν ἡ ἀρχὴ τῆς κινήσεως) (Met. A 984a24-28)”, (ii) that “matter” is the possibility for 
individuation in the sense that we have in our minds the idea of a table and with this 
idea only being realised through the creation of individual tables in matter and with the 
principle here being that: “…if it comes to be, it is its concrete unity that comes to be 
(οὕτως καὶ ἐπὶ τοῦ τί ἐστι) (Met. Z 1034b12)”, (iii) that the world we experience is a 
composite and entangled world of independent beings in which “…the house and the 
builder do not perish together (Met. Δ 1014a24-25)”, and (iv) that how we engage with, 
use, and shape “matter” through human craft shows us the possibility of creation in the 
world and also the necessary meaningfulness of this creation, i.e. since artistic products 
are evidently not the result of “chance” in any possibly meaningful sense298.  
                                                 
296 Cf. “…a house exists potentially if there is nothing in X, the matter, to prevent it from 
becoming a house (δυνάμει καὶ οἰκία: εἰ μηθὲν κωλύει τῶν ἐν τούτῳ καὶ τῇ ὕλῃ τοῦ γίγνεσθαι 
οἰκίαν)…similarly in all other cases where the generative is external (καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων 
ὡσαύτως ὅσων ἔξωθεν ἡ ἀρχὴ τῆς γενέσεως) (Met. Θ 1049a9-13)” 
 
297 I suggest that the basis for Aristotle’s argument for the gradutated and phased nature of the 
process of realisation is that: “…a thing is potentially all those things which it will be of itself if 
nothing external hinders it.  E.g. the seed is not yet potentially a man; for it must be deposited in 
something other than itself and undergo a change.  But when through its own motive principle it 
has already got such and such attributes, in this state it is already potentially a man (ἤδη τοῦτο 
δυνάμει); while in the former state it needs another motive principle, just as earth is not yet 
potentially a statue (for it must first change in order to become brass) (Met. Θ 1049a13-18)” 
 
298 Remi Brague well explains the importance of “craft” as an example of creation, as follows: 
“The sharpness with which the artificial form emerges from the invisible results in a purer 
manifestation of the possible as such, whereas in natural generation, as in all cyclical processes, 
this possible (dunamis) is never more than an entr’acte between two realities which overshadow 
it… Making is given pride of place because it is the motion that best lends itself to the definition 
put forth: the telos is clearly visible in it (“Aristotle’s Definition of Motion and its Ontological 
Implications” in Graduate Faculty Philosophy Journal (1990) p 15-16)”   
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 If Aristotle’s consideration of “craft” is suggestive and prospecting in the sense 
that it is probing to understand such things as the nature of and context for human 
thought, I suggest that Aristotle’s discussion of (b) “digestion” is much a more direct 
consideration of the nature of “matter”.   In respect to the digestion of food Aristotle’s 
basic principle and emphasis is that matter must be actively transformed by something 
in order to actively become food on the basis of the principle that:  
 
“…food is acted upon by what is nourished by it, not the other way round (ἔτι πάσχει τι 
ἡ τροφὴ ὑπὸ τοῦ τρεφομένου, ἀλλ' οὐ τοῦτο ὑπὸ τῆς τροφῆς) (De An. II 416b1-2)” 
 
and upon the basis that: “…while it is being acted upon it is unlike, but when the action 
is complete, it is like (πάσχει μὲν γὰρ τὸ ἀνόμοιον, πεπονθὸς δ' ὅμοιόν ἐστιν) (De An. II 
417a20-21)” and he argues, further, that it takes both “soul” and “heat” (or “energy”) to 
effect this transformation from one being to another, as follows: 
  
“…the soul-principle in question is a power of preserving what possesses it as an 
individual (τοιαύτη τῆς ψυχῆς ἀρχὴ δύναμίς ἐστιν οἵα σώζειν τὸ ἔχον αὐτὴν ᾗ 
τοιοῦτον), while food prepares it for work (ἡ δὲ τροφὴ παρασκευάζει ἐνεργεῖν).  For 
this reason it cannot continue to exist while deprived of food (διὸ στερηθὲν τροφῆς οὐ 
δύναται εἶναι) …Now all food requires digestion, and that which produes digestion is 
heat (πᾶσαν δ' ἀναγκαῖον τροφὴν δύνασθαι πέττεσθαι, ἐργάζεται δὲ τὴν πέψιν τὸ 
θερμόν); therefore everything which has a soul has heat (διὸ πᾶν ἔμψυχον ἔχει 
θερμότητα) (De An. II 416b27-30)” 
 
and with the matter being transformed from what is proper to one being to what is 
proper to another which Aristotle explains as follows: “What is the matter?  Not fire or 
earth, but the matter proper to man (τίς ἡ ὕλη; μὴ πῦρ ἢ γῆν ἀλλὰ τὴν ἴδιον) (Met. H 
1044b3)”299.  I suggest that Aristotle’s consideration of matter is “biological” rather 
than (merely) “physical” and that this explains why Aristotle places his 
conceptualisation of food (as being basic biological matter) at the very centre of his 
explanation of being.  I add that Aristotle’s account also differs from our own by not 
only being descriptive (and scientific) but also interpretative and conceptual (and 
                                                 
299 Cf. “It is clear that we must posit as many differences of matter as there are bodies (Ὅτι δ' 
ἀναγκαῖον ποιεῖν ἴσας τὰς διαφορὰς αὐτοῖς, δῆλον) (De Cael. IV 312b20)”  
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philosophical) and I suggest that this is clearly how we should be considering the 
matter.      
In respect to this last point let us consider how Aristotle treats “digestion” and 
“nutrition” in more detail below in order to demonstrate the quality and philosophical 
depth of Aristotle’s approach.  In respect to (A) Aristotle’s descriptive account of the 
digestive process we find (i) that the basic physiological structuring of being (of taking 
in food, transforming it, and then – if applicable – excreting the residue) is that:  
 
“All animals have in common the part (κοινὰ μόρια) by which they take in food and the 
part into which they take it.  These parts respectively are either identical, or diverse, in 
the ways already described…In addition to these, the majority of animals have other 
parts in common as well – first, the parts by which they discharge the residue that 
comes from their food…The part by which they take in their food is known as the 
mouth; that into which they take it, the belly; the remaining parts have many different 
names.  Now as the residue is twofold, those animals which have parts to receive the 
fluid residue have also a part for the <residue from the> solid nutriment…Hence, all 
animals which have a bladder have a bowel as well (HA I 488b29-489a7)” 
 
(ii) and that this structuring of being goes hand in hand with a structuring of behaviour 
such that:  
 
“As carnivores, the snakes suck dry whatever animal they take and eject them whole 
with their excrement.  It is much the same with the other animals of similar behaviour, 
for example the spiders; but the spiders suck the juices outside, while the snakes do it 
within their stomach (HA VII 594a12-16)”  
 
(and I note that spiders do liquefy their food before ingesting it and that Aristotle 
discusses other blood-sucking and sap-sucking insects in more detail at HA VII 596b) 
and with Aristotle’s paradigm stripped-back example of nutrition being plants regarding 
which: “Plants get their food from the earth by their roots; and since it is already treated 
and prepared no residue is produced by plants – they use the earth and the heat in it 
instead of a stomach, whereas practically all animals, and unmistakably those that move 
about from place to place, have a stomach, or bag, – as it were an earth inside them – 
and in order to get the food out of this, so that finally after the successive stages of 
concoction it may reach its completion (τέλος), they must have some instrument 
corresponding to the roots of a plant (PA II 650a21-27)”.  
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In respect to (B) the transitional forms – i.e. from description to interpretation – 
of Aristotle’s argument we find (iii) that “nutrition” is both liquid (water) and solid 
(food) (and is concocted through energy), as follows: 
 
`“Everything that grows must of necessity take food (Ἐπεὶ δ' ἀναγκη πᾶν τὸ 
αὐξανόμενον λαμβάνειν τροφήν).  This food is always supplied by fluid and solid 
matter, and the concoction and transformation of these is effected by the agency of heat 
(ἡ δέ τροφὴ πᾶσιν ἐξ ὑγροῦ καὶ ξηροῦ, καὶ τούτων ἡ πέψις γίνεται καὶ ἡ μεταβολὴ διὰ 
τῆς τοῦ θερμοῦ δυνάμεως).  Hence, apart from other reasons, this would be a sufficient 
one for holding that of necessity all animals and plants must have in them a natural 
source of heat (καὶ τὰ ζῷα πάντα καὶ τὰ φυτά, κἂν εἰ μὴ δί ἄλλην αἰτίαν, ἀλλὰ διὰ 
ταύτην ἀναγκαῖον ἔχειν ἀρχὴν θερμοῦ φυσικήν) (PA II 650a3-8)” 
 
(and I note that we must sustain ourselves through earth (food), air, fire (energy), and 
water) and (iv) that “nutrition” is a structured (internal) process which transforms the 
food by converting it into the “fed” being and expelling any unwanted residue from the 
“fed on” being as a “residue”, as follows: 
 
“…there is a receptacle for the food at each of its stages, and also for the residues that 
are produced; and as the blood-vessels are a sort of container for the blood, it is plain 
that the blood (or its counterpart) is the final form of that food in living creatures (τὸ 
αἷμα ἡ τελευταία τροφὴ τοὶς ζῴοις τοῖς ἐναίμοις ἐστί, τοῖς δ' ἀναίμοις τὸ ἀνάλογον).  
This explains why the blood diminishes in quantity when no food is taken and increases 
when it is; and why, when the food is good, the blood is healthy, when bad, poor (PA II 
650a33-650b2)” 
 
from which we see Aristotle building up towards a full philosophical interpretation of 
his description of reality. 
 In respect to (C) Aristotle’s philosophical interpretation of the process of 
nutrition we find that he argues (v) that nutrition is a manifestation of the “nutritive 
soul” in which an organic being extracts its being from the world (just as the “sensitive 
soul” extracts meaning from our worldly environment300 and the “rational soul” extracts 
formal meaning about the world itself) in which one being “masters” and transforms the 
                                                 
300 Cf. “…each sense organ is receptive of the perceived object, but without its matter (τὸ γὰρ 
αἰσθητήριον δεκτικὸν τοῦ αἰσθητοῦ ἄνευ τῆς ὕλης) (De An. III 425b22-4)” 
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being of another being (and expels the redundant form of this other being as excreta) 
into itself, as follows: 
 
“Concoction, in fact, is what happens to everything when its constituent moisture is 
mastered (Συμβαίνει δὲ τοῦτο πάσχειν ἄπασιν, ὅταν κρατηθῇ ἡ ὕλη καὶ ἡ ὑγρότης); for 
this is the material that is determined by a thing’s natural heat, and as long as the 
determining proportion holds a thing’s nature is maintained (ἕως γὰρ ἂν ἐν αὐτῇ ὁ 
λόγος, φύσις τοῦτ ἐστίν).  So urine and excreta and the waste products of the body in 
general are a sign of health, and we say they have been concocted because they show 
that its own inherent heat has mastered the indeterminate matter (ὅτι δηλοῖ κρατεῖν τὴν 
θερμότητα τὴν οἰκείαν τοῦ ἀορίστου) (Mete. IV 379b33-380a4)”  
 
(and note the stipulation that form and substance is dependent upon a “logos” or 
“determining proportion”) and (vi) that we should see “nutrition” as being a pure 
fulfilled paradigm representation of “coming-to-be”, as follows: 
  
“…when nothing perceptible persists in its identity as a substratum, and the thing 
changes as a whole (ὅταν δ' ὅλον μεταβάλλῃ μὴ ὑπομένοντος αἰσθητοῦ τινὸς ὡς 
ὑποκειμένου τοῦ αὐτοῦ) (e.g. the seed as a whole is converted into blood, or water into 
air, or air as a whole into water (ἀλλ' οἷον ἐκ τῆς γονῆς αἷμα πάσης ἢ έξ ὕδατος ἀὴρ ἢ 
ἐξ ἀέρος παντὸς ὕδωρ)), such an occurrence is no longer “alteration”.  It is a coming-to-
be of one substance and a passing-away of the other (GC I 319b14-18)” 
 
and we clearly see from this biological account proof for Aristotle’s philosophical 
principle of formal coming-to-be, of being, and of the need for a completion of natural 
process in something concrete and meaningful on the basis that: “…everything that 
changes is something and is changed by something and into something (πᾶν γὰρ 
μεταβάλλει τὶ καὶ ὑπό τινος καὶ εἴς τι) (Met. Λ 1069b36-1070a1)”301.  I note that we 
have already seen that ideas come-to-be in nature through induction or epagoge, that 
people come to be through experience and growth, and that species come to be through 
the “education of forms” and I suggest that we see generally in nature that there is room 
for and an impulse towards the development of beings which leads them to attain a 
certain completion or perfection in their final forms.   
                                                 
301 Cf. “…every movement is change from something into something (πᾶσα γὰρ κίνησις ἐξ 
ἄλλου εἰς ἄλλο ἐστὶ μεταβολή) (Met. K 1064a31-1068a25)” 
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Regarding the “material character” of substantive being we find with Jonathan 
Beere that:  
 
“In Aristotle’s philosophy, the notion of matter appears to have arisen in connection 
with the notion of change.  The notion of matter does not come up simply by asking 
what things are made out of…Aristotle’s view is that the matter of a composite 
substance is not what the substance is, but that the substance derives a material 
character from its matter.  This material character is like a qualitative property, and, 
accordingly, it is properly specified by an adjective…The box is wooden, where the 
very form of the word indicates that it says what the box is like (ποῖον), not what it is 
(τί)302” 
 
which shows us that Aristotle’s explanation of matter is that he expects the material 
being of something to be shaped by and suited to its environment (and a being’s being 
to be being within an environment) and with this translating perhaps into animal being 
so that a carnivore would exhibit the characteristics required by a carnivore etc. (and 
this is Aristotle’s complex theory of krasis which we sadly cannot delve into here).  
 Moving on to (c) “reproduction” we find that Aristotle actually argues that the 
digestive function is a necessary and connected preliminary to the reproductive function 
in the sense that the flow of nutriment must enter and maintain the mother and then 
produce and maintain the baby and hence we see in principle that: 
 
“Nutrition and reproduction are due to one and the same psychic power (ἐπεὶ δ' ἡ αὐτὴ 
δύναμις τῆς ψυχῆς θρεπτικὴ καὶ γεννητική).  It is necessary first to give precision to our 
account of food, for it is by this function of absorbing food that this psychic power is 
distinguished from all the others (De An. I 416a19-22)”  
 
and also in more detail that: 
 
“…it is only so far as what has soul in it is a “this-somewhat” or substance that food 
acts as food (ᾗ δὲ τόδε τι καὶ οὐσία, τροφή); in that case it maintains the being of what 
is fed, and that continues to be what it is so long as the process of nutrition continues 
(σώζει γὰρ τὴν οὐσίαν, καὶ μέχρι τούτου ἔστιν ἕως ἂν τρέφηται).  Further, it is the agent 
in generation, i.e. not the generation of the individual fed but the reproduction of 
                                                 




another like it (καὶ γενέσεως ποιητικόν, οὐ τοῦ τρεφομένου, ἀλλ' οἷον τὸ 
τρεφόμενον)…Now there are three separate factors [in the fact of nutrition]: the thing 
fed, the means by which it is fed, and the feeding agent (τὸ τρεφόμενον καὶ ᾧ τρέφεται 
καὶ τὸ τρέφον).  The feeding agent is soul in the primary sense; the thing fed is the body 
which contains the soul, and the means by which it is fed is the food (τὸ μὲν τρέφον 
ἐστὶν ἡ πρώτη ψυχή, τὸ δὲ τρεφόμενον τὸ ἔχον ταύτην σῶμα, ᾧ δὲ τρέφεται, ἡ τροφή).  
But since everything should be named in view of its end, and in this case the end is the 
reproduction of the species, primary soul will be that which reproduces another like 
itself (ἡ πρώτη ψυχὴ γεννητικὴ οἷον αὐτό) (De An. II 416b18-26)” 
 
from which we see the profound point that “reproduction” is a continuation of 
“nutrition” on the basis that it is a single material flow of food which sustains both the 
individual, through nutrition, and the species, through reproduction, in the world303.  I 
add in respect to the flow of sustenance that Aristotle goes to considerable lengths – 
which I cannot go into here – to track this flow of matter (as food) and to show that each 
living being must possess the biological and environmental (and maternal) facilities to 
feed at each distinct point in its development and with a statement of this principle 
being that: “Some animals have their primary matter within themselves, having derived 
it from the female parent, e.g. those animals which are produced not viviparously but 
out of larvae or eggs.  Others derive it from the mother for a considerable time by being 
suckled (GA II 733b27-29)”.  I stress here that Aristotle observes – and that he actually 
bases his philosophy upon the principle – that we observe that there must always be a 
flow of food, i.e. of blood, milk, solid food etc., which must be supported at the right 
time by a suitable biological apparatus, i.e. umbilical cord, breast, development of milk 
teeth and then adult teeth etc., and with the nature of and type of this “flow” of food in 
some sense determining the life and nature of the fed being. 
We can, however, go even further and suggest that the desire for food and the 
desire to reproduce seem to be bound up with the nature of “matter” itself and this is the 
concept of “matter” as “mother”, as follows: 
                                                 
303 Cf. “Their [i.e. animals’] activities all have to do with mating or production of young, or with 
the supply of food, or are contrived against periods of cold and heat or the changes of the 
seasons (αἱ δὲ πράξεις αὐτῶν ἅπασαι περί τε τὰς ὀχείας καὶ τεκνώσεις εἰσί, καὶ περὶ τὰς 
εὐπορίας τῆς τροφῆς, καὶ πρὸς τὰ ψύχη καὶ τὰς ἀλέας πεπορισμέναι καὶ πρὸς τὰς μεταβολὰς 
τῶν ὡρῶν).  For all animals have an innate perception of change in respect of hot and cold, and 
just as among humans some move indoors during the winter while others who command 
extensive territory spend the summer in the cold parts and the winter in the warm sunny parts, 




“… the matter is nearly, in a sense is, substance (καὶ τὴν μὲν ἐγγὺς καὶ οὐσίαν πως τὴν 
ὕλην), while the privation in no sense is (τὴν δὲ οὐδαμῶς)… the one which persists is a 
joint cause, with the form, of what comes to be – a mother, as it were (ἡ μὲν γὰρ 
ὑπομένουσα συναιτία τῇ μορφῇ τῶν γιγνομένων ἐστίν, ὥσπερ μήτηρ)… the form 
cannot desire itself, for it is not defective; nor can the contrary desire it, for contraries 
are mutually destructive (καίτοι οὔτε αὐτὸ αὑτοῦ οἷόν τε ἐφίεσθαι τὸ εἶδος διὰ τὸ μὴ 
εἶναι ἐνδεές, οὔτε τὸ ἐναντίον (φθαρτικὰ γὰρ ἀλλήλων τὰ ἐναντία)). The truth is that 
what desires the form is matter, as the female desires the male and the ugly the beautiful 
– only the ugly or the female not per se but per accidens (ἀλλὰ τοῦτ' ἔστιν ἡ ὕλη, ὥσπερ 
ἂν εἰ θῆλυ ἄρρενος καὶ αἰσχρὸν καλοῦ· πλὴν οὐ καθ' αὑτὸ αἰσχρόν, ἀλλὰ κατὰ 
συμβεβηκός, οὐδὲ θῆλυ, ἀλλὰ κατὰ συμβεβηκός) (Phys. I 192a5-25)” 
 
from which we see (a) that Aristotle insists upon a triad of “form”, “matter”, and 
“being” in which “matter” is in a sense a “mother” and that he suggests that other 
philosophers fail to accurately represent nature precisely owing to their failure to 
accommodate this desiring “mother” – i.e. this creative pathway for being – in their 
picturing of the world304 (b) that we can almost viscerally feel how Aristotle’s account 
of being through matter is messy, biological, individual, and worldly and is not just 
formal and mathematical though we encounter the complexity here that “eternal” being 
is in some sense purely formal since it has “not matter for generation…but motion from 
one place to another (Met. Λ 1069b27)”305 and (c) that it is only by positing “matter” 
and “potentiality” that we can meaningfully posit “that there is something divine, good, 
and desirable” in the world which beings such as individual human beings can “desire 
and yearn for” 306. 
                                                 
304 I note that Carl Jung comments that: “The word “matter” remains a dry, inhuman, and purely 
intellectual concept…How different was the former image of matter – the Great Mother – that 
could encompass and express the profound emotional meaning of the Great Mother (The Earth 
Has a Soul: C.G. Jung on Nature, Technology & Modern Life (Berkeley, [orig. 1964] 2002) p 
2)” and that: “It makes no substantial difference whether you call the world principle male and a 
father (spirit) or female and a mother (matter) (Ibid. p 85).” 
 
305 Aristotle’s admittance on this point does not, however, lead him to excuse philosophers who 
conflate eternal with sublunary principles, as follows: “Philosophy has become mathematics for 
modern thinkers, although they profess that mathematics is only to be studied as a means to 
some other end (Met. A 992a33-992b2)” 
 
306 Nicolas Berdyaev articulates well the visceral nature of our human being, as follows: 
“Yearning always indicates something lacking and movement towards the fullness of life.  
There is a tormenting yearning of sex.  Sex is yearning; and this yearning cannot be finally 
overcome in the everyday objective world, for in that world final wholeness is not attainable; 
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As regards a modern parallel of Aristotle’s approach to “matter” I suggest that 
A.N. Whitehead explains how “matter” seems to be obviously uncontroversial “stuff” 
until we come to consider the matter of matter philosophically, as follows:  
 
“Nature suggests for our observation gaps, and then as it were withdraws them upon 
challenge.  For example, ordinary physical bodies suggest solidity.  But solids turn to 
liquids, and liquids and gases.  And from the gas the solid can again be recovered.  Also 
the most solid of solids is for certain purposes a viscous fluid.  Again impenetrability is 
a difficult notion.  Salt dissolves in water, and can be recovered from it.  Gases interfuse 
in liquids.  Molecules arise from a patterned interfusion of atoms.  Food interfuses with 
the body, and produces an immediate sense of diffused bodily vigour.  This is especially 
the case with liquid stimulants307”.  
  
and as regards “our” contrary material-ism and individual-ism we see that Whitehead 
comments that he is opposed to:  
 
“…the grand doctrine of nature as a self-sufficient, meaningless complex of facts.  It is 
the doctrine of the autonomy of physical science.  It is the doctrine which in these 
lectures I am denying.  The state of modern thought is that every single item in this 
general doctrine is denied, but that the general conclusions from this doctrine as a whole 
are tenaciously retained.  The result is a complete muddle in scientific thought, in 
philosophic cosmology, and in epistemology.  But any doctrine which does not 
implicitly presuppose this point of view is assailed as unintelligible308” 
 
on the basis that: “The word detail lies at the heart of the whole difficulty.  You cannot 
talk vaguely about “Nature” in general.  We must fix upon details within nature and 
discuss their essences and their types of inter-connection.  The world around is 
complex, composed of details309” and with this power to force our ideas upon the world 
                                                 
that wholeness which the way out from the subjectivity of sex demands (Slavery and Freedom 
(London, 1943) p 53).” 
 
307 Whitehead, A.N. Adventures of Ideas (Harmondsworth, 1933) p 240.  (and regarding the 
Heraclitean idea that “Nature loves to hide (B123 DK)” see Shimon Malin’s Nature Loves to 
Hide: Quantum Physics and the Nature of Reality, a Western Perspective (Singapore, 2012) – 
and also Sam Nico’s review of this book) 
 
308 Whitehead, A.N. “Nature Lifeless” in Modes of Thought (New York, 1938) p 132   
  
309 Whitehead, A.N. Ibid. p 127.  I add that Whitehead argues in this lecture that: “…the Hume-
Newton situation is the primary presupposition for all modern philosophic thought.  Any 
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as –isms being the problem inherent in our minds’ ability to select, simplify, and 
abstract from the world and it is precisely this problem of “idealism” that we will 
encounter in our consideration of Aristotle’s conceptualisation of “noetic matter”.    
 As regards the problem of material-ism I suggest, first, that it is a form of 
idealism and, second, that Aristotle clearly understands the problem in relation to Plato 
(see Met. M 1078b12-17) that by reducing the world to Heraclitean flux we will 
produce the error of materialism (of seeing the world as “flux”) and also the error of 
idealism (of over-emphasising the importance of our minds in the world).  In respect to 
the problem inherent both in materialism and idealism (which are, as we have said, two 
sides of the same coin) I note the position of Jacques Ellul that: 
 
“For propaganda to succeed, a society must first have two complementary qualities: it 
must be both an individualist and a mass society…an individualist society must be a 
mass society, because the first move towards liberation of the individual is to break up 
the small groups that are an organic fact of the entire society.  In this process the 
individual frees himself completely from family, village, parish, or brotherhood bonds – 
only to find himself directly vis-à-vis the entire society.  When individuals are not held 
together by local structures, the only form in which they can live together by local 
structures, the only form in which they can live together is in an unstructured mass 
society.  Similarly, a mass society can only be based on individuals – that is, on men in 
their isolation, whose identities are determined by their relationships with one another.  
Precisely because the individual claims to be equal to all other individuals, he becomes 
an abstraction and is in effect reduced to a cipher310” 
 
and with Ellul arguing regarding “materialism” (as mechanisation) of modern society 
explicitly as follows: “He [i.e. modern man] has been liberated little by little from 
physical constraints, but he is all the more the slave of abstract ones.  He acts through 
intermediates and consequently has lost contact with reality.  The interested reader may 
                                                 
endeavour to go behind it is, in philosophic discussion, almost angrily rejected as unintelligible 
(Ibid. p 135)” which is, of course, still broadly the situation prevailing today.   I add further that 
Whitehead argues in this lecture – actually from c. 1934 – that seeing genes as “pellets of 
matter” is false on the basis that: “…no a priori argument as to inheritance of characters can be 
drawn from the mere doctrine of genes.  In fact recently physiologists have found that genes are 
modified in some respects by their environment (Ibid. p 139)” which is a correction which has 
been fully accepted by modern science but which is clearly still resisted in modern philosophy 
on doctrinal grounds. 
  
310 Ellul, Jacques Propaganda: The Formation of Men’s Attitudes (New York, 1965) p 90 
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wish to consult Friedmann’s admirable work concerning the separation of the worker 
from his material.  Man as worker has lost contact with the primary element of life and 
environment, the basic material out of which he makes what he makes.  He no longer 
knows wood or iron or wool.  He is acquainted only with the machine.  His capacity to 
become a mechanic has replaced his knowledge of his material; this development has 
occasioned profound mental and psychic transformations which cannot yet be 
assessed311”.  I add that Ellul also comments on our “scientism” as follows: “…the 
scientist moves unconsciously toward the sphere of what is known scientifically, and 
tries to limit the whole question to that…The “scientific” position frequently consists of 
denying the existence of whatever does not belong to the current scientific method312” 
and I comment that it is interesting that the modern philosophical claim that we are 
hard-headed realists is itself actually a form of narcissistic idealism.  We will consider 
the problem of our various –isms when we come to consider Aristotle’s “noetic matter” 



















                                                 
311 Ellul, Jacques The Technological Society (New York, 1964) p 325 
 




17 Aristotle on Noetic Matter 
  
 I suggest that we can easily extrapolate from our previous discussion of matter 
and see that Aristotle’s “noetic matter” will possess two basic characteristics, namely (i) 
that it will represent a channelling for thought just as “perceptible matter” is a 
channelling for bodily being and (ii) that it will represent a “taking” from or abstraction 
from the world of mental objects just as nutrition is a “taking” of matter from other 
beings as food, and as our sensation is a “taking” in of data about the world through our 
various senses313.   
Before we move on to consider Aristotle’s full position on “noetic matter” (such 
as it is) let us first set the context by considering how we think about the world and how 
this might affect our ability to relate to the Aristotelian position on “noetic matter”.  I 
take our expected standardised (philosophical) approach to the world to be a mix of 
emotivism and intellectualism which I will describe as “pragmatism” and which is 
reflected in Richard Rorty’s thought, as follows:  
 
“We no more know “the nature of mind” by introspecting mental events than we know 
“the nature of matter” by perceiving tables.  To know the nature of something is not a 
matter of having it before the mind, of intuiting it, but of being able to utter a large 
number of true propositions about it314” 
 
and so as to show that Rorty is indeed an end product of our worldview I add that we 
can easily go back from his modern “pragmatism” to “the Hume-Newton situation” 
which, according to Whitehead, is: “…the primary presupposition for all modern 
philosophic thought.   Any endeavour to go behind it is, in philosophic discussion, 
almost angrily rejected as unintelligible315” and then back to the Kantian position which 
is explained by Josef Pieper, as follows: 
                                                 
313 I suggest that we can see the literalness and physicality of Aristotle’s account of our human 
world by observing that “choice” is described (following the etymology) as a “taking”, as 
follows: ““Choice” is “taking” (ἡ γὰρ προαίρεσις αἵρεσις μὲν ἐστίν) (E.E. II 1226b7)” whereas 
our “habits” as “hexeis” are (also following the etymology) a “having”. 
 
314 Rorty, Richard “Mind as Ineffable” in Richard Q. Elvee (ed.) Mind in Nature; Nobel 
Conference XVII (San Francisco, 1982) p 69 
  
315 Whitehead, A.N. “Nature Lifeless” in Modes of Thought (New York, 1938) p 135 
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“According to Kant man’s knowledge is realised in the act of comparing, examining, 
relating, distinguishing, abstracting, deducing, demonstrating – all of which are forms 
of active intellectual effort.  Knowledge, man’s spiritual intellectual knowledge (such is 
Kant’s thesis) is activity, exclusively activity316” 
 
and then back further to Descartes’ position which is that: “…a man who walks across a 
room shows much better what motion is than a man who says “It is the actuality of a 
potential being in so far as it is potential”, and so on317”.  In outline, then, I suggest that 
this modern man is reasonably well defined as an individual actively applying himself to 
the (inert) world and with this one-sided anthropocentrism having replaced the 
reflective engagement with the world which preceded it.   
I add, however, that a different distinct dimension of our modern philosophical 
position is brought home by Ladislav Kvasz in his consideration of the history of our 
engagement with mathematical abstraction, as follows: 
 
“Mathematical abstractions are unable to offer causal explanations.  Galileo yielded to 
this Aristotelian argument.  What he aimed [at] in his physics was a purely 
mathematical description of phenomena and he completely gave up the ambition of 
offering explanations of their causes.  In this way he accepted the role Aristotle had 
allotted to mathematics.  He was probably convinced that science can do no more than 
offer a precise mathematical description of the studied phenomena.  Descartes did not 
shrink from the Aristotelian challenge. On the contrary, he welcomed it. According to 
Descartes a mathematical explanation of phenomena is possible, because the 
mathematical form, i.e. extension, is the ontological basis of nature. Therefore a 
mathematical description of the phenomena is the description of the causal basis of the 
world and a mathematical explanation is a causal explanation. In other words, Descartes 
raised the geometric form to the ontological level, he converted mathematical form into 
physical substance. Mathematics does not abstract anything, as Aristotle believed. It 
grasps the ontological essence of things, because extension and motion form the 
ontological essence of bodies. Thus according to Descartes not only the particular 
physical quantities are mathematical. The ontological basis of the physical world is 
                                                 
 
316 Pieper, Josef Leisure the Basis of Culture (London, [orig. 1947] 1965) p 26 
 
317 Descartes, René  “Letter To Mersenne 16th October 1639”, CSM III §597, p 139 
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mathematical as well. Descartes thus passed from the Galilean idealization of the 
particular physical quantities to the idealization of the ontological foundation of the 
world318” 
 
and with Kvasz explaining further that: “When Descartes says that everything can be 
reduced to extension and motion, it means that mathematics is the ontological 
foundation of reality.  So geometry is not just a language suitable for the descripition of 
reality, as it was for Galileo.  Reality itself is [for Descartes] nothing else but 
mathematical bodies in motion319” and that: “[for Descartes] We do not apply 
mathematics to nature; nature itself is mathematical320”.  I repeat my initial supposition 
here that our thinking is a mixture of emotivism and intellectualism and I suggest that 
the emotitivst component is derived from the sensualism and empiricism of the Humean 
approach, that the intellectualist component is derived from the mathematicism of the 
Cartesian approach, and that in neither of these perspectives do we actually engage with 
the world rather than with our abstractions regarding and our feelings about the world. 
Moving forwards from Descartes we see that his “clear and distinct” ideas have 
become the “true” propositions about the material world which signify the mix of 
                                                 
318 Kvasz, Ladislav “The Mathematisation of Nature and Cartesian Physics” in Philosophia 
Naturalis (2003) 
 
319 Kvasz, Ladislav Ibid.   
 
320 Kvasz, Ladislav Ibid.  I note that Kvasz interestingly assesses Galileo’s famous (and 
strikingly Platonic) explanation of nature, that: “Philosophy is written in that great book which 
ever lies before our eyes — I mean the universe — but we cannot understand it if we do not first 
learn the language and grasp the symbols, in which it is written. This book is written in the 
mathematical language, and the symbols are triangles, circles and other geometrical figures, 
without whose help it is impossible to comprehend a single word of it; without which one 
wanders in vain through a dark labyrinth (The Assayer (1623))” as being a limited halfway 
house toward full abstraction, as follows: “…the failure of Galileo’s project of mathematisation 
of nature by triangles and circles, by means of which the book of nature is allegedly written, 
shows the inadequacy of ancient mathematics for the mathematisation of nature (“Heidegger’s 
Interpretation of Mathematical Science in the Light of Husserl’s Concept of Mathematization in 
the Krisis” in Philosophia Naturalis (2013) p 344)” and with the full transformation being, 
according to Kvasz, that: “…Galileo studied ordinary objects of everyday experience, and 
represented only some of their aspects in a mathematical form.  Descartes replaced all ordinary 
objects by his extended things, and identified them with space.  Finally Newton showed that this 
Cartesian identification is a mistake, and he took as the characterisation of the thingness of the 
things not extension but hardness (i.e. forces) (Ibid. p 346)” (and see also Pierre Duhem’s To 
Save the Phenomena: An Essay on the Idea of Physical Theory from Plato to Galileo (Chicago, 
[orig. 1908] 1969)). 
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intellectualism and empiricism that we encounter in modern pragmatism (as instanced 
by Richard Rorty) which is outlined by A.N Whitehead as follows: 
 
“One distortion stands out immediately…[and this is that] the substratum with its 
complex of inherent qualities is wrongly conceived as bare realisation, devoid of self-
enjoyment, that is to say, devoid of intrinsic worth.  In this way, the exclusive reliance 
on sense-perception promotes a false metaphysics.  This error is the result of high-grade 
intellectuality.  The instinctive interpretations which govern human life and animal life 
presuppose a contemporary world throbbing with energetic values.  It requires 
considerable ability to make the disastrous abstraction of our bare sense-perceptions 
from the massive insistency of our total experiences.  Of course, whatever we can do in 
the way of abstraction is for some purposes useful – provided that we know what we are 
about321” 
 
and I add regarding the nature of matter itself that the main problem we face is that of 
Newtonianism the terms of which Robert Rosen explains as follows: 
 
“…it would never occur to an ancient that life was something that needed to be 
explained.  As noted at the outset, it was in fact the rise of Newtonian mechanism, and 
its success in celestial mechanics, that provided the credibility for an entirely different 
view of the world, the “modern” view.  In that view, there was no room for a distinction 
between animate and inanimate; indeed, the distinction itself disappeared.  It was only 
then that a need for an explanation of life became manifest; indeed, life was now to be 
explained in terms of the same mechanics that had previously explained the motions of 
the comets, the planets, and the stars, for there now was no other accepted mode of 
explanation…Hence the allure of the machine metaphor322”   
 
which correctly (in my view) suggests that the one-sided mechanical reductionism that 
we encounter in the thought of Newton and Descartes – which reduces the world to 
matter, mechanics, mind, and science – has actually created a whole modern worldview 
in its image.   
                                                 
321 Whitehead, A.N. Adventures of Ideas (Harmondsworth, 1933) p 254-5 
 
322 Rosen, Robert Life Itself: A Comprehensive Inquiry Into the Nature, Origin, and Fabrication 
of Life (New York, 1991) p 182-3 
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I also add that we end up with a dispute over the very nature of “reason” (and 
hence “nous”) and of “intellectualism” and “objectivism” which Edmund Husserl 
explains, as follows:  
 
“I…am certain that the European crisis has its roots in a misguided rationalism.  But we 
must not take this to mean that rationality as such is evil or that it is of only subordinate 
significance for mankind’s existence as a whole.  Rationality, in that high and genuine 
sense of which alone we are speaking, the primordial Greek sense which in the classical 
period of Greek philosophy had become an ideal, still requires, to be sure, much 
clarification through self-reflection; but it is called in its mature form to guide [our] 
development.  On the other hand we readily admit (and German Idealism preceded us 
long ago in this insight) that the stage of development of ratio represented by the 
rationalism of the Age of Enlightenment was a mistake, though certainly an 
understandable one323”  
 
and with Husserl’s conclusion being that: “The reason for the failure of a rational 
culture…lies not in the essence of rationalism itself but solely in its being rendered 
superficial, in its entanglement in “naturalism” and “objectivism”324”.  I have assumed 
that it must be in the context of such a critique of our thinking that we should look to 
unpack our notions of “matter” and of “being” and see how they compare with 
Aristotle’s. 
 Moving back (finally) to Aristotle to set the context within his philosophy for his 
concept of “noetic matter” I argue that the critical difference between the Aristotelian 
and the Cartesian world picture is that the Cartesian world is simply reducible to 
mathematics whereas for Aristotle and for the Greeks generally we find that we must 
uncover the truth of substances and with this process of revealing being the famous 
literal meaning of aletheia or “truth”.  I suggest that the hard mathematical world of 
Descartes is very different than Aristotle’s tentative inference of a powerful ordering 
force of nature which our thought to some extent draws its being from and also imitates 
and to some extent sees unclearly and derivatively in the sense that: 
 
                                                 
323 Husserl, Edmund “The Vienna Lecture” in The Crisis of European Sciences and 
Transcendental Philosophy: An Introduction to Phenomenological Philosophy (Evanston, [orig. 
1935] 1970) p 290   
 
324 Husserl, Edmund Ibid. p 299 
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“…when we are able to render an account in accordance with the appearance (ἐπειδὰν 
γὰρ ἔχωμεν ἀποδιδόναι κατὰ τὴν φαντασίαν) of the consequent attributes (περὶ τῶν 
συμβεβηκότων), either all or some of them, then we shall also be able to speak 
excellently about the substance (περὶ τῆς οὐσίας) (De An. I 402b21-25)” 
 
and with the problem inherent in seeing the world through mathematical, idealistic, and 
abstract structures being explained by Aristotle as that: 
 
“…the mathematician… treats of these things [but] does not treat of them as the limits 
of a physical body (ἀλλ' οὐχ ᾗ φυσικοῦ σώματος πέρας ἕκαστον); nor does he consider 
the attributes indicated as attributes of such bodies.  That is why he separates them; for 
in thought they are separable from motion (χωριστὰ γὰρ τῇ νοήσει κινήσεώς ἐστι), and 
it makes no difference, nor does any falsity result, if they are separated.  The holders of 
the theory of Forms do the same, though they are not aware of it; for they separate the 
objects of physics, which are less separable than those of mathematics (Phys. II 
193b31–194a1)”325 
 
and with Aristotle’s own thought and philosophy seeking to cleave to the structures (and 
beings) of nature itself on the basis that: 
 
“Natural science deals with the things that have a principle of movement in themselves 
(ἡ μὲν οὖν φυσικὴ περὶ τὰ κινήσεως ἔχοντ᾽ ἀρχὴν ἐν αὑτοῖς ἐστίν); mathematics is 
theoretical, and is a science that deals with things that are at rest, but its subjects cannot 
exist apart (ἡ μὲν οὖν φυσικὴ περὶ τὰ κινήσεως ἔχοντ᾽ ἀρχὴν ἐν αὑτοῖς ἐστίν)…[and in 
reality] every movement is change from something into something (πᾶσα γὰρ κίνησις ἐξ 
ἄλλου εἰς ἄλλο ἐστὶ μεταβολή) (Met. K 1064a31-1068a25)”  
 
from which we see that whereas we take for granted the application of our ideas upon 
the world and its reduction to mathematics and to science we find that Aristotle argues 
                                                 
325 Cf. “…the mathematician makes a study of abstractions (ὁ μαθηματικὸς περὶ τὰ ἐξ 
ἀφαιρέσεως τὴν θεωρίαν ποιεῖται)…for in his investigations he first abstracts everything that is 
sensible (περιελὼν γὰρ πάντα τὰ αἰσθητὰ θεωρεῖ), such as weight and lightness, hardness and 
its contrary, and also heat and cold and all other sensible contrarieties, leaving only quantity and 
continuity (τὸ ποσὸν καὶ συνεχές) – sometimes in one, sometimes in two and sometimes in three 
dimensions – and their affections qua quantitative and continuous, and does not study them with 
respect to any other thing; and in some cases investigates the relative positions of things and the 
properties of these, and in others their commensurability or incommensurabilty, and in others 
their commensurability, and in others their ratios; yet nevertheless we hold that there is one and 
the same science of all these things, viz. geometry (Met. K 1061a28-1061b3)” 
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that the reducibility of formalism is a problem on the basis that our abstractions are 
imperfect and partial representations of a complex world.  I note here that we clearly see 
that our mathematical formalism is inherent in the idealism of Plato’s Theory of Forms 
which Aristotle, is, of course, seeking to contradict. 
With this essential contrast between “realism” and “idealism” in mind, then, let 
us move on to consider the nature of Aristotle’s “noetic matter” by explaining first that 
it is “unknowable”, as follows:  
 
“…matter is itself unknowable (ἡ δ᾽ ὕλη ἄγνωστος καθ᾽ αὑτήν).  Some matter is 
sensible and some [noetic] (ὕλη δὲ ἡ μὲν αἰσθητή ἐστιν ἡ δὲ νοητή) (Met. Z 1036a9)”  
 
and with Aristotle explaining his reasonsing for separating out two types of this 
“unknowable” matter, namely “perceptible” and “noetic” matter, as follows: 
 
“…perceptible matter being for instance bronze and wood and all matter that is 
changeable (αἰσθητὴ μὲν οἷον χαλκὸς καὶ ξύλον καὶ ὅση κινητὴ ὕλη), and intelligible 
matter being that which is present in perceptible things not qua perceptible, i.e. the 
objects of mathematics (νοητὴ δὲ ἡ ἐν τοῖς αἰσθητοῖς ὑπάρχουσα μὴ ᾗ αἰσθητά, οἷον τὰ 
μαθηματικά) (Met. Z 1036a10-12)”  
 
which reasonably observes that there is reason to believe that  there is a structuring of 
being which is not emergent from “perceptible matter” but which still needs to be 
accounted for in any explanation of worldly being.  I also note that it makes sense that 
we should perceive “perceptible matter” through our senses and that we should intellect 
“noetic matter” through our mind and I add that it makes no sense  to merely assert that 
other kinds of matter do not exist other than “perceptible matter” because we cannot 
perceive them.  
In respect to this unseeable “something” we ultimately see that Aristotle 
assumes that our thought is itself something which must have its own manifestation in 
the world and which should therefore be expected to have its own “medium” which 
Aristotle names as “noetic matter”.   As regards our mind or “nous” – i.e. our reflection 
upon and representation of the world through art and science and, importantly, our 
ability to interact with our fellow man in society – I suggest that Aristotle’s overall 
position is that our thought is a clear instantiation of and reflection of the “nous” that we 
find generally expressed in the world.  As regards the worldly nature of “nous” I 
suggest that it follows from Aristotle’s concept of “nous” that we see the world as a 
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“noosphere” and as a medium through which the world has the meaning which makes 
“ousia” possible and through which we also “see” these formal constructions.  It is, I 
suggest, hence that Aristotle answers a question regarding the relationship between part 
and whole, i.e. “…why are the formulae of the semicircles not part of the formula of the 
circle? (Met. Z 1036b34)”, as follows:  
 
“…there will be matter in some sense in everything which is not essence or form 
considered independently, but a particular thing (καὶ παντὸς γὰρ ὕλη τις ἔστιν ὃ μὴ ἔστι 
τί ἦν εἶναι καὶ εἶδος αὐτὸ καθ᾽ αὑτὸ ἀλλὰ τόδε τι).  Thus the semicircles will be parts 
not of the universal circle but of the particular circles, as we said before – for some 
matter is sensible, and some intelligible (Met. Z 1037a1-5)”  
 
and with Aristotle arguing elsewhere that:  
 
“Some matter is intelligible and some sensible, and part of the formula is always matter 
and part actuality; e.g. the circle is a plane figure (ἔστι δὲ τῆς ὕλης ἡ μὲν νοητὴ ἡ δ᾽ 
αἰσθητή, καὶ ἀεὶ τοῦ λόγου τὸ μὲν ὕλη τὸ δὲ ἐνέργειά ἐστιν, οἷον ὁ κύκλος σχῆμα 
ἐπίπεδον) (Met. H 1045a34-36)” 
 
which suggests that Aristotle’s position is that perceptible “matter” is “passive” and 
general and that “form” is “active” and locally instantiated in parts, wholes, and 
individuals, and with the wider suggestion being that there must be something else other 
than mere physical matter to provide the determination for matter to become something.  
I ultimately suggest, then, that Aristotle’s general conclusion on “noetic matter” is that 
the “forms” and also “actuality” must imbue nature through the medium of “noetic 
matter” (and through “nous”) in a parallel sense as that the principle of “substance” is 
itself a medium for formal being326.   
As regards the individual and human nature of “nous” we find that human 
thought has its own existence, depth, and space and reaches its own maturity and 
concreteness in the sense that:  
 
                                                 
326 Cf. “It would seem…that this “something else” is something that is not an element, but is the 
cause that this matter is flesh and that a syllable, and similarly in other cases (δόξειε δ᾽ ἂν εἶναι 
τὶ τοῦτο καὶ οὐ στοιχεῖον, καὶ αἴτιόν γε τοῦ εἶναι τοδὶ μὲν σάρκα τοδὶ δὲ συλλαβήν: ὁμοίως δὲ 
καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων).  And this is the substance of each thing, for it is the primary cause of its 




“…everything which has not matter is indivisible (ἢ ἀδιαίρετον πᾶν τὸ μὴ ἔχον ὕλην) – 
as human thought, or rather the thought of composite beings, is in a certain period of 
time (for it does not possess the good at this moment or that (οὐ γὰρ ἔχει τὸ εὖ ἐν τῳδὶ ἢ 
ἐν τῳδί), but its best, being something different from it, is attained only in a whole 
period of time (ἀλλ᾽ ἐν ὅλῳ τινὶ τὸ ἄριστον, ὂν ἄλλο τι), so throughout eternity is the 
thought which has itself for its object (Met. Λ 1075a7-10)”  
 
from which we see that Aristotle envisages the deepening of our thought over time (as 
individuals and multigenerationally as societies) as being a drawing at the well of an 
“eternal” meaningfulness.  I add that we also see that the human “idea” itself is also 
“separable” from its individual particulars and has its own separate being – and hence 
comes-into-being – on the basis that: “Nor, indeed, can any Idea be defined; for the Idea 
is an individual, as they say, and separable (τῶν γὰρ καθ᾽ ἕκαστον ἡ ἰδέα, ὡς φασί, καὶ 
χωριστή) (Met. Z 1040a8-9)”.  We see, then, that “nous” covers the meaning that we 
find expressed in and through human beings and that it also covers the meaning that we 
find in the world generally.  Aristotle’s view is that we cannot explain the phenomena 
that we experience in the material world in purely material terms and that we must 
therefore posit the existence of a parallel formal and mental or non-material world 
which informs this material world.  It is hence that “noetic matter” becomes a necessary 
posit for Aristotle. 
As regards Aristotle’s need to posit the theory of “noetic matter” we find that 
this concept provides the basis for Aristotle’s explanation for three key “unknowables” 
in his schema of the world – i.e. “matter” which is “…unknowable in itself (ἡ δ᾽ ὕλη 
ἄγνωστος καθ᾽ αὑτήν) (Met. Z 1036a8-9)” and “substance” and “being” regarding 
which: “…the question which was raised of old, and is always the subject of doubt, viz. 
“What is being? (τί τὸ ὄν)”, is just the question, “What is substance? (τίς ἡ οὐσία)” 
(Met. Z 1028b2-4)” – and that it does so by means of a further “unknowable”, i.e. 
“nous”, regarding which: 
 
“…it is right to say that we cannot undertake to try to discover a starting-point (a first 
principle) (ἀρχὴ) in all things and everything…for of course the first principle (ἀρχὴ) 
does not admit of demonstration (ἀπόδειξις), but is apprehended by another mode of 
cognition (ἄλλη γνῶσις) [i.e. “nous”] (GA II 742b30-34)”   
 
and with this “nous” being explained elsewhere as that:  
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“Mind in the passive sense is such because it becomes all things (πάντα γίνεσθαι), but 
mind has another aspect in that it makes all things (πάντα ποιεῖν); this is a kind of 
positive state like light (ὡς ἕξις τις, οἷον τὸ φῶς); for in a sense light makes potential 
into actual colours.  Mind in this sense is separable, impassive and unmixed, since it is 
essentially an activity (καὶ οὗτος ὁ νοῦς χωριστὸς καὶ ἀπαθὴς καὶ ἀμιγής, τῇ οὐσίᾳ ὢν 
ἐνέργεια); for the agent is always superior to the patient, and the originating cause to the 
matter (ἀεὶ γὰρ τιμιώτερον τὸ ποιοῦν τοῦ πάσχοντος καὶ ἡ ἀρχὴ τῆς ὕλης) (De An. III 
430a15-19)” 
 
and I note that Aristotle routinely suggests in other places that “nous” has some form of 
independent being327 and I suggest that we can unpack the solid nature of the 
“particular” into “form” and “matter” on the basis that: “…the proximate matter and the 
shape are one and the same (ἡ ἐσχάτη ὕλη καὶ ἡ μορφὴ ταὐτὸ καὶ ἕν) (Met. H 1045b18-
19)” and infer the wider picture that: “…that which is capable of receiving the object of 
thought, i.e. the substance, is thought.  And it is active when it possesses the object (τὸ 
γὰρ δεκτικὸν τοῦ νοητοῦ καὶ τῆς οὐσίας νοῦς, ἐνεργεῖ δὲ ἔχων) (Met. Λ 1072b22-
23)328”.  We see, then, that the basis of Aristotle’s argument is that thought is something 
(and also potentiality) which should be seen to be like or comparable to the material 
matter through which we physically find and shape the world. 
I add that Aristotle’s envisaging of this mental and also living “world” is not as 
radical or as arcane as it may at first appear to be and I comment that it is reflected in 
such (excellent) modern thinking Walter Elsasser’s “biotonic laws”, Jakob von 
Uexküll’s concept of the Umwelt, and Karl Popper’s “third world” which he explains as 
follows: 
 
“We live in a world of physical bodies, and we ourselves have physical bodies.  When I 
speak to you, however, I am addressing myself not to your bodies but to your minds.  
So in addition to the first world, the world of physical bodies and their physical and 
                                                 
327 Cf. “It remains, then, that reason alone enters in, as an additional factor from outside, and 
that it alone is divine, because physical activity has nothing to do with the activity of reason 
(λείπεται δὴ τὸν νοῦν μόνον θύραθεν ἐπεισιέναι καὶ θεῖον εἶναι μόνον· οὐτοῦ τῇ ἐνεργείᾳ 
κοινωνεῖ σωματικὴ ἐνέργεια) (GA II 736b 27-29)”   
 
328 Cf. “…knowledge, like knowing, is spoken in two ways – as potential and as actual (ὧν τὸ 
μὲν δυνάμει τὸ δὲ ἐνεργείᾳ).  The potentiality, being, as matter, universal and indefinite, deals 
with the universal and indefinite (ἡ μὲν οὖν δύναμις ὡς ὕλη τοῦ καθόλου οὖσα καὶ ἀόριστος τοῦ 
καθόλου καὶ ἀορίστου ἐστίν); but the actuality, being definite, deals with a definite object, - 
being a “this”, it deals with a “this” (ἡ δ᾽ ἐνέργεια ὡρισμένη καὶ ὡρισμένου, τόδε τι οὖσα τοῦδέ 
τινος) (Met. M 1087a15-19) 
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physiological states, which I will call “world 1”, there seems to exist a second world, 
the world of mental states, which we will call “world 2”.  And so the question arises 
concerning the relationship between these two worlds, the world 1 of physical states or 
processes and the world 2 of mental states or processes.  This question is the body-mind 
problem…Thus I can describe myself as a Cartesian dualist.  In fact I am doing a little 
better than even Descartes: I am a pluralist, for I also accept the reality of a third world, 
which I will call “world 3”…By “world 3” I mean, roughly, the world of the products 
of our human minds.  These products are sometimes physical things such as the 
sculptures, paintings, drawings, and buildings of Michelangelo.  These are physical 
things, but they are a very peculiar kind of physical things: in my terminology they 
belong to both the worlds 1 and 3.  Some other products of our minds are not precisely 
physical things.  Take a play by Shakespeare.  You may say that the written or printed 
book is a physical thing like, say, a drawing.  But the performed play is clearly not a 
physical thing, though perhaps it may be said to be a highly complex sequence of 
physical events.  But now please remember that no single performance of Hamlet can 
be said to be identical with Shakespeare’s play Hamlet itself.  Nor is Shakespeare’s play 
the class or set of all of its performances329” 
 
and I add that Erwin Schrödinger argues in respect to “mind”  that: “…what we call 
thought (1) is itself an orderly thing, and (2) can only be applied to material, i.e. to 
perceptions or experiences, which have a certain degree of orderliness330” and that 
Werner Heisenberg argues in respect to “form” that: 
 
“…what is thus found as a result of an interaction, of any action, is not always objects, 
but forms – forms of that energy which is the fundamental basic material of modern 
physics, capable of taking different forms in which we recognise objects331” 
 
and I note that Heisenberg also finds “…a certain intermediate layer of reality, halfway 
between the massive reality of matter and the intellectual reality of the idea or the 
                                                 
329  Popper, Karl “Knowledge: Objective and Subjective” in Knowledge and the Body-Mind 
Problem: In defence of interaction (London, [orig. 1969]1994) p 4-5   
 
330 Schrödinger, Erwin What is Life? The Physical Aspect of the Living Cell (Cambridge [orig. 
1944] 1967) p 10 
 
331 Heisenberg, Werner “Planck’s discovery and the philosophical problems of atomic physics” 
in On Modern Physics (New York, 1961) p 31.   
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image”332 and we find that his subtlety regarding the physical world translates into the 
intellectual and cultural dispute between Newton to Goethe and a situation in which 
against: “…objective reality, proceeding according to definite laws and binding even 
when appearing accidental and without purpose, there stands opposed that other reality, 
important and full of meaning for us.  In that reality events are not counted but weighed, 
and past events not explained but interpreted333.” 
 Regarding the critical concept of “form” I note that Jerry Fodor and Massimo 
Piattelli-Palmarini recommend the “…return of the laws of form334” on the basis that: 
“When very similar morphologies (Fibonacci series and Fibonacci spirals) are observed 
in spiral nebulae, in the geometrical arrangement of magnetically charged droplets in a 
liquid surface, in seashells, in the alternation of leaves on the stalks of plant stems and 
in the disposition of seeds in a sunflower, it can hardly be that natural selection is 
responsible…It is the result of the laws of physics and chemistry creating constraints on 
possible biological forms, more particularly on stable and reproducible biological 
forms.  That is what, basically, the expression “laws of form” tries to capture335.  
Regarding the critical concept of “mind” (and “matter”) I add that David Bohm argues 
that:  
 
“…the quantum theory, which is now basic, implies that the particles of physics have 
certain primitive mind-like qualities which are not possible in terms of Newtonian 
concepts (though, of course, they do not have consciousness).  This means that on the 
basis of modern physics even inanimate matter cannot be fully understood in terms of 
Descartes’ notion that it is nothing but a substance occupying space and constituted of 
separate objects.  Vice versa, it will be argued that mind can be seen to have always a 
physical aspect, though this may be very subtle336” 
 
                                                 
332 Heisenberg, Werner Ibid. p 10 
 
333 Heisenberg, Werner “Goethe and Newton on Colour” in Philosophical Problems of Modern 
Physics (Woodbridge, [orig. 1941] 1979)  p 68 
 
334 Fodor, Jerry & Piattelli-Palmarini, Massimo What Darwin Got Wrong (London, 2011) p 72 
 
335 Fodor, Jerry & Piattelli-Palmarini, Massimo Ibid. p 73 
 
336 Bohm, David “A new theory of the relationship of mind and matter” in Philosophical 
Psychology (1990) p 272 (and see also Harald Atmanspacher’s “Dual-Aspect Monism à la Pauli 
and Jung” in Journal of Consciousness Studies (2012))  
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and in conclusion I add that John Smythies argues that: “…phenomenal space and 
physical space are simply different spaces, different parallel universes337” on the basis 
that:  
 
“…a large number of experiments in psychophysics…demonstrate beyond any doubt 
that, in vision, we do not perceive the world as it actually is, but as the brain computes it 
most probably to be…Visual sensations are not parts of external objects, as the Direct 
Realist theory holds, but are televisual-like constructions of the representative 
mechanisms of perception…Thus phenomenal consciousness must be allotted its own 
real space – phenomenal space.  This may be identical with some aspect of brain space 
(however this has to be demonstrated and not simply taken for granted) but not with any 
aspect of external physical space338” 
 
and with Smythies’ reasonable conclusion being that: “…a consciousness may have its 
own space-time system and its own system of ontologically independent and 
spatiotemporally organised events (sensations and images) that have as much right to be 
called “material” as do protons and electrons339”.  As regards the value of these above 
“alternative” viewpoints from eminent thinkers I hope that they show that there is 
nothing radical about challenging Humean positions which are maintained, I suggest, 
not because they are correct but because they are convenient or in taking Aristotle’s 
“alternative” positions seriously. 
 Now, I suggest that there is a real ongoing philosophical discussion regarding 
what matter actually is and there is also a real ongoing scientific discussion regarding 
what counts as matter, what antimatter is, whether we need to posit a “multiverse” etc.  
In short, then, if anything is clear about “matter” as we currently understand it it is that 
                                                 
337 Smythies, John “Space, Time, and Consciousness” in Journal of Consciousness Studies 
(2003) p 51 
  
338 Smythies, John Ibid. p 49 
 
339 Smythies, John Ibid. p 55.  I comment that Smythies also notes that: “…traditional Hindu 
psychology states that humans are compounded of an extended physical body made of ordinary 
matter and of an extended psyche made of another form of matter too diaphanous to be detected 
by ordinary instruments (Ibid. p 47)” and that Carl Jung asserts that: “When in the course of our 
own development we grow out of many-sided contradictions and achieve a unified personality, 
we experience something like a complicated growing-together of the psyche.  Since the human 
body is built up by inheritance out of a number of Mendelian units, it does not seem altogether 
out of the question that the human psyche is similarly put together (“Archaic Man” in Modern 
Man in Search of a Soul (London, [orig. 1933] 1961) p 170). 
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we should not simply reduce it to “extended” material stuff on a Cartesian or Newtonian 
conceptual basis340.  On this basis, then, let us consider Stephen Gaukroger’s 
explanation of Aristotle’s “noetic matter” as that our thought in respect to the world – 
and our “ideas” about it – is something in the world which possesses its own “matter” 
and its own qualities in the sense that:  
 
“Aristotle’s doctrine of abstraction (ἀφαίρεσις)… [means that] When mathematical 
attributes such as numbers are defined in terms of the physical objects possessing those 
attributes they clearly have sensible matter as their matter.  When they are defined 
independently of such objects their matter is what Aristotle terms ὕλη νοητή, noetic or 
“intelligible” matter… Mathematical abstraction is distinctive in that it is a twofold 
process: we must abstract the mathematical properties of the object or collection by 
disregarding what it is that has those properties (i.e. the matter), but there is also a 
second part to the abstraction in which we disregard the properties of sensible objects 
so that what has these properties becomes the object of investigation.  These two parts 
of the abstraction taken together yield mathematical properties and a noetic matter of 
which these are the properties.  In abstracting numbers we “detach” them from sensible 
things, but it is an essential characteristic of numbers (and geometrical figures) that they 
be properties, so we must therefore “attach” them to something else; otherwise they 
would be “free floating” properties, so to speak, and this is as impossible in the case of 
numbers as it is in the case of kinds341” 
 
and let us compare Aristotle’s position as above with William James’ assessment as 
below which is based upon the “pragmatic method342” and which asserts that: “There 
is…no aboriginal stuff or quality of being, contrasted with that of which material 
objects are made, out of which our thoughts of them are made343”. 
                                                 
340 Michael Lockwood argues on this point that: “The Newtonian concept of matter is 
incorrect…and it is high time that philosophers began properly to take on board the conception 
that has replaced it.  Quantum mechanics…has robbed matter of its conceptual quite as much as 
its literal solidity (Mind Brain & the Quantum: The Compound “I” (Oxford, 1989) p ix)” 
 
341 Gaukroger, Stephen “The One and the Many: Aristotle on the Individuation of Numbers” in 
The Classical Quarterly (1982) p 318-9 
 
342 James, William “Does “Consciousness” Exist?” in The Journal of Philosophy (1904) p 481 
 
343 James, William Ibid. p 478 
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We find that William James argues that once we desubstantivise 
“consciousness” and see it merely as being some some sort of emergence then we can 
effectively seek to delegitimise this intangible altogether, as follows: “I believe that 
“consciousness,” when once it has evaporated to this estate of pure diaphaneity, is on 
the point of disappearing altogether.  It is the name of a nonentity, and has no right to a 
place among first principles.  Those who still cling to it are clinging to a mere echo, the 
faint rumour left behind by the disappearing “soul” upon the air of philosophy344” and 
with James’ subsequent suppositions being as follows: 
 
“My thesis is that if we start with the supposition that there is only one primal stuff or 
material in the world, a stuff of which everything is composed, and if we call that stuff 
“pure experience,” the knowing can easily be explained as a particular sort of relation 
towards one another into which portions of pure experience may enter… [and] if we 
take conceptual manifolds, or memories, or fancies, they also are in their first intention 
mere bits of pure experience, and, as such, are single thats which act in one context as 
objects, and in another context figure as mental states345” 
 
which shows us the natural movement (and non sequitur) from arguing that if 
something is immaterial or, rather, is not physically perceptible then it does not exist.   
As regards how James’ assessment relates to Gaukroger’s assessment of 
Aristotle’s “noetic matter” we find that James puts replicates his position, as follows: 
“We operate…by physical subtraction…[and t]his supposes that the consciousness is 
one element, moment, factor - call it what you like - of an experience of essentially 
dualistic inner constitution, from which, if you abstract the content, the consciousness 
will remain revealed to its own eye. Experience, at this rate, would be much like a paint 
                                                 
344 James, William Ibid. p 477.  I note by contrast that Aryeh Kosman explains Aristotle’s 
“nous” as follows: “Aristotle’s god is not a scientist, nor a philosopher, and divine thought is 
not a form of cosmic ratiocination or brilliantly articulated scientific theory.  For θεωρία is not 
theory; it is simply the principle of awareness (prior to its later thematization as interiority), the 
(divine) full self-manifesting and self-capturing activity of consciousness, of which scientific 
activity and philosophical speculation are to be sure particularly subtle forms, but of which the 
ruder and more incorporate activities of perception and nutrition are equally images, if meaner 
and less noble, and of which indeed – and this is after all simply the doctrine of Metaphysics, 
culminating in book 12 – the essential being of all things, the formal principle of their being 
what they are, which constitutes their intelligible essence, is also a mode (“What Does the 
Maker Mind Make?” in Virtues of Thought: Essays on Plato and Aristotle (Cambridge Mass., 
[orig. 1992] 2014) p 135)” 
 
345 James, William Ibid. p 478-482  
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of which the world pictures were made346”.  As regards James’ own position, however, 
we find that he rejects the idea that our mind “paints” in the world, as follows:  
 
“…my contention is exactly the reverse of this. Experience, I believe, has no such inner 
duplicity; and the separation of it into consciousness and content comes, not by way of 
subtraction, but by way of addition347”  
 
and with James insisting that: “Consciousness connotes a kind of external relation, and 
does not denote a special stuff or way of being. The peculiarity of our experiences, that 
they not only are, but are known, which their “conscious” quality is invoked to explain, 
is better explained by their relations - these relations themselves being experiences - to 
one another348”.  Ultimately, then, I suggest that the contrast we find between James 
and Aristotle is that James argues that we do not actively interpret the world but merely 
passively accumulate its experiences but that Aristotle argues that we are determinate 
beings with an internal world which actively move in the world and I note that this 
distinction arises from a disagreement over the need for “noetic matter”. 
 The distinction we encounter above is, of course, stark.  We see that Aristotle 
asserts the active and creative involvement of man in a world in which “The faculty of 
thinking…thinks the forms in the images (τὰ μὲν οὖν εἴδη τὸ νοητικὸν ἐν τοῖς 
φαντάσμασι νοεῖ) (De An. III 431b2-3)” and I add that he argues that we must recognise 
that when we speak about such formal “intangibles” we are not merely talking about the 
numbers and / or language (and “mind”) which our modern philosophers are willing to 
recognise (I note that Aristotle actually regards number and word as being exceptional 
and to some extent misleading examples of “intangibles”; see Cat. 4b28-39).  We find, 
rather, that Aristotle is referring to an immense wealth of the “intangible” which 
includes poetry, melody, art, logic, form, good, science, thought, love, meaning etc. 
which all possess natural structures, means, and objects which cannot be accounted for 
– or dismissed – as random individual accumulations of experience349.   We see that 
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349 See Francis Wolff’s “The Three Pleasures of Mimēsis According to Aristotle’s Poetics” in 
Bernadette Bensuade-Vincent & William R. Newman (eds.) The Artificial and the Natural: An 
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James, on the other hand, regards man as a passive, material, and plastic being who 
merely regurgitates the world he experiences and whose thought can be explained as 
being a literal mirroring of the physical external world in the sense that: 
 
“Why…do we call a fire hot, and water wet, and yet refuse to say that our mental state, 
when it is “of” these objects, is either wet or hot? “Intentionally,” at any rate, and when 
the mental state is a vivid image, hotness and wetness are in it just as much as they are 
in the physical experience350” 
 
and I add that this strangely mechanical, literal, and disembodied worldview – which 
perhaps merely extends Descartes’ account of soulless mechanical animals to human 
beings – is importantly reflected in the very history and structure of Western science 
itself in the sense that Mae Wan-Ho explains, as follows: “The standard procedure is to 
grind up the organisms or cells to a pulp, or “homogenate” [and]…it only gradually 
dawned on us that the cell is highly structured351”.  I conclude on the basis of the views 
outlined above that we can clearly discern the existence of two very different mental 
“worlds” and I suggest that the very existence of these consistent and expansive mental 
“worlds” supports Aristotle’s posit that we must account for – even if aporetically – the 
existence of a shared mental energy or “noetic matter” in which our shared world of 
thought, imagery, and culture subsists which we can reasonably call a “noosphere”.    
As regards Aristotle’s approach to the world I suggest that we see here, as 
elsewhere, a willingness to posit unknowables in order to maintain the shape and 
accuracy of our total worldview.  Namely, I suggest that we have previously seen in 
respect to memory or touch or food that Aristotle argues that we discriminate and we 
take what we want from the world on a range of different levels, through a range of 
means, and through a range of different “matters”.  I add in respect to nutrition that we 
are acting upon the world by extracting our matter from it, that in respect to sensation 
we are balancing or maintaining ourselves in the world, whereas in respect to thought 
we are acting upon the world in the sense that we are actively shaping it and imposing 
ourselves upon it.  I conclude that we are, following Aristotle, simply considering the 
                                                 
350 James, William “Does “Consciousness” Exist?” in The Journal of Philosophy (1904) p 488-
89 
 
351 Ho, Mae-Wan The Rainbow and the Worm: The Physics of Organisms (Singapore, 1993) p 
93-94 (and see also Robert Rosen’s “On the Strategy of Relational Modelling” in Life Itself: A 
Comprehensive Inquiry Into the Nature, Origin, and Fabrication of Life (New York, 1991) and 
David Bohm’s “On the Subjectivity and Objectivity of Knowledge” in Beyond Chance and 
Necessity ed. John Lewis (London, 1974)) 
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force and power which is in things (both as physical and non-physical forces) and I 
suggest regarding James that his attempt to reduce the world to pragmatic description 
which denudes nature of meaning and invests it in ourselves is merely a way to redefine 
this force as merely being our force or will. 
As regards this intellectual force I note that the Greek term “deinotēs” means 
both terribleness and cleverness  and that Aristotle’s position which takes this duality 
seriously (for which see N.E. VI 1144a23-30) contrasts significantly with the position 
of Sigmund Freud who maintains that:  
 
“Civilisation has little to fear from educated people and brainworkers.  In them the 
replacement of religious motives for civilised behaviour by other, secular motives 
would proceed unobtrusively; moreover, such people are to a large extent themselves 
vehicles of civilisation352” 
 
with this contrast showing us the contrast between Aristotle’s “ancient” position (a) that 
our picture of the world is precisely that, a picturing or channelling exhibiting force and 
focus, (b) that ideas have power and (c) that these ideas can be forceful and also 
forcefully destructive353 and Freud’s “modern” position which accepts the force of ideas 
and of intellectuals and assumes that they are vehicles of civilisation and progress.  I 
suggest that the possibility which Aristotle raises (and which other philosophers may 
wish to ignore) is that the application of our thought through our various narrow 
progressive –isms may actually serve to mutilate and degrade their objects of affection 
e.g. think about what happens when “social” becomes social-ism, “individual” becomes 
individual-ism, feminine becomes “femin-ism”, “intellectual”  becomes intellectual-ism, 
                                                 
 
352 Freud, Sigmund The Future of an Illusion in Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund 
Freud, vol. XXI (London, [orig. 1927] 2001) p 39 
 
353 I suggest that Mircea Eliade correctly finds this combination of “cleverness” and 
“terribleness” reflected in our modern world, as follows: “…the phenomenon of colonisation 
was part of the baroque style.  The love of power and the frenzy to enjoy this power.  
Colonisation and Puritanism are two poles of the baroque.  On the one hand, the slave trader; on 
the other hand, the Puritan – or, on the one hand, the will to gain wealth as rapidly as possible 
(and by all the means available); on the other hand, the mystical doctrine of the Quakers.  The 
will to power – outward or inward (No Souvenirs: Journal, 1957-1969 (London, 1978) p 200)”.  
On the terribleness of the bored intellectual and the reason why philosophy is so important as an 
occupation for intellectuals who otherwise may interfere in politics see Elizabeth Shaw’s 
“Aristotle on the Fullness of Social Living” in The Imaginative Conservative (online, 2014) 
(and see also Werner Heisenberg’s “Goethe and Newton on Colour” in Philosophical Problems 
of Modern Physics (Woodbridge, [orig. 1941] 1979)). 
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“positive” becomes “positiv-ism”, “material” becomes material-ism, “function” 
becomes functional-ism, “situation” becomes “situation-ism”, “environment” becomes 
“environmental-ism”, “selection” becomes selection-ism, “physical” becomes physical-
ism etc. etc. ad nauseam.  I will take the liberty here of christening this rule as 
“Jackson’s law of intellectual mutiliation”. 
 Now, as regards the meaning and origin of the problem of intellection that I have 
set out above I will seek to show below that our worldview fundamentally hinges upon 
our conceptual understanding of “God” and also upon how our thought in respect to 
“God” has changed over time.  We see that G.W.F. Hegel shows us how our viewpoint 
is derived from the West’s Christian background, as follows:  
 
“There can be no doubt that the essential Christian definition of freedom and of 
individuality, which as free is infinite within itself and is personality, has misled the 
understanding into conceiving the individualisation of finitude in terms of the category 
of a subsisting unchangeable atom, and of overlooking the element of the negative that 
resides in power and its general system354” 
 
and I add that Ladislav Kvasz also explains well that our picture of the world is based 
upon and derived from our picturing of “God” on the basis that: 
 
“…monotheistic theology with its idea of an omniscient and omnipotent God, who 
created the world, indirectly influenced the process of this mathematicisation.  In 
separating ontology from epistemology, monotheistic theology opened the possibility to 
explain all of the ambiguity connected to these phenomena as a result of human finitude 
and so to understand the phenomena themselves as unambiguous, and thus accessible to 
mathematical description355” 
 
and with Kvasz explaining the construction of our world picture further by adding that: 
“Determinism and randomness are two aspects of the same reality.  Determinism is the 
ontological side and probability the epistemological side of the same world.  According 
to Laplace, the world is absolutely determinisitic, but to the human mind, it is opened 
only in a probabilistic way…In his Scholium generale, Newton characterised the 
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355 Kvasz, Ladislav “The Invisible Link Between Mathematics and Theology” in Perspectives 
on Science and Christian Faith (2004) p 112 
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absolute space as Sensorium Dei.  Therefore the possibility of its mathematicisation 
originates in God’s perfection.  To humans, only the relative, empirical space is 
accessible356”.   
If this is our modern picture of reality, however, we also find that Kvasz adds 
regarding the ancient picture of reality that:  
 
“…the ancient notions of apeiron, tyché, kenón, and kinesis were much broader than our 
modern notions of infinity, randomness, space, and motion, which became the bases of 
the new mathematical disciplines.  Today we strictly discriminate between the infinite 
and the indeterminate, between randomness and fate, between emptiness and space, 
between motion and change.  Thus from the ancient notions, which were broad and 
ambiguous, narrow and specific parts were separated, and it was only these narrower 
notions that were mathematicised357” 
 
which shows us that this narrowing of our concepts historically went hand-in-hand with 
the focussing of our intellectual power and that this focussed and mechanical power has 
driven the modern world for better and for worse.   I posit that we see both the simple 
directed power of the thought of thinkers such as Newton and Descartes and also that 
the confusion, dogmatism, and dissimulation which permeates our modern thinking has 
arisen from out of the confusion which necessarily arises from the attempt to marry an 
idea such as “hypothesis non fingo” with an insistence that the world is created by an 
omniscient “God”358. 
 Now, let us expand upon Ladislav Kvasz’s valuable assessment of the difference 
between ancient and modern concepts by recognising (a) that we have seen this 
difference in respect to the terms symmetry, mean, proportion, priority which have a 
purely mathematical significance in our worldview but have a much wider value-laden 
and worldly or substantive significance in Aristotle’s and (b) that we also see that this 
                                                 
356 Kvasz, Ladislav Ibid. p 114-115 
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358 In respect to “dissimulation” we see that Descartes is willing to argue (and note the “not 
seem to support the opinion”) that: “Moving force is the force of God Himself conserving as 
much displacement in matter as He put in it at the first moment of creation … And this force in 
created substance is its mode, but it is not a mode in God; but this being somewhat above the 
understanding of the common run of mind, I have not wanted to deal with the question in my 
writings so as not to seem to support the opinion of those who consider God as a world-soul 
united to matter (“To More, August 1649”, CSM III §404, p 381)” 
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difference in respect to the richness of concepts applies to all the terms we have 
considered such as “mind”, “desire”, “choice”, “pleasure”, “development” etc. which 
are concepts that we treat in purely descriptive and scientific way but which Aristotle 
(also) treats in a wider transcendent and philosophical sense.  We can also add that we 
see this distinction in respect to the concept of “number” itself as Rémi Brague explains, 
as follows:   
 
“A schema is the way something holds (echein) together.  In this sense, an arithmos is 
like a figure…The term arithmos here designates not so much number as an expression 
of quantity, but rather the structure realised by the elements that draw together…[and] 
the articulation [of movement] is both the act of unifying and the act of 
dividing…Arithmos is not viewed as what makes counting possible, but as what a 
collection must possess in order to be a collection, and thus in order to be counted.  
Articulation alone makes enumeration possible… Time “advances” down the middle, 
through the present that simultaneously ejects the past and the future.  The “movement” 
of time is centrifugal359” 
 
and we also see that Imre Lakatos identifies our flattened take on “number” that: 
“Mathematics has been trivialised, derived from indubitable, trivial axioms in which 
only absolutely clear and trivial terms figure, and from which truth pours down in clear 
channels.  Concepts like “continuity”, “limit”, etc. gave way to concepts like “natural 
number”, “class”, “and”, “or” etc.  The “arithmeticisation of mathematics” was a most 
wonderful Euclidean achievement360” and that Paul Feyerabend draws out this 
comparison further, as follows: “Nowhere has Lakatos shown that the aims of modern 
science (progress with the help of “anticipations of the mind”) are better than the aims 
of Aristotelian science (absorption of facts into a stable body of basic theory; “saving” 
the phenomena), and that they are reached more efficiently361”.   
                                                 
359 Brague, Rémi “On Aristotle’s Formula ὅ ποτε ὄν: Physics IV.11, 14” in Claudia Baracchi 
(ed.) The Bloomsbury Companion to Aristotle (London, [orig. 1982] 2013) p 82-84 
 
360 Lakatos, Imre “Infinite Regress and Foundations of Mathematics” in Proceedings of the 
Aristotelian Society (1962) p 166 
 
361 Feyerabend, Paul “Theses on Anarchism” in For and Against Method (Chicago, 1999) p 117.  
On the Cartesian “problem” see also Emily Grosholz’s Cartesian Method and the Problem of 
Reduction (Oxford, 1991), Richard Hassing’s “History of Physics and the Thought of Jacob 
Klein”, The New Yearbook for Phenomenology and Phenomenological Philosophy XI (2012), 
and Katherine Brading’s “Autonomous Patterns and Scientific Realism” in Philosophy of 
Science (2010).  I also note Imre Lakatos’ argument around the principle that: “When in science 
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I add further on this subject that David Bohm arrives at “Aristotelian” positions 
on “form” by recognising the: “…formal cause…[and that] what is involved [here] is 
not a mere form imposed from without, but rather an ordered and structures inner 
movement that is essential to what things are.  Any such formative cause must evidently 
have an end or product which is at least implicit362” and also on “mind” regarding 
which: 
 
“My suggestion is that at each stage the proper order of operation of the mind requires 
an overall grasp of what is generally known, not only in formal, logical, mathematical 
terms, but also intuitively, in images, feelings, poetic usage of language, etc.  (Perhaps 
we could say that this is what is involved in harmony between the “left brain” and the 
“right brain”.)  This kind of overall way of thinking is not only a fertile source of new 
theoretical ideas: it is needed for the human mind to function in a generally harmonious 
way363” 
 
and with Bohm ultimately ending up seeing “nous” or “mind” as a heightened form of 
“sensation” which is reminiscent of Aristotle’s “agchinoia”, as follows: 
 
“The perception of whether or not any particular thoughts are relevant or fitting requires 
the operation of an energy that is not mechanical, an energy that we shall call 
intelligence…Suddenly, in a flash of understanding, one may see the irrelevance of 
one’s way of thinking about the problem, along with a different approach in which all 
the elements fit in a new order and in a new structure.  Clearly, such a flash is 
essentially an act of perception, rather than a process of thought…though later it may 
be expressed in thought.  What is involved in this act is perception through the mind of 
abstract orders and relationships such as identity and difference, separation and 
connection, necessity and contingency, cause and effect, etc…If intelligence is to be an 
unconditioned act of perception, its ground cannot be in structures such as cells, 
molecules, atoms, elementary particles, etc…The actual operation of intelligence is thus 
                                                 
one wants to prove everything from below, one has first to redefine, reconstruct, everything in 
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beyond the possibility of being determined or conditioned by factors that can be 
included in any knowable law364” 
 
and I add further that Bohm (paralleling Husserl365) also seeks to explain why our 
thought has ossified in the way that it has by considering the shift from the ancient 
concept of “proportion” to the modern concept of “measure”, as follows: “…as time 
went on, this notion of measure gradually began to change, to lose its subtlety and to 
become relatively gross and mechanical.  Probably this was because man’s notion of 
measure became more and more routinized and habitual, both with regard to its outward 
display in measurements relative to an external unit and to its inner significance as 
universal ratio relevant to physical health, social order, and mental harmony.  Men 
began to learn such notions of measure mechanically, by conforming to the teachings of 
their elders or their masters, and not creatively through an inner feeling and 
understanding of the deeper meaning of the ratio or proportion which they were 
learning366”. 
 Regarding “reason” as “nous” and “noetic matter”, then, I ultimately concur 
with Russell Winslow’s conclusion that:  
 
“…nous does not have attributes, it does not have an organ, it does not have shape, 
except as the form in potency of what it perceives.  Nous is the most primordially open 
part of the soul.  It can become any intelligible thing that works upon it.  If there is such 
a thing as primary matter in Aristotle, from this description it would seem that, rather 
than some sort of lowly material substrate, nous – the highest potency in the cosmos – is 
a kind of primary matter.  After all, nous can potentially become all forms, for 
Aristotle: “…it will be said that the soul is a place of forms, except that this is not the 
whole soul but the noetic soul, and it is not the form in its entelecheia, but in potency 
(De An. III 429a 28)367”  
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and I suggest regarding “matter” and “mind” that the Aristotelian idea that there are 
numerous “powers” in the world and that: “It is clear that we must posit as many 
differences of matter as there are bodies (De Cael. IV 312b20)” is only shocking or 
even subject to challenge if we assume or seek to assert that the world reduces to one 
elemental principle such as “God” or physical “matter”.   
Regarding “science” and our modern standard “scientific” worldview I suggest 
that Aristotle’s posit of “noetic matter” is itself both a reasonable scientific posit and is, 
more importantly, a philosophical necessity as a placeholder through which we can 
properly represent our real, observed human situation just as the much maligned 
concept of the “ether” should actually also be retained and posited to explain our 
physical situation, as the physicist Robert B. Laughlin explains, as follows: 
 
“Relativity actually says nothing about the existence or nonexistence of matter 
pervading the universe, only that any such matter must have relativistic 
symmetry….About the time relativity was becoming accepted, studies of radioactivity 
began showing that the empty vacuum of space had spectroscopic structure similar to 
that of ordinary quantum solids and fluids.  Subsequent studies with large particle 
accelerators have now led us to understand that space is more like a piece of window 
glass than ideal Newtonian emptiness.  It is filled with “stuff” that is normally 
transparent but can be made visible by hitting it sufficiently hard to knock out a part.  
The modern concept of the vacuum of space, confirmed every day by experiment, is a 
relativistic ether.  But we do not call it this because it is taboo368”   
 
and I add regarding this “taboo” that the insistence upon holding outdated Newtonian 
and Cartesian philosophical concepts of matter (as considered above) is due to the fact 
that it supports a certain “positivist” philosophical worldview.  I add further that the 
attempt to reduce “truth” to “being able to utter a large number of true propositions369” 
is also a manifestation of the same narrow and reductionist “positivist” thinking which 
debases our philosophy, science, and politics.   
                                                 
368 Laughlin, Robert B. A Different Universe: Reinventing Physics from the Bottom Down (New 
York, 2005) p. 120-121 (and see Johann Rafelski and Berndt Müller’s The Structured Vacuum: 
Thinking About Nothing (Deutsch, 1985) esp. pps 172-3 and Christopher Decaen’s “Aristotle’s 
Aether and Contemporary Science” in The Thomist (2004)). 
 
369 Rorty, Richard “Mind as Ineffable” in Richard Q. Elvee (ed.) Mind in Nature; Nobel 
Conference XVII (San Francisco, 1982) p 69 
 
 228 
Alternatively, I suggest that Michel Foucault offers us a rich and focussed 
philosophical assessment of man through consideration of a series of “focal points of 
experience” and “kairoi370” or “opportune moments” as follows: 
 
“…by “thought” I meant an analysis of what could be called focal points of experience 
in which forms of a possible knowledge (savoir), normative frameworks of behaviour 
for individuals, and potential modes of existence for possible subjects are linked 
together371”  
 
and with examples of these “opportune moments” being as follows:  
 
“The movement of the soul that Seneca describes with Platonic images is, I think, very 
different from the movement found in Plato, and it arises from a quite different spiritual 
framework or structure.  You see first of all that in Seneca’s description of this 
movement of the soul as, in fact, a kind of uprooting from the world, a transition from 
darkness to light, etcetera, there is no recollection, even if reason recognises itself in 
God.  What is involved is a journey over the world, an investigation into the things of 
the world and their causes, rather than a rediscovery of the soul’s essence.  There is no 
question of the soul withdrawing into itself and questioning itself in order to discover 
within itself the memory of the pure forms it had once seen.  Rather, what is involved is 
really seeing the things of the world, of really grasping their details and organisation372”   
                                                 
370 Foucault, Michel The Government of Self and Others (Basingstoke, [orig. 1982-3] 2010) p 
224 
 
371 Foucault, Michel Ibid. p 3 
 
372 Foucault, Michel The Hermeneutics of the Subject (New York, [orig. 1981-2] 2005) p 281.  I 
note that Foucault also argues along these lines that: 
 
“Whereas the Platonic movement consisted in turning away from this world in order to 
look towards another – even if souls, who, through recollection, have rediscovered and 
savoured the reality they have seen, are led more by force than by their own will back to 
this world in order to govern it – the Stoic movement defined by Seneca is completely 
different.  It involves a sort of stepping back from the point we occupy.  This liberation 
enables us to reach the highest regions of the world without, as it were, ever losing 
being out of sight.  We reach the point from which God himself sees the world, we see 
the world to which we belong and consequently can see ourselves within this world 
(Ibid. p 276)” 
 
and that: “…the spiritual exercise of Marcus Aurelius tends towards a sort of dissolution of 
individuality, whereas the function of Seneca’s spiritual exercise – with the subject’s move to 
the world’s summit from where he can grasp himself in his singularity – was, rather, to found 
and establish the subject’s identity, its singularity and the stable being of the self it constitutes 
(Ibid. p 307).” 
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and I suggest that our highly abstract but contentless worldview is the logical result of 
our history in which the Greeks imbued the world with meaning, the Christians 
attributed this meaning to “God”, and then the moderns denied existence to this “God”.  
I add that we can follow Foucault and find a shift from “memory” (finding ourselves) to 
“meditation” (understanding ourselves) to “method” (manipulating ourselves)373 and 
also see a contrast between (A) (modern) methodical man as a constructed thing in a 
“flux space374” organised or driven by “laws” of nature (“atoms and the void”) and (B) 
(Aristotelian) meditative man as a natural and en-formed and individual human being in 
time and space.   
I ultimately suggest in this philosophical context that there is nothing in 
Aristotle which is unreasonable – even his concept of “noetic matter”, the idea that there 
are many (material) “worlds”, and the idea that there is “noosphere” in which the 
richness of our culture, thought, and history is contained etc. – and also that the real 
problem we face is not excessive speculation but is, rather, the attempt to control and 
restrict what can and cannot be said to a narrow, outdated, and self-serving framework 
of reference regarding which Roger Scruton comments, as follows: “[Richard] Rorty 
was paramount among those thinkers who advance their own opinion as immune to 
criticism, by pretending that it is not truth but consensus that counts, while defining the 









                                                 
 
373 Cf. Foucault, Michel The Hermeneutics of the Subject (New York, [orig. 1981-2] 2005) p 
460 
 
374 Benoist, Alain de “On Identity” in éléments (2004) p 59.  I am reminded of Jacques Ellul’s 
argument that we live in a system characterised by authoritarianism within anarchy and hence 
that: “…what we actually observe is a technical order, but within a growing chaos (“The Present 
and the Future” in Perspectives on our Age (Toronto, [orig. 1981] 2004) p 56)” 
 




18 Aristotle on God 
 
 We ultimately arrive at Aristotle’s view of “God” and of the “divine” regarding 
which we can begin by setting the context by considering that Aristotle argues that we 
have no personal relationship with “God” in the general sense that:   
 
“…forasmuch as certain of the lower animals also dream, it may be concluded that 
dreams are not sent by God (θεóπεμπτα), nor are they designed for this purpose [to 
reveal the future].  They have a supra-natural aspect (δαιμóνια), however, for nature 
[their cause] is δαιμονíα [supra human], though not itself divine (ἡ γὰρ φὺσἱς δαιμονíα, 
αλλ' οὐ θεíα) (Div. 463b12-15)” 
 
and that: “…nothing is thought to be any longer either good or bad for the dead (N.E. V 
1115a27)” from which we see that Aristotle argues that we cannot draw the inference 
that we have some relationship with “God” such as that “He” sends dreams or allows us 
to live after death376.  I add that we see that Aristotle concedes that “nature” has a “supra 
human” or “daemonic” aspect (this reminding us of Socrates’ “daemon”) but also 
argues against Plato’s personalisation of “divinity” as “eternal men (ἀνθρώπους 
ἀϊδίους)” (Met. B 997b11)377 on the basis that we can maintain our wonder in the 
mystery of being only by actively avoiding normalising “God” by conflating our 
representations of the world with the world itself and, ultimately, by conflating “God” 
with ourselves.   
I suggest further that Aristotle’s evident caution leaves us with the question 
regarding “…whether a centaur or god exists (Post. An. II 89b33-34)” and with how 
exactly we can think about something which is beyond the range of our senses and is 
something that we can imagine or infer but not directly know, as follows: 
 
                                                 
376 Cf. “…those things are noble which which it is possible for a man to possess after death 
rather than during his lifetime, for the latter involve more selfishness…[and we should strive 
for] success gained not for oneself, but for others…in a word, all acts of kindness (τὰ 
εὐεργετήματα), for they are disinterested (οὐ γὰρ εἰς αὑτόν) (Rhet.I 1367a1-6) (and see Robert 
Mayhew’s “Aristotle on Prayer” in RHIZAI (2007)). 
 
377 Cf. “It is absurd to suppose that purpose (ἕνεκά του γίγνεσθαι) is not present because we do 
not observe an agent deliberating (τὸ κινοῦν βουλευσάμενον) (Phys. II 199b26-28)”  
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“How can one prove the essence (τὸ τί ἐστιν)?  Anyone who knows what “man” or any 
other thing is (τὸ τί ἐστιν) must also know that it is (ὅτι ἐστιν); because no one knows 
what a non-existent thing is (τὸ γὰρ μὴ ὂν οὐδεὶς οἶδεν ὅτι ἐστίν).  (He may know the 
meaning of a phrase, or of a name if, e.g., I speak of a unicorn; but it is impossible to 
know what a unicorn is) (ἀλλὰ τί μὲν σημαίνει ὁ λόγος ἢ τὸ ὄνομα, ὅταν εἴπω 
τραγέλαφος, τί δ' ἐστὶ τραγέλαφος ἀδύνατον εἰδέναι) (Post. An. II 92b4-8)” 
 
and I suggest that Stephen Menn follows Aristotle’s subtleties here well, as follows:  
 
“For Aristotle, as for Plato, “it is evident that there is some eternal and unmoved 
substance separated from the sensibles (Met. Λ 1073a3-5)”, and Aristotle is willing to 
describe this in deliberately Platonic terms as “something separated and itself-by-itself” 
(Met. Λ 1075a12-13)”…[and so we see that] Aristotle’s general concern is not to avoid 
separation, but to avoid applying to divine, immaterial substances predicates which are 
in fact applicable only to things bound up with matter.  Aristotle frequently charges the 
Platonists with improperly assimilating incorruptible things to corruptible things378”  
 
and I generally suggest that A.N. Whitehead draws the correct conclusion regarding the 
carefulness of Aristotle’s approach to “God”, as follows: “…in his consideration of this 
metaphysical question [Aristotle] was entirely dispassionate; and he is the last European 
metaphysician of first-rate importance for whom this claim can be made…It may be 
doubted whether any properly general metaphysics can ever, without the illicit 
introduction of other considerations, get much further than Aristotle379”. 
 On the basis, then, that Aristotle identifies the problem of human limitedness in 
respect to how he sees or, rather, infers “God” let us now move on to consider that 
Aristotle’s basic position on the “divine” is that we possess a human power of 
reflexivity which runs parallel with a pregnancy of purpose that we find in nature itself.  
As regards the significance of this situation I suggest that these possibilities and this 
relationship between these possibilities enable us to see the structuring and 
                                                 
378 Menn, Stephen “Aristotle and Plato on God as Nous and as the Good” in Review of 
Metaphysics (1992) p 563 (cf. “…they [the Platonists] say there is a man-in-himself and a 
horse-in-itself and a health-in-itself, with no further qualification – a procedure like that of the 
people who said there are gods, but in human form.  For they were positing nothing but eternal 
men, nor are they making the Forms anything other than eternal sensible things (Met. B 997b8-
12)”)  
 




purposiveness of the world itself which Aristotle considers “divine”.   In more detail, 
we see that Aristotle argues regarding this possibility for opportunity generally that: 
 
“…opportunity and moderation (τὸν καιρὸν ἢ τὸ μέτριον), do not fall within the 
province of a single science to study, but different sorts of opportunity and of 
moderation are studied by different sciences, for instance opportunity and moderation in 
respect of food are studied by medicine and gymnastics, in respect of military 
operations by strategies, and similarly in respect of another pursuit by another science; 
so that it can hardly be the case that the Absolute Good is the subject of only one 
science (E.E. I 1217b38-1218a1)” 
 
and in respect to the relationship between “opportunity” and “God” we find that 
Aristotle argues that: 
 
 “…opportunity belongs to God, but the right time does not, because nothing is 
convenient to God (θεῷ γὰρ καιρὸς μὲν ἔστι, χρόνος δ' οὐκ ἔστι δέων διὰ τὸ μηδὲν εἶναι 
θεῴ ὠφέλιμον) (Pr. An. I 48b37-38)” 
 
which suggests to us that we see and use the pregnancy of purpose in nature which is 
made possible by “God” but which is not necessarily supervised by him.   
We find, however, that Aristotle also finds this divine possibility as operating 
within us, as follows: 
 
“…this is what we are investigating – what is the starting-point of motion in the [soul]?  
The answer then is clear: as in the universe, so there, everything is moved by God; for 
in a manner the divine element in us is the cause of all our motions (κινεῖ γάρ πως 
πάντα τὸ ἐν ἡμῖν θεῖον).  And the starting-point of reason is not reason but something 
superior to reason (λόγου δ᾽ ἀρχὴ οὐ λόγος, ἀλλά τι κρεῖττον).  What, then, could be 
superior even to knowledge and to intellect, except God (τί οὖν ἂν κρεῖττον καὶ 
ἐπιστήμης εἴη καὶ νοῦ πλὴν θεός)?  Not goodness, for goodness is an instrument of the 
mind (ἡ γὰρ ἀρετὴ τοῦ νοῦ ὄργανον); and owing to this, as I was saying some time ago, 
those are called fortunate who although irrational succeed in whatever they start on.  
And it does not pay them to deliberate, for they have within them a principle of a kind 
that is better than mind and deliberation (whereas the others have reason but have not 
this)…It is clear, then, that there are two kinds of good fortune – one divine, owing to 
which the fortunate man’s success is thought to be due to the aid of God (ὁ εὐτυχὴς διὰ 
θεὸν), and this is the man who is successful in accordance with his impulse (κατὰ τὴν 
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ὁρμὴν), while the other is he who succeeds against his impulse.  Both persons are 
irrational.  The former is more continuous good fortune, the latter is not continuous 
(E.E. VIII 1248a25-1248b8)” 
 
from which we see that “logos” is regarded as a corrective faculty which will bring us 
back into line with the “goodness” of nature in lieu of “God” itself and is necessary if a 
person does not happen to possess divinely-inspired “luck” and, perhaps, “genius”380.  I 
add that although “God” is not the same as “goodness” (or “virtue” or “aretē”), which is 
“an instrument of the mind”, it is clear that “logos” and “goodness” are derivatives of 
“God”. 
I add that we find another aspect of “God” in the “cycles” of an “unmoved 
mover” regarding which:  
 
“There is…something which is always moved with an unceasing motion, which is 
motion in a circle; and this is plain not in theory only but in fact (ἔστι τι ἀεὶ κινούμενον 
κίνησιν ἄπαυστον, αὕτη δ᾽ ἡ κύκλῳ (καὶ τοῦτο οὐ λόγῳ μόνον ἀλλ᾽ ἔργῳ δῆλον)) (Met. 
Λ 1072a21-23)”  
 
and with these “cycles” existing upon the basis of “order” regarding which: “The chief 
forms of beauty [are] order (τάξις) and symmetry (συμμετρία) and definiteness (τὸ 
ὡρισμένον) (Met. M 1078a36-1078b1)”381 and upon the basis of “continuity” regarding 
which: ““Continuous” means that whose motion is essentially one, and cannot be 
otherwise; and motion is one when it is indivisible, i.e. indivisible in time (συνεχὲς δὲ 
λέγεται οὗ κίνησις μία καθ᾽ αὑτὸ καὶ μὴ οἷόν τε ἄλλως: μία δ᾽ οὗ ἀδιαίρετος, ἀδιαίρετος 
δὲ κατὰ χρόνον) (Met. Δ 1016a5-7)”.  We therefore see in outline regarding “God” that 
he is unknowable by us even if his “goodness”, “logos”, “cycles”, and “order” are 
knowable by us.  
 As regards “God’s” unknowability we can add that he is brute “actuality” or 
“energeia” in the sense that:  
                                                 
380 On the subject of fortune see Friedemann Buddensiek’s “Does Good Fortune Matter? 
Eudemian Ethics VIII.2 on Eutuchia” in Fiona Leigh (ed.) The Eudemian Ethics on the 
Voluntary, Friendship, and Luck (Leiden, 2012) and Monte Ransome Johnson’s “Luck in 
Aristotle’s Physics and Ethics” in Devin Henry & Karen Margrethe Neilsen (eds.) Bridging the 
Gap between Aristotle’s Science and Ethics (Cambridge, 2015). 
 
381 Cf. “…how is there to be order unless there is something eternal and independent and 





“…the actuality of thought is life, and God is that actuality (ἡ γὰρ νοῦ ἐνέργεια ζωή, 
ἐκεῖνος δὲ ἡ ἐνέργεια) (Met. Λ 1072b28)” 
 
and he is unknowable as the origin of our thought and life is also unknowable.  I add on 
this theme that Aristotle suggests elsewhere that we are in a relation with “God” (and 
also “nous”) which is analogous to our relationship with the light of the sun which is 
utterly alien to us in its nature but which enables us to see and live, as follows:  
 
“…the cause of a man (ἀνθρώπου αἴτιον) is (i) his elements: fire and earth as matter, 
and the particular form (τά τε στοιχεῖα, πῦρ καὶ γῆ ὡς ὕλη καὶ τὸ ἴδιον εἶδος); (ii) some 
external formal cause, viz. his father (καὶ ἔτι τι ἄλλο ἔξω οἷον ὁ πατήρ); and besides 
these (iii) the sun and the ecliptic, which are neither matter nor form nor privation nor 
identical in form with him, but cause motion (καὶ παρὰ ταῦτα ὁ ἥλιος καὶ ὁ λοξὸς 
κύκλος, οὔτε ὕλη ὄντα οὔτ᾽ εἶδος οὔτε στέρησις οὔτε ὁμοειδὲς ἀλλὰ κινοῦντα) (Met. Λ 
1071a14-18)”. 
 
and I suggest that Aristotle’s emphasis here is that there are a wide range of 
fundamentals of nature which we cannot see but which enable us to live.   
In other words, then, I suggest that we see that Aristotle suggests that our world 
is simply a suspended reality in the sense that:  
 
“…we must observe that neither the matter nor the form comes to be – i.e. the 
proximate matter and form.  For everything that changes is something and is changed 
by something and into something (πᾶν γὰρ μεταβάλλει τὶ καὶ ὑπό τινος καὶ εἴς τι).  That 
by which it is changed is the primary mover; that which is changed, the matter; that into 
which it is changed, the form (ὑφ᾽ οὗ μέν, τοῦ πρώτου κινοῦντος: ὃ δέ, ἡ ὕλη: εἰς ὃ δέ, 
τὸ εἶδος) (Met. Λ 1069b35-1070a2)”  
 
and with examples of the cyclical nature of “life” being that: 
 
“…the seed comes from other indivdiuals which are prior and complete, and the first 
thing is not seed but the complete being, e.g. we must say that before there is a seed 
there is a man – not the man produced from the seed, but from another from whom the 
seed comes (τὸ γὰρ σπέρμα ἐξ ἑτέρων ἐστὶ προτέρων τελείων, καὶ τὸ πρῶτον οὐ 
σπέρμα ἐστὶν ἀλλὰ τὸ τέλειον: οἷον πρότερον ἄνθρωπον ἂν φαίη τις εἶναι τοῦ 
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σπέρματος, οὐ τὸν ἐκ τούτου γενόμενον ἀλλ᾽ ἕτερον ἐξ οὗ τὸ σπέρμα) (Met. Λ 
1072b35-1073a3)”  
 
and also that: “For in the generations of men there is a kind of crop as in the fruits of the 
field (φορὰ γὰρ τίς ἐστιν ἐν τοῖς γένεσιν ἀνδρῶν ὥσπερ ἐν τοῖς κατὰ τὰς χώρας 
γιγνομένοις); sometimes, if the race is good, for a certain period men out of the common 
are born in it, and then it deteriorates (Rhet. II 1390b24-27)”.  
 In basic conclusion, then, we find that Aristotle refers to “God” as the source of 
“good” and of “logos”, as the “order” and “cycles” of “life”, and also as the existence of 
brute “actuality” itself, i.e. “God” is the meaning behind the structured existence we 
encounter in the world.  I add here that the consequence of this picturing of “God” is 
that Aristotle insists that just as we should seek to preserve the discreteness and 
otherness of “God” as far as we can, we should also maintain an awareness of our own 
particular being and “individuality”, as follows: 
  
“…each man wishes himself what is good (ἕκαστος δ᾽ ἑαυτῷ βούλεται τἀγαθά), while 
no one chooses to possess the whole world if he has first to become someone else 
(γενόμενος δ᾽ ἄλλος αἱρεῖται οὐδεὶς πάντ᾽ ἔχειν ἐκεῖνο τὸ γενόμενον) (for that matter, 
even now God possesses the good (ἔχει γὰρ καὶ νῦν ὁ θεὸς τἀγαθόν)); he wishes for this 
only on condition of being whatever he is (ἀλλ᾽ ὢν ὅ τι ποτ᾽ ἐστίν); and the element that 
thinks would seem to be the individual man, or to be more so than any other element in 
him (δόξειε δ᾽ ἂν τὸ νοοῦν ἕκαστος εἶναι ἢ μάλιστα) (N.E. IX 1166a19-23)”   
 
and with the human individuality which leads Aristotle to argue that we would not want 
as human beings to change places with “God” also being a critical aspect of Aristotle’s 
argument against the hypostatisation of Plato’s “third man” (and his conceptualisation 
of “God”), as follows:  
 
“The universal causes, then, of which we spoke do not exist.  For the individual is the 
source of the individuals.  For while man is the cause of man universally, there is no 
universal man (ἄνθρωπος μὲν γὰρ ἀνθρώπου καθόλου, ἀλλ᾽ οὐκ ἔστιν οὐδείς); but 
Peleus is the cause of Achilles, and your father of you (Met. Λ 1071a20-23)”  
 
from which we see that Aristotle concludes regarding “man” (a) that our ideas and 
abstractions are artificial and limited generally and in respect to “God” in particular, (b) 
that the individual person is his own human self or personality who cannot be directly 
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related to the non-human being of “God”, and (c) that we should not misrepresent and 
mutilate our own individual human being by seeking to apply the abstractions of 
idealism or of an abstract and imperfectly known “God” to it. 
I add that we not only see that “man” shows us a limited and distinct “self” but 
also that this human personality and self of man suggests a creativity in nature which is 
suggestive of the existence of “the divine” in nature and that our composite nature 
shows us (through our struggle) “the divine” in the sense that:  
 
“…we must not follow those who advise us, being men, to think of human things, and, 
being mortal, of mortal things, but must so far as we can, make ourselves immortal, and 
strain every nerve to live in accordance with the best thing in us (ἀλλ᾽ ἐφ᾽ ὅσον 
ἐνδέχεται ἀθανατίζειν καὶ πάντα ποιεῖν πρὸς τὸ ζῆν κατὰ τὸ κράτιστον τῶν ἐν αὑτῷ); 
for even if it is small in bulk, much more does it in power and worth surpass everything.  
This would seem, too, to be each man himself, since it is the authoritative and better 
part of him (δόξειε δ᾽ ἂν καὶ εἶναι ἕκαστος τοῦτο, εἴπερ τὸ κύριον καὶ ἄμεινον).  It 
would be strange, then, if he were to choose not the life of his self but that of something 
else (ἄτοπον οὖν γίνοιτ᾽ ἄν, εἰ μὴ τὸν αὑτοῦ βίον αἱροῖτο ἀλλά τινος ἄλλου) (N.E. X 
1177b31-1178a3)” 
 
which properly emphasises the “divine” importance of our human individuality, 
personality, creativity, and of our “desire to know” which may not be significant in 
cosmic terms but which are significant because they define us as people and give us our 
meaning.  I suggest that this meaningfulness of “personhood” and of “personality” is 
expressed well (from a religious perspective) by Nicolas Berdyaev, as follows:  
 
“…personality is the coming into being of the future, it consists of creative acts.  
Objectivisation is impartiality, the ejection of man into the world of determinism.  The 
existence of personality presupposes freedom.  The mystery of freedom is the mystery 
of personality.  And this freedom is not freedom of the will in the elementary sense, 
freedom of choice, which presupposes rationalisation.  The worth of man is the 
personality within him.  Human worth consists solely in personality.  Human worth is 
liberation from slavery, liberation also from the servile understanding of religious life 
and of the relation between man and God.  God is the guarantee of the freedom of 
personality from the enslaving power of nature and society, of the Kingdom of Caesar 
and of the object world382”. 
                                                 




and that Jonathan Beere explains well our final human situation from an Aristotelian 
perspective as being that: “…our own activity of thinking gives us an inkling of what 
god does.  God’s activity counts as thinking in that we understand god’s activity, to the 
extent that we understand it at all, in the following way: starting with human thinking, 
or at least a certain view of it, we solve certain problems and clarify certain confusions 
to arrive at a clearer view of god’s activity383” and gives us a useful conclusion that: 
“One should not think that god has turned out to be a rather anemic god, but that 
supreme goodness has turned out to be an extreme of simplicity and activity that is 
incompatible with the complex albeit orderly goodness familiar in the sublunary 
realm384.”  In short, then, for Aristotle we are not and can not aspire to be “God” but we 
can see that good, order, and meaningfulness infuse our world even if we only see this 
“divine” aspect of reality derivatively385.  
Now, if Aristotle’s position is, as above, that we can infer “God” through the 
“good”, “order”, “cycles”, and “personality” that we find in the world and by inference 
from the basic existence of a dynamic and ordered “actuality” that: “…if besides 
sensible things (παρὰ τὰ αἰσθητὰ) no others exist, there will be no first principle, no 
order, no becoming, no heavenly bodies (οὐκ ἔσται ἀρχὴ καὶ τάξις καὶ γένεσις καὶ τὰ 
οὐράνια) (Met. Λ 1075b25-26)” we also find that Aristotle does not altogether dismiss 
the positive value of the traditional Greek myths but does rather explain them 
historiographically, as follows: 
 
“A tradition has been handed down by the ancient thinkers of very early times, and 
bequeathed to posterity in the form of a myth, to the effect that these heavenly bodies 
are gods, and that the Divine pervades the whole of nature (περιέχει τὸ θεῖον τὴν ὅλην 
                                                 
383 Beere, Jonathan “Thinking Thinking Thinking: On God’s Self-thinking in Aristotle’s 
Metaphysics Λ.9” (online, 2010) p 27 
  
384 Beere, Jonathan Ibid. p 29-30.  Beere adds regarding God’s “nous” that: “God’s thinking can 
serve as a determinate content in a way that ordinary thinking cannot, because god’s thinking is 
not a relationship between god and something further (Ibid. p 29)” 
 
385 I note that Aristotle does suggest that we have something of the “divine” in us on the basis 
of: “…the divine element (θεῖον) which thought (ὁ νοῦς) seems to contain (Met. Λ 1072b23)” 
and regarding other animals he contends that: “…a horse is not happy, nor is a bird nor a fish 
nor any other existing thing whose designation does not indicate that it possesses in its nature a 
share of something divine (ὃ μὴ κατὰ τὴν ἐπωνυμίαν ἐν τῇ φύσει μετέχει θείου τινός), but it is 
by some other mode of participating in things good that one of them has a better life and another 
a worse (E.E. I 1217a26-29)” 
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φύσιν).  The rest of their tradition has been added later in mythological form to 
influence the vulgar and as a constitutional and utilitarian expedient (πρὸς τὴν εἰς τοὺς 
νόμους καὶ τὸ συμφέρον χρῆσιν); they say that these gods are human in shape or are 
like certain other animals, and make other statements consequent upon and similar to 
those which we have mentioned.  Now if we separate these statements and accept only 
the first, that they supposed the primary substances to be gods, we must regard it as an 
inspired saying; and reflect that whereas every art and philosophy has probably been 
repeatedly developed to the utmost and has perished again, these beliefs of theirs have 
been preserved as a relic of former knowledge.  To this extent only, then, are the views 
of our forefathers and of the earliest thinkers intelligible to us (Met. Λ 1074b1-14)” 
 
and (having argued that “myths” are a vulgarisation of a perennial philosophy) Aristotle 
traces philosophy back to “wonder”, as follows: 
 
“All [people] begin, as we have said, by wondering that things should be as they are, 
e.g. in regard to marionettes, or the solstices, or the incommensurability of the diagonal 
of a square; because it seems wonderful to everyone who has not yet perceived the 
cause that a thing should not be measurable by the smallest unit (Met. A 983a13-17)” 
 
and also back to “myths” which are the natural expression of this “wonder”, as follows: 
“…the myth-lover is in a sense a philosopher, since myths are composed of wonders 
(διὸ καὶ ὁ φιλόμυθος φιλόσοφός πώς ἐστιν: ὁ γὰρ μῦθος σύγκειται ἐκ θαυμασίων) (Met. 
A 982b18-19)”.   I comment that we are reasonably brought back through these 
historical considerations to Aristotle’s own basic position that: “All men (πάντες 
ἄνθρωποι) by nature (φύσει) desire (ὀρέγονται) to know (τοῦ εἰδέναι) (Met. A 980a22)” 
and also that Aristotle also suggests that “dialectic” and the parsing of opinions is 
another preliminary for his form of mature philosophy. 
 In tracking Aristotle’s thoughts on “God” backwards we find that Aristotle also 
sees value in Socrates’ “daemon” (and we began our discussion on “God” with 
Aristotle’s thought that: “…nature is δαιμονíα [supra human], though not itself divine (ἡ 
γὰρ φὺσἱς δαιμονíα, αλλ' οὐ θεíα)”), as follows: 
 
“…the daimonion is nothing else than a god or the work of a god; but he who thinks it 
to be the work of a god necessarily believe that gods exists (τὸ δαιμόνιόν οὐδέν ἐστιν 
ἀλλ' ἢ θεὸς ἢ θεοῦ ἔργον· καίτοι ὅστις οἴεται θεοῦ ἔργον εἶναι) (Rhet. II 1398a15-17)”    
 
and that Aristotle defends Socrates and, interestingly, attacks Plato, as follows: 
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“…as Aristippus, when in his opinion Plato had expressed himself too presumptuously, 
said, “Our friend at any rate never spoke like that,” referring to Socrates…[and] in the 
Socrates of Theodectes: “What holy place has he profaned?  Which of the gods 
recognised by the city has he neglected to honour?” (Rhet. II 1398b29-31 & 1399a8-
10)”  
 
and that Aristotle defends the truthful man on a Socratic basis, as follows: 
 
“…a priestess refused to allow her son to speak in public; “For if,” said she, “you say 
what is just, men will hate you; if you say what is unjust, the gods will.”  On the other 
hand, “you should speak in public; for if you say what is just, the gods will love you, if 
you say what is unjust, men will” (Rhet. II 1399a21-25)” 
 
which leads us to see (a) that Aristotle sees value in Socrates’ thought that we each have 
a spirit or conscience (as well as “thought”) which is peculiar to us and is in some way 
representable as being “divine” (b) that Aristotle sees value in his formal (pagan) 
religion  which serves to sanctify a locality and to bind a society together and (c) that 
both “God” and “man” are in some sense actors in an entangled world and it is hence 
that Aristotle adds that: “…if not even the gods (οἱ θεοὶ) know everything, hardly can 
men (Rhet. II 1397b13)”386.   
I add that we have already seen (as throughout) that Aristotle is temperamentally 
ill-disposed to Plato’s idealism and we do rather find that he is better disposed to 
Heraclitus’ everyday realism, as follows:  
 
“There is a story which tells us how some visitors once wished to meet Heraclitus, and 
when they entered and saw him in the kitchen, warming himself at the stove, they 
hestitated; but Heraclitus said, “Come in; don’t be afraid; there are gods even here” (PA 
I 645a19-24)” 
 
from which I ultimately conclude that Aristotle’s “God” is grounded in being and is 
inferred from our structured observation of everyday lived being through philosophy.   I 
suggest further that Aristotle’s thinking on “God” and “man” is best explained through 
the maxim of Leibniz that “one draws back to leap higher”, i.e. man can “see” the unity 
                                                 
386 Cf. “…even God and the good man are capable of doing bad deeds (Top. IV 126a34-5)” 
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provided by God only because his character is so conflicted that he is required to leap so 
much higher.   
My own view on “God” accepts the scepticism of Joseph de Maistre that:  
 
“I have read millions of witticisms about the ignorance of the ancients who saw spirits 
everywhere: it seems to me that we are much more foolish in never seeing them 
anywhere.  They never stop talking about physical causes, but what is a physical 
cause?387”  
 
and finds good sense in Aristotle’s approach to “the divine” which is both limited and 
thorough in its thought that “the divine” simply “pervades the whole of nature”.   I 
argue that by removing “God” and its balance and force we run into the temptation to 
set ourselves up as “God” and / or to lose sight of the balance that we find expressed by 
the world (however we seek to explain it).  I also argue that an Aristotelian “God” 
avoids the terrible literalness and puritanism that we find exhibited in both biological 
creationists and also in “Dawkinists” and that it shows us that the pretention of literal 
purity and certainty relies upon such “straw man” arguments as that which de Maistre 
exposes as follows: “Who has ever maintained that there was a need for syllogisms to 
smelt metals, to crystallise salts or to shatter blocks?388”.   
Ultimately, I suggest that all real philosophers and, probably, all reflective 
scientists have understood the limitedness of science and hence the limitedness of the 
philosophy (or sophism) which claims to base itself upon the idea that “science” is all-
encompassing truth.  On this last point I believe that we can to some extent at least 
reverse Werner Heisenberg’s assessment (certainly in Heisenberg’s case) that: “…we 
may be certain that that final and purest clarity, which is the aim of science, was entirely 
familiar to Goethe the poet389”.  I conclude that Aristotle’s philosophical architectonic is 
a reasonable and thorough assessment of reality in the sense that it is ambitious and 
expansive and also knows its own limits and insists upon keeping them in mind.  The 
desire to dispense with structures and limits may, conversely, seem to be modest but it 
                                                 
387 Maistre, Joseph de An Examination of the Philosophy of Bacon (Montreal, [orig. 1836] 1998) 
p xviii 
 
388 Maistre, Joseph de Ibid.  p 18 
 
389 Heisenberg, Werner “Goethe and Newton on Colour” in Philosophical Problems of Modern 
Physics (Woodbridge, [orig. 1941] 1979) p 76 
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has, rather, the contrary tendency to be confused and grasping.  I therefore commend 




















































Glossary of Greek Terms 
 
Detail of some core Greek terms employed by Aristotle.  Most definitions are extracted 
from Liddell & Scott, with a few notes from Martin Heidegger [MH].  More detail on 
how Aristotle uses these terms will be found in the main text – below are only brief, 
indicative outlines of these complex philosophically-employed terms. 
 
ἀγχίνοια (agchinoia) - quick wit, readiness of mind 
αἴσθησις (aisthēsis) – perception by the senses; common name of the senses – touch, 
hearing, sight, taste, smell; also ἀναισθεσία – insensibility to pleasure or pain   
αἰτία (aitia) – cause; [orig.] a charge, accusation; see also συναίτιος (joint cause) 
αἰὼν (aiōn) – period of existence, lifetime; era, epoch of time 
ἀκμή (akmē) – the highest point of anything; the bloom, flower, prime of a man’s age 
ακρασία (akrasia) – incontinence, lack of guiding principle 
ἀληθεία (alētheia) – truth, reality, as opposed to appearance, MH “revealing the order at the 
start” – see also οὐσία and ἀρχή 
ἁμαρτία (harmatia) – a failure, fault, sin; from ἁμαρτάνω – to miss, miss the mark 
ἀναλογία (analogia) – proportion, analogy 
ἀνάλῠσις (analusis) – a loosening, a breaking down something along the lines of its 
meaning; often contrasted with σύνθεσις (“seeing together”) 
ἀνομοιομερῶν (anomoiomerōn) – “non-uniform” parts of the body viz. face, hand, foot; 
contrasted with ὁμοιομερῶν (“uniform parts”) such as such as flesh, bone, blood etc. 
ἀόριστος (aoristos) – without boundaries, undefined, indefinite; often contrasted with 
ὡρισμένον (determinateness, boundedness) 
ἀπόδειξις (apodeixis) – proof, demonstration; setting forth, showing forth, exposition 
ἄπορία (aporia) – difficulty of passing, perplexity; also ἄπορος without passing 
ἀρετή (aretē) – excellence (of all οὐσίαι), virtue (of man) 
ἀρχή (archē) – a beginning, origin, first cause, the cause of change and the principle of 
something being something such and behaving so; also power, sovereignty, dominion; also 
ἄρχων – ruler, commander and see also υπάρχω (spring up) 
ἀρχιτέκτονος (architektonos) – master-craftsman; guiding artist who understands his 
materials (as a scientist understands his field of investigation); also ἀρχιτεκτονική (master 
artistry) 
ἁφή (haphē) – a touch, contact, touching, the physical contact between two different 
objects, the animal sense or sensation of physical contact 
βίος (bios) – life in a specifically human life (animal life in general uses ζωή (zōē)); a 
course of life, manner of living; a living, livelihood 
βούλευσις (bouleusis) – deliberation about worldly affairs; often contrasted in its various 
forms with the various forms of ἐπιστήμη (scientific knowledge) 
βούλησις (boulēsis) – willing, will, wish; a form of ὄρεξις (appetite) 
γένος (genos) – race, stock, family; a class sort kind; an abstract grouping which covers but 
does not directly refer to species, e.g. animal to pig; see also εἶδος (form) 
γνώμη (gnomē) – understanding, a means of knowing, mind, thought, judgement, 
intelligence; see also διάνοια (intelligence) and νοῦς (intuition) 
δεινότης (deinotēs) – terribleness, cleverness 
διάθεσις (diathesis) – a disposition, arrangement, bodily disposition; see also ἕξις (ethical 
state) and πάθος (emotion) 
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διάνοια (dianoia) - thought, intellect, intelligence; see also γνώμη (understanding) and 
νοῦς (intuition) 
δύναμις (dunamis) – power, potentiality, faculty; often compared with ἐνέργεια (activity) 
ἔθος /  (ethos) – an accustomed place, a custom, mores; also ἠθικός ἠθικός – of or for 
morals, and τὰ ἠθικά – a treatise on morals; see also ἕξις (having, possession) 
ἔθνος (ethnos) – a number of people accustomed to live together; flocks; a nation, people, 
tribe 
εἶναι (einai) – to be, to exist; also τὸ ὄν – Being; and τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι – essence, that which 
enables a thing come to be what it becomes 
ἓκαστος (hekastos) – particular; every, every one, each, each one; see also ἕτερος (heteros) 
ἐμπειρία (empeiria) – experience, experience in or acquaintance with something; see also 
πεῖρα (trial) 
ἐν (hen) – one, a unity; of the state, condition, position, in which one is; often compared 
with πολλαχῶς (manifold) 
ἐνδέχεται (endechetai) – admitting of being or of not being 
ἐνέργεια (energeia) – actuality, activity; work; derived from ἔργον (work), often compared 
with δύναμις (power) 
ἐντελέχεια (entelecheia) – entelechy, goal pointing principle (of specific type of οὐσία); 
often used with but distinguished from ἐνέργεια (activity) 
ἕξις (hexis) – a having, possession; an ethical state, esp. a good habit; see also ἧθος 
(custom), and also διάθεσις (disposition) and πάθος (emotion) 
ἔξωθεν (exōthen) – from outside 
ἐπαγωγή (epagōgē) – induction, knowing the world through the process of reasoning from 
particulars to other particulars and also to universals (i.e. to what is καθόλου)   
ἐπαμφοτερίζειν (epamphoterizein) – to admit a double sense, to “dualise” 
ἐπιθυμία (epithumia) – desire, longing; a form of ὄρεξις (appetite) 
ἐπιστήμη (epistēmē) – knowledge, scientific knowledge; knowledge of the “why” as well 
as the “what”; understanding of the principles of some subject matter, a coming to a 
resolution, point of standing-still (eph-istemai); often contrasted in its various forms with the 
various forms of βούλευσις (human deliberation) 
ἔργον (ergon) – work, function of something; activity, MH “the manner of presencing” 
ἔσχατον (eschaton) – most extreme example, point, instance of a phenomenon 
ἕτερος (heteros) – the other, one of two; see also ἓκαστος (each one) 
εὐδαιμονία (eudaimonia) – happiness, good fortune, having a beneficial δαίμων 
ἡγούμενον (hēgoumenon) – ruling part, governing principle; see also ἀρχή (origin) 
ἡδονή (hedonē) – pleasure 
ἦθος (ēthos) – see ἔθος 
θυμός (thumos) – passion, spirit, courage, seat of self; a form of ὄρεξις (appetite) 
θύραθεν (thurathen) – from outside, from outside the door 
ἴδιος (idios) – ones’ own, pertaining to oneself, peculiar, property 
καθόλου (katholou) – on the whole; “universal” in the sense of being what the human mind 
can grasp about the forms of the world through particulars by means of ἐπαγωγή 
(induction) 
καιρός (kairos) – due measure, proportion, fitness; the right point in time, the proper time 
or season of action, the exact or critical time 
κάλος (kalos) – beautiful, fine, noble 
κατηγορία (katēgoria) – category; [orig.] accusation, charge [in a lawcourt] 
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κίνησις (kinēsis) – movement, motion 
κοινός (koinos) – common, shared in common, common to or with another 
κοινωνία (koinōnia) – community, partnership, fellowship 
κόσμος (kosmos) – the world universe; the perfect order of being; good behaviour, decency; 
compared with τάξις (particulate order) 
κρασις (krasis) – blending, compounding, combination 
κράτος (kratos) - governing power over something 
κύκλος (kuklos) – ring, circle, round; any circular motion, an orbit of the heavenly bodies, 
revolution of the seasons, cycle of events 
κύριος (kurios) – authoritative, dominant, decisive (power, principle, or person) 
λόγος (logos) – the word or that by which the inward thought is expressed; ratio 
μέθοδος (methodos) – method, inquiry as a path to nature 
μέσος (mesos, to meson) – the middle, moderate, mediating 
μεταβολή (metabolē) – a change, changing, transition (e.g. conversion of food in the 
metabolic process) 
μέτριος (metrios) – moderate, holding to the mean; temperate; proportionate, fitting 
μέτρον (metron) – a measure or rule, that by which anything is measured; measure, length, 
size 
μίμησις (mimēsis) – imitation, representation by means of art 
μιξις (mixis) – mixing, mingling; intercourse with others (compare with κρασις (blending)) 
μοῖρα (moira) – human fate, destiny 
μορφή (morphē) – form, shape, figure 
μόριον (morion) – part, a part of a ὅλος (whole) 
μῦθος (muthos) – anything delivered by word of mouth; a tale, story, narrative, fable 
νομός (nomos) – anything assigned, a usage, custom, law, ordinance; often contrasted with 
φύσις (nature); also νόμισμα (money) anything sanctioned by custom, usage, institution  
νοῦς (nous) – intuition; mental perception; natural reason; see also ἀγχίνοια (quickness of 
wit), διάνοια (intelligence), and γνώμη (understanding) 
οἰκεῖος (oikeios) – [orig.] of the house; proper, fitting, suitable for a thing and private to it; 
conformable to the nature of a thing; also ἴδιος (idios) – one’s own, pertaining to oneself; 
private, personal 
ὅλος (holos) – whole, a whole; often used with μόριον (part) 
ὁμοιομερῶν (homoiomerōn) – “uniform parts” of the body such as flesh, bone, blood 
etc.; contrasted with ἀνομοιομερῶν (“non-uniform” parts) of the body such as face, hand, 
foot etc. 
ὄρεξις (orexis) – appetite, appetition of three types:  ἐπιθυμία, θυμός and βούλησις 
ὁρισμός (horismos) – marking out by boundaries, limitation; the definition of a word 
ὁρμή (hormē) – violent movement onward, impulse, the first stir or start in a thing 
ὅρος (horos) – boundary, landmark, limit; see also πέρᾰς (limit) and ἔσχατον (final 
instance) 
οὗ ἕνεκα (hou heneka) – that for the sake of which; the final cause; see also τέλος (end) 
and ἀρχή (origin) 
οὐσία (ousia) – that which is one’s own, one’s substance or property or belongings; the 
being, essence, nature of a thing; MH “presencing, unconcealedness” – see also ἀληθεία 
(truth, revealedness) 
πάθος (pathos) a passive characteristic of something; an emotion; a passive state or 
condition; the incidents or changes to which a thing is liable; often contrasted with ἕξις 
(habit) 
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παρρησία (parrēsia) freespokenness, openness, frankness, truth-telling 
πεῖρα (peira) - trial, attempt, essay, experiment; see also ἐμπειρία (experiment) 
πέρᾰς (peras) – an end, limit, boundary; see also ὃρος (limit) 
περιέχων (periechōn) – that which surrounds something (the “form”, for e.g., surrounds the 
“matter”) 
πνεῦμα (pneuma) – breeze, influence, breath, that which is breathed forth, spirit 
ποίησις (poiēsis) – a making, fabrication, creation production; a passive suffering; often 
contrasted with πραξις (action) 
πόλις (polis) – city, republic, body of citizens; also πολιτεία – the condition and rights of a 
citizen, citizenship 
πολιτεία (politeia) – the condition or constitution of a state; the body of citizens; civic life, 
the rights of a citizen; citizenship, rights of a citizen (civitas). 
πολλαχῶς (pollachōs) – the manifold, the manifoldness of being 
πραξις (praxis) – an action, act, doing; also πρᾶγμα (pragma) an action which has been 
done, an actualised thing; often contrasted with ποίησις (poiēsis)  
προαίρεσις (prohairesis) – a choosing one thing before another, a deliberate choice, a 
resolution; a principle of action, a commitment to something 
πρότερος (proteros) – prior; before, former, sooner; contrasted with ὔστερος (posterior) 
σημεῖον (sēmeion) – sign, mark, token; a sign from the gods, an omen; a sign or signal; a 
sign or proof 
σοφία (sophia) – intellectually guided wisdom; intuitive wisdom combined with knowledge 
which enables true thinking and φῐλο-σοφία – the systematic treatment of a subject and 
proper investigation of truth and nature; often compared with φρόνησις (practical wisdom) 
σπέρμα (sperma) – seed, origin 
σπουδαῖος (spoudaios) – term used to specifically reference a good man as opposed to 
general terms such as κάλος (fine) and ἀγαθος (good)   
στέρησις (sterēsis) – privation, deprivation 
συμβεβηκὸς (sumbebēkos) – a chance event, accident, contingency 
συμβολή (sumbolē) – a coming together, a contract 
συμμετρία (summetria) – commensurability; symmetry, due proportion 
συναίτιος (sunaitios) – being the cause of a thing jointly with another 
σύνεσις (sunesis) – judgement, a coming-together, union; quick comprehension, mother-
wit, intelligence 
συνεχής (sunechēs) – continuous, continuous with or contiguous to, in a line with (in 
space), continuous, unintermitting (in time); constant, persevering (in persons), holding 
together 
σύνθεσις (sunthesis) – a seeing together, combination; often contrasted with ἀνάλῠσις 
(analusis) 
σύνθετον (suntheton) – composite, complex thing; also σύνολον (sunolon) a whole which 
is a composite 
συνωνῠμία (sunōnumia) – synonym, “focal reference” 
σχῆμα (schēma) – form, shape 
σῴζω (sōzō) – preserve; to keep, observe, maintain laws 
σῶμα (sōma) – the living body 
σωρός (sōros) – heap; often contrasted with ὅλος (whole) 
σωτηρία (sōteria) – saving, deliverance, preseravation, safety 
τάξις (taxis) – order; an arranging, order of battle, the order or disposition of an army; 
compared with κόσμος (cosmic order) 
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τέλος (telos) – the fulfilment or completion of anything; also τελευτή (finishing, 
completion) 
τέχνη (technē) – art, skill; an art, i.e. a system or method of making or doing; often 
contrasted with ἐπιστήμη (scientific understanding)  
τόδε τι (tode ti) – the this itself, a defined individual “this” 
τόπος (topos) – place; a place, occasion, opportunity; subject topic; see also χώρα (chōra) 
τύχη (tuchē) – chance 
ὕλη (hulē) – a wood, forest, woodland; firewood, fuel; matter (or “energy”); a subject 
matter 
ὑποκειμένον (hupokeimenon) – substratum; that which lies present as enformed or 
enformable matter 
ὕστερος (husteros) – posterior; following, coming after; contrasted with πρότερος (prior) 
ὑπάρχω (huparchō) – (from ἀρχή) to begin, make a beginning, to begin to be, come into 
being, arise, spring up – MH “presencing which rules from what already lies present”; also 
ὑπαρχή (beginning) and ὕπαρχος (commanding under another, a lieutenant) 
φαντασία (phantasia) – imagination, the power by which an object is presented 
φάντασμα (phantasma) – image, appearance of something 
φρόνησις (phronēsis) – practical wisdom, prudence; the ability to manage one’s affairs and 
to act effectively and well in the world; often compared with σοφία (intellectual wisdom) 
φυλακτικός (phulaktikos) – preservative, vigilant, observant 
φύσις (phusis) – the nature, natural qualities, powers, constitution, condition, of a person or 
thing; from φυω – to bring forth, put forth leaves, etc.; often contrasted with νομός (human 
law, convention) 
χαός (chaos) – chaos 
χώρα (chōra) – the space in which a thing is; a land, country; one’s place in life; see also 
τόπος (place) 
χωριστός (chōristos) – separate or separable in thought 
ψῡχή (psuchē) – soul; informing essence of something 
ὡρισμένον (hōrismenon) – boundedness; something which has a boundary, is determinate; 
a bounded and determined something; often contrasted with ἀόριστος (indefinite) 
ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ (hōs epi to polu) – to tend for the most part, things which happen for the 
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